European Elections after Eastern Enlargement

Preliminary Results from the European Election Study 2004

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Preface

In a multifaceted and complex political community like the European Union, it appears to be tremendously difficult to achieve more civil awareness, transparency and democracy. The European-wide excellence network CONNEX (Connecting Excellence on European Governance), which is composed of experts from 42 research institutions in a total of 21 countries, analyses how "efficient and democratic governance in the EU" works.
CONNEX seeks to integrate independent fundamental research and to mobilise outstanding scholars from different disciplines to deepen our knowledge of European multilevel governance.

The Network of Excellence has two main concerns: On the one hand it aims at taking stock of the wealth of on-going and already conducted governance research and making it accessible to a broad public. On the other hand, it seeks to build a Europe-wide research community, which stands for scientific excellence, dealing specifically with the topic „governance".
Since its start in July 2004, the network has organised many high-level conferences and academic workshops. The activities outcomes mainly take the form of publications such as edited volumes, special issues of academic journals and articles.

The CONNEX Report Series launched with this volume is aimed to complete the range of our dissemination instruments. It has been designed to make first results of our research activities rapidly accessible to a public of specialists interested in the issues addressed by the Network. The content of each volume can also be downloaded from the project website (www.connex-network.org).

We are pleased to publish this first volume that presents very interesting insights about the 2004 election at the European Parliament and hope it will contribute both to the scientific debate and to the discussion in the broad public.

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Mannheim, January 2007

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Introduction

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The papers here were presented at an academic workshop held in Lisbon May 11-13, 2006 on the subject of the European Parliament elections of 2004. The workshop was convened by Michael Marsh (Trinity College Dublin) and Hermann Schmitt (MZES, University of Mannheim) and organised locally by Marina Costa Lobo, André Freire and Pedro Magalhães through the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon under the auspices of CONNEX, a Network of Excellence for research into EU governance funded under the 6th Framework Programme.[1] The participants are all part of a group that carried out a study of the European Elections of 2004 by running surveys of electors in the member states, using a standard questionnaire.[2]

The 2004 project is the latest in a long line of European Election studies stretching back to 1979.[3] These have been focussed primarily on electoral participation and voting behaviour in European Parliament elections, in part as a means of studying elections in general, but more than that, they have also been concerned with the evolution of a political community and a public sphere in the EU, examining citizens' perceptions of and preferences about the EU political regime and their evaluations of EU political performance. In essence, the aim was to explore whether we are seeing a legitimate European system of political representation in the making, at least in the channel of

political representation that is provided by competitive elections. The project was started in 1979 by a trans-national group of electoral researchers and Europeanists some of which are still on board. Between 1979 and 2004, 6 election studies were prepared and 5 of them were realised. A new era began in 2004 when national study directors - rather than the international research group - funded and conducted the 2004 study in 24 of the 25 EU member-countries.

The Lisbon meeting was designed to facilitate the discussion of further advances in the exploration of the implications of EES 2004 for accountability and representation in the European Union. Contributions were invited on the general theme of accountability and representation and the 2004 elections, but in the expectation that most would make some use of the 2004 data. The papers consequently cover a wide range of topics within those themes, from basic issues of turnout and vote choice in 2004, through the relationship between attitudes to the EU and voting decisions and case studies of EU elections in particular countries to more general issues of EU democracy: community, citizenship and identity and the relationship between the electoral process and the behaviour of MEPs. There are significant and original re-examinations of some 'old chestnuts', such as the second order thesis in papers by Toka, Marsh and Linek and Lyons, and the 'democratic deficit' in that by Rohrschneider and Loveless, papers on enduring issues of citizenship and identity by Thomassen and by Scheuer and Schmitt, as well as papers on newer, but highly important, issues, such as that by van der Brug and Fennema on anti-immigration parties. While voter surveys form the core of the EES project, there are also companion projects on the media and on party manifestos, and these too are represented in the papers collected here.

All of these papers appear in much the same form as they were presented, barring some minor editorial amendments. A few contain an 'afterword', indicating ways in which the papers could be improved, following

discussions at the workshop. However, all represent work in progress and should be read as such. Many will appear elsewhere in future with more developed arguments and analyses. However, the authors have agreed to allow their work to be reproduced here as an aid to the growing research interest in the EU in general and in the electoral process within the European Union in particular, and to advertise more widely the data resource provided by the various European elections studies. These will shortly be available as a combined data file, incorporating the studies carried out between 1989 and 2004.

Campaigns, turnout and vote switching

The first session of the workshop examined the campaigns, turnout and vote switching. De Vreese, Banducci, Semetko and Boomgaarden reported on the news coverage of the 2004 Election Campaign across all 25 countries, using data from a companion project on the media and the 2004 elections. Their paper provides a unique pan-European overview of the campaign coverage in each country, based on an analysis of three national newspapers and the most widely watched main evening private and public television news programs in each country in the final two weeks leading up to the elections. They find that average visibility of the elections on television news in the 'old' EU-15 increased in comparison with the previous EP election in 1999, while it decreased marginally in national newspapers. Even so, the elections tended to be more visible in the 'new' 10 member states than in the 'old' 15 EU member states. The news coverage tended to be domestically focused: the political personalities and institutional actors featured were generally domestic or national political actors and not EU actors, though there were more EU actors in the news in 2004 than in 1999. The tone of the news was predominantly neutral, but when it was evaluative, the news in the 'old' EU-15 was generally negative towards the EU, while in the 'new' countries a mixed pattern was found with the broadsheet press and television news being, on average, positive and tabloid papers, on average, negative. The

paper discusses these findings in the light of the literature on the EU's democratic deficit and concludes that campaign communication seems to contribute to the legitimization of European politics.

Franklin's paper looks at the dynamics of turnout, taking the 2004 elections as its focus. The elections of 2004 were extraordinary in bringing to the polls citizens of 25 countries, ten of them participating for the first time in EP elections. Turnout levels in established member states at these elections were very much as would have been expected from past patterns, but turnout in new member states was generally very low, though highly variable. This is surprising in the light of expectations that countries participating for the first time in EP elections would demonstrate higher turnout than at later elections. The variability in turnout across the new EU member states provides us with leverage that may help us understand dynamic features of turnout variations that are still puzzling to researchers. A variety of explanations for low turnout among new members have been proposed, from the fact that all of them had recently conducted referendums on EU membership that might have resulted in electoral fatigue to the fact that many of them are consolidating democracies with patterns of electoral behaviour that are not yet settled. This paper investigates these and other ideas, using the EP elections of 2004 as a resource that helps us to better understand the mainsprings of turnout variations and concludes that more research is needed, in particular into the unexpectedly low turnout figures in the new member countries.

The paper by Marsh reviews three theories of lower stimulus elections: surge and decline, referendum and second-order theory. It explores differences and similarities between them in order to assess what each can tell us about European Parliament elections in 2004. Most offer something of value, although some have a wider potential than others. Several clear patterns emerge in the results, many of them interpretable through existing theories. In addition, many similarities between the old and new member states are

found in respect to the dynamics of change, although volatility in the new states remains much higher than in the old states. Certain types of volatility, such as that within the respective sets of parties in government and in opposition, are not envisaged by theories of surge and decline or 'referendums', but might be in accordance with second-order theory of regarding the differential prospects of large and small parties. Weak party attachment seems to be a factor in all of this, but more work needs to be done to explore the precise patterns of within-camp changes.

Freire, Costa Lobo, and Magalhães explore the importance of left and right for vote choice in 2004. While the importance of the left-right divide is well established, the conditions under which the left-right cleavage is more or less important in explaining the vote are understudied. This paper seeks to determine the conditions under which the left-right divide is more or less important in explaining the vote, and whether these conditions are at work in both established and consolidating democracies. The paper examines whether the ideological location of citizens – in terms of left-right self-placement — has a different impact on the vote in different types of democratic regime (consolidating versus established democracies), defined in terms of their level of party system institutionalization and the patterns of partisan ideological competition; and whether the generic differences found between democracies in terms of their level of democratic "consolidation" or "establishment" are sustained if controls are introduced for three other factors hypothesized to make a difference in the extent to which left-right orientations have a greater influence on the vote. It concludes that there is a sizeable effect of left-right orientations on EP vote choices, particularly in party systems with low effective thresholds for new parties to enter; where the left-right and the pro-/anti-integration dimension of party competition are correlated; and where there is high perceptual agreement in the electorate on where the parties stand in terms of left and right.

Tóka's paper takes a critical look at the theory of second order elections. It argues that how the most influential theory of voting behaviour in European elections can be further clarified by taking the notion of information effects into account and offers competing information-based explanations for some previously observed empirical anomalies for the theory of second order elections. He proposes a modification in terms of the different degrees of information available in first and second order elections. He outlines a "less-information" and a "different-information" explanation. The paper offers some preliminary tests of the different explanations using data collected from EES 2004 elections. Tóka concludes that the results seem fully consistent with the different-campaign-information version of the informational account of second order election effects, but contradict both the less-campaign-information and the motivational explanation of greater support for small parties in European elections.

EU attitudes and the Vote

The second section focussed more specifically on the relationship between attitudes to the EU and Voting Decisions. This has been a debated topic both in respect of vote choice and turnout itself with many advocates on each side of the debate. The issue is very significant because it goes to the heart of the interpretation of the significance of EU elections for the European project. The first paper in this section examines attitudes to the EU themselves, asking what determines EU support. Garry and Tilley explore attitudes to European integration using the most recent wave of the European Election Study. They test a range of both individual level and contextual level theories. In general, what emerges is the similarity between west and east. Egocentric utilitarianism, national identity and political interest are all better predictors in the western than in the eastern context, but in substantive terms the effects are not particularly large. It is also interesting to note that two control variables – age and sex –act quite differently in the two contexts. Being younger and being male are predictors of a positive disposition

towards integration in the west, but not in the east. Overall, while attitudes to integration are less structured (i.e. less predictable with the theories tested) in the east than in the west, citizens in both areas are roughly similar in terms of the reasons that they favour or oppose integration. However, key differences do emerge in terms of different aspects of economic utilitarianism: economic xenophobia drives attitudes in the west and prospective economic evaluations drive attitudes in the east.

Wessels examines the sources of turnout, arguing that turnout is in decline (c.f. the earlier paper by Franklin), contrary to what might be expected from the increasing relevance of the European Union as a more and more powerful political system and the increasing significance of the European Parliament within this system. Whereas the level of turnout compared across countries may not signify political satisfaction where it is high, or the opposite, where it is low, decline across time certainly does indicate that something is going on. Mark Franklin's work on turnout has demonstrated the strong impact of demographic change in the composition of the eligible population by lowered voting age. But, even so, the question remains, why has the European system been unable to attract (new) voters. The last enlargement of the European Union moved the borders of the community far beyond the former iron curtain to the East. Indeed, the 2004 elections can be called the founding elections of the new Europe, overcoming the obsolete East-West divide. It was the first time that the people in the East could express their belonging and indicate their preference for the political course of the Union and it was the chance for the people in the old member states to demonstrate the historical significance of the event by participating in it. However, turnout was on average extremely low in the new member states, and even in the old member states it was a little lower than 1999. Wessels tests a number of hypotheses that explain low turnout in terms of the absence of factors that will promote participation. He concludes that political actors, namely candidates, parties, and EU officials, have to put more effort into making it

clear to the voter that voting makes a difference and to informing and mobilizing them.

Markowski and Tucker in their paper ask three basic questions regarding political representation in Poland and the issue of EU membership. First, how important was this issue to both masses and elites? Second, did Polish political parties react in any way to mass political attitudes towards EU membership? Finally, did views on EU membership have an effect on how Polish citizens voted, how they viewed political parties, or their overall assessment of the quality of Polish democracy? They address these questions in an effort to expand our understanding of the relevance of EU membership to Poland's domestic politics beyond the question of why certain citizens support EU membership, and in an effort to expand the study of political representation outside the confines of stable established democracies. They answer these questions using the 1997 and 2001 Polish National Election Studies, which surveyed both masses and parliamentary elites. Overall, they conclude that the issue of EU membership did matter to Polish citizens, helping inform their political choices and attitudes, and that political parties were aware of this fact and reacted to it. Although they note that this bodes well for the development of political representation in Poland, they also point out that, ironically it may ultimately prove threatening to the quality of democratic development by providing mass support for radical and anti-systemic parties.

Mattila and Raunio observe that parties do not offer real choices to voters on European integration. Indeed, in most EU countries there has been broad consensus about integration between the main parties. Importantly, previous research shows that this elite convergence is not replicated among the voters. Using EES data from 1979 to 2004, their paper analyses the ideological range of parties on the EU dimension in the EU member states. The analysis is in two stages. First they describe longitudinally the development of inter-party competition on the EU dimension between since the first EP elections.

Second, moving to the empirical analysis, they then examine the impact of various factors – such as number of parties, the range on the left/right dimension and government composition – on the level of party competition over integration. The paper finds that the higher the polarization in support for membership, the bigger is the differences between two main competitors. The level of support for membership operates the opposite way: when EU membership is very popular, there is less need for the two main parties to compete with each other on the EU dimension. But overall, the hypothesized factors explained only a small portion of between-country differences.

Finally, in this section, van der Brug and Fennema examine the support base of radical right parties, which have typically manifested a strong anti-EU position. In the last two decades of the twentieth century many western democracies have seen the rise of parties that have been labelled extreme-right (Ignazi), New Radical Right (Kitschelt), Radical Right (Norris), right-wing populis or anti-immigration parties (Fennema). There are several competing theories of support for such parties. Socio-structural models inspired most research on radical right parties until the late 1990s. The crux of these explanations is the suggestion that support for radical right parties comes from citizens who feel threatened by rapid changes in post-industrial societies. More recent contributions have challenged this perspective. Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie showed with data from 1994 that radical right parties attract support which is more broadly based in sociological terms than is that of the more established parties Moreover, they showed that support for radical right parties is motivated by the same kind of ideological and pragmatic considerations as support for established parties. However, a similar analysis for 1999 suggested a more complicated picture. The current paper replicates the earlier analyses with data from the EES 2004, which provides a wider range of cases. The analysis suggests that the difference in findings is largely due to political change: the ongoing loss of electoral credibility of some of these parties, the growth of a populist radical right in some of the countries, and the build-up of a strong party organisation by

those radical right parties whose support profile remained largely unchanged between the two surveys.

National case studies

Three papers were national case studies. Linek and Lyons examined vote switching in the in the Czech Republic with a view to testing some of the implications of the second-order election thesis. The influential second-order election thesis explains the relatively lower turnout in European elections, losses in support by government parties, and increases in support for smaller, new and radical parties at the expense of established larger parties. It has received much validation within the literature, but much of that comes from aggregate data. This paper argues that second order theory is fundamentally an aggregate level explanation and runs the risk of the ecological fallacy. Using an ecological inference technique this paper examines vote switching in the Czech Republic between the 2002 Chamber elections and 2004 European elections. These results are compared with two individual level mass survey results. The results of these analyses confirm many of the predictions of second order theory but also generate further hypotheses for future research.

