Conditionally accepted at AJS

The Three Worlds of Inequality

Kim A. Weeden

Cornell University

David B. Grusky

Stanford University

January 30, 2012

word count including abstract, methodological appendix, and references: 14,716

Abstract

Recent inequality scholarship fixates on trends in the amount of inequality and largely ignores trends in the form of inequality. We describe three ideal-typical inequality regimes (big-class, micro-class, and gradational) and identify the mechanisms driving a shift toward or away from each of them. Using GSS and CPS data on 39 measures of life chances, attitudes, and behaviors, we assess which of these three forms is becoming more prominent in the United States. We find that big-class inequality is in decline while micro-class inequality has remained stable. Moreover, big classes are simplifying into largely economic aggregates, whereas micro classes remain more complicated moral configurations that cannot be understood in terms of economic standing.

As income inequality continues to rise in the United States and other late industrial countries, scholars have turned their attention to documenting and explaining trends in the *extent* of inequality. We now know much about the sources of the takeoff in income inequality (e.g., Goldin and Katz 2008), who benefited most from it (e.g., Piketty and Saez 2007), and which countries experienced it in especially extreme form (e.g., Atkinson et al. 2007). We know relatively little, however, about trends in the *form* of inequality. Was the takeoff in income inequality accompanied by the rise of a gradational inequality system in which one's life chances, lifestyles, and attitudes ("life conditions") are increasingly defined by one's position on a hierarchical gradient of income? Are we moving toward or away from a system in which one's class situation defines life conditions? Is a Durkheimian occupationalization underway?

Such questions about the form of inequality are as critical as those about the extent of inequality. If the goal is to understand the lived experience of disadvantage, it is relevant not only how much income (or education or wealth) a person has, but also whether she is equally disadvantaged on other economic and cultural dimensions of inequality. If the goal is to understand how inequality systems change and evolve, it is likewise important to know the extent to which inequality is "crystallized." In a highly crystallized system, an economic crisis might generate a resurgence of class-based rhetoric, with the sharpest vitriol leveled at a culturally homogenous upper class with distinctive and foreign lifestyles, social attitudes, and political behaviors. In a less crystallized system, by contrast, the same economic crisis might generate a more fragmented political discourse, perhaps equally contentious in its own way but with little coherence across issues and weaker "us versus them" rhetoric. Likewise, a gradational inequality regime might inhibit class-based framing of contentious issues, not because the correlations between economic and cultural dimensions are weak but because inter-class

boundaries are poorly defined.

Given the centrality of inequality to sociological inquiry, curiously little empirical evidence can be brought to bear on the form of inequality and changes therein. The empirical research that speaks to this question focuses almost exclusively on changes in the relationship between (a) class and life chances (e.g., Breen 2004, Breen and Jonsson 2008, Weeden et al. 2007, Mouw and Kalleberg 2010; Kim and Sakamoto 2008), or (b) class and political behavior (e.g., Manza and Brooks 2008; Hout and Moodie 2008; Svallfors 2006; Hechter 2004; Clark and Lipset 2001; de Graaf et al. 2001; Hout, Manza, and Brooks 1999). The latter two literatures are important, but they fall far short of providing a full assessment of the durability of class-based inequality. Moreover, these efforts often rely on cobbling together results from prior studies rather than starting afresh with uniform and defensible measures of class or uniform and defensible analytic strategies (e.g., Kingston 2000; but see Fischer and Hout 2006; Massey 2007).[1]

If our knowledge of trend in class inequality is incomplete, our knowledge of trend in other forms of inequality, and in particular the gradational form, is altogether lacking. The gradational model, which for many years was the main alternative to class models, represents the inequality space as a simple hierarchy wherein positions (usually occupations) are arrayed along a continuous gradient of income, socioeconomic status, or prestige. To the extent that this metric is associated with individual life conditions, the inequality regime can be understood as gradational. Curiously, whereas challenges to class models have been highly vocal and hotly debated, gradational models have largely disappeared from the day-to-day practice of inequality research without much fanfare (but see Hauser and Warren 1997). This disappearance seems as

[1] The inequality space is "organized in class terms" insofar as classes capture the effect of the site of production on individual-level outcomes (e.g., attitudes, behaviors, life chances). This understanding of class differs from the older, "grand narrative" tradition, where the goal was to identify the cleavages around which class interests and collective action *would likely* form, not those around which life conditions *do* form.

much due to changing political winds and the inevitable half-life of any research tradition as to any hard empirical evidence that gradationalism is declining over time. In subfields where gradational models are still used extensively (e.g., health), it seems as much due to inertia or tradition as to any empirical evidence that gradationalism within that domain remains an accurate characterization of the inequality space (see also Torssander and Erikson 2010).

If standard class models of inequality have been under attack and gradational models have faded away, what is the alternative? The emerging convention within American sociology is to carry out analyses of life chances, lifestyles, and attitudes and behaviors with individual or family measures of income, earnings, or education, with these colloquially referred to as "class measures." This practice is common not only in public opinion and political research on the (ostensible) polarization of American political and social attitudes (e.g., Dimaggio et al. 1997; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008), where links to the class-analytic tradition are relatively weak, but also in the burgeoning sociological literature on the consequences of inequality (e.g., see Lareau and Conley 2008). The loose and non-standard use of the "class" term by contemporary sociologists masks a very fundamental shift away from understanding the inequality space with models that are rooted in the division of labor. Although rarely framed as such, this shift is consistent with the assumption that positional inequalities, and in particular those based on the division of labor, are in decline.

We are left with many competing models of the inequality space and either vocal claims or tacit assumptions about their ongoing relevance, but little systematic empirical evidence on actual trend in these forms. In this paper, we begin to fill this gap by assessing the extent to which class-based and gradational forms of inequality have strengthened or weakened in the United States over the past 40 years. We focus here on positional inequalities, not because we

think individual measures of education and income are unimportant for understanding life conditions, but because positional approaches have long been a staple of sociological analysis and hence constitute an obvious starting point in examining changes in the form of inequality.

In evaluating trends in class-based inequality, we will adopt a very catholic and encompassing understanding of class. Until recently, scholars have understood classes as large, analytically defined aggregate categories ("big classes") rather than the more local, organic, and deeply institutionalized categories that emerge around occupations and become "micro-classes" (see, e.g., Grusky and Sørensen 2001).[2] We now know that big-class schemes gloss over much of the available class structure (see, e.g., Jonsson et al. 2009; Weeden and Grusky 2005a,b). For example, Weeden and Grusky (2005a, p. 201) found that only 32 percent of the total occupational variability in political party identification occurs between big classes, while the remaining 68 percent occurs between the occupations that comprise big classes. We cannot predict with much accuracy whether a randomly drawn professional is a Democrat, but we can predict with reasonable accuracy whether that same professional is a Democrat once we know whether she or he is a sociologist, engineer, or social worker. The same conclusion holds across a spate of life chances, attitudes, behaviors, lifestyles, and consumption practices (e.g., Jonsson et al. 2009; Di Carlo 2007; Liu 2008; Weeden and Grusky 2005a).[3]

This work does not, however, speak to questions of trend. Did the big-class form weaken only recently, or have big classes been relatively weak for some time? Do trends in micro-class organization differ from trends in big-class organization, or do these trends move in lockstep? To what extent, if at all, has the rise in income inequality rendered the income dimension especially

[2] We will refer to conventional class categories as big classes, reserving the generic term, "class," to refer to both the big-class and micro-class form. Likewise, we will use the terms "micro class" and "occupation" interchangeably, thereby calling attention to the class-like features of occupations (e.g., Grusky and Sørensen 2001).
[3] We use the term "outcome" for convenience, and fully acknowledge the role of selection and spurious variables in generating some of the class-outcome association.

important, perhaps transforming economic standing into the "master dimension" of the inequality space?

We will take on such questions about the evolving inequality space by couching them as a contest between three competing, ideal-typical inequality regimes or worlds. Our overarching question is simple: Which, if any, of these three worlds is ascendant and which, if any, is in decline? After describing these three worlds in the next section, we identify mechanisms that may be moving us toward one or more of these worlds, albeit in full recognition that our data are not up to the task of teasing out which of these mechanisms of change are operating. We then turn to an unabashedly descriptive analysis of trend, reflecting our belief that the task of establishing trends in the form of inequality is logically prior to the task of explaining them.

Three worlds of inequality

The inequality space may be organized in big-class, micro-class, or gradational terms, each of which is best regarded as an ideal type. As such, the question is not whether contemporary inequality aligns perfectly with one of the ideal types, but whether inequality is becoming more or less consistent with an ideal type. We will review each of these three ideal types in turn with the aim of clarifying possible pathways of change in the form of inequality.

Big-class world

In a big-class world, inequalities in life conditions are organized around such familiar sociological categories as professional, manager, service worker, craft worker, and laborer.[4] Entry into these big classes is driven in part by schooling: managers or professionals often hold an undergraduate or graduate degree, whereas craft workers often take some form of generalized

[4] Obviously, there are many varieties of big-class models, each defined by different cleavages (e.g., relationship to the means of production, position with respect to labor and commodity markets, nature of the employment contract). For our purposes, the distinctive features of all big-class formulations are that the classes are (a) few in number, (b) large in size, and (c) "analytically" defined rather than deeply institutionalized.

vocational training. These distinctive educational experiences solidify pre-existing class-based attitudes and aptitudes (for those raised in the class), and train "newcomers" into class-specific values or codes of behavior. In some cases, unions or political parties will also carry out such training, because both seek to advance their goals by bringing members into a narrative that features their class and their putative class interests. This shared training, whether by schools, unions, or political parties, generates cultural and behavioral homogeneity among big-class members.

Closed social networks further reinforce this homogeneity. In a big-class world, members of a big class marry within their class, form confidant and support networks within their class, and interact mainly with one another. These within-class ties are facilitated by class-based segregation in the education system, in neighborhoods and communities, and in the workplace. Because all but the most casual interactions are intra-class, class members are constantly exposed to class-specific beliefs and behaviors, and any deviation from those normative beliefs and behaviors may result in sanctions (e.g., Wilensky and Ladinsky 1967; in the context of political beliefs, see also de Graaf et al. 1995).

The class environment itself forges an additional layer of class-based homogeneity in attitudes, behaviors, and interests. The standard formulation here, as expressed by Bourdieu (1984, p. 104), is that "homogeneous conditions of existence impose homogeneous conditionings and produce homogeneous systems of dispositions capable of generating similar practices." This homogeneity of practice is established either because (a) the underlying opportunities, constraints, and logic of the class situation generate a characteristic set of interests (e.g., Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006); or (b) there is a "direct translation of the lessons of the job to outside-the-job realities" (Kohn 2000, p. 539). The first mechanism refers to the shared interests

that the class environment engenders (e.g., a preference for a flat tax among high-income classes), while the second mechanism refers to the effect of workplace routines and organization on extra-workplace attitudes and lifestyles (e.g., the tendency for workers in intellectual occupations to come to value intellectual leisure activities). These two types of "environmental effects," coupled with self-selection, shared training, and interactional closure, generate a world in which aggregate social classes organize a range of life conditions.

A hypothetical big-class world is graphed in Figure 1. In this figure, and in Figures 2 and 3, each marker represents an occupation, and markers with the same shape and shading belong to the same big class. The vertical axis pertains to an attitude or behavior (e.g., political conservatism) that is associated with the class situation, while the horizontal axis locates occupations in a gradational space that might be operationalized by, for example, occupational income. The tightness of the clusters in Figure 1 indicates that the occupations comprising a given big class are relatively homogenous in political conservatism. The big-class world of Figure 1 does not, however, take on a strongly hierarchical cast. Although some of the mechanisms described above might resolve to a hierarchical form (e.g., rich classes tend to vote for parties that represent the interests of the rich), big-class scholars typically insist that most of the underlying mechanisms generate more complicated patterns that are not wholly reducible to a gradational metric (e.g., Svallfors 2006; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992).

Micro-class world

In a micro-class world, the same forces of selection, training, interactional closure, interest formation, and learning generalization are at work, but they operate principally at the level of institutionalized occupations. Consider, for example, the training and education mechanism. As in a big-class regime, entry into a micro-class is driven by either formal schooling or

apprenticeship-based training, but now the feeder degrees or programs are specific to an occupation: lawyers secure a JD, doctors an OD or MD, accountants a CPA, cosmetologists a cosmetologist's degree, law enforcement officers a police academy certification, pipefitters a pipefitter's apprenticeship, and so forth. These shared educational experiences generate and solidify similar world views within occupations rather than within big classes.

The homogeneity of micro-classes is also generated by selection. Workers self-select into a particular degree or enter into a particular training program based on their understandings about which occupations are most consistent with their preexisting beliefs, lifestyles, tastes, aptitudes, and demographic attributes. Likewise, employers and other gatekeepers filter applicants based on their individual-level attributes, thus creating additional within-occupation homogeneity by matching the traits of new recruits with those of current employees.

Once in an occupation, a worker's primary and repeated interactions are with other members of that occupation, which both exposes her to their beliefs, practices, and attitudes and creates social pressures for homogenization. In an ideal-typical micro-class world, such interactional closure occurs because workplaces are organized occupationally and because residential segregation breaks on occupational lines. In practice, occupation-based residential segregation is relatively weak, but it is still present in limited form in mining towns, farm worker camps, and "faculty ghettos." Likewise, some cross-occupation interaction is inevitable in most workplaces, but it tends to take the form of particularistic affinities between specific occupations (e.g., nurses interacting with doctors) rather than more generalized interactions within the big class (e.g., nurses interacting with sociology professors).

These network processes are reinforced insofar as occupational incumbents are exposed to homogeneous environments. The occupational environment works to create occupation-specific

lifestyles (e.g., teachers tend to visit museums because of their inculcated love of learning), occupation-specific social attitudes (e.g., law enforcement officers develop a "tough on crime" stance that carries over into their attitudes on free speech), and occupation-specific economic interests (e.g., nurses oppose sunset laws that would phase out licensure). This process is further reinforced by explicit "consciousness-raising" and interest formation by intermediary organizations at the occupation level (e.g., the American Federation of Teachers, the National Cosmetology Association; see also Weeden 2002).

In a micro-class world, then, the forces of selection, training, interactional closure, learning generalization, and interest formation generate the "moral polymorphism" envisioned by Durkheim (1958, p.7). The resulting cultures and practices develop at the local level and create a patchwork of organic communities that, at best, are only loosely bound into big classes. This type of micro-class world is depicted in Figure 2, again using the example of political beliefs. Each occupation is located in the same position on the x-axis as in Figure 1, but now the various occupations constituting a big class no longer evince as much similarity in political beliefs. For example, sociologists have more left-leaning political views than economists, a difference that's likely generated by self-selection (i.e., liberals are attracted to sociology), distinctive training (i.e., sociologists are trained to favor structural or cultural accounts over individualistic ones), and interactional closure (i.e., sociologists interact with left-leaning colleagues).

Gradational world

In a gradational inequality system, the life chances, politics, and lifestyles of classes are defined by their position in a hierarchy indexed by class income or prestige. The mechanisms underlying a gradational world are very similar to those in play for our two class worlds, but now they take on a simplified form in which income or prestige considerations become the principal

levers through which these mechanisms operate. In a gradational world, for example, residential segregation is driven largely by income, meaning that incumbents of all equivalently paid classes will tend to live in the same neighborhoods. This pattern of segregation may be contrasted with a big-class world in which two equally compensated classes, such as professionals and managers, do *not* live in the same neighborhoods. We might imagine, for example, professionals clustering in "urban chic" neighborhoods (e.g., Soho) and managers clustering in manicured suburban neighborhoods (e.g., Westchester County).

