Research on Eastern European attitudes toward democracy has not comprehensively examined the economic, social, and political origins of support for and satisfaction with democracy and what these portend for democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe. Differentiating origins of mass support and satisfaction clarify whether ordinary citizens perceive democracy as a normatively correct, legitimate process of making collective and binding decisions or merely as a means to achieving efficiency and distributive justice. Multivariate analysis revealed that whereas social, economic, and psychological factors influence support, only economic evaluations predict satisfaction. This identifies support for democracy in Eastern Europe as emanating more from a recognition of the moral worth of the process than from a calculus about its benefits. However, the study reveals that dissatisfaction with democratic government abounds and may affect support. This challenges optimism for speedy consolidation, showing Eastern Europe poised to linger at the crossroads of transition for a while.

EASTERN EUROPE AT THE CROSSROADS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
Evaluating Support for Democratic Institutions, Satisfaction With Democratic Government, and Consolidation of Democratic Regimes

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During the last decade, a wave of change has swept over Eastern Europe, transforming polities with dramatic haste. Scholars have long been fascinated with such phenomena, trying to understand why some political

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systems are sustained over time and others falter (Huntington, 1991; Przeworski, 1991). Given the political history of Eastern Europe,[1] choosing democracy above authoritarian rule is a significant development and offers an excellent research opportunity to understand the dynamics of democratization and the conditions under which democracy thrives. This article seeks to explore the origins of mass support for and satisfaction with democracy in Eastern Europe, to establish the distinctive structures of these twin facets of system support, to evaluate the impact that dissatisfaction with democracy may have on support for democracy, and to assess Eastern Europe's prospects for consolidating democracy.

Such research is important. It may help to determine how people with little modern experience of democracy develop a commitment to a new and different system of governance. It may also uncover whether support for democracy is instrumental—that is, dependent on satisfaction with the process and driven more by a calculus about what may benefit the individual or society than by an abstract value for the system. Establishing the origins of mass support and satisfaction should clarify whether Eastern European publics perceive democracy as a normatively correct, legitimate process of making collective and binding decisions or as a means to achieving efficiency and distributive justice.

It is argued that political systems remain viable if their citizens ascribe to them both diffuse and specific support (see Easton, 1975). Thus, affect for the political system, as well as appreciation of the benefits that may accrue, enhances a system's ability to thrive. This justifies the relevance of both support for and satisfaction with the political process to the consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe. In advanced democracies, satisfaction with democratic government is critical to the viability of the political system (Kornberg, 1990). In this study of Eastern Europe, there is similar concern for the viability of the new political system. Indeed, the overriding question for this analysis is whether explanations of support for and satisfaction with democracy can help us to understand how likely it is for democracy to be consolidated in the transitional societies.

CONCEPTUALIZING AND OPERATIONALIZING DEMOCRACY

Democracy is popularly understood as government of, by, and for the people. Regarded in this light, some view it as a universal value (e.g., Fukuyama,

1. The term *Eastern Europe* is being used here in the political, and not geographical, context.

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1989, 1992). But scholars are divided on a conceptualization and measurement of democratic support. Some apply Easton's (1965) conceptual framework, making distinctions among objects of system support. They analyze support for a democratic system from such perspectives as the community to be governed, the institutions constituting the political regime, and the authorities responsible for governance. Furthermore, they try to distinguish between specific support (i.e., support given in exchange for certain benefits) and diffuse support (i.e., a general loyalty not dependent on rewards). This approach views support for a democratic system in holistic terms and has been subject to some debate.[2]

A related, more reductionist approach is to measure support in terms of attitudes toward democratic institutions and processes. This approach follows Dahl's (1971) conceptualization of political democracy.[3] He perceived democracy as a political system granting opportunities for citizens to formulate preferences, to indicate these to fellow citizens and the government by individual or collective action, and to have them seriously considered without discrimination.

In the context of Eastern Europe, establishing the level of support that ordinary citizens extend to basic democratic institutions seems a useful approach to determining commitment to democracy. Thus, guided by Dahl's framework, I operationalize support for democracy as support for political competition in free and fair elections; support for an independent press; and support for individual freedom. Support for these institutions and processes should indicate how committed to majoritarian rights and minoritarian freedoms Eastern Europeans may be.

I conceptualize satisfaction with democracy in terms of public perceptions of the efficacy of democratic government, based on the expectations that people have about how democratic institutions function. Most publics have beliefs about democracy (see Kornberg & Clarke, 1994) and are likely to be satisfied with democracy when these beliefs are confirmed.

Research on publics' support for democratic systems has intensified in recent years. Empirical evidence that citizens in formerly nondemocratic societies generally support democratic processes (e.g., Duch, 1993, 1995;

2. For a summary of the arguments, see Mishler and Rose (1993), Kornberg and Clarke (1992), Kornberg (1990), Dalton (1988), and Abramson (1983).

3. This concept of democracy presents it as a set of institutional arrangements, which includes: (a) freedom to form and join organizations, (b) freedom of expression, (c) the right to vote, (d) eligibility of public office, (e) the right of political leaders to compete for support, (f) alternative sources of information, (g) free and fair elections, and (h) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

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Evans & Whitefield, 1995; Finifter & Mickiewicz, 1992; Gibson, 1996b; Gibson & Duch, 1993; Gibson, Duch, & Tedin, 1992; Hahn, 1991; McDonough, 1995; McIntosh & MacIver, 1992; Miller, Hesli, & Reisinger, 1994; Mishler & Rose, 1993) has increased an interest in understanding the roots of this phenomenon and assessing its durability. Yet, support for democracy does not necessarily imply satisfaction with the democratic process. Democracy can be fragile (see Przeworski, 1991; Schmitter & Karl, 1991), undermined by discontent with the way it is developing. So, recalling the contention that mass support is critical to the continued viability of systems (Almond & Verba, 1963; Clarke, Dutt, & Kornberg, 1993; Easton, 1975), one cannot but be concerned with the likely impact of dissatisfaction with democracy on support for democracy.

EXISTING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Scholars postulate that rising living standards, the growth of a private sector, the development of an urban middle class, and increasing levels of education facilitate democratization (see Linz, 1988; Lipset, 1960; Lipset & Schneider, 1983; Weatherford, 1989). Others assert that a democratic tradition can be created in societies with a high degree of mutual trust, a willingness to tolerate diversity, an interest in politics, and a desire to participate in political activities (see Almond & Verba, 1963; Easton, 1965, 1975; Eckstein, 1988; Inglehart, 1990; Wildavsky, 1987). The theory is also held that citizens who are psychologically stable and high in self-esteem are more likely to embrace the democratic principles of compromise and restraint than others (see Sniderman, 1975).

Scholars addressing satisfaction with democracy assert that satisfaction is grounded in an enthusiasm for social programs and durable beliefs that government can and should manage the national economy effectively (see Clarke et al., 1993). They find that economic and political factors affect the level of public satisfaction with democracy and point to inflation, unemployment, and feelings about incumbent political authorities as predictors of satisfaction with democracy. Individuals' economic experiences are thus hypothesized to be central to both support for and satisfaction with democracy.

Following these perspectives, several options are available in the search for origins of mass support for transitions. Explanations may derive from publics' sociodemographic and economic experiences, their political perceptions and experiences, and their psychological makeup.

For some time, scholars (e.g., Keohane & Nye, 1977; Rosecrance, 1986) have argued that the increased flow of international communication, the

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spread of science and technology, and global interdependence have contributed to the pressure for political change in many parts of the world, not least among formerly authoritarian nations. Indeed, so great was the effect of these developments in Eastern Europe that a new class of people emerged, demanding greater political rights and liberties and holding different ideas about the nature of authority (see Lapidus, 1987, 1989). As observed in stable democracies, these new ideas were more prominent among the young and the more educated (e.g., Dalton, 1988) and were aided by urbanization, easier access to institutions of learning, and greater exposure to the media. Such changes may have inspired support for democracy in Eastern Europe (e.g., Gibson, 1996a; Mason, 1992). Others, however, do not concede that such changes lead to democratization (see Brzezinski, 1989; Cohen, 1985; Keenan, 1986; Lacquer, 1989; White, 1979, 1984). The ensuing debate, then, was whether support for democracy springs more from the gradual development of a democratic culture and the embrace of principles of democracy or is simply a means to an end, with the satisfaction of economic goals being the object of support. One way to resolve the debate is to analyze the extent to which social, economic, or political differences independently explain why some Eastern Europeans support democracy and others do not.

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC EXPERIENCES

Let us first consider individuals' social experiences by focusing on the impact of education, age, gender, the work place, and urban versus rural exposure.

Education. Education plays an important role in individuals' evaluations and, in Eastern Europe, may be closely linked with the diffusion of a democratic culture. Being exposed to new ways of thinking and applying these to differentiate between the usefulness of clinging to old ways and the wisdom of adopting less traditional values may account for why some citizens support democratic processes and others do not. But, education may contribute to support for democracy in conflicting ways. On one hand, persons with higher education may be more socialized into accepting established norms (Brown, 1989; Nunn, Crockett, & Williams, 1978; Smith, 1992; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982; White, 1979, 1990) and, in authoritarian systems, may tend to be less democratic. On the other hand, education may instill liberal values, such as the preference for equality of opportunity and respect for individual rights and liberties (Fletcher, 1990). Insofar as education broadens perspectives, the better educated may be more willing to endorse new

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political and economic strategies for achieving social goals and be more tolerant of diverse political and social views.

Age. A compelling energy behind reform movements all over the world has been the aspirations of younger people.[4] In Eastern and Western Europe, there is evidence of the differences that underline political attitudes across generations. In the West, younger people are found to be more outspoken and more critical of the authorities (Dalton, 1988; Jennings & Niemi, 1981). Although not much is documented on this phenomenon in Eastern Europe, it is found that younger generations also tend to be more critical of the established system (see Bahry, 1987). This is not surprising because age is an important variable in the development of new values and attitudes (Flanagan & Dalton, 1990) and has considerable impact on political change (Andersen, 1976; Butler & Stokes, 1974). In Eastern European societies, in which older citizens are more socialized into conformity and passive acceptance of the state's authority than younger citizens, one would expect younger Eastern Europeans to be more enthusiastic about democratic institutions and procedures than older citizens. Also, younger citizens may develop a greater interest in "self" than older members of society, and if they believe democracy has more to offer than the old system, they are more likely to support it than are their parents or grandparents.

Gender. The roles of men and women are determined by the social environment.[5] In the authoritarian culture, rigid hierarchical arrangements made it common for men to become more politically prominent than women (see, e.g., Bohr, 1989). Gender differences were noticeable (see Gray, 1989; Gruzdeva & Chertikhina, 1986). In countries where the socialist belief in equality between the sexes goes beyond the rhetoric to the actual practice, one may see little or no gender differentiation in political support or satisfaction with the political process. Yet, because Eastern European women are found to accept traditional roles, to prefer the order and security of authoritarian rule, and to be less willing to accept political diversity (see Bahry, 1987;

4. Although younger people are usually the most alienated from the system and therefore are more receptive to change, expressions of dissatisfaction are primarily attitudinal. Research has found that middle-aged persons, rather than the young, are more likely to be politically active (see Duch & Gibson, 1992).

5. See Peers (1985) for a discussion of differentiation in gender roles among Soviet families. Of course, one cannot draw conclusions from such discussion about the role of gender in the development of values and attitudes throughout Eastern Europe.

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Carnaghan & Bahry, 1990), they are less likely to be supportive of change to a democratic system.

Occupation. The work place is one of the social structures in which attitudes toward politics are shaped (see Miliband, 1969). Individuals benefit from shared ideas in the work place, from contact with others of diverse interests and abilities, from access to new foreign technologies and expertise, and from an expanded worldview. Occupation differentiates individuals in terms of attitudes and political preferences. How individuals feel about the authorities or the political system may be directly related to the nature of their employment, their beliefs about equality, merit versus patronage, financial status, and so on. In this context, occupation has both social and economic implications for development. To the extent that individuals' occupation exposes them to modernizing institutions, such as large-scale productive enterprises (Weiner & Huntington, 1987), and new ways of viewing the decision-making process, or positions them to make the most of political and economic change, one would expect workers to develop a set of attitudes, values, and behaviors that is in accord with modern thinking. Insofar as occupational experiences engender such attitudes, citizens are likely to support the institutional demands of a democratic system.

ECONOMIC EXPERIENCES

Some suggest that economic discontent in Eastern Europe may be somewhat responsible for the crisis of confidence that ultimately led to the collapse of the old regimes (e.g., Grey, Jennisch, & Tyler, 1990). It is generally accepted that economic evaluations affect political perceptions (Clarke, Dutt, & Kornberg, 1993; Kiewiet, 1983; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979; Lewis-Beck, 1988; MacKuen, Erikson, & Stimson, 1992) and that political stability and economic health are primary forces in building confidence in and creating allegiances to democratic governments (Almond & Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1971; Huntington, 1968). Yet, the literature is split on the effect of economic dissatisfaction on political support. Some argue that economic discontent leads one to reject the political regime (e.g., Przeworski, 1991); others distinguish support for regime from support for incumbents and contend that economic disenchantment in transitional societies should not spark an assault on democratic institutions (e.g., Duch, 1995; Schmitter, 1994).