Gyrfasowa's paper is on the EP election in Slovakia, setting it in a wider EU context. It argues that the circumstances of the election allowed differential turnout to affect the outcome. Slovak citizens introduced themselves on the European scene with critically low turnout – only 17 per cent of eligible voters participated in the selection of 14 Slovak EP members. On the other hand, in spite of mid-term unpopularity, the pro-European coalition parties did well, rather than the parties that might have mobilized the voters by appealing to anti-EU sentiments. That means the trend in Slovakia did not follow a pattern observed in some other countries – a strengthening of the opposition and greater support for smaller euro-sceptical or anti-EU parties. Europhobes like communists or nationalists failed completely. The

traditionally best-mobilized constituencies of national populist parties were not apparently motivated by the idea of Europe. This issue has lower salience for them; they are ambivalent about it. The differential mobilization helps explain the success of coalition parties.

Finally, Teperoglou and Skrinis look at the 2004 European Election in Greece and ask if it fits the second order model. The paper is divided in two parts and tries to answer two questions. In the first part they examine the 2004 European Election in Greece with the help of the second-order election model, looking at participation, losses by large parties, including the government parties, and finally gains by smaller parties. The main conclusion is that the hypotheses of the second-order election model are corroborated. The question that runs through the second part of their paper is an attempt to extend this perspective one step further: Second-order election, for whom? In other words, did all voters treat the election as a second order contest? They attempt to answer these questions using data from the Eurobarometer Flash 162, exit polls and results of the EES 2004. Their tentative findings suggest that EP elections have less of a second-order nature for older citizens, for voters living in rural areas, and for the less well educated.

The issue of EU democracy

The fourth section of the workshop examined the issue of EU democracy. First of all, De Winter, Swyngedouw and Goeminne explore attitudes towards the scope of EU government. The question about the decision-making level that is the most appropriate to deal with different policy areas is multifaceted and has been posed by political philosophers since centuries. The question of level of government is also one of the aspects of the political system that is supposed to affect strongly its legitimacy (Thomassen and Schmitt, 1999).

The paper argues that the legitimacy of a given level of government in democratic polities depends on the evaluation by the citizens of whether a certain division of power is right or not. The question of the appropriate level of governance has been dormant for a long time given the permissive pro-European consensus. The subsidiarity debate has turned it into one of the hot issues in the debate on the legitimacy of and democratic deficit within the EU. This paper first examines to what extent European citizens allocate decision-making responsibilities to the European Union, the national state, or the regional level. Second, the authors test a set of hypotheses concerning the socio-demographic, attitudinal and structural characteristics that affect differences in preferences for government levels. Finally, they suggest questions for future research.

Thomassen's paper on European Citizenship and Identity is part of a larger project on the legitimacy of the European Union. It is based on the European Election Study 2004. It argues that the bases of democratic legitimacy need to be deduced from normative democratic theory. From this perspective three dimensions of legitimacy are distinguished: Identity, Representation and Accountability and Performance, although the analysis in this paper is limited to the dimension of Identity. 'Who constitutes the people' is one of the most fundamental aspects of legitimacy. However, there are two contrasting views from the perspective of legitimacy on what 'the people' really means. In one view the establishment of a legitimate democracy requires the pre-existence of a collective identity. An alternative view is that citizenship is primarily a legal construct that – once established – can enhance the development of a sense of community. These alternative concepts of citizenship and identity were operationalised in the European Election Study. The paper presents a preliminary descriptive analysis of the development of both the sense of European citizenship and the sense of a collective European identity and discusses the possible consequences for the legitimacy of the European Union, arguing that the recent expansion of the

Union seems to have significantly reduced average levels of trust between peoples.

Štebe's paper looks at trust and legitimacy in the EU, focusing on the possibly contrasting perceptions of national and EU institutions. It sees citizenship as a set of roles and expectations on the individual level that are in a process of transformation. The modern view is that citizenship is a feature of a nation state. This raises the question whether the EU, as new institutional and political entity, can be the focus of the type of emotional attachment typical of national states, or whether any attachment of citizens to it is of a different nature. Moreover it is interesting to contrast old and new members of EU. The paper concludes that national and European citizenship are not independent but influence one another; that in the new member countries, European citizenship seems to be stronger than national citizenship; and that contextual factors – some deeply routed in history – structure the correlation between the two.

Scheuer and Schmitt examine the dynamics of European identity. They suggest that EU democracy requires a European demos: in more modern language, a European political identity. In earlier work, using the EES 1994, they identified major indicators of European political identity: (1) personal identification of the citizens as Europeans, (2) a sense of we-feeling among the people in the EU beyond national borders, and (3) a clear notion about who is in and who is out. The European Election Study 2004 contains the data that can show the degree of change that has happened within the last decade. The questions guiding the analysis are whether citizens' identification with the EU has increased over time, whether the bonds among the European people have gained in strength, and whether the new member countries have been integrated into the European demos. The paper concludes that identification with Europe has increased, but not everywhere, and that Europeans have very distinct perspectives about the trustworthiness of fellow Europeans from different geographical areas of the Union.

Rohrschneider and Loveless take on the fundamental question of the EU's democratic deficit and ask whether this is different in the old and new member states. They explore citizens' perception of representation within the European Union and examine whether explanations developed for west European countries apply to the new member-states. Their argument is that previous models often view the representation deficit through the lens of national-level, predominantly economic, performance but that recent analyses suggest that West European citizens evaluate the EU on its own terms on the basis of a range of political criteria, such as its capacity to represent citizens. On the basis largely of data from the EES 2004, they examine to what extent this mechanism applies to the new member-states. Do East-Central Europeans perceive a democracy deficit? If so, what drives these perceptions? And what similarities and differences emerge across the East-West divide? Data from the European Elections Studies 2004 allow them to begin to tackle these questions. They find that that for the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe, dissatisfaction with representation in the EU is more strongly driven by economic concerns than is that of their Western counterparts, but also that *both* low and high institutional quality is a strong predictor of high levels of dissatisfaction with the representational quality of the EU. That does not diminish the role of economics entirely, but rather underscores the role of economics as it directly impacts individuals, particularly in countries in which socio-economic development places economic issues at the forefront of national interests.

Finally, Wüst and Faas shift the focus from citizens and voters on to MEPs. They make use of party manifestos from one of the projects complementing EES 2004 to see how far party manifestos link with the behaviour of MEPs in the European Parliament. Wüst and Faas suggest that an important element in the chain of political representation in Europe is the voting behaviour of elected members in the European Parliament. They argue that voters expect their representatives not only to act in their interest, but also to act in a

manner consistent with the programmatic profile the respective parties presented in the EP election campaigns. Combining the record on MEP's roll call voting behaviour with the content of election manifestos issued for the EP elections, they are able to analyze the congruence between the two. Euro manifestos show a significantly larger variance than national manifestos on EU-related content, which makes them specifically valuable for such analyses. They analyze this relationship between programs and roll call voting for core issue areas and for the time period ranging from 1979 to 2004.

Notes

[1] http://www.connex-network.org

[2] Principal Investigators were Stefano Bartolini (Florence), Wouter van der Brug (Amsterdam), Cees van der Eijk (University of Nottingham), Mark Franklin (Trinity College Hartford, Con.), Dieter Fuchs (Stuttgart), Gábor Tóka (Central European University, Budapest), Michael Marsh (Trinty College Dublin), Hermann Schmitt (University of Mannheim) and Jacques Thomassen (University of Twente). National study directors were: Günther Ogris (Austria), Marc Swyngedouw and Lieven Dewinter (Belgium), James Tilley (Britain) and John Garry (Northern Ireland), Bambos Papageorgiou (Cyprus), Lukáš Linek (Czech Republic), Jorgen Goul Andersen (Denmark), Alan Sikk and Vello Pettai (Estonia), Mikko Maatila and Tapio Raunio (Finland), Pascal Perrineau and Bruno Cautres (France), Andreas Wüst (Germany), Ilias Nikolakopoulos and Eftichia Teperoglou (Greece), Gabor Tóka (Hungary), Michael Marsh (Ireland), Renato Mannheimer and Roberto Biorcio (Italy), Ilze Koroleva (Latvia), Algis Krupavicius (Lithuania), Patrick Dumont (Luxembourg), Cees van der Eijk (the Netherlands), Radoslaw Markowski (Poland), Pedro Magalaes (Portugal), Olga Gyrfasova (Slovakia), Niko Tos (Slovenia), Juan Diez Nicolas (Spain), and Sören Holmberg (Sweden). The project was co-ordinated by Hermann Schmitt. Data integration was carried out by P. Matthew Loveless (Mannheim/Bloomington, Ind.)

[3] http://www.europeanelectionstudies.net/

Chapter 1

The news coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary Election Campaign in 25 countries[1]

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Abstract

This article analyzes the news coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary (EP) elections in all 25 member states of the European Union (EU). It provides a unique pan-European overview of the campaign coverage based on an analysis of three national newspapers and two television newscasts in the two weeks leading up to the elections. On average, the elections were more visible in the new 10 member states than in the 15 old EU member states. The political personalities and institutional actors featured in news stories about the elections were generally national political actors and not EU actors. When it was evaluative, the news in the old EU-15 was generally negative towards the EU, while in the new countries a mixed pattern was found. The findings of the study are discussed in the light of the literature on the EU's legitimacy and communication deficit.

Introduction

The 2004 EP elections were an unprecedented exercise in democracy with more than 455 million people in 25 countries having the opportunity to vote. The elections took place only weeks after the accession of 10 new member states to the European Union – the largest enlargement ever. Most voters in both the old EU-15 and the ten new member states experience politics primarily through the media. Most of what citizens know about the campaign stems from the media and this is particularly true in the case of low salience, second-order elections (Bennett and Entman, 2001; see also Eurobarometer 162). Empirical knowledge about the media's coverage of EP elections is a prerequisite for assessing the well-being of democratic processes in Europe and for informing the on-going discussion about the EU's democratic and communicative deficits.

Observations of the democratic process in the EU have been dominated by the 'democratic deficit.' This has been identified as being one of the major shortcomings of European integration and has been conceptualized in terms of institutional design and linkage institutions that focus on national rather than EU issues (Coultrap, 1999: 108; Kuper, 1998; Scharpf, 1999). The unelected nature of the Commission, the lack of European Parliamentary power in policymaking, and the dominance of national issues are reflected in a lack of popular support, legitimacy and engagement with the EU among EU citizens (e.g., Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993).

Analysis of the importance of the media in alleviating or contributing to the democratic deficit focuses on its ability to contribute towards a shared framework of reference and a European identity. Firstly, the lack of EU legitimacy is viewed as a communication deficit (Meyer, 1999; Anderson and McLeod, 2004). According to this view, EU institutions have been unsuccessful in shaping European identity and promoting the connection between citizens and EU institutions via the media (Anderson and

Weymouth, 1999; Anderson, 2004). While the EU and, specifically, the European Parliament, need to promote themselves, they are often confronted with media outlets that are either sceptical or uninterested (Anderson and McLeod, 2004; De Vreese, 2002; Meyer, 1999). Accordingly, negative news and a lack of news in general about the EU and the EP is thought to contribute to a lack of legitimacy and to detract from the formation of a European identity.

Secondly, the lack of a European public sphere has been referred to as the public communication deficit (Scharpf, 1999; Schlesinger, 1999). From this perspective, the development of European democracy depends on the existence of a European public sphere which entails a common public debate carried out through a common European news agenda (Schlesinger, 1995), ideally in a European media system (Grimm, 1995, 2004). Several scholars have formulated minimal criteria for a European public sphere. The criteria include corresponding media coverage in different countries with shared points of reference in which ’speakers and listeners recognize each other as legitimate participants in a common discourse that frames the particular issues as common European problems‘ (Risse and van de Steeg, 2003: 21). At the very least, in a European public sphere national media should report on the same topic using common sources, including EU sources and sources from other EU countries. Therefore, a discussion of European issues amongst a set of EU actors in the media is important to the development of a European public sphere or Europeanized national spheres which will sustain democracy in the European Union and develop it further.

In the research on media and the EU democratic and communication deficits, links have been established between media coverage of the EU and public perceptions of EU legitimacy, mass support and citizen engagement in elections. In particular, three aspects of EU media coverage tend to influence public perceptions and these are similar to those that have been identified as important in the EU public sphere. These three aspects of media coverage are

EU visibility (or quantity of coverage), the European nature of the coverage and its tone. Greater visibility of European campaigns is related to higher turnout in European Parliamentary Elections (Banducci and Semetko, 2003, 2004). Greater visibility of EU news is related to knowledge gains about the EU (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005), and a greater visibility of pro-EU actors tends to positively influence support for EU membership (Banducci et al., 2002). Finally, negative news about the EU has been found to be related to negative public evaluations of the EU (Norris, 2000a).

Our intention in this study is not to report on how the media shape public perceptions, but to provide a detailed examination of media content across the 25 EU member states in order to better assess the possible role the media can play in enhancing EU democracy. Structured knowledge about the media's coverage of European elections is only now emerging and we have virtually no knowledge about the way in which news media in the new member states approach European political and economic topics. Studies of the European public sphere tend to focus on quality newspapers or magazines and tend to cover only a handful of countries (for example, Van de Steeg, 2002; Meyer, 2005; Peters et al., 2005; and Trenz, 2004), or not all member states (Kevin, 2003). Our study contributes to the debate on the democratic deficit, the media and EU public opinion by providing analysis of media content across print and television in all current member states. In this article, we report the findings of an unprecedented EU-wide study of the news media's coverage of the 2004 EP elections. We provide contextual information to understand the campaign as reported by television and newspapers in each country and we assess the developments in the media's coverage by comparing it with coverage of the 1999 EP election campaign in 15 EU countries.

Interest in the extent to which news media coverage contributes to the democratic deficit or to a European public sphere leads to three key foci for the study: First, we analyze the general news environment in Europe during

the campaign for the 2004 EP elections and we assess the visibility and amount of attention devoted to the elections by national news media. Contributing to a European public sphere, increased visibility of the elections in the news gives voters an indication of the salience or importance of the election. In addition, visible news coverage is expected to give voters information about candidates and party positions. Second, addressing both the public sphere and the democratic deficit, we investigate the extent to which national news media presented the elections as a national or European event. European parliamentary elections have been characterized as second order *national* elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). This implies two particular characteristics about the European parliamentary election campaigns: low campaign intensity and national, not European issues on the agenda. The content analysis of the news coverage allows us to assess the extent to which coverage of the campaign focuses on EU level versus national level actors. Greater emphasis on EU actors indicates a European public sphere while a greater emphasis on national actors contributes to the democratic deficit. Third, we assess the tone of news coverage of the EU. The invisibility of the EP in the news and the negative tone in coverage of the EU have been cited as contributing factors to the democratic deficit in terms of negative attitudes about the EU (Norris, 2000b) and low participation in EP elections (Norris, 2000a).

All of these aspects are addressed in a comparative fashion. In addition to cross-national comparisons, we distinguish between media, groups of countries, and elections. We compare the coverage of television and newspapers, public and private networks, and broadsheet and tabloid newspapers. Furthermore we contrast the coverage in the old EU-15 countries with the coverage in the ten new countries. Finally we look at over-time differences by investigating changes in coverage compared to the 1999 EP elections. We develop the importance of these comparisons below.

As a secondary focus, the data reported will be a useful resource for researchers examining public opinion, elections, and media influences in the context of the European Union. The study reports characteristics of coverage across all member states in 1999 and 2004 using standardized measures across countries and years. Thus the results reported in this paper provide values on important contextual indicators. While the results and the analysis are largely descriptive, others can incorporate these measures into their own research on the European Union.

News and Information in European Parliamentary Elections

This study of the news coverage of the 2004 EP elections takes place in the context of a highly competitive news and information environment in Europe. While in the 1980s television broadcasting in Europe consisted mainly of publicly funded monopolies, by 2004 all countries in the EU had a dual system of broadcasting, with public and private stations co-existing and competing (Brants and de Bens, 2000). During the past 20 years the newspaper market in Europe also changed, and by 2004 newspaper readership was in decline though still considerable in many European countries (Lauf, 2001). The structural developments in the news market are important because of the choices citizens have about how to find political news in the available outlets. Private television usually provides less 'hard' political news (Blumler, 1997; Pfetsch, 1996) and less news about issues of European integration (Peter and de Vreese, 2004).[2]

How visible is the EU on the news agenda?

Coverage of European affairs tends to be cyclical in nature with coverage of the EU virtually absent from the news agenda and then peaking around important EU events before vanishing off the agenda again (De Vreese et al.,

2001; Norris, 2000a). This pattern of news coverage has also been found to apply to EU summits, which are pivotal moments for EU decision making and where news coverage of EU affairs is much more visible than during 'routine periods' (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006; Peter and de Vreese, 2004; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). During other key events, such as national referendums on issues of European integration, EU news can take up a substantial part of the news agenda, especially in the final weeks of the campaign (De Vreese and Semetko, 2004). During routine periods, i.e., outside the referendum periods and when there are no major scheduled events such as European Council meetings, for example, EU politics is marginal in national news (Gerhards, 2000; Peter and de Vreese, 2004; Peter et al., 2003).

While some studies have focused on the Europeanization of the media in a single country (e.g., Koopmans and Pfetsch, 2003), or the coverage of particular cases by media across countries (e.g., De Vreese et al., 2001; Meyer, 2005; Risse and van de Steeg, 2003; Trenz and Münzing, 2003), our knowledge about the specific way in which EP elections are covered is quite limited. The 1979 campaign was virtually absent from the media agenda until the final weeks before the elections (Blumler, 1983; Siune, 1983). No systematic and comprehensive cross-national study of media coverage was carried out until the 1999 EP elections. In 1999, a research team at *The Amsterdam School of Communications Research* conducted an analysis of the most widely watched television news programs in the then 15 EU member states in the two weeks leading up to the 1999 European elections. The results showed that the average proportion of the program (based on time) given to the election in the main evening news programs for all EU member states was about 7 percent. Belgium, Britain, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain devoted less than 5 percent of news time to the European elections. Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, and Sweden are somewhat above average, spending 8 to 13 percent of news time on these elections (De Vreese et al., 2006; Peter et al., 2004).

The visibility of EP elections matters. Information in the news about key democratic moments such as elections is a pre-requisite for enhancing public awareness and possible engagement in EU politics. Moreover, the EU, faced with challenges to its legitimacy and unclear structures for political accountability, is dependent upon media coverage to reach its citizens.

Representative democracy? The absence of EU representatives

In addition to the visibility of the elections in the news, the presence of political personalities and actors at the EU level (such as candidates for the EP and members of EU institutions) in the news is a necessary condition for the functioning of political representation in a democracy (De Vreese, 2002). The visibility and identification of potential *representatives* is a prerequisite for a healthy democratic process. One of the features of the democratic deficit is that European parliamentary elections are contested by national parties that clash over national or domestic cleavages and not over European issues. The second order theory of EP elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) posits that EP elections take a secondary role to national politics and are largely contested on the basis of national rather than EU issues. Looking at actors in the news can therefore give us an assessment of whether the news covers *European* elections as being either a national or a European contest.

Several studies have investigated the visibility of actors in *national* election campaigns (e.g., Semetko and Schönbach, 1994; Semetko et al., 1991; Van Praag and Brants, 2000). However, we have only scant knowledge about the representation of the EU in the news. Analyses of the 1999 EP elections suggest that EU actors were much less visible than national actors (De Vreese et al., 2006), especially in countries that were long-standing members of the EU (Peter et al., 2004). With regard to this pattern and in the light of

the 2004 enlargement, it is relevant to assess whether EU actors were evident in the news in Europe.

How negative is the news about the EU?

News is largely neutral and the number of explicit evaluations is generally limited, but when evaluations are present, they tend to be negative. This pattern is inherent in the news genre and has been demonstrated to also apply to political news (Kepplinger and Weissbecker, 1991). In the case of the EU, the pattern does not appear to differ much. Norris (2000a) in her re-analysis of the EU Commission's media monitor reports found that news about several EU policies as well as EU institutions tended to be tilted towards negative evaluations. In an analysis of the media coverage of the 1999 EP elections, Banducci and Semetko (2004) found that negative news about the EU matters for democratic participation but not necessarily in the way one would expect. More negative news about the EU tended to mobilize the electorate up to certain point. However, when negative news increased in volume an individual's probability of voting declined. Thus, evaluative media content is an important parameter for assessing the nature of public debates, because evaluative media content provides important cues for citizens' perception of the EU.

Comparing news media coverage across outlets, elections and countries

Visibility, European focus and tone constitute the main dependent variables in the study. Based on an understanding of national media systems, reporting differences between different news outletsmthe salience of European elections and the importance of the European parliament, we expect variation in these dependent variables across outlets and countries. First, we make

comparisons that relate to expected differences produced by the *outlet*. The type of media (print vs. television), the financing structure of the broadcasting outlet (public vs. private) and the nature of the newspaper (tabloid vs. broadsheet) have been shown to produce differences in the quality and style of news reporting. Newspapers generally have more political news than does television, given that they have far less constraints in terms of space and production costs. Public broadcasters tend to have more political and economic news (Pfetsch, 1996) and in particular more news about European integration than do private news companies (see Peter and de Vreese, 2004).

We also expect political considerations to produce variation in media coverage across *countries* and across election *years*. There has been an increase in the powers of the European Parliament since the 1999 election (Kreppel, 2002; Hix et al., 2003). As the policy making power of the institution increases, the salience of elections for members of the European Parliament should increase. The view of EP elections as being second order is based on the perception that these elections are not salient because nothing is at stake (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). However, with the increased importance of the European Parliament, stakes were higher in the 2004 election. The differences in the amount of attention paid to the elections by the news media should reflect this increased importance.

The addition of ten new member states in May 2004 may have also increased the salience of the elections. The novelty factor suggests that interest in the elections should be greater in the new member states. Given the novelty of the event (Peter et al., 2004), we expect the visibility of the EP elections to be higher in the new member states than in the old EU-15. Finally, given the second-order perspective on media coverage of European elections (De Vreese et al., 2006) we expect non-EU actors to dominate news about the elections in general. However, given greater experience with EU politics and greater familiarity with EU actors, these individuals may be more prominent

in the older member states with there being greater focus on domestic actors in the new member states.

In summary, given the extant knowledge of national media systems, styles of news coverage and the status of the European parliament discussed above, we have the following expectations regarding coverage of the EP campaigns:

First, with respect to visibility in the news, we, given the growing importance of the European Parliament in EU decision making and the recent enlargement, expect the visibility of the EP elections in 2004 to be higher than it was in 1999. We expect the visibility of the 2004 EP elections to be higher in the new countries than in the old countries, given the novelty of the event, and we also expect the visibility of the EP elections to be higher on public broadcast news and in broadsheet newspapers than on private television news and in tabloid papers.

Second, characterization of EP elections as second order *national* elections leads us to expect that news about the EP elections is dominated by *domestic* political actors. However, we expect that quality newspapers and public broadcasting, when compared to other outlets, will give more prominence to EU actors with quality newspapers giving the greatest prominence.

Third, news about the EP elections is mostly neutral and, if evaluative, negative in tone. Based on previous research (De Vreese et al., 2006) we expect news, when evaluative, to be negative towards the EU. We have no *a priori* expectations about differences in tone of the news across years, new and old member states or the type of outlets.

Content Analysis of News Media Coverage during the EP Campaign Period: Research design and method

To study the news coverage of the 2004 EP elections, a media content analysis was carried out in all 25 member states of the EU.[3] We include in our study two television news programs and three national newspapers from each country. We focus on national television and newspapers as these media are consistently listed as the most important sources of information about the EU for citizens in Europe (Eurobarometer 54-62) and because television and newspapers were the two most widely cited sources in which citizens were exposed to information about the 2004 elections (Eurobarometer 162). In each country we include the main national evening news broadcasts of the most widely watched public and private television station. We also include two 'quality'- i.e. broadsheet - newspapers and one tabloid newspaper from each country. These media outlets were selected to provide a comprehensive idea about the news coverage in each country. For reasons of comparability between media and with the 1999 elections we focus on the final two weeks of coverage.

For television, our sample consists of 49 television networks and the newspaper sample consists of 74 different newspapers.[4] An overview of missing days (due to technical problems) is provided in the Appendix. For television, we coded the entire news program of each station. Given that the length of news programs in Europe varies (from 15-60 minutes) and given that the number of news stories per program differs too, we base all analyses on length of the individual news story as a proportion of the total length of each news program. Our unit of coding and of analysis is the individual news story, defined as a change of topic, typically introduced by the anchor person. In total 9,339 television news stories were analyzed. For newspapers, we also used the individual news story as the unit of analysis. We coded all stories on

the front page of the newspaper as well as a random page inside the main section of the newspaper and all news stories about the EP elections throughout the newspaper. In the analyses presented here, we use the analysis of the front pages as the base, for reasons of comparability with the study from 1999. The n for this analysis is 8,280.

Coding procedure

Under supervision and in close cooperation with the principal investigators, coding was conducted by trained and supervised coders. Coder trainers were trained with the codebook for the study developed by the principal investigators. Individual coders were recruited based on their language capabilities. They completed initial training and only when their coding was of sufficient quality (assessed by coder tests that were matched with master codes completed by the coder trainer team), did actual coding commence. Given the challenges in cross-national content analysis (see Peter and Lauf, 2002), coders were monitored and intra- and intercoder-reliability tests were conducted. The results of these tests were satisfactory (80-100% agreement).

Measures

Our first measure used here is *visibility of the EP elections*. Each news story was coded for *topic*. A range of codes that enables us to identify when a story was about the elections and what the specific topics of these stories were was assigned to news about European elections. To tap the *domestic versus European* nature of the story, we relied on the coding of actors in the news. An actor is defined as a person (e.g., MEP candidate), groups of persons (e.g., political party), institution (e.g., national parliament) or other organization (e.g., Red Cross) that is featured in the story. Up to 20 actors per news story were coded. Coders first identified the main actor (in terms of importance) and then other actors in order of appearance. Actors have been classified as EU actors, domestic political actors or other actors. EU actors include EP candidates as well as the EU president and EU commission members. Domestic political actors are members of the government,

spokespersons for government agencies or members of opposition parties. This includes all members of national parliaments. The category of other actors includes journalists, celebrities, ordinary citizens and other actors that do not fall into the EU or domestic political actor categories.[5] For each election story, a maximum of 20 actors could be coded and across all news stories a total of 19,851 actors were coded. Coders also noted whether the tone of coverage towards the actor was neutral, negative or positive. For *tone of the news* we rely on explicit evaluations of the European Union, its institutions and/or its policies. News was coded for being either neutral (i.e., no evaluation present), negative or positive, predominantly negative or positive or mixed.

Data analysis

In our analyses of the general news environment, the visibility of the elections and the tone of the news, we use the individual news story as the unit of analysis. In the analysis of the presence of different actors in the news, we rely on the coding of actors which is the unit of analysis.

Results

More news about the elections

We first turn to the *visibility* of the 2004 EP elections in national news media. Looking at television news, we found that EU news took up 9.8 percent of the news, on average, in the two weeks leading up to Election Day. The average visibility of EU news in 2004 was higher in the new member states (10.4 percent) than in the old member states (9.2 percent). Of the news about the EU, 80 percent was devoted specifically to the EP elections on average.

Figure 1 displays the visibility of news about the EP election and of other EU related issues in television newscasts during the 1999 and 2004 EP election campaigns.[6] The 15 old EU countries are displayed on the left hand side and

the new member states that took part in the EP elections for the first time in 2004 are shown on the right hand side. The EU-wide average of 9.8 percent contains significant cross-national variation. In Greece, for example, the elections took up 21 percent of the news, while in Germany the elections took up only three percent of the news. The elections were most visible in Greece, Denmark, Slovakia, Austria, and Ireland, and took up more than 15 percent of the news in these countries. The elections were least visible in Germany, Belgium and the Czech Republic, with less than five percent of the news devoted to the elections.

On average, we found an increase of the news devoted to the EP elections from 6.6 percent in 1999 to 9.2 percent in 2004 in the old member states, and ten of the 15 old member states showed an increase in visibility. Six countries from the new member states showed more than ten percent EU news.

Figure 1: Visibility of EU news in television newscasts 1999 and 2004



Note: Values are length-based percentages within the countries and election periods. All stories in television newscasts were included. Values display the proportion of news stories about the EP election and about other EU news. 1999 n=4781; 2004 n=9339.

Turning to national newspapers, Figure 2 shows the visibility of EU news on newspaper front-pages, with the results for the new member states again displayed on the right hand side and the comparison between 1999 and 2004 for the old member states on the left hand side. The picture shown here is slightly more differentiated than that for television. Overall 5.9 percent of front-page stories were devoted to EU news in all 25 member states. EU news was most visible in Malta, Cyprus, Greece and Austria. The smallest proportion of EU news on newspaper front-pages was found in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Lithuania with less than four percent.

Figure 2: Visibility of EU news on newspaper front-pages 1999 and 2004



Note: Values are story-based percentages within the countries and election periods. All stories on newspaper front-pages were included. Values display the proportion of news stories about the EP election and about other EU news. 1999 n=2224; 2004 n=8280.

Whereas in 1999 there were 6.2 percent of front-page stories about EU news in the 15 old member states, this slightly decreased to 5.6 percent in 2004. The four countries with the highest amount of news in 1999 (Portugal, France, Denmark, and Greece) all showed a decrease in visibility. The three countries with the lowest visibilities in 1999 displayed an increase in 2004.

Portugal showed the sharpest decrease, from 14 to 5.3 percent and the UK the highest increase from 2.9 to 5.4 percent of front-page stories devoted to EU news.

Comparing the visibility in the old versus the new member states in 2004, we again see a higher overall visibility on newspaper front-pages in the ten new member states. Whereas in the old member states the overall proportion of EU news stories was 5.6 percent, it amounted to 6.1 percent in the new member states. However, the pattern is less clear compared to television news. Of the ten new countries, the two states with the highest visibility in newspapers are the two smallest member states Malta and Cyprus.

Looking at the visibility of EU news in 2004 in public broadcasting and private television news, as well as in broadsheet versus tabloid newspapers, we find support for our second expectation.

Figure 3: Visibility of EU news in television newscasts and on newspaper front-pages in 2004



Note: Values are length-based percentages within the categories and election periods. All stories in television newscasts and on newspaper front-pages were included. Values display the proportion of news stories about the EP election and about other EU news. Television newscasts n=9339; newspaper front-pages n=8280.

Figure 3 shows that the EP elections were consistently more visible on public broadcasting news programs than on private television news. The elections were also covered more extensively on the front pages of the broadsheet press than on the tabloid press. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that in commercial television news and in the broadsheet press the new member states gave more room to the elections than the outlets in the old member states. Looking specifically at television news about the elections (which was 79.5 percent of all EU news in 2004 and 84.8 percent in 1999) and comparing the visibility in public broadcasting news and private television news in 1999 and 2004, we find that public broadcasters devoted more time to the elections than do their private counterparts (see Figure 4). This pattern was found in 1999 (with 6.3 percent of public news and 4.9 percent of private news devoted to the elections) and again in 2004 (with 9.5 percent of public news and 4.9 percent of private news devoted to the elections). While the share of EP news on private news remained largely the same in 1999 and 2004, public broadcasters increased the visibility of the elections.

Figure 4: Visibility of EP election and other EU news 1999 and 2004



NOTE: Values are length-based percentages within the categories and election periods. All stories in television newscasts were included. Values display the proportion of news stories

about the EP election (blue bars) and about other EU news (red bars). 1999 n=4781; 2004 n=9339.

In conclusion, media attention for the 2004 EP elections rose compared to the 1999 elections. This increase in visibility was driven primarily by the new member states which devoted a higher share of the news (both on television and in newspapers) to the elections than did the old countries. The average overall increase was in particular driven by newspapers in Malta and Cyprus and by public broadcasting television news.

As a final note with respect to the visibility of the elections, we will briefly discuss the general news and information environment in the EU during the campaign. In terms of the time spent on issues in the news, in 2004 the EP elections came further down the list than news about domestic and social policies, sports, and economy/business, but ahead of domestic party politics, and crime. Compared to 1999, the news agenda in 2004 was less dominated by international conflicts, which, because of the Kosovo conflict, were very high on the news agenda in 1999. In 2004 the Iraq conflict did not attract a similar level of attention.[7]

European elections: slowly expanding the domestic battlegrounds

Figure 5 shows the proportion of actors featured in stories about the EP election across the 25 EU member states. A comparison is also made with the actors featured in the coverage of the 1999 EP election. Clearly, in both election years domestic political actors dominated the coverage of the EP elections. In 1999, four countries (Germany, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden) had either no EU actors in EP election stories or did not exceed 1%. The Netherlands was the only country where EU actors were more frequently featured than domestic actors in EP election news but in 1999 there were only two stories on national television news about the elections. This indicates that the second order nature of EP elections was reflected in the news coverage, possibly detracting from the European public sphere.

When we examine the main political actors, there are some changes evident in 2004. While the coverage is still focused on domestic actors, there was an overall increase in the proportion of EU actors. In several countries, the proportion of EU actors reached or exceeded the proportion of domestic political actors (Malta, Portugal and France). Similar patterns are evident when looking at the other actors in the news stories. Across the member states, countries that show a higher proportion of main protagonists that are EU actors also show a high proportion of other actors that are from the EU. Therefore, while we see that EP election news coverage still predominantly features domestic political actors, there has been an increase since 1999 in attention paid to EU actors. During the 1999 election, 83 percent of actors in EU election stories were national political actors in all member states while in 2004 a comparatively lower proportion (50 percent for main actors and 48 percent for other actors) were national political actors. However, these figures for domestic political actors are still higher than those for EU actors.

Figure 5: Actors in the news (EU actors, domestic actors, and other actors)



Note: The figure compares all actors in the news in 1999 with main protagonists in 2004.

We might expect that the new member states would focus more on domestic political actors. This tendency to be less European-focused in news coverage

may stem from the fact that the press in these countries is less familiar with covering EU issues and therefore has a greater reliance on domestic sources. Also, EU actors in these countries may be more difficult to identify. However, Peter et al. (2004) show that there tend to be more EU representatives in news in countries that hold EP elections for the first or second time than in countries that have held multiple elections. From the analysis of 2004 news coverage, we see little difference between old and new member states in terms of the focus placed on domestic and EU actors. In new member states, 27 percent of main actors and 21 percent of other actors in news stories were EU actors. In the old member states, the focus on EU actors was similar: 25 percent of main actors and 21 percent of other actors were at the EU level.

There were also only small differences by outlet and medium. Newspapers tend to show greater numbers of EU and domestic political actors while TV features a greater number of non-political actors. In television news stories about the election, 22 percent of main actors and 19 percent of other actors were EU political actors. In print, 26 percent of main actors in stories about the EU election were from the EU level and 21 percent of other actors were EU level actors. The differences between commercial and public service broadcasters are even smaller. They tend to feature similar proportions of EU and domestic political actors, with 20 percent of actors in commercial news stories and 18 percent in public television news stories being EU level actors. Given that public broadcasting has an educational mission, we expected that public television news would tend to have a greater EU focus but this does not appear to be the case.

With only a little malice: more positive news in the new countries

Turning to the tone of the news about the EU, we find that most news about the EP elections that made specific reference to the EU was neutral. About 84 percent of the news mentioning the EU or its institutions did so in a neutral way without making explicit positive or negative evaluations.

Looking at the 16 percent of the news that did contain explicit evaluative content, we created a mean score ranging from minus one (signifying consistent negative evaluations) to plus one (signifying consistent positive evaluations).

Figure 6: Tone of news (explicit evaluations EU, ranging from –1 to +1) by country



We look at the tone of the news in each of the member states individually in order to assess the average tone of information available to citizens in each country. Figure 6 represents the average tone in each country. The most negative news was found in Greece and Portugal (-.20), the UK (-.18) and the Netherlands (-.17), while the most positive news was found in the Czech Republic (+.02), Cyprus (+.10), and Malta (+.11). Figure 6, moreover, shows that nine of the ten countries with the most negatively slanted news were all from the old EU-15. Conversely, seven of the ten countries with the least negative or even positive news were from the new countries.

Figure 7: Tone of news (explicit evaluations EU, ranging from –1 to +1) by medium type



Comparing the different media types in the old and new countries yields noteworthy differences. As Figure 7 shows, the average tone in the broadsheet press was negative in the old EU-15 (-.08) but positive (+.01) in the new countries. For the tabloids, the papers in the all countries were negative; -.12 for the tabloids in the new countries and -.13 for the tabloids in the old countries. Looking at public broadcasting news, we found that news in the new countries was, on average, slightly positive (+.02) while, on average it was negative (-.05) in the old countries. There were no differences

in tone between private television news in the old and new countries, with all stations being marginally positive.

Discussion

Our study of the news media coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary elections in all 25-member countries of the European Union provides unprecedented insights into the first elections in the enlarged EU. The study includes three national newspapers and the most widely watched main evening private and public television news in each country in the final two weeks leading up to the elections.

From a standpoint of democratic citizenship, a campaign has the potential to inform and mobilize voters to take part in the process of electing representatives. The media play a crucial role in this process. The EU also relies on the media to indirectly strengthen its legitimacy by increasing citizens' awareness of its activities and policies. In 1999, doubt was raised as to whether the media fulfilled this role (De Vreese et al., 2006). In 1999 the picture painted of the news coverage of the European elections was gloomy from the perspective of the coverage of the campaign in the most popular media outlets in some countries. The European elections were given relatively low priority in the news, they rarely made the opening of the news bulletins, the coverage was domestic in nature, with most stories taking place in the home country and addressing issues with implications for the home country. Few representatives of EU institutions made it into the news and those EU actors that did were rarely quoted.

In 2004, according to our expectations based on the increased importance of the EP and the novelty of the event in several countries, the overall *visibility* of the elections increased. Specifically we found that the visibility of the EP elections was higher in the 10 new EU member states than in the old member states. On television news, the elections in the old EU-15 increased in

visibility compared to the previous EP election in 1999. This was not true for newspapers though, where the visibility increased in some and decreased in other old EU-15 member states. Public television news and broadsheet papers covered the elections more elaborately in terms of quantity of coverage than did private television news and tabloids in both old and new member countries.

When comparing visibility in the old member states between 1999 and 2004 a few interesting individual country developments emerge. We found large changes in visibility in Ireland, Portugal, and Denmark, though there were very different patterns in these countries. Visibility in Ireland went up drastically both on television and in newspapers. The same pattern was observed for Spanish, British, German, and Belgian news outlets' interestingly these are all countries in which visibility was quite low in 1999. In Portugal, by contrast, we saw visibility sharply declining, especially in newspapers but also on television news. A decrease in visibility in all news outlets was also seen in France and Italy. These countries were all in the high to mid-range of visibility in 1999. Other countries show a mixed picture with visibility going up on television and down in newspapers in most cases. This was particularly the case in Denmark where visibility on television more than doubled, whereas it decreased more than one third in newspapers. Finland, Sweden, Netherlands, and Greece also showed this pattern, though it was less pronounced. Among the 'new' member states Malta stood out as the country with the highest visibility in newspapers and the second highest on television. Visibility was especially low in both areas in Latvia..

We expected differences in the visibility of EU election news between types of news outlets. Specifically, we expected a higher visibility on public broadcasting news than on commercial news. We also expected news to be more visible in the quality press than in tabloid papers. The results showed that in the old member states public broadcasting had about twice as much EU news as did commercial television news. In the new member states the

general picture is the same, but differences were less pronounced. In line with expectations, there was more EU news in broadsheet newspapers than in tabloids. Contrary to the situation in television, the differences between the quality press and tabloid newspapers are less pronounced in the old member states and more so in the new ones. Furthermore, we expected the visibility of EU news to be higher in 2004 than in 1999 on the one hand, and to be higher in the new member states than in the old countries on the other hand. Whereas the former was clearly the case, the pattern for the latter was less conclusive. We showed that on television, no matter whether public broadcasting or commercial news, the visibility of both EP election and other EU news was considerably higher in 2004. Further, we saw that there was hardly any difference in visibility between old and new member states in public broadcasting news and the quality press.

With respect to the *domestic focus* of the news, our study dovetails into previous research (e.g., De Vreese et al., 2006) in finding that news coverage was more domestically focused than EU-focused. The actors featured in news stories about the elections were generally domestic or national political actors and not EU actors. However, though the coverage is still focused on domestic actors, there was an overall increase in the proportion of EU actors in 2004. In some countries (e.g., Malta, Portugal and France), the proportion of EU actors reached or even exceeded the proportion of domestic political actors. Moreover, countries that show a higher proportion of main protagonists who are EU actors also show a high proportion of other actors from the EU. Therefore, while we see that EP election news coverage still predominantly features domestic political actors, there has been an increase in attention paid to EU actors. Only in the Netherlands were there less EU actors featured in the campaign coverage in 2004. Almost no change was found in Austria and Spain. Portugal, for instance, sticks out, since here the visibility of EU actors increased from less than two percent in 1999 to almost 50 percent in 2004.

Our expectation that national actors would dominate the coverage of the EP election was therefore met. Looking at the results, a very consistent picture was found when comparisons were made between countries, type of medium and type of outlet. Domestic political actors dominated the news, and this was even more noticeable among the main actors. This pattern was basically the same for the old and new member states. The difference in visibility between EU and domestic actors was slightly less distinctive in print news and on commercial television.

According to expectations about the increased importance of the EP we found that the visibility of EU actors had risen in most old member countries compared to 1999. Contrary to expectations based on previous research (Peter et al., 2004), we did not find a higher level of EU actors in new member states. Our findings add to extant knowledge insofar as it is not a general rule that news in first-time election countries will include more EU actors, though news in countries that have experienced several EP elections seems to include fewer EU actors.

Our analysis of the *tone* of the news coverage corroborates extant research, showing that most news is neutral, but when it was evaluative, the news in the old EU-15 was generally negative towards the EU, while in the 'new' countries a mixed pattern was found with the broadsheet press and television news being, on average, positive and tabloid papers, on average, being negative. These findings conform to our expectations. However, we found noteworthy variation within this general pattern. The tabloid press was the most negative, while the quality press and public television was positive in the new member states, but negative in the old. Commercial television news was on average positive, though slightly more so in the new countries.

Our study provides empirical evidence in a largely theoretical debate about the EU's legitimacy and its communicative deficit. The benchmarks provided here, focusing on visibility of elections, the representation of Europe, and the

evaluative nature of the coverage are important to assess the role played by the media. From the viewpoint of the European Parliament there seems to be reason for a bit of optimism. In terms of visibility and share of EU actors, the trend between 1999 and 2004 is one of increase. The results for the new member states also give quite a positive outlook. Visibility, both of EU news and EU actors, was relatively high. Furthermore, the tone towards the EU was considerably more positive it was in the new member states. However, if these findings have to be ascribed mainly to the novelty of the elections in these new countries, then caution with respect to optimism is warranted.

In addition to these normative reflections, future research needs to also investigate the specific *effects* the campaign had in European elections. It has previously been demonstrated that television is particularly capable of contributing to turnout in European elections (Schönbach and Lauf, 2002), especially among citizens with lower levels of political interest and awareness, who may be 'trapped' by having to watch election news on television. Based on the 1999 European parliamentary election, and most previous campaigns, where there was little in the way of coverage of the campaign on main evening television news, uninterested citizens had few opportunities to accidentally come across interesting news about the elections that might boost their interest and awareness (Schönbach and Lauf, 2002).

In relation to the 1999 elections, Banducci and Semetko (2003, 2004) found that the visibility of the EP campaign on television news influenced individuals' likelihood of voting in the EP election. Greater visibility on the TV news broadcasts that respondents reported watching increased the probability of voting. Contrary to expectations, negative coverage of the EU did not demobilize the electorate. These questions still have to be addressed for the 2004 elections in the enlarged Europe, but with this study we can assess the coverage of the elections in a more accurate and detailed way than previously.

Notes

[1] This paper has since been published as de Vreese, C. H., Banducci, S., Semetko, H. A. & Boomgaarden, H. A. (2006). The news coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary election campaign in 25 countries. ***European Union Politics, 7*** (4), 477-504

[2] It should be acknowledged that the scope of differences between public and private channels and their importance is contested (see Brants, 1998; Blumler, 1997).

[3] The study was funded by research grants from the Dutch National Science Foundation [NWO], The Halle Foundation, the EU CIVICACTIVE Research Program, Emory University, and The Amsterdam School of Communications Research/ University of Amsterdam to the principal investigators, Susan Banducci, Claes H. de Vreese and Holli A. Semetko.

[4] Television: in Belgium two French and two Flemish stations were included; in Finland and Germany four newscasts; in Spain and Poland three newscasts; in Austria, Greece, and Ireland one newscast). We had to exclude Cyprus (for technical reasons) and Luxembourg (for linguistic reasons). Newspapers: in Belgium, three French and three Flemish newspapers were included; in Luxembourg, Malta, Lithuania, and Cyprus, only two newspapers were included because of availability.

[5] It should be noted that a difference in coding during the 2004 study necessitates classifying actors into main protagonists (those actors that were the primary focus of the news story) and other actors (actors that were mentioned in the news story but were not the main focus).

[6] The numbers that function as the base for Figure 1 (and all subsequent Figures) are available in the form of a documented appendix from the authors.

[7] These brief observations are based on a detailed analysis of the general news environment during the campaign period. The results of this analysis which indicate how much attention different topics received in the news in 1999 and in 2004 is available from the authors upon request

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Appendix:

Outlets and missing days

Country	Outlet	Missing
Austria	ORF, Kronen Zeitung, Der Standard, Die Presse	None
Belgium/Flemish	Het Journaal (VRT), VTM Nieuws, Het laatste nieuws, de Morgen	None
Belgium/French	JT Meteo, Le Journal, La Dermiere Heure, La Libre, La Soir	None
Czech	TV Ceska, TV Nova, Mlada Fronta, Pravo, Blesk	None
Cyprus	No television, NP: Cyprus Mail, Politis	None
Denmark	TV-Avisen (DRTV1), TV2 Nyhederne, JyllandsPosten, Politiken, EkstraBladet	TVAvisen June 1 / TV2 Nyhederne June 5
Estonia	ETV, Kanal 2, Postimees, SL Ohtuleht, Eesti Paevaleht	Kanal 2 June 3, 12
Finland	Yle, MTV3, Ruutu4, Helsingin Sanomat, Aamulehti, Hufvudstadbladet	Yle June 1 / MTV3 June 4, 6, 7 / Ruutu4 June 1,2
France	LaJournal (TF1), Le Journal (F2), Le Monde, Liberation, Le Figaro	F2 June 5
Germany	ARD Tagesschau, ZDF Heute, RTL Aktuell, Sat1, Bild, FAZ, SZ	None
Greece	ET1 news, Ta Nea, Kathimerine, Eleftheortypia	ET1 June 10, 13
Hungary	MTV, TV2, Magyar Nemzet, Nepszabadsag, Blikk	Magyar June 1
Ireland	RTE1, Irish Independent, Irish Times, The Star	None
Italy	TG1, TG5, Il corriere della sera, La Republica, Il Giornale	TG5 June 1 / La Republicca June 6/ Il Giornale June 7
Latvia	Lat TV, LAtvija Televizija, Diena, Rigas Balss, Neatkariga	LatTV, Latvia Televizija June 11
Lithuania	LRTV, TV3, Lietuvos rytas, Respublika	LRTV June 10 / TV3 June 4-7, 11
Luxembourg	No television, Luxemburger Wort, Tagesblatt	LW June 2, 3 / Tagesblatt June 1, 3
Malta	TVM, Super1, The Times, Malta Independent	Super 1 June 2
Netherlands	NOS Journaal, RTL nieuws, De Telegraaf, NRC, de Volkskrant	None
Poland	TVPSA, POLSAT, Rzeczpospolita, Gazeta Wyborcza, Super Express	None
Portugal	RTP1, SIC, Public, Correio de Manha,	RTP1 June 1
Slovenia	RTV, POPTV, Slovenske Novice, Delo, Dnevnik	None
Slovakia	STV1, Markiza, Novy Cas, Daily Pravda, Sme/Praca	None
Spain	TVE, Antenna3, Tele5, El Pais, ABC, El Mundo	TVE June 1, 2, 6, 8, 9
Sweden	Rapport TV2, Nyheterne (TV4), Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter, Goteborgsposten	TV4 June 4-13, GP June 12
UK	BBC1, ITV, The Sun, Daily Telegraph, The Guardian	None

Chapter 2

Turning out or turning off? How the European Parliament Elections of 2004 shed light on turnout dynamics

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Abstract

How can we explain the low voter turnout observed in certain new members of the European Union at elections to the European Parliament in 2004? Several possibilities have been suggested in past research, and this paper surveys these suggestions and finds them wanting. It proceeds to ask whether there is evidence that voters in new member countries are responding to the same forces as in established member countries, and finds this to be the case. The determinants of turnout are the same in new member states, but there is a 'turnout gap' in some of these countries that separates them from other new member states as well as from established member states. The bulk of the paper addresses the question of how to account for this turnout gap. Some part of the gap can be explained if we assume that there is a learning process in new democracies that has advanced further in some countries than in others, but the bulk of the gap remains to be explained.

The European Parliament elections of 2004 were extraordinary in bringing to the polls citizens of 25 countries, ten of them participating for the first time in European Parliament (EP) elections. Turnout levels in established member states at these elections were very much as would have been expected from past patterns – which is to say low by comparison with turnout in national elections, but highly predictable on the basis of institutional and contextual factors, as we shall see. However, turnout in new member states was generally very low indeed, though highly variable. This was surprising in the light of expectations that countries participating for the first time in European Parliament elections would demonstrate higher turnout than at subsequent elections (Franklin 2005). If turnout in new member states is going to drop as much in later EP elections as has occurred for established member states moving to their second and later EP elections, then it will be virtually zero in some new member countries – a disturbing prospect.

One explanation, widely touted, is that the low turnout among new member states in 2004 was due to the fact that all but one of them had held referendums on their accession treaties, so that voters may have been suffering from election fatigue. This comforting suggestion ignores the fact that in 1996 three countries (Austria, Finland and Sweden) voted in a "special" European Parliament election shortly after having held referendums on their accession treaties, without apparently suffering from election fatigue.

Moreover, not all new member countries displayed low turnout at these elections. Indeed, citizens of Malta and Cyprus went to the polls in greater numbers than in many established member states, prompting Richard Rose (2005) to point out that the low turnout was a feature not of new member states but of post-communist new members. His explanation for the low turnout in post-communist states was lack of trust in political parties and the government, a legacy of communist rule. This suggestion seems somewhat quixotic, however. Political trust has not previously been found to be related to turnout in EP elections and its influence in certain studies of national

turnout has been shown to be due to the use of under-specified models (Franklin 2004). Rose's findings are based on an N=25 bivariate analysis, one of a rather large number of such analyses that he performed in order to explore different possible reasons for low turnout among post-communist EU member states. With only 25 cases, apparent relationships readily arise by chance and the more variables are tried out the more opportunities there are for chance to play a role. There is no question that trust in certain government institutions is low in post communist states, and also no question that the turnout of these states in the 2004 EP elections was low. This does not mean that the low EP election turnout was due to lack of trust. The correspondence noted by Rose could easily be coincidental. Multivariate analysis of individual-level survey data does not find this relationship, as we shall see.

Indeed, Rose's suggestion that we distinguish post-communist states from others seems to miss the mark. Not all even of the post-communist member states displayed particularly low turnout in the 2004 EP elections. In Lithuania turnout was 48 percent, about average for non-communist member states, and in Hungary and Latvia turnout was 39 and 41 percent, no lower than in Britain, Finland or Sweden. If all post-communist EU member states had displayed turnout in this range, no-one would have remarked upon the supposed low turnout of these states. Several countries with higher turnout had specific reasons that did not apply in the post-communist states: simultaneous national or local elections in four of them, or compulsory voting in four (Italy, which abolished compulsory voting in time for the elections of 1994, is an additional country that still shows strong traces of its earlier compulsion to vote, as we will see). So the anomalous turnout in these elections might really be a feature of just five states.

So what does account for low turnout among low-turnout EU member states? This question comes in two flavors. In the first place we need to know whether citizens of these countries respond to the same institutional and

contextual influences as citizens of established member states. If they do, then we need to explain what accounts for the turnout gap between the two groups of states. If they don't, then we need to consider the possibility that turnout in these states responds to quite different forces than in established democracies, making it very hard for us to explain the distinctiveness of turnout levels. I should add that it would be very troubling to political science if this were to prove to be the case. Other recently democratized members of the European Union (Greece, Spain and Portugal) did not show any anomalous behavior in regard to turnout by the time of our first EU-wide election study in 1989, by which time they had enjoyed democratic rule for no greater period than had post-communist societies in 2004.

Thus the question of whether, when it comes to turnout at EP elections, citizens of low turnout states respond to the same forces as citizens of established member states is central to our investigation. We will address that question first, before even theorizing about reasons for lower turnout in some countries.

Evaluating the 'Standard Model'

We address the question whether the same forces operate in new as in established democracies by applying the 'standard model' of turnout at European Parliament elections established in past research (Franklin 2001; 2005). According to this model, turnout in these elections responds to just three independent variables: compulsory voting (countries that apply compulsion see much higher turnout), time until the next national election (as this time shrinks, turnout rises – except for compulsory voting countries) and whether the election is the first such election in the experience of the country concerned (countries, except for compulsory voting countries, see a 'first election boost' to their level of turnout). The model does not rule out the existence of other factors, which might share responsibility for turnout variations with the three variables mentioned, but no other variable suggested

in past research proves significant when added to the standard model. In particular, turnout at the most recent national election does not prove significant. Even though countries do vary in their levels of turnout at national elections, this variation (once we have controlled for compulsory voting) does not account for variations in turnout at EP elections.

Table 1 shows effects on turnout among established member countries in 2004 (Model A, which is taken from Franklin 2005) and compares these effects with the effects on turnout when the dataset contains new member countries. When including new members it is necessary to decide how to treat the turnout gap between these and established members. If no allowance is made (as shown in Model B) variance explained is considerably reduced, years until the next election becomes barely significant at the 0.05 level and the first election boost appears to vanish completely (the effect is smaller than its standard error). If we follow Rose's suggestion of distinguishing post-communist countries from other new members (as we do in Model C) the model performs much better, though effects (particularly the first election boost) are substantially different from those found among established members. If, instead of distinguishing post-communist new members from the rest, we instead distinguish just the five countries that had particularly low turnout in 2004 (as we do in Model D), the model performs better still, yielding coefficients for other independent variables that are virtually indistinguishable from those in Model A.

This model tells us that new member countries behaved just like established member countries in 2004, so long as we take account of the particularly low turnout registered by five of them. In all countries (including the five with particularly low turnout) it is reasonable to assume that a first election boost was in fact experienced,[1] in all countries there is an apparently identical effect of time until the next election, and in all countries the effect of compulsory voting (or the lack of it) appears very similar.[2]

Table 1: Comparing effects of the 'standard model' of turnout at European Parliament elections when new member countries are treated in different ways.

Variable	Model A[a] b	Model B[b]	Model C[b] b	ModelD[b] b
(Constant)	52.9 (2.4)***	51.5 (3.0)***	52.5 (2.4)***	53.1(2.4)***
Compulsory voting in country[c]	33.0 (3.0)***	33.6 (3.7)***	32.8 (2.9)***	32.2(2.9)***
Years until next national election[d]	-2.8 (0.8)***	-2.2 (1.1)*	-2.6 (0.8)**	-2.8(0.8)***
First EP election held in country[d]	10.9 (2.9)***	1.5 (3.1)	13.3 (2.9)***	9.9(2.7)***
Post-communist country			-29.7 (4.1)***	
Low turnout country				-34.0(4.6)***
Adjusted variance explained	0.806	0.684	0.803	0.805
N	79	89	89	89

a. From Franklin (2005) – aggregate data from 1979 to 2004 omitting countries that were new members in 2004..

b. Aggregate data from 1979 to 2004, all available cases.

c. Treating Italy as 0.875, 0.75, 0.675 of a compulsory voting country in 1994, 1999 and 2004 (see text).

d. Except for compulsory voting countries (coded 0).

These findings are quite encouraging. It does not appear that citizens of the new member states are reacting differently to European Parliament elections than citizens of established member states (though this conclusion can only be tentative for the five states with particularly low turnout – see footnotes 1 and 2). Our task is now to establish, if we can, why five of these countries displayed such very low turnout. Note that it is still an open question whether the five states with particularly low turnout should be distinguished from other post-communist states. If we cannot find anything that distinguishes them from the other post-communist states (but can find something that distinguishes all post-communist states from other member states) this would not do violence to our aggregate-level findings. Though Model D does appear to perform better than Model C, the differences are certainly not statistically significant.

Understanding low turnout in some new member states

In this paper I propose that the reason for particularly low turnout in some new member states might not be so much the legacy of communist rule, as Rose suggested, but rather features of these countries that are connected with their status as relatively new democracies. Mass publics in established democracies have been found to be quite sophisticated in many respects (for a survey see van der Eijk and Franklin 2006), but it may well take time for that degree of sophistication to develop. European Parliament elections are occasions when electorates display considerable sophistication (indeed, it was our study of EP elections that prompted our realization of the full extent of electoral sophistication: see van der Eijk, Franklin, et al. 1996). Mass publics in established democracies also have long-established commitments to political parties and to the "rules of the game" of politics, which may bring them loyally to the polls even in an election which has no purpose that is apparent to them. Moreover, such elections provide voters with opportunities for various sorts of expressive voting, as described in van der Eijk, Oppenhuis and Franklin (1996). A desire to seize those opportunities may be one thing that brings voters to the polls.

In recent work, van der Brug and Franklin (2005) established that party preferences in post-communist EU member states are formed in very much the same way as in more established member states, but this does not rule out differences that could account for lower turnout. Indeed, the quasi-experimental laboratory that the 2004 European Parliament elections provide could prove very useful in shedding light on turnout dynamics generally, especially if certain post-communist states have been found to be developing faster than others in the direction of more sophisticated voting behavior.

Taking advantage of this opportunity requires survey data, and we are fortunate to have at our disposal surveys of about 1000 voters per country conducted in 19 of the countries that took part in the 2004 EP elections – all except Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxrmbourg, Malta, and Sweden (countries that either were not surveyed at all or for which critical variables are missing from the surveys). These surveys form part of the European Elections Study 2004 (EES04), details of which are provided in an appendix.

To evaluate the effects of party loyalty and the "rules of the game," the EES04 contain a battery of questions relevant to testing conventional ideas about voters' political resources and the extent to which they are susceptible to mobilization pressures (see Franklin 2004 for a survey of relevant variables). In addition to conventional variables, we also have a measure specific to the European Election studies of the propensity (on a 10-point scale) of each respondent to vote for each party. Past research (Franklin, van der Eijk and Oppenhuis 1996) has shown that this variable does provide additional power to discriminate between voters and non-voters at European Parliament elections. Those who claim to be more likely to vote for their most preferred party do in fact vote at a higher rate, even controlling for other influences on electoral participation. In this research I have added a second measure derived from the vote propensity questions, expected to provide additional discriminating power: the difference between respondents' propensities to vote for their most preferred party and their mean propensity to support all parties. The idea here is that for voters whose support for their most preferred party is barely ahead of their general support for all parties, it will not make much difference who wins, whereas voters who distinguish more clearly between their most preferred party and other parties are more likely to want to express that difference.

In this research I also test another new idea. Some voters whose preferences are tied as between two or more parties may find in European Parliament elections an opportunity to vote for a party that they were unable to vote for

at the previous national election, simply because, at that election, they were only allowed to cast one vote. European Parliament elections provide such voters with an opportunity to express this support, and so the participation rate among those with relevant motivations (those with more than one party tied for first place) may well be higher. This would be particularly true if their propensity to support these parties was high, so we again employ two variables to operationalize this idea.

Table 2 displays the mean values for these five variables, along with mean values for a selected set of conventional measures of voters' resources and susceptibility to mobilization, divided into separate columns for citizens from low turnout countries, citizens from other post-communist countries, and citizens of more established democracies (including two countries that were new EU members in 2004). The variables have been coded such that higher values should yield higher turnout, on the basis of expectations derived from other research; and we see that, for most of the conventional resource and mobilization variables, mean values are indeed higher for other countries (in the last column of means) than for low turnout countries (in the first column of means). Values for other post-communist countries generally fall in between (occasionally they equal or exceed the values for other countries). Only for two of these variables – 'left-right extremism' (how far each responded places themselves from the midpoint of the scale) and 'EU good for country' – is the pattern reversed, with low turnout countries having a higher mean than established member states. So there does seem to be a prime facie reason to suppose that we can explain at least part of the difference between low turnout countries and other countries on the basis of these variables.

Table 2: Differences between mean values of selected independent variables for different categories of countries

	Low turnout countries	Other post-communist	Established members plus Cyprus
Conventional resource and mobilization variables:			
Interested in EP election	2.02	2.08	2.19
Read newspaper	3.25	3.34	4.14
Trust national parliament	3.97	4.54	5.53
Trust European Parliament	4.54	5.39	4.77
Trust government	4.17	4.46	5.18
Left-right extremism	1.98	1.92	1.88
Political interest	2.14	2.08	2.30
EU good for country	1.83	1.87	1.71
Satisfaction with EU democracy[a]	2.05	2.21	2.43
Approval of government	1.29	1.45	1.41
How close to party	1.38	1.42	1.41
Years of education	18.91	18.38	19.36
Age	46.06	48.10	49.88
Age squared	2408.98	2615.78	7722.89
Middle class	2.31	2.00	2.47
Rural resident	0.28	0.36	0.29
Expressive motivation variables:			
Maximum vote propensity	8.13	8.05	8.27
Max propensity – mean propensity	4.46	4.33	4.40
N of ties for max propensity	0.69	0.40	0.53
Ties * max propensity	1.73	0.53	1.20
N	3914	2200	17665

Source: European Election Study 2004.

a. Specifically, satisfaction with democracy in regard to the EU Commission.

Expressive motivation variables are quite another matter, however. Three out of four of them progress in the wrong direction if our theoretical expectations are correct, apparently helping to dampen differences between low turnout and established member countries. Still, these expectations were only theoretical. No past findings confirm the effects of any of these variables, other than maximum vote propensity (which does progress in the right direction). So we should restrain our reactions until we have looked at the findings from multivariate analysis of these data.

Multivariate findings

Table 3 contains effects (first differences) of independent variables on electoral participation from logistic regression analysis (coefficients and robust standard errors clustered by year are presented in an appendix).[3] The effects shown are standardized beta coefficients and first differences: the differences between predicted turnout when each variable is adjusted by one unit while other variables are held at their mean values. Both are interpretable in much the same way as corresponding coefficients in OLS regression. The table presents three models, of which the first replicates some of the effects already seen at the aggregate level in Table 1: effects of aggregate-level variables on electoral participation at the individual level. It was not possible to include 'First EP Election' in this model because only Cyprus, among established democracies for which we have survey data, was facing its first EP election – and Cyprus is a compulsory voting country for which effects of a 'first election boost' are not expected (see Table 1).[4] The data are thus insufficiently differentiated to allow sensible effects to be estimated for 'First EP Election' (all the low turnout countries are first election countries and none of the established democracies are first election countries). Because First Election is not included, the effect attributed to low turnout countries (at -0.195) is less than in Table 1 (electoral participation looks higher in those countries because the fact that they were facing their first election is not taken into account). However the effects of compulsory voting and of time to the next election look much the same at the individual level as at the aggregate level. These variables explain a remarkable 17 percent of the variance in electoral participation, indicating the extent to which individuals are affected by contextual features of European Parliament elections.

Model B introduces traditional resource and mobilization measures.[5] These cut the unexplained difference between low turnout and other countries by nearly a third to 0.136 and increase variance explained to over 30 percent.

There are some surprises among the individual-level effects. Trust in the European Parliament proves to be a quite powerful predictor of electoral participation. Trust in (national) government, however, has a negative impact on turnout in EP elections, quite contrary to Rose's suggestion (though it is a very weak effect, only significant at the .01 level). The most powerful effects, judging from the values of the standardized regression coefficients (betas) are the aggregate level influences, along with only three individual-level effects: whether the respondent is interested in the EP election, whether he or she voted in the previous national election, and his or her age. In particular that last variable shows major 'start-up' and 'slow-down' effects with younger and older voters being considerably less likely to turn out to vote.

Because of the large differences between established and new member states in terms of the age structures of their electorates (seen in Table 2) the age variables alone could be responsible for a 3% difference in turnout levels. The remaining 3% difference that is accounted for by individual-level independent variables included in Model B will be largely the result of interest in the European Parliament elections and political interest, both of which have substantial effects and see notable differences in the right direction between different electorates in Table 2. Other variables will have made a lesser contribution, and 'EU good for country' will have had an impact in the 'wrong' direction (because respondents from new member states are more likely to report this sentiment), helping to counteract the effects of other variables.

The big surprise in Table 3 comes when we move to Model C, where we see effects of vote propensities actually reducing by 0.8 of one percent (to -0.144) the differences between low turnout and other countries that we would otherwise have been able to explain. The balance of effects of these variables are strongly in the anticipated direction, but when taken in conjunction with differences between the different electorates of interest shown in Table 2, all

but one of the effects results in a reduction in our ability to explain turnout differences between low turnout countries and the rest. Only the negative effect of the level at which ties take place, along with the 'wrong' direction of the progression across electorates in Table 2, yields an influence of this variable on turnout that helps to explain differences between the three electorates. But the effect of this variable is small.

Table 3 First differences (effects) for independent variables on whether voted or not, from logistic regression (coefficients and robust standard errors in appendix)

	Model A		Model B		Model C	
	First diff-erence	Beta	First diff-erence	Beta	First diff-erence	Beta
Low turnout country	-0.195	-0.186***	-0.136	-0.130***	-0.144	-0.138***
Compulsory voting	0.327	0.313***	0.274	0.263***	0.275	0.264***
Years to national election	-0.027	-0.083***	-0.034	-0.104***	-0.035	-0.105***
Interest in EP election			0.062	0.148***	0.061	0.145***
Read newspaper			0.003	0.024***	0.003	0.023***
Trust national parliament			0.003	0.022**	0.003	0.020**
Trust European Parliament			0.009	0.056***	0.008	0.052***
Trust national government			-0.002	-0.017**	-0.002	-0.016**
Left-right extremism			0.007	0.027***	0.003	0.012*
Political interest			0.023	0.042***	0.021	0.038*
EU good for country			0.010	0.024***	-0.009	-0.022***
Satisfaction with EU democracy[a]			0.009	0.016**	0.009	0.016**
Government approval			0.002	0.012*	0.001	0.007
Feels close to party			0.022	0.020***	0.021	0.019***
Years of education			0.001	0.017***	0.001	0.017***
Age in years			0.002	0.327***	0.002	0.305***
Age squared			0.000	-0.321***	0.000	-0.298***
Middle class			0.012	0.033***	0.011	0.030***
Rural residence			0.022	0.028***	0.021	0.027***
Voted in previous national election			0.195	0.223***	0.181	0.207***
Maximum vote propensity					-0.003	-0.020*
Max propensity – mean					0.013	0.065***
N of ties for max propensity					0.029	0.055***
Ties * max propensity					-0.002	-0.029***
Pseudo R^2	0.170		0.303		0.308	
Number of cases	28860		28860		28860	

Source: European Election Study 2004. Effects significant at *.05, **.01 and ***.001 levels.

a. Specifically, satisfaction with democracy in regard to the EU Commission.

We should digress a moment to consider why there should be countervailing effects between each pair of coefficients in this set, and why the progression across these variables in the electorates that we study should be generally in

the 'wrong' direction. The first anomaly is easily understood in terms of corrective factors. If we only look at 'maximum vote propensity' and at 'number of ties for maximum propensity' we see effects in the expected direction. Taking account of the difference between 'maximum vote propensity' and mean propensity, on the one hand, and the interaction of number of ties and the level of maximum vote propensity, on the other, yields a more nuanced pair of influences in each case, where the larger effect is somewhat mitigated by a smaller effect in the opposite direction. This sort of thing often happens when employing interaction effects.

As to the surprising progression of these influences found across electorates, our primary expectation (that maximum vote propensities would be higher in more established democracies) is in fact born out. That the number of ties for maximum propensity should be highest in low turnout countries is perhaps not surprising if we consider these to be countries in which party systems are not well-established, so that fewer voters have developed clear preferences for one party over the rest. Interestingly, this is the variable in which other post-communist societies deviate most from their expected location between the other two types. They actually see a considerably lower proportion of tied maximum propensities than do established member countries, suggesting that in these countries party systems have become quite well established even in the short time since the end of communism ([it would be nice if someone could suggest some references to literature that would support this conjecture]).

Discussion

The fact that the standard model works for countries added in 2004 (provided low turnout countries are recognized as such) is heartening. It means that new members of the European Union, even the post-communist countries, are not very different from existing members in terms of things that influence the turnout of their electorates at European Parliament elections. But this is

only true when we include an arbitrary dummy variable picking out low turnout (or post-communist) countries. The difference in turnout registered by this variable is not well-accounted for on the basis of theoretical expectations. We explain somewhat less than a third of the difference on the basis of conventional resource and mobilization variables, and a trifle less even than that when we take account of possible expressive motivations. This is disappointing. Evidently, whatever it is that accounts for the particularly low turnout of 5 countries in 2004 remains largely to be explained.

However, we should bear in mind that the same is true for low turnout countries among established member states. We focused in this paper on particularly low turnout in certain new member countries, but we do just as badly in explaining the low turnout of certain established members. We can of course do a great job if we simply include a dummy variable that picks out these countries, and label it with some convenient term such as 'Eurosceptic.' We might be able to do the same with the very low turnout countries, including a second dummy variable that applied uniquely to them, if we could find an equally appealing label. But labeling countries does not explain them, and a complete explanation of variations in turnout at European Parliament elections still eludes us.

Worse, we were quite wrong in some of our theoretical expectations regarding measures based on vote propensities, although we were correct in thinking these would affect turnout. They do, adding half of one percent to variance explained and providing effects that are comparable in magnitude to the most powerful of the effects of variables routinely employed in conventional individual-level studies. What they do not do is explain the difference between high and low turnout countries. Citizens of low turnout countries do not fail to participate in EP elections because of a failure to have acquired the sort of differences in vote propensities that we expected would be features of established democracies, nor because of less motivation for expressive voting. These variables all show differences between high and

low turnout countries that are counter to expectations. Turnout in low turnout countries would be even lower without them!

On the other hand, the fact that in all countries the effects of the structure of vote propensities have strong implications for turnout at European Parliament elections is an important finding. The applicability of the same reasoning to national election turnout should be high on the agenda for future research.

Notes

[1] The extent of the first election boost among low turnout countries cannot be separately estimated, since its magnitude simply alters the estimated turnout gap between these countries and the rest. However, the other five new member states show virtually the same pattern as established member states in this regard.

[2] Again it is not possible to tell whether the effect is the same for the five low turnout countries, since any deviation for these countries from the general pattern will be taken up by the dummy variable distinguishing them from other countries.

[3] Missing data has been plugged with mean values for all but the dependent variable.

[4] Malta was a first election established democracy that does not employ compulsory voting, but we have no survey data from Malta.

[5] In addition we include voted at previous national election as a surrogate for variables relevant to national turnout that are missing from our model. Without this variable, we explain only 25% of variance, but effects of other variables are hardly affected by its inclusion.

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Chapter 3

Vote Switching in European Parliament Elections: Evidence from June 2004

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The fifth set of elections to the European Parliament in 2004 saw 25 countries sending representatives to the parliament in Brussels and Strasbourg, more than twice the number who participated in the first elections in 1979. On the face of it this presents anyone wishing to understand what happens at these elections with a great deal more variety and uncertainty than previously but this would ignore the fact that we have learned a lot about European Parliament elections in the last 25 years. We have observed significant regularities in the behaviour of European voters and have developed a theory – second-order election theory – which provides a sensible account of such regularities. On this basis we certainly have a set of expectations about what will happen not just in the 15 countries who participated in the last election of 1999 but also in those who participated for the first time in 2004.

This is not to say that our expectations are very precise, nor that our theory is without blemish. Uncertainty remains to cloud any predictions, and there remain both features of behaviour that are unexplained by theory as well as facts which fit uncomfortably with it. This paper reviews the performance of the theory of second-order elections to date, and also considers the alternative merits of two theories which were developed to explain regularities in the behaviour of US voters in the congressional elections that

occur in presidential midterm which show significant parallels with those of European Parliament elections. Elections to parliaments within members states are held according to various timetables. Occasionally national and EP elections coincide (they always do in Luxembourg); more typically they do not but fall somewhere within the national parliamentary election cycle in each member state. While those elected to the European Parliament sit in European Party Groups, they are elected on national party lists, and hence it is possible to compare the performance of national parties in European Parliament elections with their performance in the preceding national election. It is also possible to compare turnout. When we do so we observe two pretty general patterns: governments lose votes compared to the preceding national election and turnout falls. In the US there are national elections every two years for Congress and every four years for the President. Congressional elections take place coincidentally with presidential elections, and again in the middle of a president's term of office – a 'midterm' election. Congressional midterm elections differ from the preceding congressional election in two respects: the president's party wins fewer votes, and turnout is lower. This pattern has endured throughout the twentieth century, almost without exception.

The theories that will be discussed here have generally sought to link the regularities in each context, to see the turnout and government or presidential loss as connected rather than separate phenomena. In the European context it is a central aspect of the theory of 'second order national elections' (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Reif 1985; Reif 1997). In the US context this is the contribution made by the theory of 'surge and decline' advanced by Angus Campbell (1960, 1966). A further common aspect of each theoretical approach is that the results of the less important election are seen as interpretable only through an understanding of something exogenous. In the European case this is the national parliamentary election cycle; in the US case this is the presidential election cycle.

In the next section we will review two sets of theory. Special attention will be given to two things. Firstly, what is the source of the explanation and secondly, what is the mechanism of decision-making at the level of the individual that provides the expected change. Having done that we can then move on to consider the manner in which these theories can be applied to the 2004 European Parliament elections, what they explain and what they do not explain.

Second-order theory and some alternatives

Second-order theory

The concept of a second-order national election in fact has its roots in observations of electoral patterns in US midterm elections, as well as German regional elections but it was used by Reif and Schmitt (1980) as an explanation of the results of the first direct European Parliament election. Reif and Schmitt point out that elections differ in terms of how important people think they are and assume national general elections will be considered more important than European Parliament elections. Rather than distinguish elections as such they refer to different arenas of politics, with elections to bodies in the most important arena of primary importance and elections in other arenas of lesser consequence.[1] As long as national politics remain pre-eminent, general elections in parliamentary democracies are first-order elections. All others are second-order. Voters can be expected to behave differently in the two types of elections because of their differential importance. For a start, they will be less likely to vote in second-order elections because they and the parties know that such elections are less important. When they do turn out voters will be more mindful of the political situation in the first-order arena than that of the second-order arena. First-order issues, for instance, will dominate second-order ones.[2] In particular, voters may take the opportunity to signal their dissatisfaction with government policy despite the fact that the second-order election has no direct implications for government composition. Additionally, in making

their choice voters are more inclined to follow their 'heart' in second-order elections, whose relative un-importance means there are no consequences. This explains why their behaviour may differ from that in first-order elections, in which voters tend to follow their 'head'.

Although Reif and Schmitt do not develop a proper theory of the voter, some points are implicit in what they say. Essentially, at the core of second order theory is a relatively strategic voter who has a preference structure across two or more parties with more than one non-zero element. In other words, a voter does not simply support one party and reject the rest.

This strategic aspect can be further developed. Reif and Schmitt suggested that governments would perform particularly poorly when second-order elections occurred at midterm. The rationale for this is that midterm is a normal nadir of government popularity, brought about by a combination of popularity cycles, and the inevitability of unrealized expectations (see below). However, this is disputed by Oppenhuis et al (1996) who question the existence of such popularity cycles and instead focus on the importance of the election as a signalling device. This is also a function of the time since the last general election, and the time expected until the next one. When a second-order election follows close on, or is simultaneous with, a general election, it passes almost unnoticed. Hence turnout will be particularly low (but not in the case of concurrent elections where turnout in both contests tends to be at the same level). Those who do vote will please themselves, voting with the 'heart'. However, when a second-order election takes place on the eve of a general election, its importance as a sign of what will happen at that general election is considerable. In such circumstances turnout will be rather high (relative to other second order elections) and voters are more likely to signal their discontent with a party or government. The 'referendum' element of second-order elections is thus contextually located, not by levels of government dissatisfaction or economic trends but by the timing of the second-order election in the first-order election cycle.

A second development of second-order theory is the suggestion that the differential importance of elections is better represented by a continuum than by a categorisation (van der Eijk et al 1996). Not all second-order elections are equally unimportant but not all first-order elections are equally important either. In fact, where general elections have few implications for the choice of government, because a system of consociational democracy operates for instance, then they may differ little from second-order elections in the same system. Perhaps only in countries where general elections are expected to bring about some alternation of government control does it make sense to see local or European parliament elections as second-order.

We now turn to some alternative theoretical approaches, developed to account for US midterm election results. We begin with the theory of surge and decline, and then deal more fully with the so-called referendum element of such elections, already alluded to above.

Surge and decline

The original theory of Surge and Decline was presented by Angus Campbell (1960). We call this "Campbell_1". The theory seeks to explain differences in turnout and support for the president's party between midterm and preceding presidential elections in the United States but Campbell himself saw it as having a more general relevance. In his original formulation of surge and decline theory Campbell suggested that although the theory was specifically intended to illuminate well-established patterns in US political behaviour it was likely that:

> 'the basic concepts… - political stimulation, political interest, party identification, core voters and peripheral voters, and high- and low-stimulus elections - are equally applicable to an understanding of political behaviour in other democratic system' (Campbell 1960: 62)

The expectation is that in presidential elections people are likely to depart from their 'normal' pattern of political behaviour. This is because such elections are (relatively, in the US context) high stimulus elections. The higher stimulus of a presidential election promotes two types of change. First, it draws those to the polls who do not usually vote, those Campbell calls 'peripheral' voters. Lacking a strong party attachment, peripheral voters are likely to be swayed disproportionately by the circumstances of the moment to vote for the winning party. At the next midterm election, these voters stay at home, thus adversely affecting the president's party. The high stimulus also means that regular, or 'core' voters are more likely to be swayed by the advantage circumstances give to the winning party to depart from their normal partisan behaviour, only to return to their habitual behaviour in the lower-stimulus midterm. Again, this is to the disadvantage of the president's party. Presidential elections are thus a departure from an equilibrium that is restored at the subsequent congressional election.

After reviewing some individual level evidence and arguing that it does not support classic surge and decline theory, James Campbell (1993) provides a revised version of surge and decline in which the mechanism of a higher/lower stimulus remains much the same but the impact of that on different types of voters changes. We call this "Campbell_2". On the basis that the individual level evidence does not support the differential turnout of independent voters in the two types of election, James Campbell argues instead that the difference in the result is caused by the return to the mid term electorate of partisans of the losing party in the previous election ('disadvantaged partisans') who were cross-pressured by short-term forces and abstained, and the switching back of weaker partisans who defected due to the same cross pressures. In his revised version of surge and decline theory it is strong partisans who move from abstention to voting, and weak partisans and independents who switch. The important concept in the revised model is that of cross-pressure. Strong partisans may find themselves cross-pressured in a presidential year, wanting to vote for their normal party but preferring

the candidate of the opposition. They resolve the conflict by abstaining. Weaker partisans have no problem with the cross-pressures and simply switch parties. "Campbell_2" is a revision of "Campbell_1".

Referendum theory

A quite different explanation for midterm losses is the referendum theory advanced by Tufte (1975). In sharp contrast to surge and decline, which finds the roots of inter-election decline in the upsurge at the previous election, referendum theory locates it in the record of the administration. However, as in surge and decline theory, the roots remain external to the election itself, since they are located in the record of the administration rather than of Congress. Midterm elections are essentially a referendum on the government's performance, in which voters express their approval or disapproval through voting for or against those representing the president's party. The mechanism of change lies in the decision by at least some midterm voters to reward or punish the party of the president. The election provides an occasion at which voters can signal their dissatisfaction. This view is expressed most clearly by Tufte and we refer to his theory as "referendum".

Tufte considers two separate causes of approval: the public's general satisfaction with the president's performance and the trends in economic development. His analysis uses these to predict the magnitude of swings against the incumbent party, and he shows these can predicted with a high degree of accuracy. There is nothing in the theory of a referendum itself to explain why swings are almost always adverse, but Tufte suggests that this stems from two further trends. The first is that presidential popularity tends to decline through a term of office; the second is that the performance of the economy tends to be better at the time of presidential elections. Of course, to the extent that neither is the case, the president's party should not suffer at midterm.

Unlike surge and decline, Tufte's referendum theory does not directly link turnout and midterm loss but others have attempted to do so within referendum theory. Kernell (1977) asserts a 'negativity' hypothesis. Like Tufte, Kernell sees the midterm election as strongly influenced by perceptions of the president's record but he offers a more fundamental account of why this is bad news for the president's party. According to Kernell, judgements on presidential performance are always biased in a negative direction because – as a social-psychological rule – negative impressions are always more salient than positive ones. Moreover, voters are more likely to act on negative impressions. Hence, there will be more people dissatisfied with the president than there were two years ago; dissatisfied voters will also be more likely to turn out than satisfied ones, and, having turned out, will be more likely to vote against the president's party.[3]

Having outlined various theories we now turn to examine their relative value in accounting for features of European Parliament elections. The following analysis deals largely with the central point at issue between the competing theories, the explanation of government losses. It deals only indirectly with turnout, in as much as differential turnout is essential to such explanations.

Explaining government vote loss in European Parliament elections

Much of the work on second order-elections has followed Reif and Schmitt (1980) in examining election results, using aggregate data. Regarding 2004, analyses have already been completed which indicate that the patterns of gains and losses in these elections are in line with those in the previous five sets of European Parliament elections (e.g. Marsh 2005a; Hix and Marsh 2005; Schmitt 2005a). The 'success' of second-order theory in this context is unsurprising, and in line with previous work at this level although it is evident that patterns in post-communist states are not quite the same as those in the older member states. This paper focuses on the individual level. This is

more challenging as it brings into to question not so much what is happening but who makes it happen. In particular we want to observe the pattern of voter mobility across the two elections (general to EP) and see how well it matches the expectations of the various theories already discussed. The approach follows previous work using the 1999 European election study (Marsh 2003; Marsh 2005b).

Specific expectations, derived from the discussion above, are as follows:

- H1 That most of the change is away from the government (Surge and decline: Campbell_1)
- H2 That government will lose more votes to non-voting than opposition parties, and many more voters will switch parties away from them than towards them (Surge and decline: Campbell_1)
- H3 Independent voters are less likely to turn out at European elections than general elections, relative to partisans (Surge and decline: Campbell_1)
- H4 Low interest voters are more likely to switch or abstain from government parties (Surge and decline: Campbell_1)
- H5 There should be a higher defection of partisans at general elections than European elections (Surge and decline: Campbell_1)
- H6 Opposition partisans who abstained last time will rejoin the opposition side (Surge and decline: Campbell_2)
- H7 Weak opposition partisans who voted for the government last time will return to the opposition (Surge and decline: Campbell_2)
- H8 There should be a shift away from the government by voters dissatisfied with its record (Referendum)
- H9 Satisfied government supporters abstain more then dissatisfied ones who are more likely to switch (Referendum); strong government partisans also abstain (Campbell_2)

- H10 Change and stability are a function of first order concerns so left-right attitudes may affect decisions to switch or stay (Second order)
- H11 Second-order concerns are not relevant: i.e. European attitudes do not affect the decision of voters to switch (Second order).

Earlier work on the 1999 elections gave mixed results. Partisanship did matter in explaining voting patterns with defections more common in general elections, and non partisans less likely to vote in EP elections, sustaining the sort of 'normal' vote interpretation of mid-term elections put forward by Cambell_1. Government popularity, however, proved a poor guide to defections, and gave little support to the simple referendum interpretation of these elections. Second–order interpretations were supported in as much as patterns of vote switching were consistent with the view that some voters have multiple preferences: switchers have another option, abstainers do not. However, contrary to second-order theory, Europe did appear to matter with government defectors significantly more critical about further integration than those who stayed loyal. This result is broadly in line with some recent aggregate studies suggesting anti-European parties and parties divided on Europe suffer in EP elections (Ferrara and Weishaupt 2004; Hix and Marsh 2005).

There are two particularly significant points of interest in the 2004 elections. The first is to see if the impact of European attitudes in 1999 was a quirk, or whether it is repeated and, if it is, whether or not it is strengthened. The latter might be expected, given the further erosion of the old 'permissive consensus' and the very visible success of anti-EU parties in a number of countries. The second is possible variation between old and new member states. This may have several sources. One is that party attachment might have a rather different meaning in new democracies and represent much more a short-term attraction than a long-term predisposition (e.g. Schmitt 2005b). Another is that the very instability of party systems in many post-

communist states hardly testifies to strong attachments and does not provide favourable conditions for the development of attachments (e.g. Sikk 2005). Data for this paper is from the European Election Study 2004. About 27,000 interviews were carried out with electors just after the 2004 elections in all EU member states apart from Malta. Between 500 (in Cyprus) and 2100 (in Sweden) electors responded to questionnaires, with an average of over 1100 in each country. Country samples have been weighted so that each sums to 1000. [4]

Operationalisations are as follows:

- Vote change: differences between recalled vote at the last national election and reported EP vote[5]
- Partisanship: Feeling of being close to a party, measured on a 4-point scale: not close, sympathiser, quite close, very close. This is coded from –3 (very close to opposition party to +3 (very close to government party) with not close as zero
- Government popularity: approval or disapproval of the government's record to date, running from -1 (disapproval) through zero (DK) to +1 (approval)
- Views on Europe: item on attitude to Unification which uses a 1-10 point scale to indicate whether integration has gone too far or should be pushed further. This is recoded here as a 10 point scale from –4.5 (too far) to +4.5 (further).
- Left-right self placement: Respondents were asked to place themselves on a 10 point left right scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right)
- Political interest: Four point scale self-assessed interest in politics from none (0), a little (1), somewhat (2) to very (3). Missing values were coded 0.

Table 1 contains the evidence of voters' movements between the two elections, general (GE) and European (EP), showing in each case whether they voted for a government party, an opposition party, or did not vote. This

provides a basis for evaluating the surge and decline hypotheses 1-3 and 6. We can see from Table 1 that the government parties lost a higher proportion of votes than did the opposition – retaining only 51 per cent of their GE votes as opposed to the opposition's 65 per cent. We can also see that erstwhile government supporters are also more likely to abstain than they are to defect (although they were no more likely to abstain than erstwhile opposition voters). Amongst clear non-habitual voters, that is those who did not vote in the EP election, the government did marginally worse last time than the opposition (30 percent of 9,069 as opposed to 30 percent of 10,772: 31 percent as against 37 percent.) Interestingly, there is no difference in the propensity of government and opposition voters to abstain: shifts in aggregate support are not due to differential turnout. The marginal figures indicate a small under-recall of government support here, although not enough to suggest government support from such voter was significantly higher in the general election. A rough adjustment of these figures to allow for errors in recall would still indicate that 2004 non-voters did not favour the government parties in the previous general election. There is relatively little evidence of significant shifts from abstention to voting as might be expected from Campbell_2 (6) although what remobilisation there was did benefit the opposition by a ratio of more than 3:1.

There are some differences here between new and old member states and it should be said that the under-recall of government voting is more severe in the new states: only 42 percent of those who recalled voting in the general election claimed to have voted for the government but in those elections 48 percent of voters did so.[6] In the old states government parties kept 56 percent of their votes compared to 39 in the new states, and oppositions kept 72 percent and 53 percent respectively. When it comes to the EP votes of GE abstainers, these clearly favour the opposition in both sets of countries by a ratio of 3:1. Non-habitual voters were also more likely than more habitual voters to have favoured the opposition in the previous general election in

both sets of states. In general then differences are slight but the new states did show more volatility.

Table 1: European Parliament Election Vote and Recalled National Election Vote

	EP vote recall				
	Opposition	**None**	**Govt**	Total	
national vote recall					Unweighted N
Opposition	65	30	4	100	10,772
None	14	82	4	100	3,406
Government	19	30	51	100	9,069

Source: European Election Study 2004. Note: Weighted for analysis to equalize country size

In multiparty systems there is of course a switching of parties that is not apparent in table 1: that between government parties or between opposition parties. In all 26 percent of stable government voters switched government party (24 percent in the old countries, 32 percent in the new ones) but 46 percent of stable opposition voters did so; 72 percent in the new accession states shifted opposition party. This is a remarkable degree of volatility across the two elections in the new member states.

Surge and decline theories direct most attention to the party attachments of voters, arguing that tendencies to stay, abstain or switch vary across different categories. We thus need to know something of the character of the voters in the different cells. Table 2 makes this clearer, breaking down the voter transition matrix in Table 1 by party attachment, coded here as simply 'Opposition', 'None' and 'Government'.

Table 2: Recalled National Vote by Party Attachment and European Parliament Vote

	EP vote recall				
national vote recall	*opposition*	*none*	*govt*	TOTAL	unweighted N
attached to …					
opposition					
opposition	73	25	2	100	6,336
independent	56	39	5	100	3,966
government	34	27	39	100	420
TOTAL	65	30	4	100	10,772
none					
opposition	28	70	2	100	573
independent	11	86	3	100	2,555
government	10	67	24	100	278
TOTAL	14	82	5	100	3,406
government					
opposition	55	32	14	100	650
independent	25	39	36	100	3,581
government	10	23	67	100	4,838
TOTAL	19	30	51	100	9,069

Source: European Election Study 2004.

Note: cell entries are row percentages. Ns are weighted to equalize country size

Campbell_1(3) would lead us to expect independents who voted for the government in the national election to abstain in the European Parliament election, whereas partisans who crossed over should return. This is what we find. Of the independents who voted for the government last time, 39 percent abstained in the European election and more stayed with the government (36 per cent) then switched (25 per cent). Partisan defection was rare in the general election but of the tiny number of 'disadvantaged' partisans who defected to the government last time, 55 per cent returned, compared to only 14 per cent who stayed and 32 per cent who abstained. Campbell_2 (6) predicts partisans of the non-government party should move from abstention back to their party. However, there are very few of them and, while 24 per cent returned, 67 per cent continued to abstain. Campbell_2 (7) also predicts that independents should switch back from the government, but this was less common than abstention. A further expectation from Campbell_1 (5) is that there should be more defections – that is, those identifying with one party but voting for another – in general elections than in European ones. The numbers

are very small here. Only 8 percent of partisans who voted defected in the national election and 10 percent in the European election. On the whole these results suggests the original theory, Campbell_1 is more useful here than the revised one, Campbell_2.

These results hold generally true for both the old and new member states. Overall there seems to be very little difference in the patterns observed. Only with respect to the last point concerning the probability of defecting is there an interesting difference. Here we see that partisan defections are less common in national elections in the old member states (11 percent in EP election, 6 percent in the general election) but more common in national elections in the new accession states: 14 percent as against 9 percent. This pattern in the old states is the reverse of what was found in 1999, when general elections involved more defection but of course, overall, the percentages are small.

While this detailed analysis is necessary to test some ideas of surge and decline theory, and to give some idea of the numbers involved, a more general and multivariate analysis is preferable to consider the other expectations. Such an analysis also allows us to control for the country factor in our data set. We are particularly interested in those voters in the first and third rows, those who voted for or against the government last time, and in how their behaviour in this 2004 election is related to characteristics like partisanship, satisfaction, and their views on Europe.

Table 3 contains sets of coefficients which indicate the impact of a set of predictors on the probability of shifting or abstaining rather than staying with the government party (this is the reference option). Table 4 shows the impact of the same set of predictor variables on the probability of shifting or abstaining, rather than staying with the opposition party (this is the reference option). The cell entries are log odds ratios which show the average change in the odds of defection or abstention relative to stability, and the associated

p-values. We can use these two tables as evidence in relation to the expectations outlined earlier, starting again with those from surge and decline theory.

As these results show, partisanship is linked significantly both to abstention and defection patterns, both in the case of previous government and non-government parties. For former government voters, as partisanship inclines towards the government it seems to have more impact on defection than abstention. The odds of defection from the government are more than halved with a one point increase in attachment, whereas the odds of abstention drop a little less. Pro-government attachment also hugely raises the odds of defecting (back perhaps) from the opposition but as we have seen there are few such deviant government partisans. On interest (H4) it is apparent that more interested voters are about half as likely to abstain than stay or switch. This holds both for those who voted for government parties and for non-government parties in the previous general election.

Expectations 8 and 9 from referendum theories offer two different possibilities: that defection or abstention from the government is a function of approval (Tufte), and that abstention is not a function of approval but that defection is (negative voting). Results point to the weakness of negative voting theory but give some support to referendum theory. There is the expected tendency for voters to leave the government when they are dissatisfied: the odds of doing so rather than staying increase by more than 60 points. There is no sign at all of negative voting, which would require a link between disapproval and switching but not between disapproval and abstention. The coefficients are quite similar and equally significant.

Table 3: Factors explaining EP choices of general election supporters of government parties: Multinomial Logit Estimates (odds ratios)

	All	*Old 15*	*New 10*	*All*	*Old 15*	*New 10*
	EP vote	**Opposition**		**EP Abstained**		
Government approval	0.677	0.659	0.766	0.723	0.716	0.762
(4 point scale)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Positive attitude to EU	0.981	0.989	0.954	0.949	0.943	0.952
(10 point scale)	(0.198)	(0.503)	(0.149)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.072)
Left right	0.898	0.875	0.953	0.923	0.917	0.937
(10 point scale)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.200)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.042)
Pro-government attachment	0.418	0.447	0.335	0.646	0.696	0.522
(7 point scale)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Political interest	0.890	0.897	0.874	1.537	1.521	1.557
(4 point scale)	(0.016)	(0.052)	(0.181)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	6797	4985	1812			
Pseudo R squared	0.21	0.19	0.22			

Note: Country dummies included but not shown; p values in parentheses. Reference category is support for government parties in EP election.

Table 4: Factors explaining EP choices of general election supporters of opposition parties: Multinomial Logit Estimates (odds ratios)

	All	*Old 15*	*New 10*	*All*	*Old 15*	*New 10*
	EP vote	**Government**		**EP Abstained**		
Government approval	1.546	1.570	1.543	1.049	1.108	0.980
(4 point scale)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.196)	(0.033)	(0.730)
Positive attitude to EU	1.027	1.019	1.017	0.940	0.962	0.916
(10 point scale)	(0.317)	(0.506)	(0.751)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.000)
Left right	1.602	1.222	1.203	1.025	1.018	0.931
(10 point scale)	(0.018)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.628)	(0.289)	(0.001)
Pro-government attachment	2.817	2.529	4.239	1.318	1.308	1.341
(7 point scale)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Political interest	0.951	0.890	1.218	1.837	1.757	1.949
(4 point scale)	(0.567)	(0.224)	(0.236)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	7532	5424	2395			
Pseudo R squared	0.20	0.18	0.19			

Note: Country dummies included but not shown; p values in parentheses. Reference category is support for opposition parties in EP election.

Second order theory rests on the assumption that voters have preferences across a number of parties and that different elections provide different contexts in which they select from their set. However, it suggests that voters will be motivated by first order issues rather that second order ones. This is a difficult thing to test but we make a start here by comparing the impact on defection and abstention of two general sets of issues: those relating to European integration and those relating to the left-right dimension. In each case we have taken the most simple specification, asking whether the left-right and pro-/anti-integration position have anything to do with defection. The results appear to show that a voter's views on the EU are not connected to the probability of changing party blocs but are related to abstention. This gives some support to H10. A one point increase in support for integration is associated with a significant drop in the odds of abstention but not of defection. This is not a strong relationship but it is consistent across erstwhile government and opposition supporters. In contrast, left-right position does appear to have an impact on switching as well as defection, particularly for erstwhile government supporters. In other words, pro-EU voters are more likely to vote, but left wing voters are more likely to switch.

These results generally hold true consistently across the old and new member states but there are exceptions, most notably with respect to the attitude dimensions. Left-right orientations are linked more consistently to abstention in the new states, particularly amongst those who voted for opposition parties last time. Left-right orientations (i.e. being more left wing) are linked more closely to defection in the old states: erstwhile government voters are about one-quarter less likely to defect when they are one point more right wing, a change which makes erstwhile opposition voters about one quarter more likely to defect. There are also differences with respect to party attachment which seems a stronger determinant of stability in the new member states. A one point increase in attachment to a government party is associated with a change in the odds of staying of about 3:1 in the new states as opposed to less than 2:1 in the old ones among erstwhile government supporters; among

erstwhile opposition supporters the odds of changing increase by over 4:1 as opposed to about 2:1.

In two further pieces of analysis we explored the importance of voters' relative utilities for different parties, replicating analysis of 1999 (Marsh 2003, 2005) as well as exploring the volatility within the opposition parties. First, using the party utility measures developed by van der Eijk (Tillie, 1995; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996) we examined how the distance between the highest utility for a government party and the highest utility for an opposition party impacted on voters decisions to switch, abstain or remain loyal. This analysis was kept separate because of the much greater degree of missing data on these questions, the overall N for analysis dropping by about 30 percent. This variable proves to have a strong impact on vote choice. Government voters who perceive a positive differential between the two sets of parties are much less likely to defect, and less likely to abstain; similarly, opposition voters who perceive a differential are more likely to defect and abstain. In each case the effects on switching are much greater than those on abstention. The inclusion of this variable leaves the relative importance of other variables, and conclusions drawn above, unchanged. But it does indicate the possibility that voters do consider a number of parties in the vote choice set and where differentials are small, may change their vote decision from election to election.

Volatility within the opposition parties – a topic not envisaged by US mid-term election theories – is best explained by party attachment but political interest and attitudes to the EU play a small part: those more interested are more likely to remain loyal, as are those more pro-EU, although both coefficients are significant only at the .05 level. Those who switch within the set of government parties are simply less partisan. These relationships, particular within new member states, will be explored further in a later version of this paper.

Discussion

This paper has examined the expectations we might have about the 2004 elections in the light of available theoretical work both on European Parliament elections and the analogous US midterm elections. We contrasted the US-based theories of Angus Campbell and his successors with Reif and Schmitt's theory of second order elections on the basis that all seek to explain the comparable patterns of regularity in different political systems. There are differences between the theories. These lie chiefly in different conceptions of what motivates the average voter, with surge and decline allowing for more strategic, 'rational' behaviour than the other theories, but they also lie in the behaviour that each was developed to explain. Surge and decline and referendum theories focus on behaviour in a two-party system with a separation of powers and an electorate which is easily categorized as identifying with one party or another. In parliamentary democracies none of these conditions applies. Two-party systems are rare, even if they are liberally defined; there is no separation of powers, and party identification, as the concept is understood in the US, is much less easily separated from immediate voting intentions. Nonetheless, the assumption with which this paper began was that such theories are at least potentially applicable in the different circumstances. Second-order election theory has grown out of this literature but offers explanations for matters outside the normal ambit of US focused studies, such as the shift of votes from larger to smaller parties, as well as adapting previous insights to understanding electoral change in sub- and supra- national elections.

On the whole we discovered all three areas of theory do offer some understanding of the mechanics of individual vote change. The expectations derived from surge and decline theory are only in part confirmed by the data. First of all, there is mixed evidence that government losses can be seen as a consequence of voters returning to 'normal' behaviour. While defections do not appear to be much greater in European elections, it seems that defections

by partisans were not significantly more apparent in general elections than European elections, a finding which runs counter to some popular wisdom that European elections are contexts in which partisanship counts for little. We also see at the individual level that independent voters are more likely than others to abstain at the lower stimulus election and that partisanship is linked to shifts in and out of the voting public in some of the expected ways, although it is evident that 'peripheral' voters alone are not responsible for the losses suffered by governments. It must be acknowledged that these findings may be distorted by the fact that we have only recall evidence for the last national election We badly need widespread panel data on these elections, something that is not yet available for more than the odd country (e.g. Heath et al., 1999). Even so, the distortions in recall might be expected to strengthen links between partisanship and recalled choice rather than weaken them and the evidence here should certainly not be discounted on that point. In general the findings give more value to Campbell's original formulation that his namesake's revised version. While not every expectation is fulfilled, nor can all be dismissed.

Traditional referendum theory gets some support. The individual level analysis revealed modest results with respect to government popularity but it is clear that this factor does help to explain voting shifts.[7]

Evidence with respect to the attitudes of voters, a focus prompted by second-order theory again was mixed. As expected, attitudes to the EU do not seem to account for vote switching between government and opposition. In contrast left-right orientations do help account for such changes, with left wing voters more inclined to shift towards or stay loyal to opposition parties. However, abstention by general election voters does seem to be more common among less pro-EU voters. These results are based on rather crude measures and more sophisticated specifications are certainly possible. Governments in general tend to be favourable to integration: we would therefore expect opposition voters to be motivated more by anti- than by pro-

integrationist views. An alternative specification, using a voter's closeness to the EU position of the government [mean position of government parties as seen by all voters] gave very similar results. We also explored other specifications for left right, including a moderate-extremist folding of the left right scale. Arguably, most governments are centrist and the opposition should attract more extremist voters (or they might go to more "outspoken" coalition (or opposition) parties). There was some support for this, but the unfolded scale was considerably more powerful and we opted for simplicity. Second order theory suggests voters will opt for the closest party on the major dimensions on national politics. This specification will be tested in a subsequent version of this paper.

There are some contrasts here with a similar analysis using data on the 1999 elections. In particular, the traditional referendum theory is much better supported here, and the signs that the EU mattered to government defections is now absent. However, the relevance of surge and decline theory and the patterns of change by party attachment are very similar. There are also some contrasts between patterns in the new and old member states although for the most part the picture is quite similar. Differences are greatest with respect to the issue scales with anti-EU abstention and left defection confined to the old member states.

This paper has largely focussed on a review of theories of lower stimulus elections, exploring differences and similarities between them, in order to assess what each can tell us about European Parliament elections. Most offer something of value, although some have a wider potential than others. What we can say is that we certainly did not lack useful tools for generating expectations about the 2004 elections and for analysing them in retrospect. We have shown several clear patterns in previous results, many of them quite consistent with theory and thus interpretable in such terms. We have also reported on many similarities between the old and new member states in respect to the dynamics of change, although volatility in the new states

remains much higher than in the old states. Moreover, certain types of volatility, that within the sets of parties in government or in opposition, is not envisaged by theories of surge and decline or 'referendums', but might be in accordance with second-order theory regarding the differential prospects of large and small parties. Weak party attachment seems to be a factor in all of this, but more work needs to be done to explore the precise patterns of within-camp changes.

Notes

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1 Second-order elections theory can be seen as an early exploration in the then uncharted territory of multi-level governance (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2001).

2 As the policy reach of multi-level governance grows within the EU an increasingly large body of issues is dealt with in both first- and second-order political arenas (see again Hooghe and Marks, appendix table 1). What is referred to here is therefore the specifics of the national and the European arena, which is the political standing of the national government on the one hand, and the future direction of European integration – whether one should speed it up or slow it down – on the other.

3 For a concise review of some other variants see Campbell, 1993.

4 Full details on EES website: http://www.ees-homepage.net

5 An alternative operationalisation would be to contrast the EP vote with vote in a hypothetical general election at the same time. This was used by Oppenhuis et al 'The Party Context: Outcomes', pp. 287-305. It has the advantage of removing the bias of recall data but the disadvantage of being subject to the same second-order effects of any opinion poll taken between election. However, Oppenhuis et al's findings on the existence of switching and abstention contributing to government party losses are similar to those in the analysis here (below).

6 The error is 7 percentage points in the EP elections: the survey shows 30 percent as against a target figure of 37 percent. