

BEYOND MEAD: THE SOCIETAL REACTION TO DEVIANCE*

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What I prefer to call the sociology of deviance now appears to be under attack from so many quarters, both for what it is and what it is not, that a sense of embattlement is inescapable. The diverse, perverse, and tangential nature of the criticisms makes it difficult to tell friend from foe. Sensitive to this state of affairs, Peter Manning (1973) in a review essay of surpassing excellence asserts that a grey fog has settled over the field. This I can discount as the natural fog of good men's minds; but his further allegations that the theoretical impetus of deviance sociology is spent and that a state of exhaustion and conceptual decay prevails, I found painful and much harder to reconcile with my proprietary interests.

I should say parenthetically that reading the essay left me spelled by the beauty of its words and niceties of expression, as well as overwhelmed by its sense of prophecy. It recalled me to an old auctorial ideal espoused by James Branch Cabell, namely that we should write beautifully of things as they are. But having had time to cast off Manning's spell, I conclude that sociologists sometimes write beautifully of things as they are not and that in striving for rhetorical symmetry their conclusions may go beyond what facts will support. In this case I must object that the allegations of its sadness and senility ignore the theoretical potential of deviance sociology, its continuing research output, its influence on the diversion movement in criminal justice, and its striking impact on younger,

highly articulate sociologists in Britain. Granting the slow stain and constant erosion of all ideas, it seems to me that even with age deviance sociology still is "majestic in decay."

But without further pause on the decadence issue, I would like to deal with what may cause some of the faithful to cry sacrilege, namely the deficiencies of G. H. Mead's conception of symbolic interaction and their implications for the study of deviance. My purpose is not to add to the theoretical confusion but to clear some of it away, and hopefully free up sociological energies to exploit in the measure it deserves its least worked area, namely the societal reaction. In order to maximize the clarity of my discussion I will recap what the term has meant to me.

Some years ago in my early work on deviance I used the term societal reaction to comprehend a number of processes by which societies respond to deviants either informally or through their officially delegated agencies (Lemert, 1951). While communication of invidious definitions of persons or groups and the public expression of disapproval were included as part of the societal reaction, the important point was made that these had to be validated in order to be sociologically meaningful. Validation was conceived as effective social control taking form as isolation, segregation, penalties, supervision, or some kind of organized "treatment." In effect, this was a kind of *middle range conceptual orientation* to a body of data.

Societal reaction theory distinguished objective as well as subjective aspects of deviance, recognizing a relationship between the nature, degree, extent, and

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visibility of deviance and corresponding form and intensity of the societal reaction. It also allowed that attributes of deviants and the form of their deviance affected the way in which societal definitions were internalized, most easily seen in biological anomalies and physical handicaps. Among the objective influences on the societal reaction were noted technology, procedures, and limitation of agency personnel and resources. However, these did not get much elaboration or application, save in the discussion of changing tolerances for crime.

Then, as in my later work on deviance (Lemert, 1973), I emphasized the need to begin the analysis with the societal reaction, more particularly social control, rather than with etiology. Herein lay the distinctiveness of the societal reaction approach, which sought to show how deviance was shaped and stabilized by efforts to eliminate or ameliorate it. In retrospect, the break with structural conceptions of deviance and the traditional concern of sociology with causes was by no means complete. This I now believe to have been less a matter of theoretical asymmetry than an encounter with a perennial problem of sociological theory, namely how to establish a connection between symbolic systems, social systems, and physical systems, without denying the obvious fact that human beings make choices that affect as well as are affected by the system. According to J. F. Scott's (1963) informed analysis, even the grand theorist of our age, Talcott Parsons, failed to reach an ultimate solution of this problem.