Eastern Europeans were accustomed to government assuming responsibility for their economic well-being (Grey, Jennisch, & Tyler, 1990; Mason, 1992) and therefore held the old regimes accountable for their economic fail-

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ures. It is likely, then, that dissatisfaction with the old regime led some citizens to support democratic institutions and processes. Some scholars maintain that economic discontent in Eastern Europe translates into rejection of the guiding political philosophy (e.g., Mishler & Rose, 1993; Pipes, 1991).

Advocates of rational behavior argue that individuals evaluate their past, current, and future circumstances and calculate what serves their best interests (see Page, 1978; Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980). Such calculations influence preferences (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Lau, Brown, & Sears, 1978; Sears, Hensler, & Speer, 1979). Individuals may prefer and support democracy because it satisfies their best interests. Eastern Europeans may support democratization to achieve both economic prosperity and individual liberty. The disarray of the economy and deprivation of basic economic needs may have caused some individuals to seek a political solution to national economic problems. For others, the attraction of the new regime may simply be an opportunity to experience a different economic and political system. As some scholars have pointed out, established regimes are supported for what they are and what they do (Weil, 1989), but new regimes may well be supported for what they are not and do not do (Rose, 1992). It is quite likely that some Eastern Europeans support democracy for not promoting a centralized economic system. Hence, those who hope to benefit materially from political change would more readily support democracy than those who perceive change as potentially costly.

Although the concept of self-interest generally applies to the individual, in societies in which people have been socialized to believe that society's welfare is more important than the individual's, self-interest may extend beyond the personal to the national interest. As such, a general concern for the nation's well-being may also have influenced attitudes toward political reform. Empirical analysis should clarify whether individuals' support for democracy is influenced by approval of national political and economic change as well as the desire for personal economic improvement.

POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES

Scholars assert that through socialization, democratic values can be learned and through political participation, individuals can be socialized into becoming good democratic citizens. Many (e.g., Andersen, 1976; Pateman, 1970; see also Jackman, 1972) claim that the experience of certain kinds of participation helps to develop and foster qualities that are necessary for functioning in a democratic system. Certainly, in open societies, party membership, opinion leadership, and frequent political discussion contribute to a sophisticated way of thinking about politics and therefore benefit democracy

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(see Bennett, 1975; Jennings & Niemi, 1981). In societies where individuals are politically aware and politicians are attentive, people develop a sense of efficacy that encourages greater political involvement (see Muller & Seligson, 1994; Muller, Seligson, & Turan, 1987).

It is expected, then, that those who feel efficacious and take an active interest in politics are more likely to support a democratic regime than are the inactive. And, as suggested by research into elite-mass differences in the West (see McClosky & Brill, 1983; Nunn, Crockett, & Williams, 1978; Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Stouffer, 1955) and similar such differences in Eastern Europe (Reisinger, Melville, Miller, & Hesli, 1995), elites are generally more supportive of the established norm than ordinary citizens. Hence, long-standing party members—the elites in socialist societies—may be less prone to support democratic principles than would ordinary citizens.

Attitudes of mass publics toward established political institutions may also be important to a determination of political support and satisfaction. Citizens who view authoritarian institutions as efficient may not support a change to democracy. Eastern Europeans who are dissatisfied with the way their state performed in the past may develop expectations about democracy that lead them to support democracy. Satisfaction with democracy is likely to be achieved when these expectations are realized (Clarke et al., 1993).

Researchers have investigated individuals' attitudes toward democratic institutions and processes primarily in terms of economic circumstances (see Kornberg & Clarke, 1992; Lipset & Schneider, 1983). However, because public attitudes toward incumbents are also likely to affect democracy support, one cannot overlook the role that executive popularity might play in an analysis of public preferences for a new system. In Eastern Europe, approval of the incumbent's effectiveness as well as rejection of inefficient state management should increase support for a change in political institutions.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES

Individuals facilitate the transition to democracy by embracing democratic values and upholding the philosophy that publics are entitled to certain rights and privileges. Not all individuals, however, are able to do this. Some are so socialized into the authoritarian dogma that they find it difficult to entertain a new philosophy. To a large degree, such attitudes are influenced by an individual's psychological makeup. Factors, such as dogmatism, trust, and patriotism, may determine how likely publics are to support or be satisfied with democratic processes.

Dogmatism or closed-mindedness, as defined by Rokeach (1960), is the propensity of individuals to see the world in terms of good and evil. Empirical

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research supports the argument that the closed-minded are often more politically and socially resistant to change (e.g., Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982). One would therefore expect closed-minded Eastern Europeans to be less accepting of democratic values than those who are open to new ideas.

Trust is critical in a democracy (see Dahl 1989; Inglehart, 1990; Putnam, 1993). Trust facilitates a willingness to tolerate diverse political and economic strategies, a readiness to participate in political and economic activities, and an ability to resolve conflicts pertaining to autonomy, initiative, and emotional security (Almond & Verba, 1963; Erikson, 1963). To the degree that Eastern Europeans trust fellow citizens, one would expect corresponding support for democratic principles and institutions.

Patriotism is perceived, among scholars, to be loyalty to the political institutions of one's country (see, e.g., Connor, 1993). As such, it is relevant to a consideration of support for and satisfaction with reform. Scholars researching individuals' attachment to country and nation have made a distinction between the effects of patriotism and nationalism on individuals' attitudes and policy preferences (Connor, 1993; Hough, 1988; Sniderman, Fletcher, Russell, Tetlock, & Gaines, 1991). Whereas patriotism is viewed as an attachment to the state and its institutions, nationalism is identified as an emotional attachment to one's ethnonational group (see Connor, 1993). Patriotic Eastern Europeans, who glorify their state and its institutions, may view the infiltration of foreign structures or reform based on foreign strategies as a denigration of their institutional and cultural framework and are likely to reject democracy in the interest of preserving the traditional political structure. Of course, one should be mindful of the fact that some Eastern European societies were subject to foreign domination and externally imposed institutional structures. Patriotism, among the latter, is therefore likely to have a positive, rather than a negative, relationship with support for democracy.[6]

RESEARCH DESIGN

The analysis relies on two surveys conducted in Eastern Europe. The data used for the analysis of support for democracy were compiled by the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press in 1991. The survey instrument was administered in personal interviews conducted in several Eastern and Western European countries. Only the data for Hungary, Czechoslovakia,

6. The hypotheses contained in this section define the independent variables that will be used in the analysis.

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Poland, Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania were utilized in this analysis. More than 6,000 adult respondents participated in the surveys[7] in these countries.

Data for the analysis of satisfaction with democracy were taken from the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer of 1992. Interviews of 1,000 persons in the Eastern European countries identified above provided the opinions necessary for addressing the extent to which Eastern Europeans are satisfied with the way that democracy is developing in their countries.

MEASURING SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

Relying on Dahl's (1971) conceptualization of democracy as discussed earlier, an index of support for democracy was developed. It includes three primary subdimensions of basic democratic principles, broadly identified as (a) support for competitive elections, (b) support for a free press, and (c) tolerance of minority preferences. These represent the majoritarian rights and minoritarian liberties that are safeguarded by democratic institutions.

COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS

Scholars overwhelmingly agree that if there is one institution that is necessary to democracy it is that of competitive elections (e.g., Dahl, 1971; Dennis, 1970; Huntington, 1984; Sartori, 1986). They contend that a political system is only democratic insofar as its collective decision makers are elected to office through open, periodic competition in which candidates freely participate and citizens freely choose (see Huntington, 1984). Choice, in competitive elections, ideally implies that between two or more parties, rather than that between two or more candidates from a single party. A plurality of parties is more likely to present a range of proposals that differs sufficiently from another party's to offer a basis for competition and a reason for candidates, when elected, to try to keep their promises. Thus, closely related to the institution of competitive election is the value for multiple parties. If it is widely believed in Eastern Europe that different political parties with diverse political views should be allowed to compete for the opportunity to respond to publics' preferences, then at least one institutional requisite of democracy will have been met. Conversely, if mass publics openly reject the existence of

7. Details of the Times Mirror Survey may be found in Kellerman, Kohut, and Bowman (1992). See especially "About the Data" (Section 7, pp. 287-305). Information about the second survey is contained in the February 1993 Central and Eastern Eurobarometer publication, No. 3.

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multiple political parties, then such resistance would denote an unwillingness to facilitate political competition and be receptive to the varied interests of citizens.

Respondents from Eastern and Central Europe were asked if they approved of a change to a multiparty system. As Table 1 (Section A) demonstrates, a majority of respondents (roughly 72%) supported change to a multiparty system. Such support for a pluralistic party system implies that people were fairly enthusiastic about having electoral choice.

FREE PRESS

Constraints on press freedom have resulted in the suppression of information and, therefore, limited the capacity of individuals to develop a reservoir of political knowledge to assist them in controlling authoritarian rule. As such, the importance of a free press in democratic societies is self-evident. Respondents were asked whether they would approve or disapprove of placing greater constraints and controls on what newspapers print. Only a minority, as illustrated in Table 1, wanted press censorship. The vast majority of respondents disapproved of restricting the press.

TOLERANCE

Tolerance of individuals with opposing political values is established as one of the hallmarks of a democratic citizen.[8] Scholars have invested much research on the question of whether citizens will tolerate political activity by groups and individuals that they consider undesirable (e.g., Barnum & Sullivan, 1989; Duch & Gibson, 1992; McClosky & Brill, 1983; Nunn et al., 1978; Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Sniderman, 1975). They assert that where there is no tolerance, there can be no genuine political competition and participation.

To measure the degree of support that citizens extend to democracy in Eastern Europe, where dissent has for decades been crushed and protest behavior ostracized, it is especially important to include an evaluation of support for minoritarian rights. The belief that unpopular groups should not be deprived of their civil rights simply because their values and beliefs are not shared by a majority represents respect for and tolerance of minority opinion.

8. See Samuel Stouffer's (1955) discourse on tolerance. But also see an alternative conceptualization of tolerance by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982). Other useful discussion of this topic may be found in Gibson (1996b).

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Table 1
Section A: Distribution of Responses in Support for Democracy, 1991

Variable	Hungary	Czech-oslovakia	Poland	Russia	Ukraine	Lithuania
Multiple political parties						
Approve (%)	74.0	76.8	68.1	63.6	72.6	75.0
Uncertain (%)	7.3	5.9	14.4	11.3	9.9	8.6
Disapprove (%)	18.8	17.2	17.5	25.1	17.5	16.4
Cases (*N*)	996	920	1,495	1,119	585	501
Free press						
Approve (%)	63.1	73.9	67.6	65.5	70.9	65.5
Uncertain (%)	8.9	9.3	11.6	8.0	9.8	6.0
Disapprove (%)	28.0	16.8	20.8	26.5	19.3	28.5
Cases (*N*)	982	920	1,493	1,118	581	501
Ban homosexuals						
Agree (%)	67.2	58.9	61.9	61.7	67.4	72.1
Uncertain (%)	10.0	12.3	12.0	12.7	15.2	12.5
Disagree (%)	22.8	28.8	26.1	25.6	17.4	15.4
Cases (*N*)	994	920	1,494	1,123	585	501
Ban books						
Agree (%)	71.0	53.0	58.2	60.3	62.4	59.3
Uncertain (%)	7.5	10.2	8.5	6.5	9.6	5.6
Disagree (%)	21.5	36.8	33.3	33.2	25.0	35.1
Cases (*N*)	994	920	1,491	1,117	584	501
Withhold free speech from fascists						
Agree (%)	73.5	67.1	62.9	68.3	73.3	71.1
Uncertain (%)	8.7	11.2	13.7	6.5	12.5	6.5
Disagree (%)	17.7	21.7	23.4	25.2	14.2	22.4
Cases (*N*)	983	920	1,492	1,122	585	501

Section B: Item-to-Scale Correlation of Support Index, 1991

Variable	Hungary	Czech-oslovakia	Poland	Russia	Ukraine	Lithuania
Majoritarian	.80	.79	.80	.82	.82	.83
Minoritarian	.74	.73	.72	.78	.76	.75
Gamma	.17	.14	.14	.26	.25	.25

Responses to the following statements were deemed likely to reveal the degree of politically tolerant attitudes residing in Eastern Europe:

1. Homosexuals should not be permitted to teach in schools.
2. Books that contain ideas that are dangerous to society should be banned from public school libraries.

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3. Freedom of speech should not be granted to fascists.

The univariate analysis shown in Table 1 confirms that, in most of the countries, there is little tolerance for the rights of homosexuals or fascists. Less intolerance to free dissemination of information was displayed. Such responses reinforce the view (see Gibson & Duch, 1991, 1993; Gibson et al., 1992) that the level of intolerance in portions of Eastern Europe (specifically the former Soviet Union) may be an obstacle to the consolidation of democracy. Yet, research in Western societies shows that tolerance is a difficult and elusive democratic value (see Sullivan et al., 1982). Eastern Europeans, although having less experience with democratic norms, support the granting of civil liberties to citizens, but their level of tolerance when applied to specific groups of citizens varies with the degree of political threat that such groups are perceived to pose. Research has found that Russians, for example, identify homosexuals (see Gibson et al., 1992) and fascists (see Gibson, 1996b) among their most disliked groups. Although such intolerance may weaken their value for democratic procedures, it does not suggest that Eastern European support for democratic institutions is necessarily fragile.

INDEX OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

The mean of the two majoritarian items was combined with the mean of the three tolerance items to form the support index. The items were well correlated (see Table 1, Section B) with the index. Attitudes toward political rights were, overall, of greater impact in the index than were attitudes toward civil liberties, reflecting the generally low support for minority freedoms. In a comparison of the overall strength of support for majoritarian and minoritarian rights, Czechs (47.6%) appeared to be the most supportive of democracy, with an average of 75.4% supporting political rights for all and 29.1% approving minority freedoms. Hungarians (39.8%) seemed least supportive, with about 68.6% favoring majoritarian rights and 20.7% approving minoritarian liberties. Specifically, though, Russians were the least supportive of democratic institutions (64.6%), and Ukrainians were the least willing to grant civil liberties to minorities (18.9%). These differences are reflected in the correlation between majoritarian rights and minoritarian freedoms, ranging from gamma = .14 (Czechoslovakia and Poland) to .26 (Russia) and indicating that the components of support for democracy are distinct but related.[9]

9. Note that factor analysis of these items identified them as comprising a single dimension of attitudes.

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Thus, the index, comprising both the majoritarian and minoritarian elements of democratic institutions and processes, is used here as a measure of support for democracy in Eastern Europe.

MEASURING SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Scholars recognize that it is important to consider beliefs about democracy when evaluating satisfaction with democratic government (e.g., Kornberg & Clarke, 1994). In stable democracies, beliefs about democracy influence the satisfaction that people feel with the way democracy works (Kornberg & Clarke, 1994). As democracy develops in Eastern Europe, however, there are fundamental questions still needing answers, not least of which are: How satisfied are Eastern Europeans with the democratic process? and How likely are they to remain committed to democracy if they are dissatisfied with its progress? This study is interested in establishing the extent to which the beliefs and experiences that lead Eastern Europeans to support the democratic process influence their satisfaction with the development of democracy in their countries.

The following four questions comprised the satisfaction with democracy measure:

1. On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way that democracy is developing in our country?
2. How much respect is there for human rights nowadays in (our country)? Do you feel that there is a lot of respect, some respect, not much respect, or no respect at all?[10]
3. In general, do you feel that things in our country are going in the right or wrong direction?
4. Taking everything into account, do you feel that things are better for you now under the present political system or do you think things were better for you under the previous political system?

Each of these items sought to elicit individuals' perceptions about the efficacy of democratic government over the short period of their association with it and to identify those elements of reform with which publics were most satisfied. Figure 1 illustrates the degree of satisfaction that Eastern Europeans expressed with each of these aspects of democracy. In most of the countries,

10. Respect for human rights is widely viewed as a common feature of democratic, more so than authoritarian, societies. A perception of new respect for human rights in formerly authoritarian societies is more than likely an indication of satisfaction with the democratic process.

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

Figure 1. **Satisfaction with specific aspects of democracy in Eastern Europe.**

people claimed little satisfaction with democracy, indicating that they were not particularly happy with the outputs of democratic government. Except in Czechoslovakia, where the mean satisfaction level was 52.1%, less than a third of respondents claimed to be satisfied with democratic government. In Russia, the mean satisfaction level was lowest: 21.1%. This raises concern about the effects that such widespread dissatisfaction can have on continued support for democracy.

Factor analysis of the items confirmed them to represent a unidimensional scale of satisfaction. As the factor loadings in Table 2 (Section A) show, the indicators were relatively similar contributors to the index. The most notable exception was the low value in Lithuania for the direction in which the country is headed. Only a quarter of Lithuanians believe that the country is proceeding along an acceptable path. The item-to-scale correlations shown in Section B of the table reinforce this view.

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Table 2
Section A: Factor Structure of Satisfaction With Democracy Measure

	Factor Loading					
Variable	Hungary	Czech-oslovakia	Poland	Russia	Ukraine	Lithuania
Way democracy developing	.60	.63	.65	.63	.54	.56
Current system better	.57	.66	.49	.46	.50	.52
Human rights respect	.41	.53	.59	.43	.47	.58
Country in right direction	.57	.63	.60	.59	.56	.32
Eigenvalue	1.87	2.12	2.02	1.83	1.80	1.73
Item variance (%)	46.7	53.0	50.6	45.8	44.9	43.3

Section B: Item-to-Scale Correlation of Satisfaction With Democracy Measure

Variable	Hungary	Czech-oslovakia	Poland	Russia	Ukraine	Lithuania
Way democracy developing	.75	.74	.79	.79	.70	.73
Current system better	.72	.79	.72	.58	.65	.67
Human rights respect	.52	.63	.59	.54	.60	.75
Country in right direction	.71	.74	.73	.75	.72	.41

ANALYSIS

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

Tests of the hypotheses that social and economic experiences, political perceptions and experiences, and psychological attributes[11] predict support for democracy in Eastern Europe revealed that these theories indeed contribute to an understanding of Eastern Europeans' support for democracy. Multivariate analysis showed that dissatisfaction with the past health of the national economy, approval of political and economic change, individuals' gender, level of educational attainment, exposure to city life, and the tendency to be open-minded and trusting of fellow citizens predicted support for democracy in Eastern Europe. As the consolidated model in Table 3 illustrates, support for democracy is widely influenced by a desire for political and economic change. Yet, that is more the case among Central European publics than in Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania, where the health of the na-

11. Several indicators, operationalizing each of the four broad hypotheses discussed in the theoretical perspectives section herein, were used to identify influences on support for democracy. Only those determined to be significant predictors of support are included in this discussion of results.

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Table 3
Consolidated Model of Support for Democracy in Eastern and Central Europe, 1991

Variable	Hungary	Czech-oslovakia	Poland	Russia	Ukraine	Lithuania
Approve political/ economic change						
b	.10 (.02)	.10 (.02)	.07 (.02)	.08 (.02)	.09 (.03)	.11 (.03)
β	.15**	.18**	.10**	.10**	.13**	.16**
Retrospective evaluation of national economy						
b	–.02 (.01)	–.01 (.01)	–.00 (.01)	–.04 (.01)	–.04 (.01)	–.04 (.01)
β	–.08	–.06	–.02	–.14**	–.15**	–.17**
Gender						
b	–.08 (.03)	–.06 (.03)	–.07 (.02)	–.09 (.03)	–.17 (.04)	–.04 (.04)
β	–.08*	–.07	–.08*	–.09*	–.18**	–.04
Level of educational attainment						
b	.06 (.02)	.05 (.02)	.03 (.01)	.04 (.01)	.03 (.01)	.07 (.01)
β	.12**	.10*	.11**	.12**	.09*	.25**
Age						
b	–.00 (.00)	–.00 (.00)	–.01 (.00)	–.01 (.00)	–.01 (.00)	–.00 (.00)
β	–.15**	–.13**	–.17**	–.24**	–.22**	–.01
Urbanization						
b	.07 (.02)	.07 (.02)	.06 (.01)	.06 (.02)	.04 (.02)	.04 (.02)
β	.11**	.11**	.12**	.09**	.07	.06
Closed-mindedness						
b	–.05 (.01)	–.09 (.02)	–.12 (.01)	–.04 (.02)	–.03 (.02)	–.11 (.02)
β	–.11**	–.18**	–.22**	–.07	–.05	–.20**
Trust in fellow citizens						
b	–.02 (.02)	–.02 (.02)	–.07 (.02)	–.08 (.02)	–.11 (.02)	–.10 (.03)
β	–.03	–.04	–.11**	–.12**	–.20**	–.15**
Intercept	9.76 (1.73)	9.78 (1.86)	11.98 (1.49)	17.21 (1.73)	15.85 (2.33)	.57 (1.33)
Adjusted R^2	.15**	.17**	.19**	.21**	.25**	.27**
Standard error of estimate	.43	.41	.40	.46	.40	.43
Pairwise *N*	976	910	1,360	1,118	585	499

Note: b = unstandardized regression coefficient. β = standardized regression coefficient. Standard error of *b* and intercept shown in parentheses.

tional economy exercises a stronger influence on individual support. This finding very quickly established that Eastern and Central European motivations were different.

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Educational attainment was also a significant predictor. Better educated individuals were found more likely to favor democratic practices. This accords well with the theory that education is critical to imparting knowledge and skills supportive of democratic values. Education exposes publics to a broad worldview, enabling citizens to make rational choices, understand the norms of tolerance, and develop a conscious respect for basic individual rights and liberties (Brown, 1989; Fletcher, 1990; Lipset, 1960; Sullivan et al., 1982). Confirmation of this in the countries under study suggests that choosing democracy over authoritarian rule may have stemmed from publics' understanding of the moral worth of a democratic system. In addition, being psychologically prepared to accept new ideas encouraged commitment to democratic principles. Therefore, the fact that well-educated, open-minded, relatively young, urbanized Eastern Europeans who trust fellow citizens support democracy may augur well for the consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe.

Yet, one cannot ignore some differences in the attitudes of Eastern versus Central European publics. Among the Czechs, for example, who were earlier deemed most supportive of democracy, it is interesting that support for democracy is influenced by national economic judgments, a finding that is distinct from the impact demonstrated in Russia ($\beta = .14$, $p \leq .001$), hitherto assessed to be the least supportive of democratic institutions and processes. Although it appears simplistic to argue that the less individuals are influenced by economic self-interest, the more likely they are to be committed to the ideal of democracy, such an argument is in fact justified by the data. This finding rather explicitly asserts that citizens from the former Soviet Union were more ready to embrace democracy as a consequence of negative evaluations of the state of the national economy in the past, whereas the effect of economic dissatisfaction was zero in the case of Central Europe. The strength of the variables measuring economic evaluations, compared to the sociodemographic[12] and psychological predictors, indicates that commitment to democracy in some countries is stirred more by cultural change and new ways of thinking about politics than by a desire for better economies or more efficiently run societies. This is reassuring because there are those (e.g., Huntington, 1991; Przeworski, 1991) who argue that the political challenges

12. There are many ways to interpret the impact of social indicators. Some find that they reveal much about an individual's socialization (see, e.g., Jennings & Niemi, 1981); others believe that they have an economic basis (see Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994; Lipset, 1960). However, the fact that age and education here retain an effect that is independent of the economic indicators in the equation suggests that these two variables better reflect the impact of socialization rather than of economic interest.

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associated with economic recovery take their toll on newly democratizing nations and, without commitment to democratic institutions, publics' dissatisfaction with the economic situation may undermine their support for democracy.

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Many believe that satisfaction with the experience of democracy fosters greater commitment to democracy (see, e.g., Evans & Whitefield, 1995; Rustow, 1970). In this analysis, the political, economic, and social indicators employed to explain citizens' support for democracy were used to evaluate the structure of their satisfaction with democracy. Sociodemographic experiences and political attitudes both failed to predict satisfaction with democracy. Although better educated Czechoslovakians and Hungarians were more satisfied with democracy than were the less-educated, it was not found to be generally true that higher levels of education influenced satisfaction with the way that democracy was developing. Similarly, the experience of participating freely and frequently in political discussion or persuading others toward new beliefs had no significant impact on publics' satisfaction with a democratic system.

Economic experiences, however, clearly predicted satisfaction with democracy. Retrospective evaluations of the economy and optimism for the future both played a significant role in predicting satisfaction with democracy. In the Ukraine, Lithuania, and the Central European countries, a favorable view of the national economy over the past few years ($\beta = .26$, $p \leq .001$, on average) predicted citizens' satisfaction, whereas in Russia, hope for the future of the national economy had a powerful impact ($\beta = .32$, $p \leq .001$) on the way people felt about democracy. In addition, as further illustrated (see Table 4), optimism about their personal economic future also accounts for satisfaction among some Eastern Europeans.

Such findings imply that satisfaction is not based on attitudes toward democratic institutions but rather on short-term evaluations of the outputs of the democratic system. This offers important insight into the contrast between support for democracy as a legitimate decision-making process and satisfaction with a system able to yield economic prosperity. But it also suggests that if indeed diffuse support for a democratic culture has developed in Eastern Europe, short-term economic evaluations alone are unlikely to destroy attitudes favoring democratic institutions.

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Table 4
A Reduced Model of Satisfaction With Democracy, Eastern Europe, 1992

Variable	Hungary	Czech-oslovakia	Poland	Russia	Ukraine	Lithuania
Retrospective evaluation of the national economy						
b	.23 (.01)	.22 (.01)	.21 (.01)	.12 (.01)	.18 (.00)	.20 (.01)
β	.27**	.29**	.28**	.17**	.23**	.21**
Prospective evaluation of the national economy						
b	.14 (.01)	.14 (.01)	.22 (.01)	.22 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.03 (.01)
β	.18**	.19**	.27**	.32**	.18**	.05**
Retrospective evaluation of the household situation						
b	.20 (.01)	.12 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.09 (.01)	.10 (.00)	.15 (.01)
β	.23**	.16**	.16**	.13**	.15**	.19**
Prospective evaluation of the household situation						
b	.07 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.07 (.01)	.04 (.01)	.12 (.01)	.15 (.01)
β	.08**	.15**	.08**	.06**	.15**	.18**
Intercept	–1.33 (.02)	–1.64 (.03)	–1.61 (.02)	–1.11 (.02)	–1.21 (.01)	–1.17 (.02)
Adjusted R^2	.34**	.36**	.36**	.28**	.27**	.22**
Standard error of estimate	.65	.68	.66	.67	.66	.68
Pairwise *N*	999	920	999	999	1,398	999

Note: b = unstandardized regression coefficient. β = standardized regression coefficient. Standard error of *b* and intercept in parentheses.
*$p \leq .01$. **$p \leq .001$.

CONNECTING SATISFACTION WITH SUPPORT

The relationship between support for and satisfaction with democracy is now brought into perspective. Relying on the results of the support analysis, we note that support for democratic institutions varies with social, psychological, and economic experiences. We note too that the structures of support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy differ because only favorable evaluations of the economy have any impact on Eastern Europeans' satisfaction. And because, as already shown (see Figure 1), many Eastern Europeans

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are dissatisfied with the development of democracy, it is reasonable to conceive that their dissatisfaction stems primarily from negative economic evaluations and not from their political perceptions or sociodemographic experiences. Such a finding draws a clear distinction between support for and satisfaction with democracy. And, whereas Eastern Europeans support the ideals of democracy, they are far from satisfied with its outputs.

A relevant question, then, is what impact such widespread dissatisfaction with democratic government may have on citizens' attitudes toward democratic institutions over time. Can commitment to democratic institutions be eroded by high levels of dissatisfaction? In stable democracies, one would not expect short-term dissatisfaction to affect commitment to democratic processes. Citizens usually vent their dissatisfaction on those they hold accountable for poor economic performance by "throwing the rascals out" (see Riker, 1982). However, in Eastern Europe, given their inexperience with government institutions that facilitate accountability, publics may be unable to do the same. Dissatisfaction alone may not change attitudes toward democracy but an inability to channel dissatisfaction might. It is therefore useful to ascertain empirically how likely individuals are to blame their dissatisfaction on the democratic process and the pace of democratization rather than on the vision of their governments to devise strategies for relieving the economic burden.

Because the analyses of support and satisfaction were conducted with two different sets of data and because most of the variables used to examine support are available in the data used to examine satisfaction, an instrument, generated by the standardized predicted values of the support equation (i.e., $\hat{Y} = a + bX_1 + bX_2 + bX_3 + bX_4$),[13] was employed to consider the impact of dissatisfaction with democracy in a fully specified model of support for democracy. The analysis revealed that in Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania, dissatisfaction with democracy demonstrated a weak to moderate effect on support for democracy, but in the Central European countries, publics' dissatisfaction with the way that democracy was developing had no influence whatsoever on their support for democracy. Given the especially weak coefficients yielded in Russia and the Ukraine ($\beta = -.13$, $p \leq .001$; $\beta = -.11$, $p \leq .01$.), one might argue that except in Lithuania ($\beta = -.20$, $p \leq .001$), feelings of economic discontent are not likely to have a significant impact on publics' commitment to democratic institutions. Indeed, examination of the data reveals that in most of Eastern Europe, what matters more to support for democracy are gender,

13. X_1 represents evaluation of past national economic performance, X_2 represents evaluation of past household economic situation, X_3 represents evaluation of national economic future, and X_4 represents evaluation of household economic future.

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education, open-mindedness, and approval of political and economic restructuring, rather than dissatisfaction with the way that democracy is developing. In each country, dissatisfaction with democracy had a weaker impact on publics' support for democracy than sociodemographic influences. Such results suggest that despite the economic situation causing dissatisfaction, a value for democracy may temper publics' discontent and encourage individuals to develop more than labile attachment to the concept of democratic rule.

Viewed in relation to the current political climate in Eastern Europe, these findings seem reasonable. The reality in Eastern Europe is that negative assessments of the economic performance of current governments have not brought about antidemocratic mass protest (see Duch, 1995; Gibson, 1996b). Instead, the holding of and participation in elections and referenda show Eastern Europeans to be supportive of democratic institutions. Some argue that support is more likely to diminish in times of economic crisis or when people blame democracy for the failure of the economy to perform as expected (see Huntington, 1991; Przeworski, 1991). But Eastern Europeans are resilient and long-suffering, having endured foreign domination for decades. As observed in other democracies (see Diamond, Linz, & Lipset, 1988; McDonough, 1995), discontented Eastern Europeans may learn to channel their discontent and level blame not at the regime but, rather, at the government of the day.[14]

PROSPECTS FOR CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY

How likely, then, is it that Eastern European societies will not abandon reforms but will extend legitimacy to democratic institutions? One scholar postulated that "democracy is consolidated when it becomes self-enforcing . . . when compliance—acting within the institutional framework—constitutes the equilibrium of the decentralized strategies of all the relevant political forces" (see Przeworski, 1991, p. 26). Another scholar asserted that the continued viability of a political system depends on its citizens ascribing to it both diffuse and specific support (Easton, 1975). Linking these, one could argue—in light of the determinants of support for and satisfaction with democracy as well as the willingness of Eastern European pub-

14. Elections held subsequent to the surveys used in this analysis have resulted in the unseating of incumbents from political office and support the view that citizens replace the political leaders (e.g., Walesa in Poland) that they blame for failing to meet their expectations rather than reject the institutions under which they serve.

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lics and the authorities to work within an agreed institutional framework—that there may be few obstacles in these territories to the achievement of full democratic status. Indeed, the one imaginable obstacle may be the situation in which support for the authorities is linked with support for the regime. Any such blurring of the lines of accountability and the likelihood that grievances against incumbents may be directed at the regime would be detrimental to the consolidation of democracy.

Political observers (e.g., Miller et al., 1994; Schmitter & Karl, 1991) agree that the slow pace of reform may cause disillusionment. Yet, little effort has been made to understand how an inexperienced public may account for and resolve the lethargy of reform. In stable democracies, people readily distinguish the government of the day from the regime. But in societies in which the authorities-regime separation is not clear (see Kornberg, 1990), the regime, rather than the government, may suffer the consequences of dissatisfaction. In Eastern Europe, roughly 40% of citizens approve the performance of their leaders,[15] a distribution that corresponds fairly well with the average distribution of support for democracy. It becomes unclear from this how well supporters distinguish their new leaders from their new regime.[16] Such a distinction is particularly relevant to the survival of democracy in the nations under study.

An attempt to establish the effect[17] that support for the authorities has on support for the institutions revealed that in most of the six countries, citizens make the appropriate distinction between government and regime. There is a link in only two countries between approval of the executive and support for democracy. In Russia and Lithuania, this link calls into question the extent to which the authorities-regime relationship is separated in the minds of ordinary citizens. In Russia, for example, a positive relationship between the two variables was identified, suggesting that Russians who approve Yeltsin support democracy. Should they become disillusioned by Yeltsin's leadership,

15. Asked whether they approved or disapproved of the way the president was handling his job, 69.1% of Czechoslovakians, 34.6% of Hungarians, 14.8% of Lithuanians, 42.8% of Poles, 42.4% of Russians, and 36.3% of Ukrainians approved.

16. Relying on Easton's (1965, p. 194) distinction, the regime consists of formal structures and procedures and the norms that define how they will be used. The political authorities, on the other hand, are those who occupy political positions and have primary responsibility and discretion for making binding decisions for the political system (Easton, 1965, p. 213). Presidents and prime ministers therefore fall in the category of "authorities."

17. Bivariate regression analysis revealed that leader popularity had the following effect on support for democratic institutions: Czechoslovakia, $r = .07$, $\beta = .01$; Hungary, $r = -.05$, $\beta = -.04$; Lithuania, $r = -.23$, $\beta = -.22$, $p \leq .001$; Poland, $r = .00$, $\beta = .01$; Russia, $r = .23$, $\beta = .22$, $p \leq .001$; and the Ukraine, $r = .03$, $\beta = .03$.

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they may vent their grievances not only against him and the members of his administration but against the entire regime.[18] The fact that in recent elections Yeltsin's position as president was seriously challenged by an opponent (Zyuganov) with supposedly antidemocratic views may well support the notion that disillusionment with the pace of democracy in transitional societies has the potential to undermine support for the process (Przeworski, 1991; Schmitter & Karl, 1991). In Lithuania, the negative relationship between incumbent approval and support indicates that those approving of Landsbergis, then chairman of Lithuania's Supreme Soviet, were not supportive of democracy and reinforces the view that perceptions of government performance may be linked with perceptions of regime performance. Although such perceptions are not widespread, appearing in only two of the six countries, it seems reasonable that transitional polities in which citizens distinguish the authorities from the institutions would be more likely to deflect public dissatisfaction from the regime to the authorities than those in which publics fail to make that distinction. Any such failure could impede the consolidation of democracy.

CONCLUSIONS

In this article, I have considered three related questions: (a) What are the determinants of support for and satisfaction with democracy? (b) What does a difference in the structure of support and satisfaction mean for understanding the two concepts and the way they relate? and (c) What inferences can be drawn from these about potential obstacles to achieving full democratic status.

Results of the analysis reveal that supporters of democracy in Eastern Europe favor political and economic change and are well-educated, open-minded, young, male, urbanized, and motivated, to some degree, by disenchantment with the nation's past economic performance.[19] This profile suggests that support for democracy is primarily diffuse, based on an understanding of democratic beliefs and a willingness to embrace change. The fact

18. Roughly 79% of Russians and 63% of Lithuanians claim dissatisfaction with democracy. Note too that negative judgments about the past performance of the national economy influenced support for democracy in these two countries, and positive perceptions of the health of the national economy as well as personal well-being are important predictors of their satisfaction with democracy.

19. This is determined by the predictors of support that were significant in at least half of the six countries under study.

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that support for democratic institutions is widely held suggests that a democratic culture may have crept up stealthily in former authoritarian polities. Satisfaction with democracy, on the other hand, is based on a recognition of needs met, on a favorable assessment of the economic outputs of democratic government, and on the promise of a healthier economic future than that which existed under authoritarian rule. In this context, satisfaction with democracy may represent specific support for the efficacy of democratic government. These are interesting differences and very pertinent to the theory that viable political systems rely on a fair helping of both diffuse and specific support.

One may draw a few inferences from this finding. First, one could infer that the presence of both diffuse and specific support for democratic institutions and processes makes the new political system in Eastern Europe potentially viable. Second, one may infer that because there is greater diffuse support in the region than there is specific support, the choice of democracy over authoritarian rule may stem from more than just faddish lip service and therefore is likely to prevail. Third, however, one could view the imbalance in the strength of support and satisfaction as potentially worrisome because a deterioration in specific support for the economic efficiency expected of democratic government could negatively affect publics' support for reform and so obstruct the viability of the new system. The fact is that a democratic system will not survive on faith alone. Until beliefs about democracy are reinforced by favorable outcomes, transitions to democracy will linger at the crossroads of change.

So far, events in Eastern Europe support the expectation that the budding democracies will remain committed to democracy. Yet, some scholars are skeptical of the motives of political actors whose primary interest may be in securing positions favoring opportunities for corruption (see Schmitter, 1994). Many Eastern Europeans distrust politicians and parties (Schmitter, 1994) and, in the absence of progress, may transfer their disillusionment with the pace of reform from the particular miscreants to the entire regime. Indeed, some strategies of democratization have confused political and economic input. In Poland, for example, introducing free market reform prior to institutional reform may have helped to undermine mass support for democratic institutions (Hunter, Ryan, & Hrechak, 1994; Zubek, 1994). Generally, however, where democratic institutions represent the will of citizens, publics will submit their dissatisfaction to the institutions and effect change. As elections in Eastern Europe show, publics are venting their dissatisfaction with the way that democracy is developing by rejecting undesirable political leaders. In the absence of active protest against the granting of political rights or civil liberties, or publics' confusing government and regime, there is perhaps

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little reason yet to doubt that Eastern Europeans can move forward toward consolidating a durable institutional framework with widespread legitimacy.

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