Immigrant Revitalization and Neighborhood Violent Crime in Established and New Destination Cities

David M. Ramey, *Ohio State University*

Recently, scholars examining the link between immigration and crime have proposed an "immigrant revitalization perspective," wherein larger immigrant populations are associated with reduced violent crime in aggregate areas. However, research supporting this claim typically draws on findings from research on heavily Latino neighborhoods in "established destination cities" and rarely takes into account the massive dispersal of immigrants across the country at the end of the twentieth century. Using a representative sample of neighborhoods in large US cities, this project analyzes violent crime rates for 8,628 census tracts, divided by racial and ethnic composition, nested within 84 cities, classified by immigration history or "destination" status. Findings suggest that the immigrant revitalization process may be heavily contingent on neighborhood- and city-level context. Specifically, neighborhoods with relatively small and recent immigrant populations may rely on receptive contexts provided by established destinations to revitalization neighborhoods and contribute to lower violent crime rates.

Scholarly interest in how immigration influences neighborhood crime surfaced in the early twentieth century amid a period of considerable change in American cities (Martínez 2006; Moehling and Piehl 2009). For example, as waves of European immigrants more than doubled the percentage of foreign-born residents in Chicago, sociologists at the University of Chicago began studying heightened rates of delinquency in the neighborhoods where immigrants settled (Bursik 2006; Shaw and McKay 1969). They found that economic and social factors compelled many immigrants to move into neighborhoods with low-income housing and high levels of residential instability. While high crime

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2010 meetings of the Population Association of America, Washington, DC. Ruth Peterson, Lauren Krivo, Chris Browning, and Reanne Frank provided helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper. This research uses data from the National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS), collected by Ruth Peterson and Lauren Krivo and funded by grant SES0080091 from the National Science Foundation, and the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB), collected by the Urban Institute GeoLytics, Inc. Information on how to obtain NNCS data is available at the ICPSR website (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/RCMD/studies/27501), and the NCDB is available through GeoLytics, Inc. (http://www.geolytics.com/USCensus,Neighborhood-Change-Database-1970-2000,Products.asp). *Please direct correspondence to David M. Ramey, Department of Sociology, Ohio State University, 238 Townshend Hall, 1885 Neil Ave. Mall, Columbus OH 43210, USA; email: ramey.31@osu.edu.*

Social Forces 00(00) 1–33, xxxx 2013
doi: 10.1093/sf/sot085

may have been a feature of these neighborhoods, it did not follow immigrants as they moved into other parts of the city (Bursik 2006; Shaw and McKay 1969). Moreover, although delinquency rates were high in "immigrant" neighborhoods, they were no higher than in similar low-income neighborhoods throughout the city (Martínez 2006; Shaw and McKay 1969). These, and related findings, led to Shaw and McKay's (1969) thesis that levels of crime in neighborhoods are in large part a function of social disorganization stemming from economic disadvantage, residential instability, and ethnic heterogeneity. From their vantage point, crime levels are not a cultural trait of any particular group.

Recent waves of immigrants, particularly from Latin America, have contributed to renewed scholarly interest in, and public concern about, the connection between immigration and crime. Notably, contemporary scholars apply Shaw and McKay's (1969) social disorganization theory in examining neighborhood crime rates for cities with substantial immigrant populations (Bursik 2006; Martínez 2006; Stowell et al. 2009). Consistent with Shaw and McKay's thesis, the results from this work show that, although neighborhoods with large immigrant populations have higher than average rates of economic disadvantage and residential instability, they have relatively low crime rates (Martínez 2006; Martínez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Sampson 2008). For some, this pattern provides evidence of "immigrant revitalization," whereby large and growing immigrant populations are argued to improve local economic structures and strengthen social ties, thereby contributing to lower crime rates, particularly in disadvantaged local areas (Martínez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Sampson 2008; Stowell et al. 2009; Vélez 2009). Despite such claims, it is premature to draw firm conclusions about the connection between immigration and crime from these limited results. One reason is that much knowledge about how levels of immigrant composition and immigrant growth contribute to neighborhood crime comes from research that relies on samples of neighborhoods in places like Los Angeles, Chicago, and Miami, cities with historically large and deep-rooted immigrant populations. Over the past half-century, these immigrant populations and their native-born offspring have transformed these neighborhoods into prominent communities characterized by a high concentration of co-ethnic neighbors (Iceland 2009; Park and Iceland 2011). Yet, even as immigrant composition remains relatively high in neighborhoods in these "established immigrant destination" cities, migrant populations are now a nationwide phenomenon (Iceland 2009). More specifically, internal migration of the foreign-born and the emergence of new immigrant networks have led to the rapid rise of immigrant communities in fast-growing "new destination" cities like Charlotte, NC; Minneapolis, MN; and Nashville, TN (Iceland 2009; Singer 2004, 2009). In these places, immigrant communities are relatively more recent, smaller in size, and less densely concentrated in central city neighborhoods (Iceland 2009; Park and Iceland 2011). Importantly, as immigrant growth becomes a feature of more American cities and neighborhoods, it raises the fundamental question of how the relationship between immigration and crime compares/differs across various "contexts of reception," that is, cities and neighborhoods with diverse immigration histories and patterns of growth (Portes and Rumbaut 2006).

To elaborate, evidence suggests that immigrant composition and immigrant growth are generally associated with lower neighborhood violent crime rates. However, this may be due to certain influential contextual factors that are unique to places with traditionally large immigrant populations. Notably, due to a large immigrant presence over time, residents of many neighborhoods in established destinations have developed long-standing ties to cities' political, economic, and social institutions that help them integrate new arrivals (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Waters and Jimènez 2005). Such connections facilitate the development and continuation of social and labor market ties (i.e., external investments, political strength) that translate into informal and formal social control, which, in turn, guard against "street" crime in these communities (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Martínez 2006; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). It is unclear whether neighborhoods in new destination cities are able to take advantage of these same safeguards. With smaller and more recent immigrant and co-ethnic communities citywide, new destination neighborhoods may have fewer resources to address potential crime problems associated with the social conflict, economic disadvantage, and disruptions of social networks that may emerge in neighborhoods where new arrivals have settled (Crowder, Hall, and Tolnay 2011; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Waters and Jimènez 2005). Thus, for neighborhoods in new destinations, immigrant composition and immigrant growth may not routinely be associated with less violent crime, as is the case in similar neighborhoods in established destinations.

In this article, I seek to extend research on the association between immigration and neighborhood crime by examining the existence and nature of this relationship across different types of local areas within different types of cities. In doing so, I draw on social disorganization theory, immigrant revitalization arguments, and an immigrant incorporation framework to test assumptions about immigrant composition and crime in what Portes and Rumbaut (2006) call different "contexts of reception." In addition, in light of the importance of racial structure in setting the context for differences in crime levels, I examine the role of immigrant characteristics across neighborhoods of different racial and ethnic compositions. Using data from the National Neighborhood Crime Study and the Neighborhood Change Database, I rely on a multilevel modeling strategy to examine how rates of criminal violence (homicides and robberies) vary for four types of racial/ethnic neighborhoods within a sample of large US cities classified according to their "immigrant destination status." Importantly too, I employ cross-level interaction models to examine whether city destination modifies the relationship between characteristics of local immigrant populations (immigrant composition and recent immigrant growth) and neighborhood violence in racially and ethnically distinct areas.

Conceptual Framework

Social Disorganization Theory

Scholars often employ social disorganization theory when considering how crime rates vary across different neighborhoods. This perspective argues that

crime is a function of neighborhood social and economic structure (Nielsen, Lee, and Martínez 2005; Shaw and McKay 1969). High levels of poverty, residential instability, and ethnic heterogeneity render a neighborhood unable to maintain and enforce meaningful social control (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003). In their analyses of early twentieth-century Chicago, Shaw and McKay (1969) found that neighborhoods characterized by these structural conditions consistently displayed relatively high juvenile delinquency rates. Such neighborhoods were characterized as "disorganized" due to their inability to "realize common goals and solve chronic problems" (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003, 374). Social disorganization reflects that concentrated economic disadvantage can prevent neighborhood residents from gaining access to important political and economic resources that strengthen local institutions, promote social cohesion, and bolster local labor market ties (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Peterson and Krivo 2010; Squires and Kubrin 2006). Also, residential instability and population heterogeneity may undermine efforts at social control by disrupting social norms and reducing social solidarity (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Hipp, Tita, and Boggess 2009; Nielsen, Lee, and Martínez 2005).

There are many reasons to expect higher levels of immigrant composition and immigrant growth to contribute to neighborhood social disorganization and accompanying high levels of violent crime rates, regardless of the criminality of immigrant populations themselves (Ousey and Kubrin 2009; Shaw and McKay 1969). Because many immigrants arrive with low levels of income and education, immigrant populations routinely emerge in high-poverty neighborhoods (Jargowsky 2009). In these neighborhoods, immigrant composition and recent immigrant growth can give rise to potential cultural barriers, economic competition, and increased ethnic heterogeneity that could foster mistrust and threaten to disrupt community social cohesion (Hipp, Tita, and Boggess 2009; Martínez, Lee, and Nielsen 2004). Put differently, by bringing in members whose language and ways of living are different from those of current residents, large or recent immigrant populations may disrupt existing neighborhood social ties and potentially weaken the ability of local institutions to meet the needs of a changing community (Hipp, Tita, and Boggess 2009; Martínez, Lee, and Nielsen 2004). If so, immigrant populations may contribute to neighborhood disorganization and, thereby, higher violent crime rates.

Interestingly, the findings of existing research are not consistent with this expectation. To the contrary, research reveals that neighborhoods with a more heavily immigrant population do not have higher rates of violent crime than their counterparts with fewer immigrants (Martínez 2006; Martínez, Lee, and Nielsen 2004; Martínez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Sampson 2008). Indeed, evidence suggests that immigrant composition and immigrant growth may protect against violent crime and delinquency (Martínez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Sampson 2008). Immigrant composition has been found to have a negative association with violent crime rates in Chicago (Vélez 2009), Los Angeles (Feldmeyer 2009), and Miami, El Paso, and San Diego (Martínez, Lee, and Nielsen 2004), among other cities. Martínez, Stowell, and Lee (2010) examined San Diego neighborhoods between 1980 and 2000 and found that immigrant composition

contributes to lower homicide rates over time, even after controlling for prior homicide. In light of these recent findings, scholars have suggested that researchers take seriously the possibility that higher levels of immigrant composition and immigrant growth may contribute to lower rates of violent crime in otherwise "disorganized" neighborhoods (Martínez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Sampson 2008; Vélez 2009). They further argue that, if this is the case, an "immigrant revitalization" perspective might better describe and account for the patterns observed in the above studies.

Immigrant Revitalization

Immigrant revitalization arguments are an extension of the "immigrant paradox" literature, which demonstrates that unexpected benefits are associated with residence in immigrant communities, despite their higher levels of concentrated disadvantage and residential instability (Martínez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Sampson 2008). From this perspective, large and growing immigrant populations are viewed as potentially having positive social and economic benefits for neighborhoods. Indeed, Sampson (2008) points out that "immigrant neighborhoods" are some of the most thriving hubs of economic activity in Chicago. As a source of low-wage labor and consumption, immigrant communities are often considered a sign of economic growth rather than decline for cities and neighborhoods (Sampson 2008; Waldinger 1989). This economic growth encourages strong labor market ties, which in turn strengthens community social ties and promotes efforts at social control (Martínez 2006).

In addition to promoting economic viability, a large and growing immigrant population can also reinforce formal and informal social institutions, a feature that contributes to social organization and helps meet the needs of growing immigrant populations (Martínez 2006; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Vélez 2009). Immigrants develop strong ties to both family members and neighbors, and in turn use these kin and "fictive kin" networks to create social support structures in neighborhoods with large concentrations of immigrants (Ebaugh and Curry 2000; Vélez 2009). Further, immigrant composition bolsters local institutions like churches and community centers (Shihadeh and Winters 2010; Vélez 2009). Such programs help neighborhoods deliver services to new arrivals and sustain efforts at attracting external community investments (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Vélez 2001, 2009).

In brief, by helping revive economic and social institutions, immigrant communities reinforce neighborhood ideals and provide a boost to efforts at social control (Lee and Martínez 2006; Vélez 2009). The consistency of this finding has prompted scholars to suggest that neighborhoods and "cities of concentrated immigration are some of the safest places around" (Sampson 2008, 31). Evidence supporting this claim notwithstanding, patterns of immigration in the United States are changing. Immigrants are moving into new types of neighborhoods and cities across the United States. Unlike ethnic enclaves in large established destination cities, many such receiving areas have small and relatively new immigrant communities and vary considerably in their racial and ethnic

composition (Iceland 2009; South, Crowder, and Chavez 2005). These features of receiving communities raise important questions: to what extent do immigrant composition and immigrant growth "revitalize" neighborhoods in places outside large established destination cities; and do such effects occur for local areas regardless of their race–ethnic composition?

Neighborhoods and Cities as Different Contexts of Reception

For much of the twentieth century, a small group of large cities with a history of immigration and ethnic diversity, such as Los Angeles, Miami, and Chicago, served as entry points for new immigrants (Iceland 2009; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). In these "established destination" cities, many neighborhoods became "ethnic enclaves," characterized internally by a heavy presence of residents of the same ethnicity, foreign- and native-born, and strong social and economic ties between residents (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Vélez 2009). These strong ties helped incorporate large immigrant populations into a city's social, economic, and political structure. However, during the 1990s, a number of "new destination cities" emerged amid changes in the economic, social, and political structure of the United States (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Singer 2004). Large numbers of immigrants left ethnic enclaves in established destination cities and, accompanied by new arrivals from abroad, began to settle in areas with little to no co-ethnic or foreign-born presence (Singer 2004; Winders 2012). In doing so, they changed the compositional structure of neighborhoods and cities across the United States. Despite this trend, studies of immigrant communities and violent crime rates have focused primarily on neighborhoods in a small number of established destination cities; only recently have researchers begun to consider this relationship in cities where immigration is a relatively new phenomenon.

In their book *Immigrant America*, Portes and Rumbaut (2006) describe how cities and neighborhoods with varying immigration histories provide different "contexts of reception" for the incorporation of immigrant populations in the United States. Specifically, local government policies, labor market conditions, and the size and characteristics of the co-ethnic community provide favorable or unfavorable conditions for new arrivals (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). A "receptive" context is one in which the government, labor market, and a large co-ethnic community serve to integrate new arrivals socially and economically. On the other hand, a "handicapped" context of reception is one with little to no co-ethnic presence, where the local governments and native population may view immigrants negatively, and immigrant groups are isolated from the social fabric of the community. Portes and Rumbaut argue that cities providing receptive contexts foster the development of strong social ties and "enclave economies" that may help immigrant communities avoid the crime that is a "constant presence in the dilapidated neighborhoods where immigrants often settle" (2006, 202). While Portes and Rumbaut (2006) touch only briefly on the criminological implications of their argument, their thesis is consistent with social disorganization and immigrant revitalization.

As traditional points of arrival for newcomers from abroad, established destinations have structures in place to address potential social issues that accompany large concentrations of immigrants (Iceland 2009; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Waters and Jimènez 2005). For example, local and city governmental and non-governmental organizations in established destinations help integrate new arrivals by providing bilingual services, legal advice, and dense, interconnected social and labor market ties, all of which open doors to potential jobs and encourage civic participation (Martínez 2002; Sampson 2008; Vélez 2009; Waters and Jimènez 2005). Further, large segments of the labor market in established destinations are composed of ethnic businesses and firms (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Here, less discrimination in the labor market results in fewer barriers to hiring and promotion and more opportunities for immigrants to develop strong connections to local economic and political networks (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Thus, neighborhoods in established destination cities are able to rely on a structure of vibrant and extended immigrant labor markets and political connections. This facilitates efforts at both informal and formal social control locally (Martínez 2002, 2006; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Vélez 2009).

On the other hand, in new destination cities, local institutions may be less equipped to assist local immigrant populations in revitalizing neighborhoods (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Singer 2004; Winders 2012). With smaller and relatively newer immigrant populations citywide, immigrants in new destinations are less likely to settle in ethnic enclaves and more likely to settle in neighborhoods where native-born whites or African Americans comprise the majority racial/ethnic group (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; South, Crowder, and Chavez 2005; Winders 2012). With smaller and potentially weaker immigrant and co-ethnic communities, new arrivals in new destinations have less information about safe and unsafe communities (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010). Further, smaller immigrant communities and greater dispersion in new destinations prevent immigrants from having significant influence in neighborhood organizations and impede efforts of local governmental and non-governmental organizations to meet the needs of new immigrant communities (Winders 2012).

With little influence in local social institutions, immigrant communities in less-established places may face both direct exclusionary or oppositional governmental policies and potential discrimination. Driven by local public demand, many law enforcement agencies in new destination places may focus their policies surrounding new immigrant communities around the enforcement of federal immigration laws and less on integrating immigrants into the city (Winders 2012). Such efforts rarely reduce crime. In fact, enforcement-centered policies have little to do with preventing violence and may be associated with higher levels of neighborhood legal cynicism and higher rates of violent crime (Chavez and Provine 2009; Kirk et al. 2012; Orrenius and Coronado 2005). In addition to less than ideal social and political conditions, there are reasons to expect that the labor market conditions facing immigrant communities in new destinations are different in ways that influence local rates of violence. Discrimination in the labor market channels immigrants into a few specific jobs, primarily in the service sector (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). The result is potentially weaker ties to

the local labor market among the immigrant population (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Immigrants' weak labor market ties can hamper revitalization by impeding immigrant incorporation into local economic and social structures (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Martínez 2006). In brief, as immigrant populations emerge in new destination cities across the country, the social and political environments that they encounter differ fundamentally from the traditional immigrant communities of established destinations. These differences may influence the ability of immigrant populations to revitalize disadvantaged neighborhoods and prevent high violent crime rates.

To summarize, established destinations are home to large immigrant populations, encouraging the growth of strong co-ethnic community ties that extend across neighborhood boundaries. These communities may be positioned to provide the economic and social context for immigrant revitalization. Social and governmental institutions in established destinations are organized in such a manner as to encourage immigrant incorporation and social cohesion, rather than conflict and mistrust. By contrast, such arrangements are less likely to prevail in new destinations, rendering some neighborhoods less able to integrate new arrivals into the local community, potentially decreasing social cohesion, and putting the neighborhood at risk for higher violent crime rates compared to similar neighborhoods in established destination cities. If new destinations provide a context of reception characterized by precarious political and social conditions, immigrant communities may not have the "revitalizing" impact observed in other contexts. Indeed, the inverse association between immigrant composition and neighborhood violence found in some studies may be due in part to factors stemming from a large immigrant presence in established destinations. Given these possibilities, it is important to explore to what extent the relationships between neighborhood immigrant composition and immigrant growth and neighborhood crime rates vary across neighborhoods in cities that differ in their experiences with immigration. It is also important to explore these relationships for neighborhoods that vary in their race–ethnic composition.

The Racial Structure of Neighborhood Crime

The research discussed above suggests that social disorganization and immigrant revitalization may be contingent on the contexts of reception that different types of cities are able to provide to their immigrant communities. However, recent scholarship on neighborhood crime suggests that many of the internal and external benefits of immigrant composition and city context of reception may also vary across racially and ethnically distinct neighborhoods (Saporu et al. 2011). Drawing upon a critical race approach to social structure in the United States, recent developments in research have shed light on how racial residential segregation creates an unbalanced distribution of social problems across different neighborhoods, including criminal violence (Peterson and Krivo 2010). Through racial discrimination in the labor and housing markets, among other institutions, a system of structural inequality has emerged that restricts the residential options of minorities (Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl 2009; Peterson

and Krivo 2010). The result is a hierarchical neighborhood structure in the United States, with predominantly white neighborhoods and predominantly African American neighborhoods at the extreme ends of neighborhood disadvantage, with majority Latino and integrated neighborhoods in between (Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl 2009; Peterson and Krivo 2010). Therefore, by confining disadvantaged racial minorities to separate and isolated communities, racial residential segregation further influences the distribution of both social problems and resources for dealing with these problems, including those associated with immigration (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

Given their extremely high levels of disadvantage, predominantly African American neighborhoods have traditionally had trouble receiving and sustaining external investments, public or private (Peterson and Krivo 2010; Saporu et al. 2011). As a result, rates of criminal violence are consistently higher in predominantly African American neighborhoods than in other race–ethnic neighborhoods (Peterson and Krivo 2010). In these disadvantaged and disorganized contexts, the positive economic and social impact of local immigrant composition and immigrant growth may be insufficient to combat criminal violence to a substantial degree in African American neighborhoods. Indeed, immigrant populations in African American neighborhoods may require the receptive context provided by established destinations in order to acquire the resources needed to revitalize local economic social institutions, thereby reducing crime. Therefore, immigrant presence and immigrant growth should contribute to lower crime rates only in established destination African American neighborhoods.

Because neighborhood disadvantage is relatively lower in both white and integrated neighborhoods than in African American neighborhoods, current and growing immigrant populations may be able to contribute positively to the existing local economic and social climate in the former areas, leading to lower rates of violence. However, similar to African American neighborhoods, this association may rely on the receptive context provided by established destination cities. Indeed, the immigrant composition of these places may be too small to develop substantial contributions to the local social and economic structure (Waters and Jimènez 2005). Moreover, through intentional discrimination or inadvertent institutional invisibility, these smaller and more recent immigrant populations may be limited in their ability to access public resources that cultivate social and economic revitalization (Waters and Jimènez 2005; Winders 2012). While current and growing immigrant populations in white and integrated neighborhoods can take advantage of opportunities provided by receptive established destination contexts to integrate the community and city economic and social structure, thereby likely reducing violence, neighborhoods in new destinations may not have these same opportunities, and as such cannot achieve these same ends. Therefore, immigrant composition and immigrant growth may contribute to lower crime rates only in established destination white and integrated neighborhoods.

In the United States, formal and informal familial and employment networks attract immigrants to co-ethnic neighborhoods with a familiar cultural setting and ready access to employment (Light and von Scheven 2008). As a result, the composition of foreign-born residents is typically much higher in predominantly

Latino neighborhoods than in other neighborhoods (Iceland 2009; Peterson and Krivo 2010; South, Crowder, and Chavez 2005). Moreover, in these places, concentrated disadvantage is relatively lower than in African American neighborhoods, and employment opportunities, especially for the foreign-born, are more readily available (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Vélez 2006). This helps immigrant populations develop vibrant local economic and political structures that take advantage of new forms of human and social capital at the neighborhood level, making them less susceptible to receptive or handicapped contexts (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Indeed, large immigrant populations in predominantly Latino neighborhoods provide an "institutional visibility" that further integrates Latino neighborhoods politically and economically in new destinations (Winders 2012). Therefore, by reinforcing local social and economic networks, and initiating connections to the city economic and political structures, immigrant composition in Latino neighborhoods may reflect neighborhood revitalization and lower violent crime rates in both new and established destination cities.

In brief, racial residential segregation creates a hierarchical system of neighborhood inequality resulting in divergent concentrations of extreme advantage and disadvantage based on racial and ethnic composition. As such, it is extremely difficult to make comparisons across different groups while simply "controlling" for neighborhood social structure. Moreover, these differences likely condition the effects of neighborhood immigrant composition and city context of reception on neighborhood violent crime in different types of neighborhoods. For these reasons, I utilize a stratified model that considers how neighborhood- and city-level immigration factors influence rates of criminal violence across separate racially and ethnically distinct neighborhoods (Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl 2009; Saporu et al. 2011).

Research Goals

This study analyzes links between factors associated with immigration and neighborhood violent crime across varying contexts of reception in large American cities. Specifically, I use multilevel modeling techniques to examine violent crime patterns for four types of neighborhoods that vary according to their racial and ethnic composition: white, African American, Latino, and integrated. For each neighborhood type, I consider how immigrant composition and recent immigrant growth contribute to local rates of violence. I then use cross-level interactions to investigate whether these relationships vary according to the contexts of reception provided by established and new immigrant destination cities.

Data and Methods

Sample

To accomplish the above goals, this project relies on data from the National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS) and the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB). The NNCS, conducted by Peterson and Krivo (2006), compiles Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data for violent and property crime at the census-tract level

for a representative sample of 91 cities with populations over 100,000 in 1999. Crime data are reported for 9,563 census tracts, Peterson and Krivo's proxies for neighborhoods, within the 91 cities. The current analysis is restricted to 8,628 white, African American, Latino, and integrated tracts in the 84 cities in the NNCS that meet the criteria for established and new destinations discussed below. Neighborhoods are defined as white ($n = 4{,}303$), African American ($n = 1{,}841$), or Latino ($n = 1{,}342$) if the respective group constitutes at least a 50-percent share of the local population. Tracts where no specific group makes up at least half the population are considered to be integrated ($n = 1{,}142$).[1] The NCDB (GeoLytics 2003) provides tract-level census data from 1970 to 2000, normalized to 2000 tract boundaries. This allows me to use 1990 and 2000 data from the NCDB to measure recent growth and decline in immigrant composition over time while avoiding issues related to official boundary changes between the two decades. Although the current investigation is not longitudinal, by relying on the NCDB, I am able to categorize cities according to whether they have historically been or only recently become immigrant destination sites, and to measure the degree of recent immigrant growth at the tract level.

Research Setting

Neighborhood immigrant growth (and immigration itself) is no longer strictly an urban phenomenon. In fact, some of the places in the United States with the fastest-growing immigrant populations are suburbs (Singer 2004), the rural South (Kandel and Parrado 2005), and smaller cities throughout the nation (Park and Iceland 2011). This raises questions about relying exclusively on large cities as research settings. I do so here for several reasons. First, while immigrant communities are present in a wide variety of places, they continue to have a considerable impression in neighborhoods of large cities (Frey 2003). Second, the theoretical perspectives (social disorganization and immigrant revitalization) on which I draw largely pertain to urban crime (Shaw and McKay 1969). Finally, as most established destinations are typically large cities (Singer 2004), it is beneficial to compare them to new destinations of similar population size. Thus, neighborhoods within urban areas are an appropriate unit for this analysis.

Dependent Variable

Following prior research using the NNCS (Peterson and Krivo 2010; Saporu et al. 2011), the dependent variable is a three-year (1999–2001) average count of tract-level homicides and robberies, taken from official police reports and aggregated to the census-tract level. Note that the NNCS offers tract-level counts for two additional violent index offenses (i.e., aggravated assaults and forcible rapes) included in the UCR reports. However, I focus on homicides and robberies because of data availability concerns and consequent loss of relevant cases if rapes and assaults were included in the violent crime measure. Due to local requirements regarding reporting laws and policies, some police departments do not report rape data, and due to data quality problems, aggravated

assault data are missing for several of the NNCS cities[2] (Peterson and Krivo 2010, 130). Thus, including forcible rapes and aggravated assaults in the index for the violent crime measure would result in a substantial reduction in sample size, including removal from the analysis of a number of theoretically important cities (e.g., Chicago; Miami and Hialeah, FL; and Dallas). In order to test the sensitivity of the dependent variable to the removal of some index crimes from the analyses, I examined models using a violent crime index that includes forcible rapes, equivalent to the measure that Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl (2009) used in their analysis of violent crime for neighborhoods in 79 of the NNCS cities. With few exceptions, these models yielded results similar to those found for the current sample of neighborhoods in 84 cities.[3] Given that violent crime indices containing neighborhood homicide and robbery rates are commonly used in the literature (Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl 2009; Peterson and Krivo 2010; Saporu et al. 2011), and the results do not differ substantially when a more inclusive measure of crime is used, in the interest of examining the sources of violence for a broad range of geographies (tracts and cities), I measure violent crime as an index including homicides and robberies. The strategy of using multiyear counts is a common practice in criminological research to minimize the impact of annual fluctuations in rare events at small levels of aggregation (Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl 2009).

Tract-Level Independent Variables

The interest here is in examining the influence of immigrant population size and growth on local violence across varying contexts of reception. Therefore, the central tract-level independent variables are *immigrant composition* and *immigrant growth*. I measure neighborhood immigrant composition as the percentage of the tract population that was born outside the United States. Immigrant growth is operationalized as the absolute growth (or decline) in neighborhood immigrant composition between 1995 and 2000. Both measures have been used in criminological and demographic research on the mobility of the foreign-born in the United States (Crowder, Hall, and Tolnay 2011; Martínez, Stowell, and Lee 2010).

Tract-Level Control Variables

In addition to these central independent neighborhood factors and in line with social disorganization arguments, measures of *neighborhood disadvantage* and *residential instability* are included in the models as control variables. Neighborhood disadvantage is an index composed of the average of the summed *z*-scores for six variables that measure the percent of the tract population that is: employed in secondary-sector, low-wage jobs; employed in professional or management careers (reverse-coded); jobless and in the working-age population (16–64); living in female-headed households; over 25 years with at least a high school diploma (reverse-coded); and living below the poverty line ($\alpha = .92$). This type of index has been used to measure disadvantage in prior research involving the NNCS (Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl 2009; Peterson and Krivo 2010). I measure

residential instability using an index of the average of summed *z*-scores for the percentage of housing units that are renter occupied and the percentage of the tract population that lived in a different residence in 1995 ($\alpha = .63$). This index is a commonly used measure of residential instability in neighborhood analyses of crime (e.g., Peterson and Krivo 2010). An additional tract-level variable, the percent of the tract that is male and between 15 and 34 years old (*percent young males*), is included to control for the population deemed to be the most crime prone in the neighborhood.

City-Level Independent Variables

Following recent research on immigration and crime, this paper focuses on current trends in migration, particularly during the end of the twentieth century (Sampson 2008), and how their influence varies in cities that were homes to substantially large percentages of immigrants prior to the 1990s (i.e., established destination cities) (Lichter et al. 2010) compared to cities with relatively small immigrant populations at the beginning of the 1990s but which experienced increases in both their absolute and relative immigrant composition during the 1990s (new destination cities) (Lichter et al. 2010). Thus, the key city-level independent variable reflects a city's status as a current immigrant destination, as measured by city-level immigrant population in 1990 and 2000. Conceptually, both established and new destinations experienced immigrant population growth during the 1990s; however, growth in new destinations was both novel and unprecedented in recent history. Operationally, the status of cities is captured as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the city is considered a *new destination* or 0 if the city is considered an *established destination*. Established destination cities are those with above-average foreign-born concentration in both 1990 and 2000 (11.7 and 17.7 percent, respectively). This category is the reference category in all analyses. New immigrant destination cities are those that had below-average foreign-born concentrations in 1990 and increases in both their absolute foreign-born population and change in the percent foreign-born over the next decade.[4] Overall, sixty-three cities fall into the new destination category and twenty-one cities are considered established destination cities (see appendix A).[5]

City-Level Control Variables

To account for significant variation in immigrant population size across cities, I include city-level *immigrant composition*, measured as the percentage of the city that is foreign-born. To control for population growth not due to immigration, I include a measure of *percent population change* between 1990 and 2000. Moreover, I include several city-level controls found to affect neighborhood crime in prior research. *City disadvantage* ($\alpha = .92$) and *city residential instability* ($\alpha = .18$) are measured as indices analogous to neighborhood-level disadvantage and residential instability measures. To capture labor market activity for the city, I include a measure of *city manufacturing*, defined as the percent of the employed civilian population age 16 and over employed in manufacturing industries.

Also, in line with prior research, at the city level I include two measures of segregation using the Dissimilarity Indices (D). D measures the relative evenness of two groups within units and indicates the percentage of one group that would have to move to a new tract for there to be an even distribution of members from both groups in each tract in the city. In the formula presented, a_j and b_j represent the number of members of the two respective groups residing in tract j, while A and B are the total number of each group in the city.

$$D_{ab} = \left[.5 * \sum_{j=1}^{n} \left| \frac{a_j}{A} - \frac{b_j}{B} \right| \right] * 100$$

Black/white segregation is controlled for because this factor has been shown to influence neighborhood violence for areas of all racial and ethnic composition (Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl 2009; Peterson and Krivo 2010). Second, because the focus of this paper is on immigrant settlement patterns, a measure of *foreign-born/native-born segregation* is included to capture the proximity of foreign-born residents to the native-born majority. Additional control variables include the percent of the city that is non-Latino black (*city-level percent black*) and the percentage of males between 15 and 34 years old (*city-level percent young males*). Because larger cities tend to have higher rates of violent crime, I also include a measure of *city-level population* (logged to account for heavy positive skew). Finally, I include two measures for census region (*South* and *West*) with the rest of the country as the reference category. Several of the city-level predictors are highly correlated with one another, raising the possibility of problems related to multicollinearity. However, tests of variance inflation and sensitivity revealed that multicollinearity is not an issue for any neighborhood type.[6]

Analytic Strategy

To assess neighborhood violence as a function of both neighborhood- and city-level structures in cities with different immigration experiences, I estimate multilevel models using HLM 6.07 with tracts at level 1 and cities at level 2. Because I am analyzing rare events within small level-1 units, I estimate a nonlinear Poisson model with counts of violent crime as my dependent variable. Specifying these counts with variable exposure by tract population is the equivalent of analyzing differences in violent crime *rates* across neighborhoods (Osgood 2000).[7] A common assumption of the Poisson model is equal means and variances of the dependent variable. Since the variance of my dependent variable is considerably larger than the mean, I control for overdispersion at level 1. Poisson models with overdispersion in HLM are analogous to a negative binomial model.[8] Continuous variables are grand-mean centered in the analysis, indicating that coefficients can be interpreted as the effects of changes from the overall mean in the sample. Furthermore, coefficients for all city-level variables can be interpreted as contextual effects on neighborhood-level violence, net of any neighborhood-level effects.

Findings

Table 1 presents means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for variables included in the study. These data draw attention to the extraordinary structural differences across different neighborhood types. White neighborhoods, on average, have extraordinarily low violent crime rates (2.6 per 1,000 population) relative to all types of non-white neighborhoods. African American neighborhoods have violent crime rates (9.9 per 1,000 population) over three times as high as white areas. Rates for Latino and integrated neighborhoods fall between these two extremes. Turning to the key tract-level independent variables, average levels of immigrant composition and immigrant growth are far greater in Latino and integrated neighborhoods than in white or African American areas ($p < .001$). Other tract-level variables differ significantly across neighborhood types as well.[9] Notably, levels of disadvantage are much higher in African American and Latino neighborhoods than in white or integrated areas ($p < .001$). To provide a clearer account of variation in neighborhood social structure across immigrant destinations, I turn to a discussion of how immigrant composition and immigrant growth vary across destination types for similar racial and ethnic neighborhoods.

Table 2 presents descriptive means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the tract-level variables across established and new destination cities for each neighborhood type. Looking at the distribution across city destination type, it is worth noting that a large proportion of white and African American neighborhoods are located in new destination cities (77.7 and 68.8 percent, respectively), while nearly 70 percent of Latino neighborhoods are located in established destination cities. Indeed, only integrated neighborhoods seem evenly distributed across city type, with a little over half of integrated neighborhoods in established destinations. Turning to the dependent variable, rates of homicides and robberies are higher for established destination white and African American neighborhoods than for similar neighborhoods located in new destination cities, but these rates for white neighborhoods are not significantly different. However, for Latino and integrated neighborhoods, a different pattern emerges. In these neighborhoods, violent crime rates are lower in established destination cities, and significantly so for integrated areas. Regarding the central independent variables, immigrant composition is significantly higher in established than new destinations for all neighborhood types. However, compared to established destinations, immigrant growth is greater for new destination Latino and integrated neighborhoods only.

The descriptive statistics discussed above provide support for stratifying neighborhoods according to their race–ethnic composition and provide early evidence that city-level context of reception may condition the associations between neighborhood immigrant characteristics (composition and growth) and violent crime. Specifically, rates of criminal violence, immigrant composition, and immigrant growth all vary significantly across neighborhood type. Moreover, this is also the case for important structural variables, particularly neighborhood disadvantage. To assess the net association of neighborhood and city immigrant population

Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Variables Used in Analysis[a]

	White neighborhoods	African American neighborhoods	Latino neighborhoods	Integrated neighborhoods	All neighborhoods
	(n = 4,303)	(n = 1,841)	(n = 1,342)	(n = 1,142)	(n = 8,628)
Tract-level					
Annual violent crime rate per 1,000 (1999–2001)	2.613	9.875	5.158	4.895	4.861
	(4.862)	(8.526)	(5.616)	(5.913)	(6.687)
Immigrant composition	11.010	5.110	42.117	26.565	16.649
	(8.505)	(7.330)	(15.216)	(13.605)	(16.315)
Immigrant growth	1.578	0.714	3.808	4.247	2.094
	(2.537)	(2.004)	(5.209)	(4.250)	(3.505)
Disadvantage	–0.647	0.814	0.764	0.103	–0.016
	(0.508)	(0.694)	(0.506)	(0.566)	(0.869)
Residential instability	0.059	–0.107	0.249	0.401	0.040
	(0.915)	(0.786)	(0.744)	(0.813)	(0.870)
Percent young males	16.045	12.945	18.295	17.781	15.963
	(6.618)	(3.328)	(3.772)	(5.262)	(5.771)
City-level					
Immigrant composition	14.764	13.251	29.815	21.930	17.731
	(9.802)	(10.373)	(13.263)	(11.061)	(12.170)
City disadvantage	0.073	0.700	0.493	0.207	0.217
	(0.666)	(0.705)	(0.574)	(0.674)	(0.736)
City manufacturing	11.286	12.213	12.053	11.758	11.665
	(3.945)	(4.778)	(2.858)	(3.817)	(3.998)

City residential instability	0.272	−0.445	−0.243	−0.021	0.000
	(0.711)	(0.566)	(0.713)	(0.708)	(0.744)
Black/white segregation	54.577	68.570	62.629	58.353	59.315
	(17.094)	(11.396)	(17.159)	(16.191)	(16.887)
Foreign-born/native-born segregation	30.906	40.581	31.236	30.544	32.974
	(8.080)	(9.554)	(8.890)	(8.242)	(9.435)
Percent black	19.025	42.514	16.540	19.789	23.752
	(14.375)	(19.435)	(12.703)	(13.946)	(18.189)
Percent young males	16.613	15.881	16.701	16.781	16.493
	(2.157)	(1.668)	(1.414)	(1.894)	(1.950)
Percent population change (1990–2000)	13.811	2.377	13.032	12.687	11.101
	(16.789)	(10.317)	(12.064)	(14.871)	(15.361)
Population (logged)	825,554	1,134,647	1,939,686	1,160,212	1,109,094
	(9,494,325)	(1,009,549)	(1,408,294)	(1,198,305)	(1,145,858)
South	34.14%	35.69%	27.35%	30.47%	32.93%
West	32.28%	5.59%	55.96%	42.21%	31.58%

[a]All variables reference 2000 data unless otherwise noted.

Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for Neighborhood-level Variables by Neighborhood Type and City Destination Classification[a]

	White neighborhoods		African American neighborhoods		Latino neighborhoods		Integrated neighborhoods	
	Established destinations	New destinations	Established destinations	New destinations	Established destinations	New destinations	Established destinations	New destinations
	(*n* = 958)	(*n* = 3,345)	(*n* = 574)	(*n* = 1,267)	(*n* = 939)	(*n* = 403)	(*n* = 587)	(*n* = 555)
	(22.26%)	(77.74%)	(31.18%)	(68.82%)	(69.97%)	(30.03%)	(51.40%)	(48.60%)
Annual violent crime rate per 1,000 (1999–2001)	2.709	2.586	11.029***	9.353	4.976	5.580	4.190***	5.641
	(4.007)	(5.081)	(8.058)	(8.683)	(4.421)	(7.704)	(6.182)	(5.523)
Immigrant composition	19.953***	8.449	8.083***	3.764	46.048***	32.960	33.509***	19.221
	(10.025)	(5.902)	(9.990)	(5.205)	(14.590)	(12.468)	(12.153)	(10.947)
Immigrant growth (1995–2000)	1.657	1.556	0.813	0.670	1.991***	8.041	3.485***	5.053
	(3.414)	(2.223)	(2.302)	(1.852)	(4.224)	(4.817)	(4.219)	(4.136)
Neighborhood disadvantage	−0.852***	−0.588	0.826	0.809	0.794***	0.693	0.004***	0.207
	(0.396)	(0.521)	(0.740)	(0.672)	(0.504)	(0.505)	(0.572)	(0.542)
Residential instability	−0.081	−0.052	−0.142	−0.090	0.278*	0.181	0.333**	0.473
	(0.983)	(0.894)	(0.793)	(0.783)	(0.707)	(0.820)	(0.818)	(0.802)
Percent young males	15.982	16.063	12.797	13.013	17.887***	19.244	17.385**	18.200
	(7.321)	(6.403)	(2.926)	(3.494)	(3.366)	(4.442)	(4.931)	(5.565)

Note: Asterisks indicate significance of two-mean *t*-tests for differences of means.
[a]All variables reference 2000 data unless otherwise noted.
* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

characteristics with neighborhood violent crime, I now turn to a discussion of findings from multilevel models of neighborhood violence across the four race–ethnic neighborhood types.[10]

Table 3 presents the coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses, for separate multilevel models for white, African American, Latino, and integrated neighborhoods. Beginning with the independent variables, the coefficients for immigrant composition are significant and negative for three of the four neighborhood types. Specifically, higher levels of neighborhood immigrant composition are associated with lower rates of criminal violence for all but African American neighborhoods. For white neighborhoods, a one-standard-deviation (16.32 percent) difference in immigrant composition is associated with a 13.9-percent-lower $[(e^{[-.009*16.32]}-1)*100]$ neighborhood violent crime rate. Similarly, one-standard-deviation differences in immigrant composition for Latino and integrated neighborhoods are associated with a 16.6- and 12.5-percent-lower violent crime rate, respectively. Regarding the effects of immigrant growth, there are distinctly different patterns across neighborhood type. Importantly, the association between immigrant growth and violent crime is significant for white and integrated neighborhoods only. For white neighborhoods, a one-standard-deviation difference in immigrant growth (3.5) is associated with a 10-percent-lower violent crime rate. For integrated neighborhoods, such a difference is associated with approximately a 5-percent-lower level of criminal violence per 1,000 population.

At the city level, after controlling for neighborhood-level immigrant composition and immigrant growth, rates of violence in white, African American, and Latino neighborhoods are not influenced by the type of destination city. However, for integrated neighborhoods, violent crime rates are much higher in new destinations than in established destinations. Specifically, the "average" integrated neighborhood in a new destination city has a violent crime rate that is 78.3 percent higher $[(e^{[.578*1]}-1)*100]$ than the rate for established destinations. Further, net of other neighborhood conditions, the new destination variable is the only significant city-level predictor for integrated areas. The coefficients for several city-level variables are significant for other types of neighborhoods. For white neighborhoods, black–white residential segregation and percent black have positive associations with violence rates, while the percentage of workers employed in the manufacturing sector is negatively associated with violent crime. Latino neighborhoods in cities with greater black–white segregation and larger populations experience higher violent crime rates as well. For African American areas, the sizes of the black and overall populations are significant. Taken together, these patterns suggest that immigrant presence at the local and city levels play a role in violent crime for some types of neighborhoods. At the neighborhood level, immigrant composition and immigrant growth have negative relationships with criminal violence in all but African American neighborhoods. Moreover, in integrated neighborhoods, violent crime rates are significantly lower in established destinations, even when immigrant factors at the neighborhood level have been controlled. Overall, the evidence suggests that higher levels of immigrant composition and immigrant growth at the neighbor-

Table 3. Multilevel Poisson Models (with Variable Exposure) of Neighborhood Violent Crime (NNCS 2006)

	White neighborhoods	African American neighborhoods	Latino neighborhoods	Integrated neighborhoods
Tract-level				
Immigrant composition	−0.009**	−0.003	−0.011***	−0.008***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Immigrant growth	−0.030***	0.007	−0.002	−0.015*
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Disadvantage	0.805***	0.264***	0.542**	0.492***
	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Residential instability	0.451***	0.218***	0.181***	0.423***
	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.040)
Percent young males	−0.005	0.005	0.023**	−0.019**
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)
City-level				
New destination	0.257	0.263	0.191	0.578*
	(0.213)	(0.239)	(0.184)	(0.221)
Immigrant composition	0.018	0.007	0.001	0.015
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
City disadvantage	−0.068	0.070	−0.014	0.094
	(0.113)	(0.147)	(0.108)	(0.118)
City manufacturing	−0.026*	−0.031	−0.020	−0.029
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)

City residential instability	0.049	0.062	0.265	−0.095
	(0.127)	(0.159)	(0.144)	(0.153)
Black/white segregation	0.015**	0.002	−0.002	0.012
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Foreign-born/native-born segregation	−0.001	−0.004	−0.008	−0.005
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Percent black	0.019**	0.006	0.015*	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Percent young males	−0.032	−0.076	−0.068	0.006
	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.046)
Percent population change (1990–2000)	−0.088	0.634	0.073	−0.482
	(0.382)	(0.785)	(0.532)	(0.499)
Population (logged)	0.117	0.171	0.209*	0.120
	(0.088)	(0.106)	(0.104)	(0.106)
South	−0.131	−0.331	0.037	−0.239
	(0.130)	(0.159)	(0.251)	(0.164)
West	0.235	−0.413	0.197	−0.196
	(0.154)	(0.233)	(0.253)	(0.189)
Intercept	−6.329***	−5.240***	−6.019***	−6.070***

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

hood level contribute to lower violent crime rates in most places throughout the nation. Indeed, the only exception appears to be neighborhoods where African American residents comprise the majority.

The next set of analyses considers how city destination type conditions the effects of local immigrant settlement patterns on local rates of violent crime. Specifically, I conduct cross-level interaction models to answer the question of whether the influence of neighborhood immigrant composition and immigrant growth on neighborhood violence varies across new and established destination cities. Table 4 presents the coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses, for models including the three neighborhood- and city-level independent variables,[11] as well as two cross-level interactions, between destination type and immigrant composition and immigrant growth, respectively.[12] Overall, the results from these models reveal several interesting patterns. Notably, for all four neighborhood types, the main effect of immigrant composition on criminal violence is negative, while the main effect of immigrant growth is significant in all but African American neighborhoods. These findings suggest that higher levels of these factors are associated with lower levels of violent crime in most established destination neighborhoods. However, for all four types of racial and ethnic neighborhoods, one or both of the interaction coefficients is significant, indicating that the association of neighborhood immigrant characteristics on local rates of violent crime depends on whether neighborhoods are located in new or established destination cities. Indeed, with the exception of Latino areas, the apparently protective elements associated with immigrant composition appear to be a feature of established destinations alone. To facilitate discussion of these patterns, I turn to a series of figures displaying expected differences in violent crime rates for one-standard-deviation differences in immigrant composition and immigrant growth in new and established destinations for each neighborhood type.

Figure 1 presents the expected percentage differences in violent crime rates for a one-standard-deviation (16.2 percent) difference in neighborhood immigrant composition in established and new destination cities for all four neighborhood types. Beginning with white neighborhoods, a one-standard-deviation difference in immigrant composition is associated with a 21-percent-lower expected violent crime rate in established destinations. However, a similar difference in immigrant composition in new destination cities is associated with a higher (3.8 percent) rather than lower expected violent crime rate, although a joint test of significance indicates that this positive association is not significant. A similar pattern holds for African American and integrated neighborhoods, as standard deviation differences in neighborhood immigrant composition are associated with lower rates of violent crime only in established destination cities (11.4 and 17.2 percent, respectively), while for new destinations the expected rates are higher rather than lower. In contrast, for Latino neighborhoods, similar differences in immigrant composition are associated with lower violent crime rates for both established and new destination Latino neighborhoods (16.9 and 15.2 percent, respectively).

Table 4. Multilevel Poisson Models (with Variable Exposure) of Neighborhood Violent Crime, Including Cross-level Interactions (NNCS 2006)

	White neighborhoods		African American neighborhoods		Latino neighborhoods		Integrated neighborhoods	
	($n = 4{,}303$)		($n = 1{,}841$)		($n = 1{,}342$)		($n = 1{,}142$)	
Tract-level								
Immigrant composition	−0.014***	−0.010**	−0.007*	−0.003	−0.011***	−0.010***	−0.011**	−0.010***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Immigrant growth	−0.038***	−0.054***	0.000	0.011	−0.003**	0.007	−0.021**	−0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Disadvantage	0.812***	0.806***	0.268***	0.263***	0.540***	0.539***	0.492***	0.485***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Residential instability	0.451***	0.448***	0.213***	0.219***	0.182***	0.181***	0.428***	0.434***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Percent young males	−0.007	−0.005	0.005	0.005	0.023**	0.024**	−0.023**	−0.024***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
City-level								
New destination	0.230	0.237	0.339	0.263	0.176	0.301	0.487*	0.461*
	(0.214)	(0.211)	(0.240)	(0.239)	(0.196)	(0.184)	(0.225)	(0.224)
Immigrant composition	0.013	0.017	0.007	0.007	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.014
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Cross-level interactions								
New destination × Immigrant composition	0.017**		0.011*		0.001		0.012*	
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
New destination × Immigrant growth		0.047***		−0.007		−0.026***		0.043**
		(0.012)		(0.016)		(0.013)		(0.013)
Intercept	−6.246***	−6.320***	−5.252***	−5.238***	−6.008***	−6.048***	−5.992***	−6.030***

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Figure 1. Percentage difference in neighborhood violent crime rate for a one-standard-deviation (16.2 percent) difference in immigrant concentration in established and new destination cities (NNCS 2006)

Figure 2 presents the expected percentage differences in violent crime rates for a one-standard-deviation (3.5 percent) difference in neighborhood immigrant growth in established and new destination cities for all four neighborhood types. For white and integrated neighborhoods, the patterns for immigrant growth are similar to those for immigrant composition above. Specifically, in these two types of neighborhood, immigrant growth is associated with lower violent crime rates only in established destination cities. In established destination white neighborhoods, a one-standard-deviation difference in the absolute immigrant growth rate is associated with a 17.1-percent-lower expected violent crime rate. In new destinations, a similar difference is associated with just 2.2-percent-fewer violent crimes per 1,000 population. For integrated neighborhoods, a one-standard-deviation difference in the absolute immigrant growth rate is associated with a 10.9-percent decline in the expected violent crime rate in established destinations but a 3.7-percent increase in expected crime levels in new destinations. For African American and Latino neighborhoods, the findings are markedly different. For African American neighborhoods, immigrant growth is associated with higher violent crime rates in both established and new destinations (3.9 and 1.4 percent, respectively), but these relationships are not significant. For Latino neighborhoods, immigrant growth is associated with higher expected violent crime rates in established destinations (2.4 percent) and lower violent crime rates in new destinations (6.6 percent). While the relationship between immigrant growth and violent crime is significantly different in established destination Latino

Figure 2. Percentage difference in neighborhood violent crime rate for a one-standard-deviation (3.5 percent) difference in immigrant growth in established and new destination cities (NNCS 2006)



neighborhoods than in new destination Latino neighborhoods, joint tests of significance indicate that immigrant growth does not significantly affect neighborhood violence in either type of destination.

In general, the patterns revealed by these cross-level interactions demonstrate that the association between neighborhood immigrant composition or immigrant growth and violent crime depends greatly on city-level contexts of reception. After including a cross-level interaction between immigrant composition and the new destination dummy variable, the main effect of immigrant composition is significant and negative for all four neighborhood types, indicating that established destination neighborhoods with greater immigrant composition experience lower violent crime rates. However, the significant and positive cross-level interactions for white, African American, and integrated neighborhoods indicate that the benefits of immigrant composition do not hold for these race–ethnic neighborhoods in new destination cities. For Latino neighborhoods, on the other hand, the non-significant interaction terms suggest that the association between immigrant composition and violent crime is similar in established and new destinations. When cross-level interactions between immigrant growth and the new destination dummy variable are considered, the results indicate that the significant and negative association between immigrant growth and violent crime is a feature only of established destination white and integrated neighborhoods.

Conclusion

This article draws from social disorganization and immigrant revitalization perspectives in criminology and research on new immigrant settlement patterns to examine the relationship between immigrant population factors (composition and growth) and violent crime (robberies and homicides) for different types of neighborhoods and cities. Employing two comprehensive data sets (the National Neighborhood Crime Study and the Neighborhood Change Database), I use a multilevel modeling strategy to examine the roles of both neighborhood- and city-level structural factors associated with neighborhood violent crime across a representative sample of US neighborhoods.

Some of the findings mirror those of prior research on immigrant communities and neighborhood crime, supporting immigrant revitalization arguments (Peterson and Krivo 2010; Sampson 2008). Specifically, neither higher levels of immigrant composition nor higher levels of immigrant growth are significantly associated with higher crime rates for any neighborhood type. The results show that greater immigrant composition is associated with lower violent crime rates in white, Latino, and integrated neighborhoods across the nation. Meanwhile, greater immigrant growth is associated with lower violent crime rates in white and integrated neighborhoods. These general findings suggest that larger and faster-growing immigrant populations are likely revitalizing neighborhoods by helping lower violent crime rates. However, the results of cross-level interaction models suggest that immigrant revitalization is a contingent process.

Findings from interaction models reveal that established destinations provide what Portes and Rumbaut (2006) call a receptive context in which immigrant composition and immigrant growth serve to revitalize communities and prevent criminal violence. For all four neighborhood types, immigrant composition has a negative relationship with violent crime rates in established destinations. However, for new destinations, only Latino neighborhoods experience a similar relationship. In these cities, there is virtually no association between immigrant composition and local violence in integrated neighborhoods and a slight positive relationship in white and African American areas, although these relationships never reach statistical significance. Similar patterns hold for the relationship between immigrant growth and violent crime. For white and integrated neighborhoods, greater immigrant growth is associated with lower violent crime rates in established destinations only. On the other hand, there is no association between immigrant growth and violent crime in either African American or Latino neighborhoods.

In places with the greatest immigrant presence, Latino neighborhoods, the patterns suggest that immigrant revitalization is a feature of larger foreign-born populations in both established and new destinations. Apparently, Latino neighborhoods provide large immigrant and co-ethnic communities that foster the development of social control through social and economic ties (Vélez 2006). Indeed, for new destination cities, majority Latino neighborhoods may in fact be newly emerging "ethnic enclaves" in which immigrant populations contribute to crime control through the continued renewal of local economic and political structures. In new destination Latino neighborhoods, foreign- and native-born Latinos utilize family and employment networks that attract newcomers and

strengthen connections to city and local institutions (Light and von Scheven 2008; Winders 2012). As some have noted, some Latino communities in new destination cities may provide their immigrant communities with "institutional visibility" wherein the city takes great steps to involve new immigrants in majority Latino neighborhoods into the local community (Iceland 2009; Winders 2012). As a result, Latino neighborhoods may not be as reliant on city-level context of reception as other types of race–ethnic neighborhoods.

Local conditions may not be as favorable for neighborhoods with relatively smaller immigrant populations such as predominantly white, African American, and integrated areas. For these three types of neighborhoods, more heavily immigrant areas tend to have lower violent crime rates in established destinations only. Smaller and more recent immigrant communities outside established destinations may have had less time to develop to a sufficient degree the economic and social ties necessary to contribute to immigrant revitalization. As a result, in new destination cities, levels of violent crime are unaffected by differences in immigrant composition or immigrant growth outside majority Latino neighborhoods.

While informative, the results reported above leave some questions unanswered. First, the analysis makes no distinction regarding the legal status of immigrants or the size of the undocumented population. Past research suggests that the neighborhood settlement patterns of undocumented immigrants are similar to those of legal migrants, and there is no evidence to suggest that undocumented immigrants are more prone to violence than their documented counterparts (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Olson et al. 2009). Given these facts, it is highly unlikely that patterns will be different for areas that attract more or fewer documented versus undocumented immigrants. Nonetheless, the legal–illegal distinction cannot be taken for granted; the role of residents' legal status in violence remains an empirical question for future analysis. Second, this project focuses on only two types of violent crime: homicide and robbery. While these index crimes are considered to have greater reliability than other forms of violence in terms of place of occurrence, this reliability does come with certain trade-offs. Homicides and robberies are but two of four index crimes reported to the UCR; thus, the above results reflect just a portion of the criminal events that concern scholars and policymakers when it comes to immigrant populations. Future research should consider other violent and property crimes, as well as the effects of immigrant composition and immigrant growth on racial- and ethnic-specific rates of crime in new destinations. Third, while this project has a strictly urban focus, immigrant growth has expanded far beyond the traditional urban metropolis; therefore, future research should attend to how levels of immigrant composition and growth affect crime in neighborhoods of less urban settings (Kandel and Parrado 2005; Singer 2009). In the meantime, the focus of this paper allows me to compare neighborhoods across similar urban contexts, while building on and expanding a rich theoretical tradition in examining urban crime. Finally, the division between new and established destination cities ignores the diversity of cities within each classification with respect to each city's immigrant community. Indeed, many new destination cities experienced rapid and unprecedented immigrant growth during the 1990s, while others have experienced a gradual change in their immigrant populations. These differences are likely to influence

how a city responds to such changes and the extent to which it is able to provide a receptive context for new arrivals. While it is clear that established destinations provide such receptive contexts, future research should continue to consider how the relationship between neighborhood immigrant populations and neighborhood crime varies across differentially situated new destination cities.

Past research suggests that, by offering foreign-born residents more economic opportunities and providing a social structure for neighborhoods to integrate new arrivals, established destinations offer a context of reception that may permit immigrant composition and immigrant growth to revitalize neighborhoods (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Sampson 2008; Waters and Jimènez 2005). The current research bolsters this claim by demonstrating that, net of other city and neighborhood structural factors, a more sizable immigrant population and immigrant growth help neighborhoods in established destinations become "some of the safest places" in the nation (Sampson 2008). However, it appears that many neighborhoods in new destinations, with smaller and more recent immigrant communities, may lack the necessary social and economic structures for immigrant revitalization; therefore, violent crime rates in these places are unaffected by the size or growth of their immigrant populations. Perhaps, as immigrant communities become a more permanent feature of new destination cities, similar structural conditions and institutional arrangements may develop that would lead to reduced violence.

Notes

1. Thirty-three tracts identified as "integrated" actually had a majority Asian population (>50 percent). Because Asians composed an ethnic majority in these tracts, they do not meet the operational definition of "integrated" according to this project. However, because a sample of 33 is too small to produce reliable analyses regarding Asian enclaves, I drop these tracts from the sample.
2. Including forcible rape in the violence index entails the loss of neighborhoods in twelve cities (Aurora, Chicago, Naperville, and Rockford, IL; Dallas, Irving, and San Antonio, TX; Fort Collins, CO; Hialeah, FL; Lexington, KY; Newport News, VA; Philadelphia, PA). Neighborhoods for another ten (Anchorage, AK; Bellevue, WA; Chula Vista, CA; Hampton, VA; Lexington, KY; Minneapolis, MN; Oklahoma City, OK; Miami, Sterling Heights, and Tampa, FL) are eliminated when including aggravated assaults. Two of the above cities (Philadelphia and San Antonio) are excluded from the current sample because they also fail to report tract-level homicide data.
3. For the baseline regression models, coefficients for immigrant composition and immigrant growth are in the same direction regardless of which sample is used. However, the coefficient for immigrant composition fails to reach statistical significance for white neighborhoods and is slightly stronger for Latino and integrated neighborhoods in the smaller sample where rape is included in the violence measure. For the interaction models, all main and interaction effects are in the same direction in the two sets of analyses. Finally, both the main and interaction effects are in the same direction in both sets of analyses, when the cross-level interaction between immigrant growth and the new destination variable is under consideration. However, in this case many of the effect sizes are somewhat larger for the models including rape in the dependent variable.
4. I recognize that the criteria I use to classify cities as established or new immigrant destinations result in slightly different classifications for certain cities than some prior research on immigrant destination cities. For example, Singer (2004) considers

Cleveland, OH, as a "former gateway" (more like what I refer to as an established destination), while this analysis considers it a "new destination city." I have several reasons for not adopting Singer's (2004) criteria. First, my unit of analysis (cities) differs from Singer, who uses total Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). Because the interest is city-level context of reception and the NNCS does not provide data for complete MSAs, I chose an approach based on city population characteristics. Second, because I am interested in current immigration patterns, I chose a strategy that allows me to compare rates of neighborhood crime across cities with experience with current immigration trends (established destinations) and cities where immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon (new destinations). Given my desire to reflect current trends in immigration, rather than the larger historical trends that Singer (2004) describes, "current immigrant destinations" in this project refer to the cities that account for a large proportion of recent immigrant growth in the United States. As such, a new destination classification reflects the fact that the city experienced unprecedented increases in its foreign-born composition during the 1990s, a period when cities across the nation experienced unprecedented growth and changes with respect to immigration.

5. Within the NNCS, five cities with below-average foreign-born concentrations in 1990 had a net decline in their immigrant populations over the decade: Akron, OH; Buffalo, NY; Livonia, MI; Dayton, OH; and Toledo, OH. These non-destination cities had relatively small immigrant populations throughout the decade and accounted for none of the relative growth in the immigrant population over the decade. Therefore, as recommended by two anonymous reviewers, the tracts ($n = 329$) in these cities were not included in the sample for this analysis. Excluding these tracts facilitates ease of comparison across two contexts of reception: receptive contexts provided by established destinations and potentially handicapped contexts provided by new destinations. Note that some tracts within established destinations have below-average immigrant composition and negative immigrant growth. These tracts are included in the sample because I consider immigrant composition and immigrant growth as simple percentages, seeking to examine the full range of variation in immigrant composition and growth across neighborhoods in destination cities. After excluding the five non-destination cities and the two cities without tract-level homicide data (Philadelphia and San Antonio) from the analysis, my final sample includes 8,628 cities in 84 cities.
6. While there is no direct test for variance inflation in HLM 6.07, I tested variance inflation factors (VIFs) running the regression command in Stata 11.0 and using the cluster command for each city. I then ran HLM models with and without potentially problematic variables (VIF > 5.0) and found no significant changes in my results.
7. A nonlinear Poisson model analyzes count response variables. Specifying the tract population with a coefficient of 1 adjusts the count-dependent variable by the population of the tract, making the analysis one of rates (crimes per population).
8. The straightforward way of interpreting the coefficients for the negative binomial is by using the factor changes in expected counts. For instance, holding all other variables constant, for each unit increase in x, we would expect a percent change of $[(e^{bx} - 1) * 100]$ in the expected violent crime rate (Long 1997).
9. For comparisons across all four neighborhood types, I examined Analysis of Variance models to assess the significance of variation across neighborhood types. For all direct comparisons between two specific types of neighborhoods, I conducted two-sample t-tests for comparison of group means.
10. Prior to estimating the two-level models, I examined unconditional models for each neighborhood type, to determine whether there is significant variation in violent

crime across cities. The resulting variance components (white neighborhoods: 0.60268, $\chi^2 = 836.297$; African American neighborhoods: 0.30965, $\chi^2 = 520.118$; Latino neighborhoods: 0.46242, $\chi^2 = 416.875$; integrated neighborhoods: 0.57237, $\chi^2 = 359.00210$) are all significant at $p < .001$. Further tests across destination type yielded similar results (available upon request).

11. To save space, table 4 does not report the coefficients for the city-level control variables. However, they are included in the interaction models. The direction, size, and significance of these non-immigration factors in the interaction models are similar to those in the full models presented in table 3.
12. Interpretations for all cross-level interactions take into account the coefficients for the main effects of immigrant composition and change in neighborhood immigrant composition, as well as the coefficients for the interaction terms ([(*e*([*b*(main effect)∗*b*(interaction term)]*x*−1)∗100]). For example, the main effect of immigrant composition is interpreted as the "effect" of immigrant composition in established destinations (when the new destination dummy variable is equal to zero).

Appendix A. List of Established and New Destination Cities

Established destination cities ($n = 21$)	New destination cities ($n = 63$)		
Alexandria	Arlington	Albuquerque	Oklahoma City
Bellevue	Aurora	Anchorage	Overland Park
Boston	Austin	Cincinnati	Pittsburgh
Chicago	Carrollton	Cleveland	Plano
Chula Vista	Chandler	Columbus	Portland
Fullerton	Charlotte	Detroit	Rockford
Garden Grove	Coral Springs	Eugene	Santa
Hartford	Dallas	Evansville	Seattle
Hialeah	Denver	Fort Collins	Simi Valley
Houston	Des Moines	Fort Wayne	St. Louis
Inglewood	Glendale	Fort Worth	St. Petersburg
Long Beach	Irving	Hampton	Sterling Heights
Los Angeles	Lexington	Jacksonville	Tampa
McAllen	Lincoln	Kansas City	Tempe
Miami	Memphis	Knoxville	Topeka
Oakland	Minneapolis	Louisville	Tucson
Ontario	Naperville	Madison	Virginia Beach
Pasadena	Nashville	Milwaukee	Waco
San Bernardino	Pasadena	New Haven	Washington
San Diego	Pembroke Pines	Newport News	Waterbury
Stamford	Phoenix	Norfolk	Worcester

References

Bursik, Robert J. 2006. "Rethinking the Chicago School of Criminology: A New Era of Immigration." Pp. 20–35 in *Immigration and Crime: Race, Ethnicity, and Violence*, edited by Ramiro Martínez Jr. and Abel Valenzuela. New York: New York University Press.

Bursik, Robert J. Jr., and Harold G. Grasmick. 1993. *Neighborhoods and Crime*. New York: Lexington.

Crowder, Kyle, Matthew Hall, and Stewart E. Tolnay. 2011. "Neighborhood Immigration and Native Out-Migration." *American Sociological Review* 76:25–47.

Ebaugh, Helen Rose, and Mary Curry. 2000. "Fictive Kin as Social Capital in New Immigrant Communities." *Sociological Perspectives* 43:189–209.

Feldmeyer, Ben. 2009. "Immigration and Violence: The Offsetting Effects of Immigrant Composition on Latino Violence." *Social Science Research* 38:717–31.

Frey, William H. 2003. "Metropolitan Magnets for International and Domestic Migrants." Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Hipp, John R., George E. Tita, and Lyndsay N. Boggess. 2009. "Intergroup and Intragroup Violence: Is Violent Crime and Expression of Group Conflict or Social Disorganization?" *Criminology* 47(2):521–64.

Iceland, John. 2009. *Where We Live Now: Immigration and Race in the United States*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jargowsky, Paul A. 2009. "Immigrants and Neighborhoods of Concentrated Poverty: Assimilation or Stagnation?" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35:1129–51.

Kandel, William, and Emilio A. Parrado. 2005. "Industrial Restructuring and New Rural Hispanic Migration: The Case of the US Meat Processing Industry." *Population and Development Review* 31:447–71.

Kirk, David S., Andrew V. Papachristos, Jeffrey Fagan, and Tom R. Tyler. 2012. "The Paradox of Law Enforcement in Immigrant Communities: Does Tough Immigration Enforcement Undermine Public Safety?" *Annals of the American Academy of the Political and Social Sciences* 641:99–124.

Krivo, Laurie J., Ruth D. Peterson, and Danielle C. Kuhl. 2009. "Segregation, Racial Structure, and Neighborhood Violent Crime." *American Journal of Sociology* 114:1765–802.

Kubrin, Charis E., and Ronald Weitzer. 2003. "New Directions in Social Disorganization Theory." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 40:374–402.

Lee, Matthew T., and Ramiro Martínez Jr. 2006. "Immigration and Asian Homicide Patterns in Urban and Suburban San Diego." Pp. 90–116 in *Immigration and Crime: Race, Ethnicity, and Violence*, edited by Ramiro Martínez Jr. and Abel Valenzuela. New York: New York University Press.

Lichter, Daniel, Domenico Parisi, Michael C. Paquino, and Steven Michael Grice. 2010. "Residential Segregation in New Hispanic Destinations: Cities, Suburbs, and Rural Communities Compared." *Social Science Research* 39:215–30.

Light, Ivan, and Elsa von Scheven. 2008. "Mexican Migration Networks in the United States, 1980–2000." *International Migration Review* 42:704–28.

Long, J. Scott. 1997. *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Martínez, Ramiro Jr. 2002. *Latino Homicide: Immigration, Violence, and Community*. New York: Routledge Press.

_____. 2006. "Coming to America: The Impact of the New Immigration on Crime." Pp. 1–19 in *Immigration and Crime*, edited by Ramiro Martínez Jr. and Abel Valenzuela. New York: New York University Press.

Martínez, Ramiro Jr., Matthew T. Lee, and Amie L. Nielsen. 2004. "Segmented Assimilation, Local Context, and Determinants of Drug Violence in Miami and San Diego: Does Ethnicity Matter?" *International Migration Review* 38:131–57.

Martínez, Ramiro Jr., Jacob I. Stowell, and Matthew T. Lee. 2010. "Immigration and Crime in an Era of Transformation: A Longitudinal Analysis of Homicides in San Diego Neighborhoods." *Criminology* 48:797–829.

Massey, Douglas S., Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone. 2002. *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Moehling, Carolyn, and Anne Morrison Piehl. 2009. "Immigration, Crime, and Incarceration in Early Twentieth-Century America." *Demography* 46:739–63.

Nielsen, Amie L., Matthew T. Lee, and Ramiro Martínez Jr. 2005. "Integrating Race, Place, and Motive in Social Disorganization Theory: Lessons from a Comparison of Black and Latino Homicide Types in Two Immigrant Destination Cities." *Criminology* 43:837–72.

Olson, Christa Polczynski, Minna K. Laurikkala, Lin Huff-Corzine, and Jay Corzine. 2009. "Immigration and Violent Crime: Citizenship Status and Social Disorganization." *Homicide Studies* 13:227–41.

Orrenius, Pia M., and Roberto Coronado. 2005. "The Effect of Illegal Immigration and Border Enforcement on Crime Rates along the US-Mexico Border." *Working Paper 131*. Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California–San Diego.

Osgood, D. Wayne. 2000. "Poisson-Based Regression Analysis of Aggregate Crime Rates." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 16:21–43.

Ousey, Graham C., and Charis Kubrin. 2009. "Exploring the Connection between Immigration and Violent Crime Rates in US Cities, 1980–2000." *Social Problems* 56:447–73.

Park, Julie, and John Iceland. 2011. "Residential Segregation in Metropolitan Established Immigrant Gateways and New Destinations." *Social Science Research* 40:811–21.

Peterson, Ruth D., and Lauren J. Krivo. 2006. The National Neighborhood Crime Study, 2000 [Computer file]. ICPSR27501-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2010.

_____. 2010. *Divergent Social Worlds*. New York: SAGE.

Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén Rumbaut. 2006. *Immigrant American: A Portrait*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sampson, Robert J. 2008. "Rethinking Crime and Immigration." *Contexts* (Winter):28–33.

Saporu, Darlene, Charles L. Patton III, Lauren J. Krivo, and Ruth D. Peterson. 2011. "Differential Benefits? Crime and Community Investments in Racially Distinct Neighborhoods." *Race and Justice* 1:79–102.

Shaw, Clifford R., and Henry D. McKay. 1969. *Juvenile Delinquency in Urban Areas*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shihadeh, Edward S., and Lisa Winters. 2010. "Church, Place, and Crime: Latinos and Homicide in New Destinations." *Sociological Inquiry* 80:628–49.

Singer, Audrey. 2004. *The Rise of New Immigrant Destinations*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

_____. 2009. *The New Geography of United States Immigration*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

South, Scott J., Kyle Crowder, and Erick Chavez. 2005. "Migration and Spatial Assimilation among US Latinos: Classical Versus Segmented Trajectories." *Demography* 42:497–521.

Squires, Gregory D., and Charis E. Kubrin. 2006. *Privileged Places: Race, Residence, and the Structure of Opportunity*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Stowell, Jacob I., Steven F. Messner, Kelly F. McGeever, and Lawrence E. Raffalovich. 2009. "Immigration and the Recent Violent Crime Drop in the United States: A Pooled, Cross-Sectional Time Series Analysis of Metropolitan Areas." *Criminology* 47:889–928.

Vélez, Marìa. 2001. "The Role of Public Social Control in Urban Neighborhoods: A Multi-Level Analysis of Victimization." *Criminology* 39:837–64.

_____. 2006. "Toward an Understanding of the Lower Rates of Homicide in Latino Versus Black Neighborhoods: A Look at Chicago." In *The Many Colors of Crime: Inequalities of Race, Ethnicity and Crime in America,* edited by Ruth D. Peterson, Lauren J. Krivo, and John Hagan. New York: New York Press.

_____. 2009. "Contextualizing the Immigration and Crime Effect." *Homicide Studies* 13:325–35.

Waldinger, Roger. 1989. "Immigration and Urban Change." *Annual Review of Sociology* 15:211–32.

Waters, Mary, and Tomas R. Jimènez. 2005. "Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges." *Annual Review of Sociology* 31:105–25.

Winders, Jamie. 2012. "Seeing Immigrants: Institutional Visibility and Immigrant Incorporation in New Immigrant Destinations." *Annals of the American Academy of the Political and Social Sciences* 641:58–78.