In a gradational world, this simple income logic holds with respect to the other mechanisms structuring the inequality space. As in micro-class world, the occupational environment forges a shared world view and shared interests, but the most important feature of that environment is occupational income or some other unidimensional gradient. This gradationalist assumption will often have a rational-action sensibility behind it. For example, in a gradational world *all* high-income occupations might approve equally of a flat-tax proposal, given that members of these occupations accrue roughly equal tax savings under such a proposal. These rational-action calculations can develop into cultural rules of thumb and even elaborated ideologies (e.g., libertarianism) prescribing particular characteristic attitudes. An occupation may still serve as a distinct "center of moral life" (Durkheim 1958, p. 7), but the content of that moral life will develop mainly in reaction to the occupation's hierarchical standing.

In a gradational world, then, money (or prestige) matters so much that it serves as a master organizing variable in the stratification system. This formulation is obviously highly stylized and incomplete: Sociologists have long held that class-based systems cannot be entirely reduced to a hierarchy of income or prestige. Bourdieu (1984), for example, argues that the high-income occupational environment is structured by cultural as much as economic considerations. In a

related line of argument, Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002, p. 33) claim that "since the [Erikson-Goldthorpe] schema aims to capture qualitative differences in employment relations, the classes distinguished are not consistently ordered according to some inherent hierarchical principal." Although few scholars would argue for a monocausal economic account, it's nonetheless important to ask whether we are moving closer to that simple one-dimensional economic form. It's also possible, as Goldthorpe and Chan suggest (2007, also Chan and Goldthorpe 2007), that a gradational form will be prominent only in some domains, especially the lifestyle domain.

Figure 3A represents an ideal-typical gradational inequality regime in which the hierarchical position of micro-classes is strongly associated with political ideology. It's possible that gradationalism instead operates mainly at the big-class level, meaning that the relationship between occupational income and politics *within* big classes is weak (see Figure 3B). In a big-class form of gradationalism, big-classes are still well-organized but they're bestowed with a culture that's determined in large part by the economic circumstances of the class.

Which world is ascendant?

What are the forces driving shifts into or out of a big-class, micro-class, or gradational world? Although there is no shortage of narratives of change within inequality scholarship, these narratives typically don't explicitly address the mechanisms that might underlie changes in the form of inequality. We will attempt to lay out some of the core mechanisms (summarized in Figure 4) in order to formulate plausible hypotheses of trend.

Big-class trend

We first consider trend at the big-class level, where by far the most prevalent stories of change are those that predict a shift *away* from a big class world. The exemplar here is the postmodern narrative that sparked the "death-of-class" debates of the 1990s, although the

proximate sources of change featured in the postmodern account (e.g., the decline in union power) also figure prominently in other scholarly traditions (see, e.g., Pakulski and Waters 2008; Beck and Lau 2008; Hechter 2004; Clark and Lipset 2001; Hall 2001; Castells 2000; Inglehart 1997; Bradley 1996; Kumar 1995). In these narratives, the weakening of big classes ostensibly arises through three types of change: (1) a decline in the class-based ideologies of the old intermediary organizations (e.g., unions, political parties), (2) a rise in "class-orthogonal" ideologies propagated by new intermediary organizations (e.g., environmentalism), and (3) an exogenous increase in inter- and intra-generational mobility across classes.

The first of these subnarratives assumes that ideological work is needed to convert "imagined" and geographically disparate big classes into culturally coherent communities. This ideological work was once a main task of unions and working-class political parties, but these intermediary organizations either died off or redefined their strategies. Political parties, for example, abandoned class-specific platforms in favor of issue politics, weakening the one-to-one correspondence between class membership and party affiliation (e.g., Evans and Tilley 2012). At the same time, unions lost members or disbanded altogether, and those that remained typically focused more narrowly on the tangible benefits of unionization, thereby shedding their former role as purveyors of a more encompassing class ideology. In the absence of organizations that explicitly train members into a class-based worldview, big classes become purely analytic fabrications, not the deeply institutionalized communities of the past.

The second subnarrative emphasizes the emergence of new types of intermediary organizations that fracture classes into diverse communities. "New social movements," for example, organize around issues orthogonal to class (e.g., gender, ethnicity, race, climate change, environment, abortion) and because they don't package their ideology in ways that develop or

reinforce class-specific cultures, the rise of such movements fracture classes rather than unify them into coherent communities. Likewise, a highly differentiated media provides big-class members with a range of lifestyle and attitudinal options that are not directly class-linked, again with the effect of weakening big-class culture.

The third subnarrative also focuses on fracturing effects, but the source is not the emergence of new forms of organization but rising levels of intergenerational and intragenerational social mobility. By this argument, a more transient class membership not only reduces the within-class homogeneity generated by selection (a "compositional effect"), but also weakens interactional closure and the training of new entrants into a class-specific culture and world view (a "contextual effect"; see, e.g., de Graaf et al. 1995). This narrative is only relevant to trend insofar as there has indeed been an increase in big-class mobility, a condition that is hardly settled in the empirical mobility literature. In the context of the United States, data limitations preclude firm conclusions about recent trends in big-class intergenerational mobility (see Beller and Hout 2006; Grusky et al. 2010), and trend in intragenerational mobility may be rather weaker than is often assumed (see Moscarini and Thomsson 2007). Nevertheless, insofar as there has been an increase in social mobility, it will limit the formation and transmission of class-specific lifestyles, consumption practices, attitudes, and political behaviors.

Do any alternative accounts describe a shift *toward* a big-class world? The Marxian story of class polarization is an unabashedly positive story about the rise of a big-class regime (e.g., Wright 1997), but contemporary scholars only rarely push that narrative now. Rising income inequality is also relevant to big-class formation, but as we discuss below, it should bring about an increasingly gradational form of big-class inequality. Moreover, although the takeoff of top-end inequality, in particular, has triggered some efforts to characterize top earners as a class (i.e.,

the "one percent"), this characterization appears to rely more on the individual's income than on her or his position in the division of labor.

For the most part, the class-analytic faithful has therefore adopted a decidedly defensive posture, with the most prominent responses emphasizing, at best, the continuing relevance of conventional big classes. In some cases, class analysts have implicitly conceded that they overreached in the past, while nonetheless arguing for the continuing role for class analysis in understanding a narrower range of outcomes. Most notably, Goldthorpe and Chan (2007; see also Chan and Goldthorpe 2007) have argued that (a) big classes continue to govern life chances and political behavior, whereas (b) detailed occupational affiliations (i.e., "status groups," in their parlance) matter most in understanding consumption practices and other cultural outcomes (see also Hechter 2004).

Micro-class trend

The mechanisms driving trend at the micro-class level are even less well specified. If there is any available theory at all, it comes in the form of "postoccupational" narratives that describe a gradual breakdown of occupational distinctions within big classes. According to postoccupationalism, the contemporary workplace increasingly relies on teamwork, cross-training, and multi-activity jobs, all of which promote the labor force flexibility that a fast-paced economy requires. In these "new economy" workplaces, it's not simply that old occupational boundaries are replaced with new ones, but that occupational boundaries of any kind are no longer built into the organizational blueprint (e.g., Casey 1996; see also Kim and Sakamoto 2008). Ostensibly, this development has been hastened by various forces, such as deunionization and rising mobility, that prevent workes from negotiating for fixed and stable job definitions (e.g., Kambourev and Manovskii 2009; Mouw and Kalleberg 2010; cf. Moscarini and Thomsson

2007). As occupational boundaries become more amorphous and occupational affiliations more ephemeral, occupations no longer convey as much information about social networks or job environments. The postoccupational story implies, then, that shifts in the social organization of work, presumably hastened by rapidly changing technologies, have reduced the relevance of occupations in structuring life conditions.

The foregoing story is perhaps the dominant one, but nonetheless there are all manner of other forces at work that might have a counteracting effect. These developments have been partly concealed from view because they have occurred off the firm's shop floor. A computer firm, for example, may now slot its *core* employees into flexibly defined, postoccupational jobs, but at the same time outsource its more deeply occupationalized labor (e.g., accounting, legal work, technical writing, advertising, website management, custodial services). Similarly, the growing reliance on employment intermediaries (e.g., temp-work organizations, headhunters) and, more recently, on computer technologies to conduct preliminary filtering of applications may have strengthened occupational labor markets, given that such intermediaries typically rely on occupational categories and labels to sort and winnow large pools of workers (e.g, Zuckerman et al. 2003, p. 1029).

The diffusion of an occupational logic is also evident in, and hastened by, the proliferation of occupational closure in the form of occupation-specific licenses, credentials, and certifications. In the United States, the proportion of the labor force that works in licensed occupations increased from 10 percent in the 1970s to 20 percent in 2004, meaning that licensees now outnumber union members (see Kleiner 2006; Kleiner and Krueger, 2010; see also, Zhou 1993). This increase reflects not only the growth of long-closed occupations (e.g., lawyers), but also the emergence of licensure in formerly "open" occupations (Kleiner 2006; Weeden 2002).

Moreover, even in occupations that aren't licensed, one often finds a growing reliance on occupation-specific credentials (see, e.g., Mayo et al. 2007). Credentials, like licenses, presumably bolster the selection, training, interactional closure, and shared interest mechanisms that generate homogeneity at the occupation level. Finally, occupational associations and occupation-specific unions have fared far better in the last three decades than classic industrial and broad-based unions, again making the trend away from a micro-class world less certain than the postoccupational narrative would have us believe.

Gradational trend

The main force behind a possible rise in gradationalism is the well-known takeoff in income inequality over the last 35 years. Because income gaps *between* classes are growing (Weeden et al. 2007), differences in the consumption opportunities available to class incumbents are also growing, which may in turn generate more distinctive class cultures and interests. Professionals, for example, will increasingly display the tolerance, cultural cosmopolitanism, and largesse that are the luxury of an economically secure group, while unskilled laborers will increasingly display the intolerance, parochialism, and economic protectionism of a class that is under threat and anxious.

If we do see a rise in gradationalism, is the big-class or micro-class form more likely to prevail? Although income gaps between big classes and micro-classes have both grown, the gaps between micro-classes are growing at a faster rate (Weeden et al. 2007) and should generate correspondingly large consumption gaps at the micro-class level.[5] As the earnings of stockbrokers, for example, pull away from the earnings of other professionals, they should

[5] Kim and Sakamoto (2008) argue that between-occupation income inequality is waning. However, their measure of earnings builds in declining occupation effects over time, because the CPS procedure used to impute missing data does not match donors on detailed occupation (see also Mouw and Kalleberg 2010; for a discussion of CPS match bias, see, e.g., Bollinger and Hirsch 2005).

increasingly adopt distinctive attitudes, values, and consumption practices. This is not just because high-earning stockbrokers have the extra income that allows them to consume conspicuously and motivates them to adopt conservative beliefs, but also because the occupation as a whole may develop an ethos of conspicuous consumption and conservative politics that is adopted by even the less successful among their ranks (Frank 1999).

The income inequality narrative offers a plausible account of increasing gradationalism, but again a countervailing narrative about the rise of noneconomic and "postmaterial" values makes the net trend unclear. As Pakulski and Waters (2008) argue, the heyday of economic determinism was perhaps some 50 years ago, a period during which unions and political parties formulated simple class narratives that had (a) the monied classes favoring low tax rates and small government, and (b) the manual and working classes supporting rent-generating institutions at the bottom of the class structure (e.g., unions) and various forms of redistributive intervention. The result was a gradational world in which politics and related attitudes and values become a simple function of class income. This formula broke down, however, as party platforms and messages decoupled from particular class income levels. The GOP, for example, has fashioned a message that brings managers and the working class together, a message that valorizes free markets and delegitimates redistribution, favors military spending over welfare spending, and celebrates (Christian) "family values." The Democratic Party, for its part, has worked to create a message that appeals to professionals as well as residual sectors of the working class (e.g., Hout and Moodie 2008). The underappreciated implication of the postmodernist narrative, then, is that big classes are breaking down mainly because their gradationalist foundation is breaking down.

The upshot is that trends in gradationalism, like trends in the big-class and micro-class inequality, are driven by complex and often countervailing social developments. We're left with

opposing, and yet equally plausible, predictions about how big-class, micro-class, and gradational inequalities are moving. We next outline how we provide evidence that assesses these putative trends in the form of inequality.

How can trend be measured?

Rather than focus on one or two life conditions (e.g., vote choice), our analytic strategy is to be as comprehensive as possible, analyzing trends in a wide range of life conditions. We group life conditions into four topical domains: (1) life chances (e.g., income, education, working conditions, home ownership);[6] (2) lifestyles (e.g., consumption practices, institutional participation); (3) sentiments (e.g., political preferences, social attitudes), and (4) demographic composition (e.g., race, ethnicity). The first three domains represent areas that sociologists have long viewed as crucial "litmus tests" for assessing the extent to which the inequality system is a class system. The fourth domain, demographic composition, is also of interest given the longstanding argument that class formation and social organization can be undermined by racial, ethnic, and other cleavages (e.g., Bradley 1996; Giddens 1981 [1973]).

The variables pertaining to life chances, institutional participation, and demographic composition are drawn primarily from the 1972-2002 March Current Population Survey ([CPS] Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010), and the variables pertaining to social and political attitudes are drawn from the 1972-2010 General Social Survey ([GSS] Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2012).[7] Within each domain, we chose variables that offer consistent coverage across survey years, similar item wording over time, and at least 2,000 valid cases in each time period. In total, we

[6] We remain agnostic on the direction of the causal relationship between class and these various life conditions. Although class is often understood as a cause of attitudes and life conditions, the opposite causal path is clearly more plausible for some of our variables (e.g., education). The models that we estimate will pertain to the association between class and life conditions rather than the effects of class.

[7] We have not included data from the 2003-2010 CPS surveys because the occupation scheme used in these surveys differs substantially from the schemes used in prior surveys.

include 40 variables for our analysis of trends in the class forms of inequality and 38 for our analysis of trends in gradationalism, a discrepancy that arises because measures of personal income are omitted for the latter. For all but one of these variables, our class measure will pertain to the *respondent's* class position; the exception is in the life chances domain, where we also assess trend in the association between *father's* class and the respondent's educational attainment. All variables, along with their item wording, response categories, sample sizes, and source surveys, are listed in Appendix Table A1.

For our main analyses, we pooled the annual or biannual samples of the GSS and CPS surveys into three time periods: 1972-1982, 1983-1992, and 1993-2010 (GSS) or 1993-2002 (CPS). [8] In supplementary analyses of the GSS outcomes, we further divided the last period into 1993-2002 and 2003-2010 subtables. This gives four time periods, but at the cost of (a) eliminating four items that no longer met our 2000-case per table threshold; and (b) introducing incompatibilities between the analyses of CPS and GSS items. This supplementary analysis reassured us that the three-period design reveals the major trends of interest without stretching the data too thin.[9]

We define the big-class and micro-class schemes with 1970 Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) codes. (See the appendix for details on reconciling 1970 and post-1970 SOC schemes.) We translated these SOC codes into two class maps: the Weeden-Grusky micro-class map and the Featherman-Hauser big-class map (Featherman and Hauser 1978). The micro-class map consists of 126 occupations (see Table A2; also Weeden and Grusky 2005a,b) that, to the extent possible, capture the institutionalized boundaries in the division of labor. The big-class

[8] The GSS and CPS samples are restricted to adult respondents in the civilian labor force who are between ages 25 and 64, inclusive. The CPS samples are further restricted to households in months 1-4 of the sampling rotation to prevent duplicate observations. Both samples are weighted by the appropriate survey weights.

[9] For one of our CPS variables, income, we carried out a separate analysis by year. The results are again consistent with the period-based approach taken here (see Weeden et al., 2007).

scheme consists of twelve classes: self-employed professionals, employed professionals, employed managers, self-employed managers, sales workers, clerical workers, craft workers, operatives, service workers, laborers, farmers, and farm laborers.[10] The micro-classes are nested within the big-class scheme (see Table A2), save for the complexity that self-employment status is incorporated in the big-class scheme but not the micro-class scheme. We will constrain micro-class effects to be identical across employment status, but fit an "employment status" effect at the big-class level where it's relevant.

The menu of available gradational models is just as lengthy as the menu of available class models. In American sociology, the long-standing tradition is to scale occupations by prestige or socioeconomic status, where the latter is a weighted function of occupational income and education. In what has become the definitive contemporary statement on occupational scaling, Hauser and Warren (1997) advocate against such composites, and suggest that pure education or earnings scores are easier to interpret and perform better in empirical terms. Following this recommendation, we apply an occupational earnings scale, choosing earnings rather than education because of the theoretical importance of the takeoff in earnings inequality for trend in gradationalism.[11]

[10] The most popular alternatives to the FH class scheme are those of Wright (1997) and Erikson and Goldthorpe ([EG] 1992). Wright's class map and the 11-class EG scheme cannot be consistently implemented with the available GSS or CPS variables. We did, however, assess trends using the seven-class EG scheme, which yielded similar results as the FH scheme. We will present results for the FH scheme because it (a) captures more of the class-outcome association in the U.S.; and (b) allows us to retain self-employed workers (i.e., the "petty bourgeoisie" in the EG scheme) without losing the nested data structure.

[11] We assess trend in gradationalism in the association between fathers' occupation and respondent's education using the same gradational scheme for fathers' occupation that we used for respondent's occupation. We are thus applying an income scale derived from 1970s data to occupations held as early as the mid-1920s (for fathers of the oldest respondents in the 1972 GSS). More commonly, though, father's occupations were held in the 1940s through 1960s. Given that income inequality was relatively stable in the three decades prior to the 1970s, we are confident that our gradational measure suffices. One should nonetheless be cautious in interpreting gradational trend in the father's occupation-respondent's education association.

The latter scale is constructed from weekly earnings data in the 1973-1982 CPS surveys.[12] We calculate the percentage of workers in each occupation who exceed a threshold earnings level, where this is defined as the weekly equivalent of $8.57/hour in 1979 dollars (see Hauser and Warren 1997). In differentiating between big-class and micro-class gradationalism, we rely on two variants of this scale, a big-class variant that averages the percentage of above-threshold earners in all occupations comprising a big class, and a micro-class variant that takes each occupation's deviation from its big-class value.[13]

Which world prevailed in the 1970s?

We begin by describing the form of inequality that prevailed in the earliest period represented by our data (i.e., the 1970s), giving us a baseline against which to assess changes in the form of inequality. For this analysis, we use the 1972-81 data to cross-classify each of the outcome variables by micro class, gender, and self-employment status (for the professional and managerial big-classes). To the resulting arrays, we apply four simple multiplicative models.[14]

The first model, the model of independence, fits the big class, micro class, and outcome marginal effects but does not allow for an association between outcome and either big class or micro class. The log-likelihood fit statistic from this model indexes the total class-outcome association in the table. The second model saturates the association between big class and outcome, but does not allow for a micro-class association with the outcome. The log-likelihood fit statistic for this model represents the total micro-class association in the table, and the

[12] We imposed the same age restrictions as in the class-outcome tables, weighted the data by the CPS earnings weight, and excluded respondents with missing values on usual hours worked per week. We also adopted other best practices, such as using unedited earnings, imputing wages for respondents whose wages are top-coded, and excluding respondents with illogical or outlying values on wages (e.g., wages below $1/hour).

[13] We also fit all of our gradational models with scales of median earnings and obtained very similar results. The correlation between the median and threshold earnings is 0.98 (big class) and 0.93 (micro class).

[14] We first purge the data of (1) the three-way association between self-employment status, gender, and outcome; and (2) the three-way association between micro-class, gender, and outcome. This prevents our log-likelihood ratios from being polluted by association that is not predicted by either the big-class or the micro-class approach.

difference between the fit statistic for this model and the model of independence represents the total association between big class and outcome. The third model constrains the association between big class and outcome to take a gradational form (while saturating the micro-class effects within each big class), and the fourth model constrains the association between micro class and outcome to take a gradational form (while saturating the big-class effects on the outcome). The log-likelihood fit statistics from the third and fourth models give us the extent of micro-class and big-class gradationalism, respectively.

The results of this exercise are graphed in Figure 5. The first notable conclusion is that in 1972 through 1981 (hereafter "the 1970s") the majority of class-based inequality in life conditions was found at the micro-class level. (The bars to the right of the y-axis, which measure micro-class association, are typically longer than those to the left, which measure the big-class and outcome association.) Averaged across outcome variables, 58% of the total class association is located between the occupations comprising big classes, while only 42% is located between big classes.[15] The life chances domain, which includes items measuring education, employment, and home ownership, is the only domain in which we find more big-class association (60%) than micro-class association (40%). These results, which confirm findings based on data that span all GSS and CPS years (Weeden and Grusky 2005a), establish that (a) inequality in the 1970s was both a micro-class and a big-class phenomenon, and (b) the micro-class component of inequality was somewhat more substantial than the big-class component.

The second conclusion from Figure 5 is that the big-class association in the 1970s was largely gradational in form, as shown by left-side hatched bars that are nearly as long as the solid

[15] The same percentages are observed if we exclude the three demographic structuration items, which we acknowledge are controversial as indicators of trend in class inequality. Note, too, that the amount of micro-class association in the 1970s tables is likely suppressed by sparse data in this period and the corresponding need to add a small constant to empty cells.

bars. Averaged across all outcomes, approximately three quarters (73%) of the big-class association is captured by an income gradient. If we want to understand, for example, which big classes are more likely to watch television, read newspapers, get divorced, or approve of abortion, it pretty much suffices to know how much money, on average, the class incumbents make. This result, which hasn't been well appreciated in prior research, is inconsistent with big-class theorizing that downplays the hierarchical dimension of class (e.g., Erikson and Goldthorpe 2002; Bourdieu 1984).

At the micro-class level, a very different result prevails: occupational earnings account for just 6% of the total micro-class association. This cross-outcome average masks some variability by domain. Most notably, in the 1970s, micro-class association in life chances was more gradational (16%) than in other domains, with the implication that occupational earnings were relatively closely tied to such variables as education (i.e., highest grade completed), home ownership (i.e., own versus rent), and employment status (i.e., full time versus part time). The main conclusion, nonetheless, is that big-class structure was largely gradational in the 1970s, while micro-class structure was largely polymorphous or "nongradational."

The key question, though, is whether there have been important changes off this baseline. The next section lays out how we answer this question and the results relevant to them.

Trends in class inequalities

We examine trend by fitting four log-multiplicative models to class-by-outcome arrays disaggregated by time, gender, and employment status (see Goodman 1991; Xie 1992). The first model allows the class and outcome marginal effects to vary over time and by gender, saturates the two-way interaction of class and outcome, fits a multiplicative shift effect that permits the strength of this two-way interaction to differ by gender, and constrains the class-by-outcome

association to take on the same pattern and to remain at the same overall strength over time. This model can be specified as follows:

$$m_{ijkt} = \tau_0 \tau_t^T \tau_{it}^{CT} \tau_{jt}^{RT} \tau_{kt}^{ST} \tau_{ikt}^{CST} \tau_{jkt}^{RST} e^{(\psi_k^S \mu_{ij}^{CR})}, \quad (1)$$

where class (C), outcome (R), sex (S), and time (T) are indexed by subscripts *i*, *j*, *k*, and *t* respectively. We use C here to refer to each of the 126 micro-class categories (and hence have suppressed the distinction between big-class and micro-class effects). The τ parameters are identified by constraining the parameter for the first category to equal one, and the μ_{ij}^{CR} parameters, which saturate the two-way association between class and outcome, are identified by constraining them to sum to zero. The two ψ_k^S parameters, which are global sex effects on this class-outcome association, are identified by forcing their sum of squares to equal one.[16]

We next fit a "global trend" model that adds a set of shift effects that allow the association between class and outcome to expand or contract in each time period. These period shift effects are applied to the global class-outcome association and do not allow for differing trend at the big-class and micro-class levels. The resulting model is specified by the following equation:

$$m_{ijkt} = \tau_0 \tau_t^T \tau_{it}^{CT} \tau_{jt}^{RT} \tau_{kt}^{ST} \tau_{ikt}^{CST} \tau_{jkt}^{RST} e^{(\psi_k^S \phi_t^T \mu_{ij}^{CR})}. \quad (2)$$

Here, the ϕ_t^T parameters are log-multiplicative period effects on the common underlying class-outcome association, while all other parameters are defined as in equation (1). The contrast in fit statistics for the models of Equation 1 and 2 offers a formal test of change in the strength of the

[16] Unless otherwise noted, we use the same identifying constraints for all models. For each occupation within the professional and managerial classes, we fit a single occupation-by-outcome association term for employed and self-employed workers, thereby conserving degrees of freedom and remaining true to the micro-class logic. At the big-class level, we allow the professional-by-outcome and manager-by-outcome associations to vary by employment status. The marginal effects of professional and managerial occupations are also allowed to vary by employment status. The models for our supplementary analysis of the EG tables are simpler because once we exclude the petty bourgeoisie, there is no need to disaggregate by employment status.

class-outcome association, while the estimates themselves (i.e., ϕ_t^T) indicate the direction of change, if any, over time.

The third model assesses whether trends in big-class and micro-class association diverge. It takes the following form:

$$m_{ijkt} = \tau_0 \tau_t^T \tau_{it}^{CT} \tau_{jt}^{RT} \tau_{kt}^{ST} \tau_{ikt}^{CST} \tau_{jkt}^{RST} e^{\psi_k^S (\theta_t^T \mu_{bj}^{BR} + \delta_t^T \nu_{oj}^{OR})}, \quad (3)$$

where the subscripts *b* and *o* index big-class (B) and occupation (O) respectively. The μ_{bj}^{BR} parameters, which are constrained to sum to zero, refer to the interactions between big-class and outcome, while the ν_{oj}^{OR} parameters, which sum to zero within each big class, refer to the interactions between micro-class and outcome. The θ_t^T parameters are multiplicative shift effects that capture trend in big-class organization after purging any confounding effect of changes in the occupational composition of big classes, while the δ_t^T parameters are analogous multiplicative shift effects that capture trend in micro-class organization net of big-class effects. The contrast between this model and Model 2 reveal whether big-class and micro-class trends are moving in lockstep.

The model in Equation 3 can be further elaborated to allow the class-outcome associations at the two levels to differ by gender. Although gender differences in trend are not the focus of our paper, we still need to test whether the pooled trend under Equation 3 may disguise offsetting trends for men and women. We therefore fit a "gender-specific trend" model:

$$m_{ijkt} = \tau_0 \tau_t^T \tau_{it}^{CT} \tau_{jt}^{RT} \tau_{kt}^{ST} \tau_{ikt}^{CST} \tau_{jkt}^{RST} e^{(\pi_{kt}^{ST} \mu_{bj}^{BR} + \varpi_{kt}^{ST} \nu_{oj}^{OR})}, \quad (4)$$

where π_{kt}^{ST} are sex-specific and period-specific shift effects on the big-class association, ϖ_{kt}^{ST} are

the analogous shift effects on the micro-class association, and all other parameters are defined as above.

The virtue of these models is that they allow us to tease out trend within sparse tables by examining the *average* change across the full set of odds ratios pertaining to the cross-classification of micro class and outcome. With the exception of a supplementary analysis of the political domain, we have not sought to uncover complicated patterns of change that wouldn't show up under our preferred paramaterization. If, for example, half of the odds ratios were to strengthen and half were to weaken, our specification would likely imply that there's no trend in class organization (depending on how sparsely populated those odds ratios are and hence their implicit weights). This characterization is descriptively correct even if one might also wish to know that it's generated by offsetting change rather than across-the-board stability. Given sparse data, we have no alternative but to focus on central tendencies, a caveat that should be borne in mind when interpreting the results presented below.

The overall scorecard

We provide fit statistics and selected parameter estimates for each of our 40 items in Tables A3 and A4. For purposes of summarizing these item-specific results, Figure 6 provides a simple count of the number of outcomes for which each of the four models described above is preferred.[17] This count shows that (a) the association between class and outcome is rarely stable, and (b) the big-class and micro-class trends tend to differ in strength or direction. According to conventional significance tests, the "no trend" model (Equation 1) is preferred for only two of the 40 outcomes, and the "global trend" model (Equation 2) for only one. By contrast, a level-specific trend model is preferred for the remaining 37 outcomes, with the gender-varying form of

[17] For the veteran status item, we fit simplified versions of Models 2 and 3 that exclude the gender shift effects. Models 1 and 4 are undefined.

that specification (i.e., Equation 4) proving especially successful.

This exercise relies on conventional tests of significance, and hence Bayesians may be unpersuaded. Indeed, BIC overwhelmingly favors the baseline model, so a BIC adherent might conclude that the dominant story is stability in the class regime. We are reluctant to accept a rendition that requires us to ignore the highly significant change reported in Figure 6. As is well-known, BIC's preference for parsimony encourages scholars to accept a "sociologically unacceptable" model (Raftery 1995, p. 152-153), even when it accounts for a low share of the association. Moreover, BIC's preference for parsimony is specific to the GSS items, where sample sizes are small. For the 10 CPS outcomes, where sample sizes are large, the BIC criterion is in near perfect accord with conventional significance tests. Even more striking, we find that the life chances variables, which are primarily drawn from the CPS, are especially likely to have weak trend coefficients, yet despite this weaker signal the CPS sample size is large enough to induce BIC to favor a model allowing for change. It follows that BIC tells us more about sample size than whether the trend ought to be reported or featured.

Trend in parameter estimates

We next turn to the parameter estimates, which allow us to assess whether conventional chi-square tests are teasing out trends that are statistically significant yet trivial and, critically, to reveal the direction of change at each level of aggregation. To this end, we calculated slope coefficients for each item with a weighted least squares regression of the estimated shift effect parameters (in additive form), where the weights are period-specific sample sizes for each outcome.[18] If the "no trend" model is preferred, the slope coefficient is fixed at 1. If the "no trend" model is rejected, the slope coefficients are calculated from the global trend parameters or

[18] Although we could have devised a model that directly forced the shift effects to change linearly, this model would complicate the analysis more than is necessary or useful.

the level-specific trend parameters, depending on which model is preferred by conventional tests of model fit. For ease of presentation, we have opted for Model 3 (which constrains trends to be gender-invariant) over Model 4 (which allows for gender-specific trends), even when Model 4 is preferred. The results are much the same, however, when gender-specific trends are allowed (see Table A5). In multiplicative form, these slope coefficients are the average multiplier over time on the class-outcome association. Values greater than one indicate that class inequalities are strengthening, and values less than one indicate that they are weakening.

Figure 7 shows the means of these coefficients, on the logarithmic scale, across the items. The main conclusion from Figure 7 is that the association between big class and life conditions is weakening in the United States. That is, when the slope coefficients indicate significant linear change, this change is more likely a decrease in big-class association than an increase. If we average across all outcomes, we find that big-class effects are declining by approximately 15% per time period.[19]

This striking result belies the long-dominant view that class systems are stable and timeless.[20] Although many forms of inequality have increased spectacularly since the 1970s, Figure 7 makes it clear that this historic expansion in inequality has *not* taken on a big-class form. Recall, too, that this trend is off a 1970s baseline that showed, for most domains, that big classes captured only a minority of the available association in the division of labor (see Figure 5). The methodological implication of this result is that the big-class model, long the sociologist's preferred measuring tool, was not only a relatively weak signal of inequality in the

[19] The four-period analysis of a subset of the GSS items reveals a decline in big-class association of 13% per period, compared to an 18% decline per period for the same items in a three-period analysis. These results are only trivially different given that the reduced per-period rate of decline is now coupled with a larger number of periods.

[20] Our analysis of the Erikson-Goldthorpe 7-class scheme shows even larger declines. This result may arise from the combination of professional and managers into a single "service class" in the 7-class scheme. Insofar as the views of professionals and managers come to diverge over time (Manza and Brooks 1999), the weakening of big-class effects will be exaggerated in such a scheme.

1970s but is becoming an ever weaker signal.

But not all forms of class-based social inequality are receding. The decline of big-class structure has not been accompanied by a correspondingly strong decline in micro-class structure. As Figure 7 also shows, the all-outcome slope coefficients indicate a mere one percent decline (per period) in micro-class structure, a strikingly different result than at the big-class level. At the same time, most domains show no evidence of *strengthening* of micro-class organization, a result that's inconsistent with a strong-form occupationalization narrative.[21] The results instead suggest either trendless fluctuation or no substantial trend in micro-class inequality.

The results presented to this point pertain to the extent to which micro classes differ in their mean scores on a host of outcomes. Although Figure 7 shows that micro-class means differ as much as ever, it does not speak to changes in the *internal homogeneity* of micro classes. It's possible, for example, that the political sensibilities of the average sociologist and the average economist continued to differ even as individual-level variability around those micro-class averages grew. We know that within-occupation variance in wages has increased over the past 40 years, albeit more so in the 1970s and 1980s than thereafter (see Weeden et al. 2007), and we might anticipate that other life conditions, especially those closely associated with income, have similarly experienced growing within-class heterogeneity.

It's well beyond the scope of this paper to attempt any comprehensive measurement of micro-class trends in internal homogeneity. For purposes of illustration, we will carry out an analysis of one arbitrarily chosen outcome simply to demonstrate a possible follow-up to the analyses presented here. This illustrative analysis will be based on a classic GSS measure of tolerance, SPKATH, which assesses whether respondents believe that atheists should be

[21] The four-period analysis of the GSS items (see footnote 19) shows an increase in micro-class association of 1% per decade.

accorded the privilege of "free speech." We disaggregated the individual-level GSS data by time (using three time periods) and then regressed the log odds that respondents favor free speech on a full complement of micro-class dummy variables. Under this model, the internal homogeneity of micro classes, which can be assessed by the size of McClellan's pseudo-R2, declines trivially from .04 to .03 between the 1970s and the 1980s and is then stable thereafter. This simple model correctly predicts the outcome for 59, 67, and 56 percent of respondents in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s-2000s respectively. [22] Although there's little evidence in this case of systematic trend in micro-class homogeneity, any general conclusion would require a full analysis across a full range of outcomes, a task that we'll leave for others. This illustration nonetheless underlines the simple point that our core analyses speak to trends in inter-occupation gaps rather than trends in intra-occupation homogeneity.

Which domains are becoming the most organized?

We consider next the extent to which our results vary by domain. The general pattern of big-class decline and micro-class stability holds across most domains, but there are notable variations on the larger theme. The political domain, for example, is seemingly the poster child for a micro-class narrative. Here, the decline of big-class organization is dramatic, with the strength of big-class effects weakening by 22% per period (Figure 7). The association between political attitudes and micro-classes, by contrast, is growing by 29% per period, a truly astonishing rate of growth.

In prior research on class and politics, these countervailing effects at the big-class and micro-class levels have not been examined, and most analyses have instead been based on the usual aggregations of micro classes into big classes (but see Weeden 2012; Fosse and Gross forthcoming). The big-class trends estimated from such arrays are affected by (a) the changing

[22] Using an ROC curve, we chose a determination threshold of 0.25, which maximizes sensitivity and specificity.

micro-class composition of big classes, and (b) the changing pattern of micro-class association. We thus should not expect our results to be entirely consistent with those revealed in prior analyses (e.g., Hout and Moodie 2008). Also, because our models condition on a common pattern of association between class membership and outcome, they conceal the partly offsetting effect of big-class realignment on the overall trend. In a supplementary analysis (not shown), we found that the decline in (net) big-class structure is muted when the common-pattern assumption is relaxed. At the same time, we also found a high correlation between sample size and measures of association that allow the pattern of class effects to vary, suggesting that the weaker big-class trend observed in the supplementary analysis may simply be an artifact of sparse tables.[23] With the data at hand, it's simply not possible to discern whether the decline in big-class inequality in political attitudes is quite as extreme as represented in Figure 7.

If the pattern of divergent big-class and micro-class trends is exaggerated in the political domain, it is muted in the life chances domain. In the latter case, the data show little evidence of any change in the strength of class-based inequalities, whether at the big-class or micro-class level (see Figure 6).[24] The structural backbone to big classes remained largely intact, with big classes differing as much as ever in their average income, education, and wealth (see Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006). Obviously, our analysis of life chances is far from exhaustive, and a fuller analysis would likely reveal various complexities that we've glossed over here. The main point to be stressed is simply that trends in life chances are less dramatic than trends in most other

[23] This supplementary analysis is discussed in the methodological appendix (see the section on parsimony and sample size).

[24] The life chances domain includes two income variables, one pertaining to all workers and another restricted to full-time workers. Although the results reported are based on year-specific income quintiles, we have also analyzed arrays in which the income cutoff points were set to the quintile values in 1987, the midpoint year of our CPS series. The results did not differ.

domains.[25] This result is consistent with a narrative that emphasizes the decline of intermediary organizations that, in past eras, inculcated a class-based worldview and helped transform "imagined" big classes into coherent cultural communities. The weakening of big classes is thus expressed "culturally" in the form of declining cross-class heterogeneity in attitudes, lifestyles, and consumption practices.

It is possible that these cross-outcome averages of big-class and micro-class slopes mask a parallelism that is only revealed in the joint distribution of slopes for individual items. We address this possibility in Figure 8 by plotting the joint distribution of big-class and micro-class slopes. As in Figure 7, the coefficients in Figure 8 are calculated from the estimated shift effects of Model 3, which fits a gender-invariant trend.[26]

Figure 8 confirms that trends in big-class organization differ from trends in micro-class organization. The striking decline in big-class organization is revealed by the relatively large number of items found to the left of the vertical axis. The trend in micro-class organization is more ambiguous, with some items indicating a decline, others clustering close to the horizontal axis (implying no trend), and yet others showing an increase. The simple conclusion is that most items evince quite different trend at the big-class and micro-class levels.

Trends in gradationalism

The preceding results speak to trends in the total amount of class-based inequality in life conditions, but not to whether that inequality is increasingly gradational. We can address questions about trend in gradationalism with straightforward elaborations of Models 1 through 4.

[25] The demographic domain is another counterexample. In this domain, *both* big-class and micro-class structure are weakening, which implies that racial and ethnic segregation are in decline. We include these items because they speak to the long-standing claim that classes are weakened where they are fractured by non-class social cleavages. We recognize, however, that many scholars find such results to be qualitatively different than those pertaining to bona fide "outcomes." If the overall averages are recalculated without the demographic items, the pattern of results remains much the same.

[26] Analogous figures that graph gender-specific results are available from the first author.

Instead of saturating the underlying association between class and outcome, we now fit an RC model that constrains the class effects to take on a gradational pattern. The scale values for the 126 classes are fixed at the value of the class earnings scale,[27] whereas the scale values for the outcome categories are either freely estimated (for items with more than two categories) or fixed at 0 and 1 (for items with two categories). More formally, in Models 1* and 2*, the μ_{ij}^{CR} from Models 1 and 2 are replaced with $\rho_i^C \varepsilon_j^R$, where ρ_i^C is the effect of class earnings (without differentiating between big-class and micro-class gradationalism) and ε_j^R are the outcome scale values. In Models 3* and 4*, the μ_{bj}^{BR} and ν_{oj}^{OR} parameters are replaced with analogous RC parameters that fix the row scale values at the big-class and micro-class earnings scale. These replacements yield the following model:

$$m_{ijkt} = \tau_0 \tau_t^T \tau_{it}^{CT} \tau_{jt}^{RT} \tau_{kt}^{ST} \tau_{ikt}^{CST} \tau_{jkt}^{RST} e^{\psi_k^S \varepsilon_j^R (\theta_t^T \xi_b^B + \delta_t^T \eta_o^O)}, \qquad (3^*)$$

where the ξ_b^B refer to the big-class scale and η_o^O refer to the micro-class scale. The two scales sum to the total (as applied in Models 1* and 2*) because the micro-class scale values are deviated around the big-class means. Model 4* is analogous to Model 3*, but allows for sex-specific trend.

Which of these models is most often preferred? The model that assumes constant gradational inequality (Model 1*) is preferred for only four outcomes, and the models that allow for trends in big-class and micro-class gradationalism are preferred for the remaining 34 outcomes. For these 34 outcomes, the model fitting a gender-invariant trend is preferred 19

[27] We apply the same income scale in all time periods despite the well-known increase in between-occupation inequality. The hypothesis at stake is that this increase in inequality will bring about a corresponding increase in the income-by-outcome odds ratios (conditional on a constant occupational scale).

times (i.e., Model 3*), and the model fitting a gender-variant trend is preferred 15 times (i.e., Model 4*). These results imply that gradationalism is changing in strength, and moreover changing at a different pace or direction across the two types of class organization.

Figure 9 presents, by domain, the trend in gradational inequality estimated under Model 3*.[28] As in the preceding analysis, these slopes are estimated under a weighted least squares model regressing time on the (logged) shift effects at the big-class and micro-class level. In interpreting Figure 9, remember that only 6% of the total micro-class inequality in the 1970s was gradational, although the percentage was higher in the life chances domain (see Figure 5). With baseline gradationalism so weak, a trend in micro-class gradationalism is interesting only if it is positive and large enough to constitute a substantial change off that base. This is not the case. As Figure 9 indicates, there is no increase in micro-class gradationalism averaged across all outcomes. Although there are local increases in gradationalism on the order of 9 to 11% (per period) in the consumption and social attitude domains, these are off a very small base. The implication is straightforward: If we are moving toward a gradational world, it doesn't take the micro-class version depicted in Figure 3A.

The big-class story is completely different. In the 1970s, gradationalism in the big-class system was substantial, arguably overwhelming (see Figure 5). The trend results show that the association between big-class earnings and (non-income) life conditions declined, on average, by 12% per period (see Figure 9). As before, the trend is exaggerated in the political domain, with gradationalism dropping precipitously at an estimated rate of 25% per period. This finding is consistent with the well-known "class realignment" in voting practices and, in particular, the defection of the relatively high-paying professional class to the political left (e.g., Manza and

[28] We use the estimates from Model 3* instead of Model 4* even when Model 4* is preferred on the basis of model fit. This makes presentation more efficient. Also, for a handful of GSS items, the gender-specific Model 4* shift effects were simply implausible because micro-class gradationalism itself was trivially small (see Figure 5).

Brooks 1999). At the other extreme, big-class gradationalism in life chances increased by approximately 3% per period, a finding driven by the growing association of big-class earnings with home ownership. The life chances domain is the only one in which big-class gradationalism is increasing, and the general trend is of declining big-class gradationalism.

The final point to be made is that the decline in big-class gradationalism, although sharp, is less dramatic than the concomitant decline in nongradational (or "polymorphic") big-class effects. Comparing Figures 7 and 9, we see that the mean slope coefficient pertaining to big-class gradationalism (0.88) is larger, although only minimally so, than the mean slope coefficient pertaining to trend in total big-class inequality (0.85), which includes both gradational and nongradational sources of the class-outcome association. It follows that the downward trend in gradational association is flatter than the downward trend in nongradational association, and also that the remaining big-class inequality is increasingly gradational. Although both forms of big-class structure are weakening, the big-class world now more closely resembles Figure 3B than Figure 1. This increase in the *share* of big-class inequality that is gradational is the only sense in which we are moving toward a gradational world.

Conclusion

Over the last decade, an influential literature on trends in the amount of inequality has emerged. The discipline has all but ignored the possibility of associated changes in the form of inequality, a perplexing state of affairs given its professed interest in how inequality is organized (see, e.g., Lareau and Conley 2008). We offer a new line of analysis that refocuses attention on understanding whether inequality is increasingly organized in big-class, micro-class, or gradational terms.

Three results from our analysis are worth underlining. Most notably, we find that the U.S. is

moving away from the ideal-typical big-class world, a trend that's especially prominent for lifestyles, social attitudes, political attitudes, and demographic composition (and, by contrast, doesn't appear at all in the life chances domain). The average decline in big-class organization across all 40 items is 15% per period (Figure 7), which is arguably a revolutionary rate of change and surely not the durable inequality with which big-class systems have long been associated.

How has such a fundamental shift been overlooked? It is partly because there hasn't been nearly enough research on trends in class effects. For the most part, the available research has been focused on life chances, where big-class effects aren't in decline, or on political outcomes, where big-class declines have been partly obscured by countervailing trends at the micro-class level. In other domains, rigorous trend analyses have been few and far between, and the weakening of big-class inequalities has correspondingly been underappreciated.

The second key result is that the micro-class form remains as strong as ever in absolute terms, while in relative terms it constitutes a growing share of total class-based inequalities in life conditions. In the 1970s, 57% of class inequality was generated at the micro-class level, compared to 43% at the big-class level. Since then, big-class inequalities have weakened while micro-class inequalities remained effectively unchanged, with the implication that the available structure in the class system is increasingly found at the micro-class level.

Third, the remaining big-class effects are not only weaker, but ever more gradational in form. Although class analysts have long argued that classes are "not consistently ordered according to some inherent hierarchical principal" (Erikson and Goldthorpe 2002, p. 31), we find that in the U.S., the hierarchical principal was already dominant in the 1970s and, if anything, became more dominant in the decades since. At the big-class level, a simple form of gradationalism, one which allows us to read off politics, attitudes, and lifestyles on the basis of

income alone, is the emergent form. This is consistent with the view that big classes have a simple rational action cast to them. By contrast, micro-class inequality not only constitutes an ever-growing share of total inequality, but it creates a form of inequality that's not as interpretable in simple economic terms. If, for example, one wants to understand "what's the matter with Kansas" (Frank 2004), one has to move beyond the usual economistic big-class accounts and explore the more complicated moral commitments that emerge at the micro-class level (Weeden 2011; Gross and Fosse forthcoming).

These results have practical implications for measuring the amount of inequality and, in particular, trends in the amount of inequality. The big-class scheme has been so dominant within sociology, particularly European sociology, that sometimes big classes are simply equated with inequality and understood as the only obvious way of capturing it. It is unquestioned practice to use big-class schemes to represent "background effects," to analyze social mobility, and more generally to model the various effects of inequality, whether as a key variable of interest or merely as a "control." We have shown that this practice is especially dangerous for carrying out trend analysis. Because big classes are capturing a diminishing share of the total structure in the division of labor, defaulting to big-class measurement may create the appearance that social background effects are declining, the mobility regime is opening up, or individual choice in lifestyles is expanding. These results are misleading insofar as they are driven by a weakening of the signal that is captured by the measurement tool. If scholars insist on using big classes in trend analysis, any evidence of a weakening in class effects will have to be accompanied with a caveat that such weakening may simply be an artifact of applying a measurement tool that is conveying less and less information about the inequality space.

If big-class schemes fall increasingly short, are occupational scales the answer? We

indicated in the introduction that the discipline's decision to move away from occupational scales appears to have occurred for complicated political reasons rather than any evidence of their declining utility. The results reported here suggest that the discipline made the right decision, even if it was for the wrong reasons. A unidimensional occupational scale captures only a small fraction of the positional structure in the division of labor (see Figure 5; see also Weeden and Grusky 2005a). Granted, if the only objective is to model inequality at the *big-class* level, then a case for gradational scales might be made. At this level, gradationalism increasingly prevails, at least in relative terms. We see no theoretical justification, however, to be content with a measure of inequality that is focused on the big-class structure when big classes account for a modest and diminishing share of positional inequalities in the division of labor.

We are left with two possible measurement approaches. The first possibility, which we implemented here, is to represent the inequality space with a full complement of big-class and micro-class effects. This approach allows all class-based effects to surface, meaning that any observed decline in such effects is not an artifact of a deteriorating measurement tool. It also allows analysts to detect countervailing effects at the big-class and micro-class levels, as we did here. The second, and more radical, possibility is to forego the division of labor altogether by representing the inequality space with individual income, education, or wealth. Although systematic efforts to test this individualistic approach against a more "sociological" (i.e., positional) approach are few and far between, it would be useful to take on this task more systematically (see Weeden 2002; de Graaf et al. 1995; Bol and Weeden 2012 for relevant efforts). This will entail not only pitting positional inequality models against each other, as we do here, but pitting positional and individual-level models against each other. In this regard, the inequality literature could learn much from the neighborhood or school effects literatures, both of

which have long understood the challenge and necessity of teasing apart the theorized contextual effects of neighborhoods or schools from individual-level effects (see, e.g., Sampson et al. 2002). We doubt that the quasi-experiments often featured in these literatures will also become available to test inequality measurement models. At a minimum, however, scholars can and should estimate the effects of social class using models that adjust for a full set of individual-level predictors of the outcome in question. Given all the class-based mechanisms at work, there is good reason to believe that the positional approach will stand up to such a test. But, that remains to be demonstrated.

Although these methodological concerns are important, we're more interested in addressing the viability of prevailing theories of change in the inequality system. As Figure 7 reveals, big-class differences in life chances (e.g., education, income) have remained largely intact, whereas big-class differences in culture (e.g., attitudes, lifestyles) have not. This pattern is consistent with the claim that intermediary organizations no longer convert big classes into culturally coherent communities. As such, the historic decline in big-class organization seems to be playing out much as the postmodern narrative implies. Although dismissing the postmodernist narrative comes easily, especially to scholars with an empirical bent, our results imply that it's high time to give the account its due.

The "shrinking culture" hypothesis requires, however, a more serious test, one that goes beyond the analyses carried out here. This hypothesis might take two forms. At one extreme, big classes may be entirely shorn of their supporting culture, becoming little more than nominal "containers" of workers with roughly similar incomes. This formulation implies that, insofar as class members behave similarly, it is mainly because their similar incomes lead them to have similar interests and to undertake a similar calculus about the costs or benefits of certain actions.

This logic implies, for example, that the characteristic opposition to progressive taxation within a well-off class is generated solely by individual calculations that big government harms one's own interests.

Although our results are consistent with the "class as containers" argument, they are also consistent with an account that emphasizes a contextual effect of big classes. After all, Figure 5 merely shows that big-class effects follow a simple gradational pattern, leaving open the possibility that class cultures built around average class incomes generate class-specific attitudes and consumption practices. By this logic, members of our well-off class may oppose progressive taxation not solely because of their individual interests, but also because of a shared anti-government culture that leads all members of the class, even the less well-off, to oppose progressive taxation. Empirically, this suggests that teasing apart individual-level effects from contextual effects, and identifying trends therein, is critical to resolving theoretical as well as methodological problems in the field.

At the same time, we should not forget that prevailing narratives about the decline in class inequality, including the postmodern narrative, fall short insofar as they suggest that *all* forms of class inequality are weakening. Our results show that inequalities between micro-classes have, on average, remained unchanged (see Figure 7). This result is not entirely surprising given that occupations remain deeply institutionalized and are not undergoing threats of the sort that big classes are. The weakening of unions, for example, has been less pronounced at the micro-class level, leaving such occupations as teachers, airline pilots, and postal workers relatively well protected. Other forms of occupational closure have increased over the last half-century, including occupation-specific licenses, training programs, and associations. For their part, employers increasingly outsource the job training and screening functions to occupation-specific

gatekeepers, such as professional or vocational schools, which sustain an "occupationalized" labor market. These developments protect occupations against the decline that big classes are experiencing.

Because occupations are deeply institutionalized, they tend to develop cultures that reflect the complicated niches and environments they occupy, cultures that then affect what we believe, how we vote, and the lifestyles we lead. Whereas big classes are simplifying into economic aggregates, micro-classes are not. The result, then, is a shift toward a labor market that is characterized by multiple centers of moral life, precisely the "moral polymorphism" to which Durkheim (1958, p. 7) so famously referred.

Methodological Appendix

Choices of Items

Table A1 gives the wording and coding of the 40 items used in our analyses. These items are not, of course, a random draw from all possible behaviors or attitudes, and it's possible that the items appearing in the GSS and CPS overstate the shift away from class-based organization. When the GSS was first developed, items were presumably selected into the questionnaire because there was diversity of opinion about them, diversity that partially fell along class lines. For example, early GSS respondents were asked whether they "approve or disapprove of a married woman earning money" because, at the time, it addressed a hotly contested issue. The debate resolved over the next 40 years in favor of the egalitarian stance, and class differences necessarily receded. Obviously, not all attitudes will harmonize in this way, but the GSS items for which there are trend data are disproportionately those that, in the 1970s, were at risk of harmonizing. By contrast, attitudes or lifestyle choices that were (or are) uncontroversial but nevertheless class-linked (e.g., preferences in artwork [Halle 1994]) appear in very few years of the GSS, if at all, and can't be included in our analysis. The overrepresentation of controversial items may bias the analysis in favor of finding a decline in class inequality. It should, however, affect big-class and micro-class inequality similarly.

This item inclusion bias may be partially offset by a compensating item removal bias. In some cases, a GSS item was discontinued from later surveys (and hence excluded from our analysis) because almost complete consensus was achieved. This form of selectivity biases *against* finding a decline in the class effect. Because few items were dropped from the GSS, we suspect that item removal bias is less consequential than item inclusion bias. Regardless, these biases must be borne in mind, especially when interpreting the attitude and lifestyle items.

Measuring Class

As noted in the text, we insist on common class schemes and gradational scales across the three time periods (see Table A2), not just out of convention but because doing so allows us to capture the hypothesized effects. If, for example, we allowed the median income of each class to vary over time, the scale itself would absorb some or all of the increase in gradationalism. By fixing the scale, we can identify trends in gradationalism that are generated by the "stretching" of the income distribution, as high-earning classes earn more than they once did and low-earning classes earn less than they once did.

We can implement common class and gradational schemes by reconciling the 1970 SOC codes with the 1980-90 SOC codes (as used in the GSS surveys collected after 1991 and in CPS surveys collected after 1982). We backcoded the more recent data into the 1970 scheme by (a) translating the 1990-basis data into the 1980 scheme, (b) multiplying each 1980-basis record by the number of 1970-SOC codes that contribute to the 1980 code (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989), and (c) assigning sex-specific weights to each record in the resulting expanded data set (see Weeden and Grusky 2005a for details, Weeden 2005 for STATA code). This weight equals the proportion of the 1980 code that is drawn from the constituent 1970 code, multiplied by the survey weight and an additional deflation factor that retains the original sample size.

Does the insistence on common big class, micro-class, and gradational schemes bias our trend analysis? We see two potential sources of bias. First, because we used the same occupational categories in each of the three time periods, our scheme effectively freezes the class structure in the 1970s. If this scheme is progressively less accurate in capturing the true boundaries and institutionalized divides in class structure, we may see a decline in class effects simply because of ever-poorer measurement. Similarly, if a micro class or big class engages in a

successful collective mobility project and its earnings increase, our income scale will no longer capture the correct inter-class orderings or distances.

The second source of potential bias arises because we freeze the occupations that constitute a given big class across the time periods. This practice, while conventional in class analysis, means that shifts in the technical features or working conditions of an occupation may alter the strength of the class-outcome association. The direction of this bias depends on whether these changes make the occupation more or less similar to other occupations in its big class. For example, computerization may have rendered clerical occupations more similar to each other, thereby weakening the net association between micro-classes and outcomes, but also made clerical occupations less similar to manual occupations, thereby strengthening the association between big classes and outcomes. If, by contrast, computerization affected the working conditions of some clerical occupations but not others, the effect on the observed trends will be reversed. In the absence of systematic, reliable data on changes in occupational skills, we cannot assess which of these two forms of bias prevail.

Parsimony and sample size

The main methodological challenge that we faced is the sparseness of the GSS data. We necessarily ruled out models that allow the class and outcome categories to be scaled in time-varying ways. We cannot, for example, apply association measures (e.g., kappa) that allow the pattern of the class-outcome association to vary over time (see, e.g., Hout et al. 1999), because such measures are too sensitive to sparse cell counts. We came to this conclusion through an analysis in which we selected an arbitrary GSS item, drew 100 random samples of different sizes, constructed 100 class-outcome tables, and applied kappa to them. We found correlations on the order of .8 to .9 between sample size and kappa.

In this context, we cannot justify carrying out a trend analysis that allows the pattern and strength of the class-outcome association to vary simultaneously. In most cases, there is no reason to anticipate substantial change in the pattern of the class-outcome association, and the dictates of sample size and theory nicely align. This happy outcome doesn't obtain in the political domain, where prior theory and evidence suggests "class realignment" in vote choice (Hout and Moodie 2008; Manza and Brooks 2005). The same realignment will presumably be expressed in the two political attitude items in our data (PARTYID, POLVIEW). Even in this domain, however, it may be problematic to confound changes in the scaling of the outcome variable with changes in the association (e.g., Jonsson et al. 2010), and therefore we conditioned on a common underlying pattern of association. This decision complicates the interpretation of the results in the political domain, as discussed in the text.

The convention of adding a small constant to empty cells in the data can also generate complications in sparse tables. Because of such complications, we've insisted that every item have at least 2,000 cases in each period, but even so some of the subtables for our two earlier periods are quite sparse. By adding a constant, we've suppressed the association in those sparse subtables, leading us to underestimate any decline in association over time. This bias is likely to be especially severe at the micro-class level where data are sparser. We assessed the extent of such bias by drawing, for each GSS item, a same-sized random sample for each of the three time periods and then reapplying our trend models. Although we found evidence of a minor suppressive effect (results available on request), it is trivial relative to the true signal in the data. We therefore report full-sample results here.

References

Atkinson, Anthony B., Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez. 2010. "Top Incomes in the Long Run of History." Pp. 664-770 in *Top Incomes: A Global Perspective.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baldassarri, Delia, and Andrew Gelman. 2008. "Partisans without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion." *American Journal of Sociology* 114(2): 408-46.

Beck, Ulrich, and Christoph Lau. 2008. "Theoretical and Empirical Explorations in the 'Meta-Change' of Modern Society." Pp. 1030-1036 in *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective (3rd Edition),* edited by David B. Grusky, Manwai C. Ku, and Szonja Szelenyi. Boulder: Westview Press.

Beller, Emily, and Michael Hout. 2006. "Intergenerational Social Mobility: The United States in Comparative Perspective." *The Future of Children,* 16(2): 19-36.

Bol, Thijs, and Kim A. Weeden. 2012. "Occupational Closure and Wage Inequality in Germany and the United Kingdom." Working paper, University of Amsterdam.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, translated by Richard Nice. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bollinger, Christopher R., and Barry T. Hirsch. 2005. "Match Bias from Earnings Imputation in the Current Population Survey: The Case of Imperfect Matching." IZA working paper 1846, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=858964##.

Bradley, Harriet. 1996. *Fractured Identities: Changing Patterns of Inequality.* Oxford: Polity Press.

Breen, Richard (ed). 2004. *Social Mobility in Europe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Breen, Richard, and Janne O. Jonsson. 2008. "Explaining Change in Social Fluidity: Educational Equalization and Educational Expansion in Twentieth-Century Sweden," *American Journal of Sociology,* 112 (6): 1775-1810.

Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2011. March Demographic Files of the Current Population Surveys. Machine-readable data file. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census.

Casey, Catherine. 1996. "Corporate Transformations: Designer Culture, Designer Employees and 'Post-Occupational' Solidarity." *Organization* 3(3): 317-339.

Castells, Manuel. 2000. *The Rise of the Network Society, The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture V. 1 (2nd Edition).* Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Chan, Tak Wing, and John H. Goldthorpe. 2007. "Class and Status: The Conceptual Distinction and Its Empirical Relevance." *American Sociological Review* 72: 512-32.

Clark, Terry, and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds). 2001. *The Breakdown in Class Politics. A Debate on Post-Industrial Stratification.* Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Davis, James A., Tom W. Smith, and Peter H. Marsden. 2012. *General Social Surveys 1972-2010.* National Opinion Research Center, Chicago.

De Graaf, Nan Dirk, Anthony Heath, and Ariana Need. 2001. "Declining Cleavages and Political Choices: The Interplay of Social and Political Factors in the Netherlands." *Electoral Studies* 20(1): 1-15.

De Graaf, Nan Dirk, Paul Nieuwbeerta, and Anthony Heath. 1995. "Class Mobility and Political Preferences: Individual and Contextual Effects." *American Journal of Sociology* 100(4): 997-1027.

Di Carlo, Matthew. 2007. "Occupational Effects on Welfare Attitudes in the United States,

Germany, Sweden, and Japan." Unpublished Dissertation, Cornell University.

DiMaggio, Paul, John Evans, and Bethany Bryson. 1997. "Have Americans' Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?" *American Journal of Sociology* 102(3): 690-755.

Durkheim, Emile. 1958 [1893]. *The Division of Labour in Society.* Oxford University Press.

Erikson, Robert, and John H. Goldthorpe. 1992. *The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Erikson, Robert, and John H. Goldthorpe. 2002. "Intergenerational Inequality: A Sociological Perspective." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16: 31-44.

Evans, Geoffrey, and James Tilley. 2012. "How Parties Shape Class Politics: Explaining the Decline of the Class Basis of Party Support." *British Journal of Political Science* 42(1): 137-161.

Featherman, David L., and Robert M. Hauser. 1978. *Opportunity and Change.* New York: Academic.

Fischer, Claude S., and Michael Hout. 2006. *Century of Difference: How America Changed in the Last Hundred Years.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Frank, Robert H. 1999. *Luxury Fever: Money and Happiness in an Era of Excess* (2nd edition). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Frank, Thomas. 2004. *What's the Matter with Kansas?* Henry Holt and Co.

Giddens, Anthony. 1981 [1973]. *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (2nd Edition).* London: Hutchinson University Library Press.

Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2008. *The Race Between Education and Technology*. Belknap Press.

Goldthorpe, John H., and Tak Wing Chan. 2007. "Social Status and Newspaper Readership."

American Journal of Sociology 112: 1095-1134.

Goldthorpe, John H., and Abigail McKnight. 2006. "The Economic Basis of Social Class." Pp. 109-36 in *Social Mobility and Inequality: Frontiers of Research from Sociology and Economics,* edited by Stephen L. Morgan, David B. Grusky, and Gary Fields. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Goodman, Leo. 1991. "Models, Measures, and Graphical Displays in the Analysis of Contingency Tables (With Discussion)." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 86:1085-1138.

Fosse, Ethan, and Neil Gross. Forthcoming. "Why are Professors Liberal?" *Theory and Society.*

Grusky, David B., and Jesper B. Sørensen. 2001. "Can Class Analysis be Salvaged?" *American Journal of Sociology* 103(5): 1187-1234.

Hall, Stuart. 2001. "The Meaning of New Times." Pp. 859-865 in *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective*, Second Edition, edited by David B. Grusky. Boulder: Westview.

Halle, David. 1994. *Inside Culture: Art and Class in the American Home.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hauser, Robert M., and John Robert Warren. 1997. "Socioeconomic Indexes of Occupational Status: A Review, Update, and Critique." *Sociological Methodology* 62: 561-572.

Hechter, Michael. 2004. "From Class to Culture." *American Journal of Sociology* 110(2): 400-45.

Hout, Michael, Jeff Manza, and Clem Brooks. 1999. "Classes, Unions, and the Realignment of U.S. Presidential Voting, 1952-1992." Pp. 83-95 in *The End of Class Politics?,* edited by Geoffrey Evans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hout, Michael, and Benjamin Moodie. 2008. "The Realignment of U.S. Presidential Voting, 1948-2004." Pp. 945-953 in *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective (3rd Edition),* edited by David B. Grusky, Manwai C. Ku, and Szonja Szelényi. Boulder. Boulder: Westview Press.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jonsson, Jan O., David B. Grusky, Matthew Di Carlo, Reinhard Pollak, and Mary C. Brinton. 2009. "Microclass Mobility: Social Reproduction in Four Countries." *American Journal of Sociology* 114(6): 977-1036.

Kambourev, Gueorgui, and Iourii Manovskii. 2009. "Occupational Mobility and Wage Inequality." *International Economic Review* 50(1): 731-59.

Kim, ChangHwan, and Arthur Sakamoto. 2008. "The Rise of Intra-Occupational Wage Inequality in the U.S., 1983-2002. *American Sociological Review* 73:129-57.

Kingston, Paul. 2000. *The Classless Society.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Kleiner, Morris M. 2006. *Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition?* W. E. Upjohn Institute.

Kleiner, Morris M., and Alan B. Krueger, 2010. "The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing." Working paper, Princeton University.

Kohn, Melvin. 2008. "Job Complexity and Adult Personality." Pp. 532-540 in *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Comparative Perspective, 3rd edition,* edited by David B. Grusky, Manwai C. Ku, and Szonja Szelényi. Boulder: Westview Press

Kumar, Krishan. 1995. *From PostIndustrial to PostModern Society: New Theories of the Contemporary World.* Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.

Lamont, Michele. 2002. *The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Lareau, Annette, and Dalton Conley (eds.). 2008. *Social Class: How Does it Work?* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Liu, Yujia. 2008. "Are Class Effects on Health Even Stronger than Typically Supposed? Working paper, Stanford University. http://www.stanford.edu/group/scspi/_media/pdf/rc28/conference_2008/p391.pdf.

Manza, Jeff, and Clem Brooks. 1999. *Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignment and U.S. Party Coalitions.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Manza, Jeff, and Clem Brooks. 2008. "Classes and Politics." Pp. 201-31 in *Social Class: How Does it Work?* edited by Annette Lareau and Dalton Conley. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Massey, Douglas S. 2007. *Categorically Unequal: The American Stratification System.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Mayo, Anthony J., Nitin Nohria, and Laura G. Singleton. 2007. *Paths to Power: How Insiders and Outsiders Shaped American Business Leadership.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Moscarini, Giuseppe, and Kaj Thomsson. 2007. "Occupational and Job Mobility in the US", *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 109(4): 807-36.

Mouw, Ted, and Arne Kalleberg. 2010. "Occupations and the Structure of Wage Inequality in the United States, 1980s-2000." *American Sociological Review* 75: 402-431.

Pakulski, Jan, and Malcolm Waters. 2008. "The Death of Class." Pp. 1022-1030 in *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective (3rd Edition),* edited

by David B. Grusky, Manwai C. Ku, and Szonja Szelenyi. Boulder: Westview Press.

Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez. 2007. "Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-2006." In *Top Incomes over the 20th Century: A Contrast Between Continental European and English-Speaking Countries*, edited by Anthony Atkinson and Thomas Piketty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Raftery, Adrian E. 1995. "Bayesian Model Selection in Social Research (with Discussion)." *Sociological Methodology* 25:111-196.

Sampson, Robert J., Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and Thomas Gannon-Rowley. 2002. "Assessing Neighborhood Effects: Social Processes and New Directions in Research." *Annual Review of Sociology* 28: 443-78.

Svallfors, Stefan. 2006. *The Moral Economy of Class. Class and Attitudes in Comparative Perspective.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Torssander, Jenny, and Robert Erikson. 2010. "Stratification and Mortality – a Comparison of Education, Class, Status, and Income." *European Sociological Review* 2010 26(4):465-474.

Weber, Max. 1946 [2008]. "Open and Closed Relationships." Pp. 128-32 in *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective (3rd Edition)*, edited by David B. Grusky. Boulder: Westview Press. Reprinted from *Economy and Society,* translated by Gunther Roth.

Weeden, Kim A. 2002. "Why Do Some Occupations Pay More than Others?: Social Closure and Earnings Inequality in the United States." *American Journal of Sociology* 108(1): 55-101.

Weeden, Kim A. 2005. "Stata Algorithm for Backcoding 1980 Census Occupation Codes into 1970 Census Occupation Codes." Department of Sociology, Cornell University.

Weeden, Kim A. 2008. "Occupational Closure and Earnings Inequality." Pp. 176-186 in *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective (3rd Edition),* edited by David B. Grusky. Boulder: Westview Press.

Weeden, Kim A. 2012. "Occupation Politics, or Big-Class Politics?" Working paper. Department of Sociology, Cornell University.

Weeden, Kim A., and David B. Grusky. 2005a. "The Case for a New Class Map." *American Journal of Sociology* 111(1):141-212.

Weeden, Kim A., and David B. Grusky. 2005b. "Are There Any Social Classes at All?" *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, 22: 3-56.

Weeden, Kim A., Young-Mi Kim, Matthew Di Carlo, and David B. Grusky. 2007. "Social Class and Earnings Inequality." *American Behavioral Scientist* 50(5):702-36.

Wilensky, Harold L., and Jack Ladinsky. 1967. "From Religious Community to Occupational Group: Structural Assimilation among Professors, Lawyers and Engineers." *American Sociological Review*. 32 (4): 541-561.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1997. *Class Counts.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Xie, Yu. 1992. "The Log-Multiplicative Layer Effect Model for Comparing Mobility Tables." *American Sociological Review* 57:380-395.

Zhou, Xueguang. 1993. "Occupational Power, State Capacities, and the Diffusion of Licensing in the American States: 1890-1950." *American Sociological Review* 58: 536-52.

Zuckerman, Ezra, Tai-Young Kim, Kalinda Ukanwa, and James von Rittman. 2003. "Robust Identities or Non-Entities? Typecasting in the Feature Film Labor Market." *American Journal of Sociology* 108(5): 1018-74.

Figure 1: Big-class world



Figure 2: Micro-class world



Figure 3: Gradational world

A. Micro-class form



B. Big-class form



Figure 4: Summary of posited sources of the rise or fall of class inequality and gradationalism

	Increase	**Decrease**
Big-class inequality	none	decline of intermediary organizations representing classes (e.g., unions, political parties) new social movements and class-orthogonal cleavages class mobility
Micro-class inequality	emergent occupational logics in labor markets occupational closure	post-occupationalism occupational mobility
Gradationalism	rising income inequality	decline of intermediary organizations representing classes

Fig 5: Total and gradational class-outcome association at baseline (1972-1981), by domain



Fig. 6: Preferred models of trends in class inequality for 40 outcomes



Fig 7: Trends in big-class and micro-class inequality, by domain



Note: Values are the slopes of multiplicative time effects from Model 3, graphed on a logarithmic scale.

Fig. 8: Joint trends in big-class and micro-class inequality, by outcome



Note: Each diamond represents an outcome variable. Coordinates are the slopes of the big-class and micro-class time shift effects from Model 3, graphed on a logarithmic scale.

Fig 9: Trends in big-class and micro-class gradationalism, by domain



Note: Values are the slopes of multiplicative time effects from Model 3*, graphed on a logarithmic scale.

Table A1: Variable mnemonics, data source, item description, and unweighted sample sizes by domain

Domain/variable	Source	Description and response categories	N
Life chances			
paoccdeg	GSS	Education: Highest degree completed. (Less than high school, high school, junior college, college, graduate). Used in the analyses of trend in association between father's occupation and education.	31,466
educ	CPS	Education: Highest grade completed. (Less than high school, high school, some college, college, some graduate school.)	866,955
ftpt	CPS	Full-time / part-time status. (Usually works full-time, usually works part time.)	789,767
ftincome*	CPS	Income 1: Wage, self-employment, and farm income of currently working respondents who usually work 35+ hours per week. (0-20, 21-40, 41-60, 61-80, 81-100 percentiles.)	695,251
income*	CPS	Income 2: Wage, self-employment, and farm income of all respondents. (0-20, 21-40, 41-60, 61-80, 81-100 percentiles.)	866,954
finrel	GSS	Relative financial position: "Compared with American families in general, would you say your family income is …" (below average, average, above average.)	27,238
tenure	CPS	Wealth: Ownership of living quarters. (Own, rent.)	783,720
Lifestyles: consumption practices			
news	GSS	Intellectual pursuits 1: "How often do you read the newspaper?" (Daily, a few times per week, once a week, less than once a week or never.)	18,860
tvhours	GSS	Intellectual pursuits 2: "On the average day, about how many hours do you personally watch television?" (0, 1-2, 3-4, 5 or more.)	17,929
socrel	GSS	Family orientation: "How often do you spend a social evening with relatives?" (At least several times a week, monthly, several times a year or less.)	17,348
socfrend	GSS	Friendship orientation 2: "How often do you spend a social evening with friends who live outside the neighborhood?" (At least several times a week, monthly, several times a year or less.)	17,343
satjob	GSS	Job satisfaction: "On the whole, how satisfied are you with the work you do… would you say you are …. ?" (very statisfied, moderately satisfied, or a little/very dissatisfied.)	27,384
richwork	GSS	Work orientation 1: "If you were to get enough money to live as comfortably as you would like for the rest of your life, would you continue working or stop working?" (Continue, stop.) Employed respondents	17,612

		only.	
hours	CPS	Work orientation 2: Hours worked last week. (1-34, 35-40, 41-60, 61 or more.)	789,767
Lifestyles: institutional participation			
marstat	CPS	Marriage 1: Current marital status (Married, widowed, divorced, separated, never married.)	866,955
divorce	GSS	Marriage 2: "Have you ever been divorced or legally separated?" (Yes, no.) Ever-married respondents only.	20,897
childs	GSS	Children: "How many children have you ever had?" (0, 1, 2 or 3, 4 or more.)	29,902
relig	GSS	Religion 1: "What is your religious preference?" (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, none, other.)	29,856
attend	GSS	Religion 2: "How often do you attend religious services?" (Never, 1-3 times per year, 1-3 times per month, at least once per week.)	29,693
union	GSS	Union membership. In 1974 and 1977, this is based on the variable "memunion;" in all other years, it is based on the variable "union." (Yes, no.)	22,231
vet	CPS	Veteran status. (Yes, no.) Men only.	489,698
Sentiments: political attitudes			
partyid	GSS	Party identification: "Do you usually think of yourself as a..." (Strong Democrat, Democrat, Independent, Republican, strong Republican.)	29,372
polviews	GSS	Political ideology: "Where would you place yourself on a scale...?" (Extremely/liberal, slightly liberal, moderate, slightly conservative, extremely/conservative.)	25,604
Sentiments: social attitudes			
spkath	GSS	Tolerance 1: "Should [an atheist] be allowed to make a speech in your community?" (Yes, no.)	18,612
spkcom	GSS	Tolerance 2: "Should [an admitted Communist] be allowed to make a speech in your community?" (Yes, no.)	17,034
homosex	GSS	Tolerance 3: "Are sexual relations between two adults of the same sex wrong?" (Always, sometimes, not at all.)	17,034
pornlaw	GSS	Tolerance 4: "Which of these statements comes closest to your feelings about pornography laws?" (Should be universal or age-specific laws forbidding distribution: should be no laws forbidding distribution.)	17,712
cappun	GSS	Crime 1: "Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?" (Favor, oppose.)	24,466
courts	GSS	Crime 2: "Do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?" (Too harshly, not harshly enough, about right.)	25,148

racmar	GSS	Racial attitudes 1: "Do you think there should be laws against marriages between blacks and whites?"(Yes, no.) Non-blacks only.	14,181
racopen	GSS	Racial attitudes 2: "Which law would you vote for?": (A) a homeowner can decide to whom to sell his house, (b) a homeowner cannot refuse to sell his house to a black. (Law a, law b.) Non-blacks only.	12,676
fework	GSS	Gender attitudes 1: "Do you approve or disapprove of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her?" (Approve, disapprove.)	13,218
fepol	GSS	Gender attitudes 2: "Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women." (Agree, disagree.)	15,806
abnomore	GSS	Abortion attitudes 1: "[Should abortion be legal if a woman] is married and does not want any more children?" (Yes, no.)	20,276
abrape	GSS	Abortion attitudes 2: "[Should abortion be legal if a woman] became pregnant as a result of rape?" (Yes, no.)	20,226
chldidel	GSS	Family attitudes: "What do you think is the ideal number of children for a family to have?" (2 or fewer, 3, four or more, as many as want.)	18,316
class	GSS	Subjective identification: What is your social class? (Lower or working, middle, upper.)	28,272
Demographic structuration			
race	CPS	Race. (White, black, other.)	866,955
ethnic	GSS	Ethnicity: Country or part of the world from which respondent's ancestors came. (Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Northern Europe, other.)	23,041
spneth	CPS	Spanish ethnicity. (Mexican/Chicano(A), Puerto Rican, Cuban, other Spanish, not Spanish.)	846,703

NOTE: Sample sizes include data from all time periods, but have not been adjusted for empty cells. Not all items were asked in every GSS survey; see GSS codebook (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2012) for details.

* The two income measures are excluded from the gradational analyses.

Table A2: Micro-class, FH, and EG codes

Micro-class		FH		EG		Micro-class		FH		EG	
		E	SE	E	SE			E	SE	E	SE
101	architects	2	1	1	1	203	buyers	3	4	1	3
102	engineers	2	1	1	1	204	sales managers	3	4	1	3
103	natural scientists	2	1	1	1	205	office mgrs, n.e.c.	3	4	1	3
104	engineering & science techs	2	1	1	1	206	building managers	3	4	1	3
105	physicians & dentists	2	1	1	1	207	restaurant managers	3	4	1	3
106	other health professionals	2	1	1	1	208	health administrators	3	4	1	3
107	nurses & dental hygienists	2	1	1	1	209	school administrators	3	4	1	1
108	therapists	2	1	1	1	210	managers, n.e.c.	3	4	1	3
109	health technicians	2	1	1	1	301	insurance agents	5	5	1	3
110	social scientists	2	1	1	1	302	real estate agents	5	5	1	3
111	religious workers	2	1	1	1	303	agents, n.e.c.	5	5	1	3
112	social workers	2	1	1	1	304	salespersons	5	5	2	3
113	professors & instructors	2	1	1	1	401	clerical supervisors	6	6	1	3
114	primary, secondary teachers	2	1	1	1	402	estimators & investigators	6	6	2	3
115	jurists	2	1	1	1	403	insurance adjusters	6	6	1	1
116	librarians & curators	2	1	1	1	404	cashiers	6	6	2	3
117	creative artists	2	1	1	1	405	bank tellers	6	6	2	3
118	authors & journalists	2	1	1	1	406	counter clerks, except food	6	6	2	3
119	designers & decorators	2	1	1	1	407	secretaries	6	6	2	3
120	accountants	2	1	1	1	408	accounting clerks	6	6	2	3
121	computer specialists	2	1	1	1	409	office machine ops	6	6	2	3
122	personnel workers	2	1	1	1	410	tabulation clerks	6	6	2	3
123	PR professionals	2	1	1	1	411	postal clerks	6	6	2	2
124	applied research workers	2	1	1	1	412	mail carriers	6	6	6	6
125	professionals, n.e.c.	2	1	1	1	413	mail distribution clerks	6	6	6	3
201	government officials	3	4	1	1	414	telephone operators	6	6	2	3
202	financial managers	3	4	1	1	415	expediters	6	6	2	3

416	stock clerks, storekeepers	6	6	6	3	601	graders & sorters	8	8	6	3
417	warehouse clerks	6	6	2	3	602	launderers	8	8	6	3
418	teacher aides	6	6	2	3	603	sewers	8	8	6	3
419	clerks, n.e.c.	6	6	2	3	604	textile operatives	8	8	6	3
501	supervisors, manual labor	7	7	5	3	605	precision machine operatives	8	8	6	3
502	inspectors	7	7	5	3	606	finishing machine operatives	8	8	5	3
503	metal processors	7	7	5	3	607	assemblers	8	8	6	3
504	machinists	7	7	5	3	608	welders	8	8	5	3
505	structural metal workers	7	7	5	3	609	meat cutters	8	8	6	3
506	stationary engine operators	7	7	5	3	610	packagers	8	8	6	3
507	heavy machinery operators	7	7	5	3	611	machine operatives, n.e.c.	8	8	6	3
508	power & phone line workers	7	7	5	3	612	miners	8	8	6	3
509	railroad conductors & engineers	7	7	5	5	613	lumbermen & sawyers	8	8	6	3
510	printers	7	7	5	3	614	fork lift operatives	8	8	6	3
511	tailors	7	7	5	3	615	home delivery workers	8	8	6	3
512	bakers	7	7	5	3	616	mass transit drivers	8	8	6	3
513	heating & cooling mechanics	7	7	5	3	617	taxicab drivers & chauffeurs	8	8	6	3
514	aircraft mechanics	7	7	5	3	618	truck drivers	8	8	6	3
515	automobile mechanics	7	7	5	3	619	garage workers	8	8	6	3
516	small electronics mechanics	7	7	5	3	620	operatives, n.e.c.	8	8	6	3
517	heavy equipment mechanics	7	7	5	3	701	freight handlers	10	10	6	3
518	mechanics, n.e.c.	7	7	5	3	702	retail stock handlers	10	10	6	3
519	electricians	7	7	5	3	703	construction laborers	10	10	6	3
520	brickmasons	7	7	5	3	704	gardeners	10	10	6	3
521	carpenters	7	7	5	3	705	laborers, n.e.c.	10	10	6	3
522	painters	7	7	5	3	801	cleaners	9	9	6	3
523	plumbers	7	7	5	3	802	bartenders	9	9	2	3
524	construction crafts, n.e.c.	7	7	5	3	803	wait staff	9	9	2	3
525	craft workers n.e.c.	7	7	5	3	804	cooks	9	9	2	3

805	kitchen helpers	9	9	6	3	811	law enforcement officers	9	9	1	3
806	practical nurses	9	9	2	3	812	guards	9	9	2	3
807	health aides	9	9	2	3	813	firefighters	9	9	5	5
808	child care workers	9	9	2	3	814	housekeepers, ex. private	9	9	2	3
809	hair stylists	9	9	2	3	815	food counter workers	9	9	2	3
810	attendants, n.e.c.	9	9	6	3	816	private household workers	9	9	6	3

Note: The FH classes are as follows: 1 = self-employed professionals; 2 = employed professionals; 3 = employed managers; 4 = self-employed managers; 5 = sales workers; 6 = clerical workers; 7 = craft workers; 8 = operatives; 9 = service workers; 10 = laborers; 11 = farmers; 12 = farm laborers. The EG classes are as follows: 1 = service class; 2 = routine non-manual workers; 3 = petty bourgeoisie (excluded); 4 = farmers; 5 = skilled workers & foremen; 6 = non-skilled workers; 7 = employed farm laborers. Results presented in the text are based on the FH scheme.

Table A3: Fit statistics and gender shift-effect parameters of class inequality models fit to 40 outcomes

Variable	Model		L2	df	Sig. of contrast	Pre-ferred model	BIC	Index of Diss.	Gender shift: men	Gender shift: women
Life chances										
paoccdeg	1	gender effect	2,633.7	3,331		4	-31,881	8.1	0.695	0.719
	2	gender effect * time effects	2,627.4	3,329	0.084		-31,866	8.1	0.694	0.720
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	2,620.9	3,327	0.037		-31,852	8.1	0.695	0.719
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	2,584.4	3,322	0.000		-31,386	7.9	n/a	n/a
educ	1	gender effect	15,832.8	3,331		4	-29,711	3.9	0.709	0.705
	2	gender effect * time effects	15,633.3	3,329	0.000		-29,883	3.9	0.709	0.706
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	15,611.5	3,327	0.000		-29,878	3.9	0.709	0.706
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	15,289.4	3,322	0.000		-30,132	3.9	n/a	n/a
ftpt	1	gender effect	5,585.1	832		4	-5,713	1.6	0.695	0.719
	2	gender effect * time effects	5,414.3	830	0.000		-5,857	1.6	0.693	0.721
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	5,371.4	828	0.000		-5,872	1.6	0.691	0.723
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	5,177.4	823	0.000		-5,998	1.5	n/a	n/a
ftincome	1	gender effect	13,272.0	3,331		4	-31,537	4.2	0.634	0.774
	2	gender effect * time effects	13,263.3	3,329	0.013		-31,519	4.2	0.633	0.774
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	13,151.9	3,327	0.000		-31,603	4.2	0.633	0.774
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	12,874.3	3,322	0.000		-31,813	4.1	n/a	n/a
income	1	gender effect	16,069.9	3,331		4	-29,474	4.2	0.622	0.783
	2	gender effect * time effects	16,042.4	3,329	0.000		-29,474	4.2	0.621	0.784
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	15,943.3	3,327	0.000		-29,546	4.2	0.621	0.784
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	15,625.8	3,322	0.000		-29,795	4.1	n/a	n/a

finrel	1	gender effect	1,622.8	1,665		3	-15,384	7.5	0.726	0.688
	2	gender effect * time effects	1,604.4	1,663	0.000		-15,382	7.3	0.723	0.690
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	1,592.8	1,661	0.003		-15,373	7.3	0.724	0.690
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	1,588.8	1,656	0.549		-15,326	7.2	n/a	n/a
tenure	1	gender effect	4,756.4	832		4	-6,535	2.3	0.847	0.532
	2	gender effect * time effects	4,601.7	830	0.000		-6,663	2.2	0.843	0.539
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	4,581.9	828	0.000		-6,656	2.2	0.841	0.541
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	4,410.7	823	0.000		-6,759	2.2	n/a	n/a
Lifestyles & consumption practices										
news	1	gender effect	1,914.4	2,498		4	-22,694	9.6	0.875	0.485
	2	gender effect * time effects	1,900.2	2,496	0.001		-22,688	9.6	0.882	0.471
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	1,896.3	2,494	0.138		-22,672	9.5	0.884	0.467
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	1,880.0	2,489	0.006		-22,640	9.4	n/a	n/a
tvhours	1	gender effect	1,832.8	2,498		1	-22,650	9.4	0.696	0.718
	2	gender effect * time effects	1,832.1	2,496	0.732		-22,631	9.4	0.697	0.718
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	1,831.4	2,494	0.684		-22,612	9.4	0.696	0.718
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	1,823.6	2,489	0.166		-22,571	9.4	n/a	n/a
socrel	1	gender effect	1,456.8	1,665		4	-14,802	8.8	0.769	0.639
	2	gender effect * time effects	1,448.1	1,663	0.013		-14,791	8.8	0.756	0.655
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	1,429.8	1,661	0.000		-14,790	8.7	0.779	0.627
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	1,413.7	1,656	0.006		-14,757	8.7	n/a	n/a
socfrend	1	gender effect	1,452.6	1,665		4	-14,806	9.1	0.550	0.835
	2	gender effect * time effects	1,443.0	1,663	0.008		-14,796	9.1	0.539	0.842
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	1,438.9	1,661	0.129		-14,780	9.1	0.543	0.839
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	1,399.7	1,656	0.000		-14,771	8.8	n/a	n/a

satjob	1	gender effect	1,548.0	1,665		4	-15,468	7.2	0.699	0.715
	2	gender effect * time effects	1,545.4	1,663	0.273		-15,450	7.2	0.700	0.715
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	1,536.4	1,661	0.011		-15,439	7.1	0.694	0.720
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	1,518.9	1,656	0.004		-15,405	7.0	n/a	n/a
richwork	1	gender effect	707.2	832		4	-7,428	5.7	0.654	0.757
	2	gender effect * time effects	704.2	830	0.225		-7,412	5.7	0.652	0.758
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	699.0	828	0.074		-7,398	5.7	0.635	0.772
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	678.6	823	0.001		-7,369	5.5	n/a	n/a
hours	1	gender effect	12,075.7	2,498		4	-21,846	3.8	0.672	0.740
	2	gender effect * time effects	11,278.4	2,496	0.000		-22,616	3.5	0.663	0.748
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	11,205.1	2,494	0.000		-22,662	3.6	0.662	0.750
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	11,139.1	2,489	0.000		-22,660	3.5	n/a	n/a
Institutional participation										
marstat	1	gender effect	13,036.1	3,331		4	-32,508	3.3	0.845	0.534
	2	gender effect * time effects	13,030.3	3,329	0.055		-32,486	3.3	0.845	0.534
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	12,754.4	3,327	0.000		-32,735	3.2	0.839	0.544
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	11,872.7	3,322	0.000		-33,548	3.2	n/a	n/a
divorce	1	gender effect	738.9	832		3	-7,539	4.7	0.768	0.641
	2	gender effect * time effects	731.4	830	0.023		-7,526	4.7	0.763	0.646
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	716.5	828	0.001		-7,521	4.6	0.746	0.666
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	708.6	823	0.160		-7,480	4.5	n/a	n/a
childs	1	gender effect	3,400.5	3,331		4	-30,940	10.6	0.585	0.811
	2	gender effect * time effects	3,396.7	3,329	0.156		-30,923	10.6	0.581	0.814
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	3,394.4	3,327	0.311		-30,905	10.5	0.584	0.812

	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	3,283.7	3,322	0.000		-30,964	10.4	n/a	n/a
relig	1	gender effect	2,622.2	3,331		3	-31,720	8.2	0.714	0.701
	2	gender effect * time effects	2,617.6	3,329	0.098		-31,704	8.2	0.710	0.704
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	2,566.7	3,327	0.000		-31,735	8.0	0.698	0.716
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	2,561.6	3,322	0.394		-31,688	8.0	n/a	n/a
attend	1	gender effect	2,421.0	2,498		1	-23,312	8.6	0.744	0.668
	2	gender effect * time effects	2,417.8	2,496	0.208		-23,295	8.6	0.746	0.666
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	2,415.3	2,494	0.281		-23,277	8.6	0.752	0.659
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	2,406.9	2,489	0.137		-23,233	8.6	n/a	n/a
union	1	gender effect	889.2	832		4	-7,440	4.9	0.752	0.659
	2	gender effect * time effects	889.1	830	0.955		-7,420	4.9	0.751	0.660
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	796.5	828	0.000		-7,493	4.5	0.747	0.665
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	779.9	823	0.005		-7,459	4.3	n/a	n/a
vet	2	time effect	1,178.2	351	0.000	3	-3,420	1.7	n/a	n/a
	3	level-specific time effects	986.1	349	0.000		-3,586	1.5	n/a	n/a
Political attitudes										
partyid	1	gender effect	3,137.9	3,331		3	-31,144	10.2	0.841	0.540
	2	gender effect * time effects	3,119.5	3,329	0.000		-31,142	10.2	0.844	0.536
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	2,995.2	3,327	0.000		-31,246	9.7	0.828	0.561
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	2,985.6	3,322	0.087		-31,204	9.6	n/a	n/a
polviews	1	gender effect	3,121.1	3,331		4	-30,707	10.8	0.776	0.631
	2	gender effect * time effects	3,120.0	3,329	0.570		-30,687	10.8	0.780	0.626
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	3,080.9	3,327	0.000		-30,706	10.5	0.799	0.601
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	3,061.4	3,322	0.002		-30,675	10.5	n/a	n/a

Social attitudes										
spkath	1	gender effect	788.3	832		3	-7,393	5.5	0.774	0.633
	2	gender effect * time effects	772.3	830	0.000		-7,390	5.3	0.766	0.643
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	761.7	828	0.005		-7,381	5.2	0.773	0.634
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	752.0	823	0.085		-7,341	5.1	n/a	n/a
spkcom	1	gender effect	824.9	832		3	-7,349	6.2	0.770	0.638
	2	gender effect * time effects	813.5	830	0.003		-7,340	6.1	0.766	0.642
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	792.4	828	0.000		-7,342	5.8	0.769	0.639
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	789.8	823	0.758		-7,295	5.8	n/a	n/a
homosex	1	gender effect	1,417.3	1,665		4	-14,812	8.0	0.711	0.703
	2	gender effect * time effects	1,397.0	1,663	0.000		-14,813	8.0	0.708	0.706
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	1,388.0	1,661	0.011		-14,803	7.9	0.708	0.706
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	1,371.2	1,656	0.005		-14,771	7.8	n/a	n/a
pornlaw	1	gender effect	831.8	832		3	-7,308	6.3	0.765	0.644
	2	gender effect * time effects	824.7	830	0.029		-7,296	6.4	0.774	0.634
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	816.1	828	0.014		-7,285	6.3	0.808	0.589
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	809.4	823	0.248		-7,243	6.2	n/a	n/a
cappun	1	gender effect	782.0	832		3	-7,626	4.7	0.828	0.561
	2	gender effect * time effects	781.0	830	0.587		-7,607	4.7	0.825	0.565
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	774.0	828	0.030		-7,594	4.6	0.837	0.547
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	768.4	823	0.347		-7,549	4.6	n/a	n/a
courts	1	gender effect	1,261.8	1,665		4	-15,615	4.9	0.731	0.682
	2	gender effect * time effects	1,254.0	1,663	0.020		-15,602	4.8	0.741	0.671
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	1,244.2	1,661	0.007		-15,592	4.8	0.746	0.666

	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	1,218.2	1,656	0.000		-15,567	4.7	n/a	n/a
racmar	1	gender effect	734.0	832		3	-7,222	5.6	0.739	0.674
	2	gender effect * time effects	729.9	830	0.125		-7,208	5.5	0.738	0.675
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	721.7	828	0.017		-7,197	5.5	0.746	0.666
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	715.7	823	0.310		-7,155	5.4	n/a	n/a
racopen	1	gender effect	821.7	832		4	-7,041	7.5	0.695	0.719
	2	gender effect * time effects	815.5	830	0.044		-7,028	7.4	0.726	0.688
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	813.5	828	0.374		-7,011	7.4	0.739	0.674
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	794.5	823	0.002		-6,983	7.5	n/a	n/a
fework	1	gender effect	695.3	832		4	-7,203	5.6	0.846	0.534
	2	gender effect * time effects	683.8	830	0.003		-7,195	5.5	0.797	0.604
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	679.9	828	0.141		-7,180	5.5	0.819	0.574
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	633.3	823	0.000		-7,179	5.5		
fepol	1	gender effect	768.5	832		4	-7,278	6.1	0.731	0.683
	2	gender effect * time effects	765.1	830	0.187		-7,262	6.1	0.731	0.682
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	759.7	828	0.068		-7,248	6.0	0.753	0.658
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	741.8	823	0.003		-7,217	5.9	n/a	n/a
abnomore	1	gender effect	827.4	832		2	-7,425	6.4	0.612	0.791
	2	gender effect * time effects	818.9	830	0.014		-7,414	6.2	0.603	0.798
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	813.1	828	0.057		-7,399	6.1	0.599	0.801
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	805.0	823	0.150		-7,358	6.1	n/a	n/a
abrape	1	gender effect	773.1	832		3	-7,478	4.8	0.759	0.651
	2	gender effect * time effects	759.5	830	0.001		-7,471	4.7	0.727	0.687
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	744.4	828	0.001		-7,467	4.5	0.731	0.682

	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	734.4	823	0.075		-7,427	4.5	n/a	n/a
chldidel	1	gender effect	1,961.4	2,448		4	-22,574	9.5	0.678	0.735
	2	gender effect * time effects	1,955.1	2,446	0.043		-22,561	9.5	0.694	0.720
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	1,945.0	2,444	0.007		-22,551	9.3	0.665	0.747
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	1,907.0	2,439	0.000		-22,540	9.1	n/a	n/a
class	1	gender effect	1,345.2	1,665		3	-15,725	5.8	0.787	0.618
	2	gender effect * time effects	1,322.7	1,663	0.000		-15,727	5.7	0.784	0.620
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	1,311.1	1,661	0.003		-15,718	5.6	0.785	0.620
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	1,300.3	1,656	0.057		-15,678	5.6	n/a	n/a
Demographic structuration										
race	1	gender effect	7,296.3	1,665		4	-15,469	1.9	0.766	0.643
	2	gender effect * time effects	6,566.0	1,663	0.000		-16,172	1.8	0.763	0.647
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	6,565.5	1,661	0.763		-16,145	1.8	0.763	0.647
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	6,518.6	1,656	0.000		-16,123	1.8	n/a	n/a
ethnic	1	gender effect	2,182.1	2,498		4	-22,923	8.8	0.745	0.667
	2	gender effect * time effects	2,149.5	2,496	0.000		-22,935	8.7	0.744	0.669
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	2,146.8	2,494	0.763		-22,918	8.7	0.740	0.672
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	2,124.2	2,489	0.000		-22,890	8.5	n/a	n/a
spneth	1	gender effect	4,990.2	3,331		4	-40,475	1.1	0.780	0.626
	2	gender effect * time effects	4,954.8	3,329	0.000		-40,483	1.1	0.780	0.626
	3	gender effect * level-specific time effects	4,945.4	3,327	0.009		-40,465	1.1	0.779	0.627
	4	gender-specific level-specific time effects	4,854.2	3,322	0.000		-40,488	1.1	n/a	n/a

Note: See text for explanation of models and Table A1 for item wording.

Table A4: Time shift effect parameters of class inequality models fit to 40 outcomes

			M2: Total class inequality M3&M4: Big-class inequality				Micro-class inequality			
Variable		Model / parameters	1970	1980	1990	linear trend	1970	1980	1990	linear trend
Life chances										
paoccdeg		2 total time effects: pooled	0.593	0.586	0.552	n/a				
		3 level-specific time effects: pooled	0.608	0.584	0.539	0.939	0.549	0.593	0.589	1.031
	x	4 level-specific time effects: men	0.413	0.400	0.379	0.958	0.288	0.398	0.450	1.236
		4 level-specific time effects: women	0.451	0.427	0.374	0.906	0.496	0.406	0.381	0.884
educ		2 total time effects: pooled	0.592	0.556	0.583	n/a				
		3 level-specific time effects: pooled	0.593	0.557	0.582	0.993	0.586	0.552	0.593	1.009
	x	4 level-specific time effects: men	0.415	0.392	0.417	1.003	0.429	0.414	0.447	1.023
		4 level-specific time effects: women	0.424	0.395	0.407	0.984	0.394	0.367	0.394	1.006
ftpt		2 total time effects: pooled	0.623	0.578	0.528	n/a				
		3 level-specific time effects: pooled	0.615	0.578	0.537	0.934	0.641	0.574	0.509	0.891
	x	4 level-specific time effects: men	0.414	0.419	0.427	1.016	0.378	0.371	0.352	0.965
		4 level-specific time effects: women	0.421	0.400	0.365	0.930	0.517	0.440	0.368	0.843
ftincome		2 total time effects: pooled	0.582	0.571	0.579	n/a				
		3 level-specific time effects: pooled	0.595	0.570	0.566	0.976	0.561	0.575	0.596	1.031
	x	4 level-specific time effects: men	0.352	0.349	0.366	1.020	0.378	0.390	0.413	1.045
		4 level-specific time effects: women	0.480	0.449	0.433	0.951	0.419	0.427	0.420	0.999
income		2 total time effects: pooled	0.588	0.571	0.573	n/a				
		3 level-specific time effects: pooled	0.597	0.571	0.563	0.972	0.573	0.572	0.586	1.012
	x	4 level-specific time effects: men	0.370	0.358	0.369	0.999	0.321	0.341	0.362	1.063
		4 level-specific time effects: women	0.481	0.444	0.412	0.926	0.497	0.455	0.442	0.945

finrel		2	total time effects: pooled	0.628	0.581	0.517	n/a			
	x	3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.638	0.582	0.504	0.885	0.571	0.582	0.579	1.005
		4	level-specific time effects: men	0.476	0.424	0.361	n/a	0.430	0.442	0.405	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.416	0.400	0.360	n/a	0.360	0.378	0.428	n/a
tenure		2	total time effects: pooled	0.517	0.570	0.639	n/a			
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.498	0.568	0.656	1.149	0.561	0.576	0.594	1.029
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.459	0.487	0.519	1.063	0.504	0.501	0.501	0.998
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.202	0.290	0.397	1.395	0.260	0.282	0.312	1.098
Lifestyles & consumption practices											
news		2	total time effects: pooled	0.525	0.687	0.502	n/a			
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.586	0.660	0.470	0.852	0.370	0.747	0.552	1.097
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.490	0.603	0.411	0.870	0.210	0.636	0.429	1.254
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.329	0.241	0.245	0.903	0.504	0.147	0.303	1.009
tvhours		2	total time effects: pooled	0.550	0.595	0.587	1.000				1.000
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.552	0.594	0.585	n/a	0.572	0.596	0.564	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: men	0.428	0.440	0.384	n/a	0.443	0.476	0.345	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.334	0.402	0.450	n/a	0.344	0.383	0.440	n/a
socrel		2	total time effects: pooled	0.580	0.669	0.465	n/a			
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.891	0.449	0.065	0.238	0.428	0.689	0.585	1.097
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.543	0.332	0.052	0.276	0.295	0.691	0.464	1.128
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.506	0.495	0.303	0.732	0.323	0.045	0.338	1.643
socfrend		2	total time effects: pooled	0.704	0.573	0.420	n/a			
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.653	0.621	0.434	0.791	0.568	0.696	0.440	0.824
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.214	0.364	0.200	0.880	0.177	0.698	0.219	0.899
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.788	0.235	0.325	0.770	0.598	0.111	0.252	0.876

satjob		2	total time effects: pooled	0.560	0.618	0.552	n/a			
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.589	0.636	0.499	0.900	0.526	0.614	0.589	1.044
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.451	0.425	0.376	0.910	0.428	0.418	0.356	0.904
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.352	0.503	0.314	0.872	0.321	0.452	0.456	1.154
richwork		2	total time effects: pooled	0.652	0.559	0.511	n/a			
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.660	0.556	0.506	0.881	0.544	0.624	0.560	0.995
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.415	0.441	0.325	0.864	0.345	0.340	0.246	0.827
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.565	0.290	0.353	0.864	0.226	0.545	0.598	1.501
hours		2	total time effects: pooled	0.638	0.583	0.503	n/a			
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.619	0.587	0.522	0.917	0.648	0.580	0.493	0.871
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.401	0.383	0.348	0.931	0.417	0.385	0.336	0.897
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.476	0.443	0.386	0.898	0.507	0.428	0.353	0.833
Institutional participation											
marstat		2	total time effects: pooled	0.591	0.571	0.569	n/a			
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.628	0.567	0.534	0.923	0.513	0.577	0.636	1.112
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.490	0.422	0.397	0.902	0.522	0.514	0.550	1.028
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.398	0.387	0.341	0.922	0.192	0.235	0.262	1.164
divorce		2	total time effects: pooled	0.700	0.559	0.444	n/a			
	x	3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.863	0.278	0.421	0.766	0.687	0.571	0.449	0.805
		4	level-specific time effects: men	0.550	0.270	0.293	n/a	0.432	0.442	0.370	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.676	0.058	0.280	n/a	0.534	0.365	0.251	n/a
childs		2	total time effects: pooled	0.595	0.603	0.531	n/a			
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.612	0.600	0.515	0.907	0.528	0.633	0.566	1.012
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.260	0.145	0.192	0.908	0.379	0.552	0.467	1.075

		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.577	0.578	0.455	0.866	0.387	0.353	0.244	0.772
relig		2	total time effects: pooled	0.597	0.607	0.524	n/a				
	x	3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.732	0.563	0.383	0.716	0.508	0.610	0.609	1.079
		4	level-specific time effects: men	0.461	0.415	0.257	n/a	0.343	0.450	0.420	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.598	0.343	0.272	n/a	0.406	0.390	0.432	n/a
attend		2	total time effects: pooled	0.544	0.635	0.549	1.000				1.000
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.614	0.534	0.581	n/a	0.526	0.655	0.542	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: men	0.484	0.458	0.491	n/a	0.376	0.520	0.386	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.368	0.325	0.272	n/a	0.357	0.419	0.370	n/a
union		2	total time effects: pooled	0.580	0.580	0.572	n/a				
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.654	0.552	0.517	0.895	0.556	0.589	0.586	1.023
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.477	0.440	0.400	0.915	0.400	0.464	0.430	1.026
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.476	0.310	0.310	0.834	0.408	0.352	0.386	0.990
vet		2	total time effects: pooled	0.603	0.541	0.586	n/a				
	x	3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.686	0.551	0.476	0.834	0.553	0.541	0.633	1.073
Political attitudes											
partyid		2	total time effects: pooled	0.688	0.553	0.471	n/a				
	x	3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.721	0.568	0.396	0.734	0.501	0.580	0.642	1.129
		4	level-specific time effects: men	0.625	0.466	0.351	n/a	0.463	0.458	0.527	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.359	0.326	0.186	n/a	0.185	0.366	0.360	n/a
polviews		2	total time effects: pooled	0.535	0.597	0.598					
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.633	0.622	0.461	0.829	0.368	0.505	0.781	1.474
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.541	0.425	0.327	0.777	0.144	0.469	0.666	2.001
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.356	0.442	0.312	0.874	0.331	0.232	0.390	1.206

Social attitudes											
spkath		2	total time effects: pooled	0.633	0.621	0.462	n/a				
	x	3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.654	0.605	0.453	0.823	0.419	0.751	0.510	1.044
		4	level-specific time effects: men	0.480	0.460	0.375	n/a	0.284	0.672	0.287	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.436	0.388	0.277	n/a	0.293	0.401	0.372	n/a
spkcom		2	total time effects: pooled	0.566	0.651	0.506	n/a				
	x	3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.583	0.631	0.512	0.922	0.327	0.853	0.408	1.013
		4	level-specific time effects: men	0.451	0.470	0.400	n/a	0.228	0.588	0.266	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.357	0.427	0.326	n/a	0.238	0.611	0.320	n/a
homosex		2	total time effects: pooled	0.700	0.538	0.470	n/a				
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.701	0.528	0.478	0.838	0.742	0.371	0.559	0.946
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.526	0.381	0.336	0.809	0.615	0.248	0.276	0.714
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.440	0.391	0.345	0.886	0.389	0.342	0.464	1.142
pornlaw		2	total time effects: pooled	0.458	0.753	0.473	n/a				
	x	3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.398	0.618	0.679	1.272	0.505	0.763	0.404	0.824
		4	level-specific time effects: men	0.357	0.470	0.549	n/a	0.555	0.527	0.288	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.068	0.466	0.358	n/a	0.153	0.476	0.285	n/a
cappun		2	total time effects: pooled	0.625	0.546	0.558	n/a				
	x	3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.654	0.628	0.422	0.774	0.622	0.523	0.583	0.997
		4	level-specific time effects: men	0.637	0.568	0.437	n/a	0.559	0.481	0.462	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.179	0.163	0.148	n/a	0.304	0.254	0.294	n/a
courts		2	total time effects: pooled	0.591	0.469	0.656	n/a				
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.766	0.366	0.528	0.901	0.523	0.503	0.688	1.178
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.682	0.403	0.453	0.845	0.337	0.377	0.481	1.204

		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.209	0.273	0.220	0.979	0.514	0.251	0.430	1.035
racmar		2	total time effects: pooled	0.593	0.629	0.503	n/a				
	x	3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.569	0.657	0.495	0.929	0.450	0.791	0.413	0.945
		4	level-specific time effects: men	0.391	0.523	0.378	n/a	0.314	0.653	0.244	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.426	0.398	0.302	n/a	0.330	0.473	0.288	n/a
racopen		2	total time effects: pooled	0.670	0.638	0.380	n/a				
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.701	0.607	0.375	0.721	0.525	0.761	0.381	0.816
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.267	0.245	0.162	0.773	0.551	0.544	0.176	0.551
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.604	0.465	0.511	0.940	0.006	0.488	0.363	6.029
fework		2	total time effects: pooled	0.742	0.530	0.410	n/a				
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.710	0.545	0.445	0.792	0.428	0.578	0.695	1.272
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.586	0.496	0.380	0.806	0.224	0.584	0.640	1.702
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.448	0.218	0.136	0.557	0.228	0.136	0.358	1.336
fepol		2	total time effects: pooled	0.673	0.563	0.481	n/a				
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.796	0.455	0.400	0.743	0.556	0.601	0.574	1.001
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.589	0.373	0.312	0.747	0.273	0.650	0.255	0.812
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.441	0.346	0.320	0.869	0.443	0.239	0.430	1.146
abnomore	x	2	total time effects: pooled	0.663	0.565	0.490	0.860				0.860
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.669	0.565	0.484	n/a	0.643	0.484	0.594	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: men	0.415	0.343	0.287	n/a	0.311	0.282	0.249	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.517	0.448	0.400	n/a	0.585	0.361	0.538	n/a
abrape		2	total time effects: pooled	0.736	0.532	0.418	n/a				
	x	3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.758	0.510	0.406	0.736	0.586	0.558	0.587	1.004
		4	level-specific time effects: men	0.590	0.335	0.290	n/a	0.506	0.523	0.414	n/a

		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.447	0.413	0.291	n/a	0.211	0.311	0.396	n/a
chldidel		2	total time effects: pooled	0.650	0.422	0.633	n/a				
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.647	0.424	0.634	1.036	0.568	0.715	0.406	0.809
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.522	0.193	0.451	0.998	0.356	0.071	0.630	1.542
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.311	0.440	0.443	1.162	0.232	0.597	0.245	0.891
class		2	total time effects: pooled	0.640	0.562	0.524	n/a				
	x	3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.642	0.568	0.516	0.898	0.618	0.519	0.590	1.001
		4	level-specific time effects: men	0.506	0.439	0.406	n/a	0.473	0.425	0.495	n/a
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.401	0.350	0.323	n/a	0.419	0.286	0.306	n/a
Demographic structuration											
race		2	total time effects: pooled	0.675	0.561	0.480	n/a				
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.675	0.560	0.480	0.844	0.673	0.564	0.479	0.844
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.506	0.432	0.370	0.855	0.481	0.421	0.369	0.876
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.445	0.357	0.307	0.833	0.473	0.370	0.310	0.812
ethnic		2	total time effects: pooled	0.697	0.569	0.437	n/a				
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.736	0.529	0.423	0.764	0.628	0.634	0.452	0.825
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.576	0.471	0.322	0.739	0.538	0.403	0.248	0.671
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.404	0.291	0.307	0.908	0.358	0.470	0.371	0.965
spneth		2	total time effects: pooled	0.562	0.564	0.605	n/a				
		3	level-specific time effects: pooled	0.547	0.566	0.617	1.063	0.593	0.561	0.578	0.990
	x	4	level-specific time effects: men	0.462	0.468	0.486	1.026	0.418	0.412	0.434	1.021
		4	level-specific time effects: women	0.261	0.324	0.398	1.234	0.412	0.377	0.393	0.981

Note: The preferred model is indicated with an "x" (see Table A3). If no model is marked, the preferred model is Model 1 (no trend) and the slope is set to 1. If Model 2 is preferred, the big-class and micro-class slopes are set to be equivalent. If Model 3 is preferred, the trend for Model 4 is not calculated. Linear trend coefficients are estimated using WLS (see text).

Table A5: Trends in class inequality by gender and domain

		Men		Women		Pooled	
Domain	Items	Big-class	Micro-class	Big-class	Micro-class	Big-class	Micro-class
Life chances	7	0.991	1.045	0.985	0.965	0.976	1.000
Lifestyles							
consumption & behaviors	7	0.766	0.978	0.859	1.111	0.736	0.985
institutional participation*	7	0.858	1.008	0.845	0.958	0.858	1.010
Sentiments							
political attitudes	2	0.755	1.503	0.801	1.167	0.780	1.290
social attitudes	14	0.862	0.976	0.885	1.148	0.865	0.971
Demographic structuration	3	0.865	0.843	0.977	0.916	0.882	0.883
All outcomes*	40	0.859	1.004	0.893	1.058	0.854	0.992

Notes: Values in the table are the geometric means (across outcomes) of the estimated linear trend in the strength of the class-outcome association. The slope coefficients are calculated from a WLS regression of time on the additive shift effects from the preferred model for each outcome; if Model 1 is preferred, the slope is fixed at 1. The weights are the total sample size (if models 1 through 3 are preferred) or gender-specific sample size (if model 4 is preferred) in each decade.

* Veteran status is only available for men. The institutional participation and summary means for women exclude this outcome.