This question was pretty well obscured during the 1950's and 1960's, probably because of the tremendous growth in our national production and

the belief that affluence was easily procurable for all, abetted by Keynesian economic theory aimed at little more than preventive maintenance of the marvelous machine making it all possible. But recently the avalanche of population growth, swift exhaustion of resources, environmental destruction, plus an "energy crisis" have made an awareness that human choices can either sustain or destroy the physical and technological basis on which they are made. Physical environments formerly taken as constants and merely limiting now can be seen changing in foreseeable time spans, and it becomes possible to speak of responses and feedback from the physical world. Even the vulgarization and deserved criticism of the ecology movement cannot quiet the deepening appreciation that man is inescapably part of a larger bio-physical system.

SYMBOLIC INTERACTION

Over the decades of the present century sociology moved steadily away from early social science, which had sought standing ground on biology, geography, and economics. Within sociology, social psychologists pushed farthest along this path, retaining only some nominal allegiance to organic and natural history analogies. And within social psychology, it has been those sociologists concerned with deviance who have laid the greatest and most exclusive emphasis on the socio-psychological process as the determining element in social life. It has been asserted that the one theme uniting the otherwise diverse views of labeling theorists, Neo-Chicagoans, or West Coast school, as they are variously called, is their fealty to the symbolic interactionism of G. H. Mead (Schur, 1969).

Nevertheless, it may be asked whether the prevailing definition of deviance as a group creation through labeling and the adoption of an "underdog" view of the symbolic process do not do a disservice to Mead. Labeling unfortunately conveys an impression of interaction that is both sociologicistic and unilateral; in the process deviants who are "successfully labeled" lose their individuality; they appear, as Bordua (1967) says, like "empty organisms" or, as Gouldner (1968) puts it, "like men on their backs" (Walton 1973). The extreme subjectivism made explicit by the underdog perspective, reflecting sympathy for the victim and antipathy towards the establishment, also distorts by magnifying the exploitative and arbitrary features of the societal reaction. But more important, it leaves little or no place for human choice at either level of interaction.

Actually the difficulties may lie in the ambiguities and uncertainties of Mead's ideas themselves. While Mead reconciled the objective and the subjective in general terms by making self and other dual aspects of a common behavioral process, the specifics of the process with respect to choice making were far from clear. Other strictures inhere in Mead's conception of the societal other; his unformed ideas about society, primarily that of one generalized other, are a poor source for a modern theory of the societal reaction (Meltzer 1967; Kolb 1967). This is amply demonstrated in the dramatic descriptions of the societal reaction which revolve around the idea of symbolic interaction.

THE DRAMATISTIC METAPHOR

Most of the currently held representations of the societal reaction are

metaphors having in common a curious primitive quality. In his one article on the subject, Mead (1928) spoke of the "modern organization of taboo;" later Tannenbaum (1937) called the process the dramatization of evil, equatable with ancient Hebraic scapegoating; (Garfinkle, 1956) depicted it as ceremonial degradation based on suprapersonal values of the tribe; others have termed the process stigmatization, victimization, exclusion, and conferral of an invidious property. Becker (1963) drew on a reconstructed incident of clan reaction to incest in the far off Melanesian islands to epitomize the contingency of the labeling process. The anachronistic overtones in these figures are unmistakable.

While fabrication of a pristine state of affairs, and the use of analogies and metaphors for purposes of analysis are inviting, it is also true that they may become the ties that bind; in this case the dramatic metaphors, or life-as-a-theatre analysis, traceable from Mead's comparison of social interaction to dramatic play and games, carry reductionistic implications hard to evade. The inescapable concomitants of the play are a scenario, actors who play prescribed parts, striking conjunction of actions, outward expression of inner conceptions, and denouement to an unequivocal end. The significant implication is that the societal reaction rests upon a kind of programmed consensus, a point made explicit by the concepts employed in many studies of agencies of social control. When "others" are agents of groups their decisions and actions are seen as the expression of rules, "routine practices," "common typifications," "proverbial characterizations," or racial-class bias, all strongly reminiscent of Durkheimian collective representations. Reifi-

cation of one locus of power, insistence on group sustaining functions of deviance and uncritical acceptance of custodial treatment institutions as "total" give a further cast of Durkheimian solidarity to groups against which deviants are said to stand as outsiders (for criticism of dramaturgic analysis, see Messinger, 1962, Zicklin, 1968, Garfinkel, 1967, 145ff.).

One consequence of the use of the above-mentioned analogies to describe the societal reaction is to restrict conflict to that between the group and the persons it seeks to label. No questions rise about possible effects of dissensus within the dominant group nor that generated by the intrusive claims of other groups. Becker's rules which create deviance appear as agreed upon, if not derived from an overarching establishment, at least from the sub-culture or occupational culture of the labelers; this despite knowledge that the salient problem for agents of social control such as police and court people is how to choose from among a plethora of rules at hand and how to find a basis for choice itself. There is little that I can find in labeling theory which deals with this kind of conflict and choice making in the context of a pluralism of groups so conspicuous in modern society.

ETHNOMETHODOLOGY—THE METHODOLOGY OF CULTURE

To say that revolutions in thought come to devour their own may overstate the case but there now comes a younger generation of ethnomethodologists, existentialists, or phenomenologists in sociology who attack labeling theory as insufficient explication of the societal reaction process. Sensitive to the fragmentation, divisiveness, and pluralism of the contemporary social

world, these writers stress the fluidity and provisional nature of the dynamics by which good and evil, and conformity and deviance emerge. While these thinkers are still allied with symbolic interactionism, they reject the Meadian concept of social role, and insist that "reality" lies under, beyond, or apart from institutional structures. Rules are replaced by concepts of "deeper rules," "relational rules," or preconceptions of social interaction (Douglas, 1970). In starkest form the ethnomethodologists assert that confrontations or collective action generating deviance are little more than negotiated understandings contrived in a world without meaning or which is "absurd" (Lyman and Scott, 1970).

The concomitant process has been called "work" or the "social construction of reality," situated in nature. Apart from this, however, clarification is meager, suggesting the difficulties which ethnomethodologists have in rising above a kind of raw "here and now" empiricism in the research application of their ideas. The low level of characterization of the stigmatization of clients at the hands of a welfare organization as a process of "muddling through." He concludes (Scott 1970):

This, in turn, implies that one can only speak of constructed meanings of stigma in the sense that they are genuinely man-made.

As the term denotes, ethnomethodology contends that cultures or sub-cultures set fundamental rules for determining what is perceived as real. In arguing for this position its partisans deepen the entanglement of deviance study in reductionism and subjectivism. The denial of any objective reality is made explicit in a statement by Erich Goode (1969):

The only reality available to individual consciousness is a subjective reality . . .

meaning is read into every situation, event, object and phenomenon.

FURTHER DILEMMAS

Insofar as ethnomethodologists hold that constructions of deviance rest on perceptions or "grounds" which are determined by cultural or subcultural screens, their ideas turn into solipsisms, recapitulating the difficulty from which Mead tried to rescue Watsonian behaviorism. In a narrow sense it is true that culture sets up an apperceptive base from which those enculturated respond selectively to define good and evil independently of other aspects of the actions they perceive. Culture may provide people with meanings that keep them acting for long periods in ways that appear to be irrational, meaningless, or even fantastic. The pure culturologist or ethnomethodologist looking at such behavior concludes that culture or social construction of reality can make anything good or bad, denying that there is any standard common to mankind that affects his efforts.

This kind of generalization can be made true only by denying that man learns or responds on any other basis than what is symbolically transmitted. Actually it is only in cases where a cultural definition of what happens is reinforced by anticipated results that men are free to selectively define reality in this circular manner. In effect they may react as if only part of what happened actually happened, thus identifying a whole pattern of action as a cultural or perceptual phenomenon.

But as W. F. Cottrell (1972) convincingly demonstrates, while some of our responses depend on symbolically acquired meanings, others require for their validation direct feedback from our bodies or the physical world; and

still other responses can be made or learned only through direct experience of the doing of them. From this point of view any pattern of human reaction to others, individual or collective, is a mixture or product of prior symbolically transmitted knowledge, past knowledge acquired from experience with the objective world and past knowledge acquired from experience with the objective world and newly invented meanings derived from immediate experience with the social and physical worlds.

CHANGE IN THE SOCIETAL REACTION

It is primarily by treating the societal reaction as a residue after all factors operating to produce it have occurred that the impression of its subjective symbolic character can be maintained. While granting that the residues of social action are symbolically transmitted, looking at the action from the perspective of change directs attention to its non-symbolic antecedents. This is made clear in Cottrell's (1972) words:

If culture be treated as a residue . . . then of course what is found there includes all the norms, the results of all strivings, as well as all knowledge that will be symbolically transmitted. But how much of what was there yesterday is still there. . . How much of what is there now is new, now to be symbolically transmitted but not learned that way? . . . if . . . our model permits us to look elsewhere we may see that culture change was preceded by technological invention, or that certain kinds of deleterious social relationships were selected out of that culture when new knowledge made it possible to discover their influence. . . It is only in the comparative short run that culture can make anything good. . . .

A great many of the studies of agencies controlling deviance have been synchronous in nature, describing and analyzing portions and pieces of a social

process. Many have been timeless and without provenience. Consequently when attention is turned to the rise and fall of moral ideas and the transformation of definitions of deviance, labeling theory and ethnomethodology do little to enlighten the process. This is especially true as it pertains to the interaction of groups. A sociopsychological model focused on symbolic interaction in the Mead tradition either leaves groups vague entities or psychologizes their action. This can be seen in the proposition that new moral and legal categories are the work of moral entrepreneurs or crusaders with a sense of mission to impose their morality on others (Becker 1963). One version of this idea has it that such crusaders seize on a single moral issue as a symbol for reform in an effort to preserve a common way of life threatened by social change. Motivation presumably is purely symbolic, monolithic, and divorced from distributive material or means considerations (Gusfield, 1966).

Looking beyond symbolic politics for pertinent theory on the societal reaction is scarcely more rewarding. Radical critics and those who write on the politicization of deviance properly have noted the superficiality of the moral crusader formulation, as well as faulting labeling theory generally for its neglect of conflict and power. But the alternative theory of so-called radical sociology I find very generalized, as well as doctrinaire. Neither the Marxian concept of class, the power elites of Mills, nor the new left "urban alliance" of blacks and students have much immediate or practical use for research into the dynamics of the societal reaction. At best they substitute ideologies for things like group rules and define power as outcome of action or an attribute rather than as a process, e.g.,

"power is the ability to enforce one's moral claims."

In sum, radical critics reify power only slightly less than those they criticize; and in order to dramatize their criticisms they sometimes get caught up in the subjective, phenomenological perspective they seek to reject. Indeed some recent radical critiques seem bent on restoring machismo to the deviant and distinguishing the stout hearted and red blooded deviants who defy the system from those who live in its chinks and crannies. But even those on the sinistral side who call for sociologists to stigmatize the oppressor instead of their victims compound contradictions of power by insisting that high ranking persons are deviants even though they admittedly hold the power indispensable to defining deviance (Liazos, 1972).

Empirical materials to aid in formulation of theory on the evolution of morals and law unfortunately are sparse, for history seldom has recorded the kinds of events relevant to the task. Yet that which is available: J. Hall's (1935) studies of the evolution of the law of theft, research on the growth of vagrancy laws (Chambliss, 1964), commission reports on the poor laws, recent English articles on the politics of deviance (Taylors, 1973), my own work on change in the California Juvenile Court Law (1970), along with investigations into the origins and working of the Probation Subsidy Program in California, make it doubtful that the emergence of new morality and procedures for defining deviance can be laid to the creations of any one group, class, or elite. Rather they are the products of the interaction of groups. The workings of legislatures reveal the multifaceted interaction they have with such groups as well as the complexities of

their own internal interaction through committees, majorities, and minorities. Judges, court workers, administrators, and police further interact to qualify the effective reach of new substantive law by jurisdictional and procedural adaptations. To understand the interplay of many groups out of which materialize new categories of moral and legal control requires a model of interaction quite different than those fathered by the psychologically oriented thought of Mead or from those of the class conflict theorists.

GROUP INTERACTION

Group interaction is best understood as a process resting on evaluation in which individuals sort out their purposes or values in terms of their dependence on groups necessary for their satisfaction. In so doing they give up some values in order to satisfy others, at the least possible sacrifice. The pattern of group action which results will reflect the claims and power of all those involved in the interaction; and the priorities it follows often are at considerable variance from the value hierarchies of individual participants. When a chain of interaction occurs between groups, the disparity between values dominate in final action, and the values of any one group member may be enormous. Police may acquiesce in positions of legislation taken by their representative association which deeply offend their sense of morality and justice because other values which have been given precedence are at stake in concurrent legislation. Legislators, too, may be captured by their group commitments so that they must give do pass to bills which are grossly contrary to values they personally espouse.

The order in which interests, claims,

or values get satisfied reflects not only group allegiance but also the availability of means for their satisfaction and the costs of such means, measurable by time, energy, and other values expended. Laws and rules made by this kind of process often express the values and norms of no group or person but rather their dilemmas, compromises, expeditious adherence to procedures, and strictures of time and budgets. For this reason it becomes difficult or impossible to predict the emergence of new definitions and controls of deviance by introspecting or "taking the role of the other" to discover what it is the minds of those making the change. Nor can predictions be made successfully by imputing cultures, subcultures, or life styles to the agents of change.

What has been said is well illustrated by reference to the interaction of a variety of professional associations which took part in revising the Juvenile Court law in California in 1961, a change which narrowed the jurisdiction of the court and effectively modified definitions of delinquency (Lemert, 1970). Each association sorted out the proposed changes in terms of its own values, supporting or resisting according to whether the changes were seen as a means of achieving their existing values or called for sacrifices deemed intolerable. In the change, probation officers gave up their accustomed right to employ a number of informal procedures but got more power *vis-à-vis* the police in decisions to detain juveniles. Police lost this power but got badly needed clarification of arrest powers. Judges lost their considerable freedom to handle the court informally, but they along with interested attorneys gained by the introduction of guarantees of certain rights to minors.

All three professional groups had splits for and against the changes, and their conflicting positions were arrived at for different reasons and in different ways. Ultimately resistance among probation officers disappeared because the resisters had to choose between continued opposition and preservation of their association, which it threatened to destroy. Opposition among judges centered around one of their members who remained against the changes throughout but ultimately chose not to risk loss of reputation among his other colleagues by protracted resistance. Police resistance, primarily among Juvenile Officers from the south state, got stymied by the structure of their lobbying committee, which was dominated by chiefs who were more concerned with evidentiary bills and a death penalty bill than they were with juvenile justice.

STRUCTURES AND THE SOCIETAL REACTION

It is clear from what has been said that social structures influenced the outcome of the legislation in question. This happened in several ways, such as limiting the access of some groups to the legislature, allocating power in a manner so that the decision of one committee was crucial, and the special autonomy to act given to the group which initiated the changes. However, here I wish to emphasize for theoretical reasons how structures become instrumentally important as vehicles or channels by which feedback from direct experience with the objective world modifies choice—in this instance how new structures affect dissemination of new knowledge which selects out old patterns or paradigms.

The movement to change the juvenile court law, although it had outside leadership, was something less than a

moral crusade, nor could it be described realistically as a popular movement shaped by public opinion. Leaders were a few attorneys, some probation officers, correctional administrators, and college professors, from among whom was organized a commission within the California Youth Authority and the Department of Corrections. Joint sponsorship by the two organizations and later loss of interest by the CYA top people in the movement made it much like an autonomous staff operation. Several of the attorneys were attracted to the movement in its early stages mainly from frustrating encounters with highhanded judges in juvenile courts, but the focus and articulation of the movement owed much to organizational features introduced with creation of the CYA.

In essence, the movement was a challenge to the traditional *parens patriae* conception of the juvenile court, although it was not so represented. Social action grew out of an accumulation of new facts and information that raised serious doubts about the efficacy of the basic philosophy of the court. The main source of such information was input at the Board created for a different purpose, to hear and dispose all cases referred to CYA. This, together with reports from its field consultant division, allowed staff and Board members for the first time, circa 1944, to develop a statewide impression of what the juvenile courts were like in fact and to begin to appreciate the discrepancies between their ideology and their performance. A number of Board members after repeatedly listening to stories of youth coming before them grew convinced that injustices were being done.

The problem of the Commission became one of convincing persons with

power to change the law that this was true. Given this general stance, the Commission did in a sense try to reconstruct the symbolic reality of the juvenile court, chiefly by means of a state-wide survey, hearings, and presentations before legislative committees. But their report was late in appearing and was not very good at that; and the Commission's presentations before the powerful Senate Judiciary Committee, a majority of whose members were opposed to any change, fell short.

The event which did more than any other to undercut and select out the existing *parens patriae* conception of the juvenile court came from the unsolicited testimony of a single up-state judge who had come to defend the old style court and fight the changes sought by the Commission. A somewhat quaint, anachronistic figure in a black suit and a furled umbrella, he told in fine detail how he ran what was in effect an inquisitorial system of juvenile justice, ordering arrested youths into detention until by confessing their misdeeds they showed the remorse he considered necessary for their rehabilitation. The impact on a committee composed entirely of lawyers, former district attorneys, and a former judge was like that of a bomb in an echo chamber.

This strongly indicates that when a radical change is contemplated on the basis of new ideas about reality, it most likely occurs when there is a validation of the ideas in direct sensory experience—in this case a living breathing judge of the type the commissioners ineptly tried to fix as an image. The situation was dramatic because it was so real and because it was not staged.

Legislators—at least those in California—are well accustomed to staged presentations and highly sophisticated

efforts to create realities favorable to the causes of lobbyists. As a matter of fact, they have committee techniques of their own designed to cope with these, that which might be called counter staging, set up to give the impression of responding to the voices of the public. Underneath, legislators tend to be tough-minded; and the prevalence of lawyers among them sets rigorous standards for what will be accepted as facts or evidence. That they have problems of obtaining objective measures of the harmful effects of deviance and of consequences of proposed programs for its control none will deny. The problems face social scientists as well as legislators, but they do not seem sufficient reason to believe that legislators have no way of getting feedback from the objective world.

It remains to comment on the effects of direct experience with physical or ecological consequences of patterns of social control as influences on change. From these flow costs, by which is meant the time, energy, and money costs of means to implement various methods of control. In a context of change this refers to anticipated as well as experienced costs. An important principle is that changes in the definition and control of deviance may be due not to any alteration in value systems but to changes in their costs of satisfaction. An increase in costs, such as the time needed to deliver a youth to detention, may change the disposition of cases by police or probation officers even though their preferences are to follow an old pattern.

Anticipated changes in the costs of means to ends affected both the support for and opposition to the 1961 Juvenile Court Law revision. Los Angeles county sheriff people favored the change because the new arrest proce-

dures simplified and helped the efficiency of their delinquency control operations. Police, on the other hand, both north and south, were concerned that the 48-hour limit imposed in the new law for investigations prior to detention hearings would make their jobs impossible. And indeed this was the case so far as their old procedures were concerned, especially in counties like Los Angeles, which had set up a detention control unit within its probation department. As a result, it became harder to use the juvenile court as an adjunct for extra-legal police methods. "Weekenders," youth swept up by police and detained in order to break up or curb local disorders, tended to disappear as a category.

Judges, probation officers, supervisors, and county executives in many instances were painfully aware that the proposed law revision would cost a great deal more money in order to provide counsel for minors, engage court reporters, and prepare records for court hearings. How to raise such funds was a critical issue in a number of counties. The requirement of two and possibly three court hearings could only increase the workload of the court and probation department, which meant either more tax funds or greater expenditures of time and effort by court personnel from judges on down.

The strong opposition to the law change by police and probation officers in the southern part of the state came from recognition of the hard fact that it would end the use of jail for detention, which was an intrinsic feature of the delinquency control system there. This eventuality was felt keenly in Long Beach, where a new wing of the jail had been constructed for such a purpose.

Higher standards of proof mandated

by the law change and the new power of probation officers to dismiss at intake meant that more time was care had to go into police investigations and reports. This was more fully appreciated after some experience with the new law, and it fostered a changed categorical attitude that "either you have a case, or you don't." An organizational reflection of this change was the decision of the Los Angeles Police to eliminate its juvenile bureau and turn its work over to the detective bureau.

Herein may lie one of the main outcomes of the 1961 law change, namely a growing tendency to redefine delinquency more exclusively as law violations, and to differentiate such cases from so-called delinquent tendencies cases, many of which began to be handled by other means. Comments now are heard from probation officers that "601's (the code term for such cases) are on their way out."

CONCLUSION

It has been my contention that existing theories of deviance are ill suited to account for the complexities of the societal reaction in modern society. In place of a sociopsychological model I have proposed a group interaction model and tried to show how it clarifies the shifting significance of ends and means and their costs in the emergence of new patterns of social control. The chief gain is a method for specifying the way in which human choices affect the societal reaction without generalizing the claims of others or reducing them to reified ideas of culture, class, or power. It also shows how costs of changes in social control feed back into decisions to make changes, without the necessity of relying on older deterministic con-

ceptions of the effects of the physical world on the social.

The possibility exists that the special subject matter of procedural law change within a bureaucratic context of correctional agencies puts the group interaction model in a more favorable light than if it were applied to substantive legislation of a more obviously "moral" nature, such as marihuana laws, temperance laws, and anti-pornography statutes. Yet I note a recent study of the evolution of our marihuana laws which advisedly chooses an organizational perspective emphasizing bureaucratic utilitarian values in its explanation (Dickson, 1968). I am also reminded of A. M. Lee's (1944) older pluralistic analysis of the temperance movement, which still stands unreconciled with the symbolic crusade theory of the same phenomenon.

A study of social control in Cuba, touching on censorship and sex behavior, not only has challenged the validity of the notion of moral entrepreneurs but also accentuates the need to fit concepts of social control to the differentiation of interests and groups in particular societies (Looney, 1973). All of which tells me that deviance sociologists can do better with working tool concepts than with ambitious theory. They obviously "can't go home again" to old style structural, positivist sociology any more than conservative sociologists can stomach the extremes of labeling theory. But there may be a less pretentious midground on which to meet—if not they, then a less committed generation of sociologists yet to come.

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ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION AND LICENSING: SOCIAL PROBLEM OR SOLUTION?

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Government regulation is frequently advocated as a solution to many economic problems. In a review of a number of studies examining the effects of government regulation, it is seen that regulation and occupational licensing have typically operated so as to increase price, restrict entry, and enhance the rate of return earned by the industry or occupation. Some organizational factors accounting for these outcomes are advanced.

The pervasiveness of the intervention of government in the economic system is a fairly well-known fact and has led to the writing of a plethora of books apparently dealing with the relationships between the government and business organizations (e.g., Fainsood, *et al.*, 1959; Mund, 1965; Anderson, 1966). The intervention of government, which is sometimes associated with the "liberal" ideology or political perspective, is expected to pro-

tect the consumer, curb the power of large organizations, and ensure better economic outcomes. Moreover, government intervention is becoming increasingly frequent and widespread. The first instance of national government regulation was the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887; and since then government has come to regulate railroads, many forms of trucking, airlines and busses, telephones and telecommunications, pipelines, barges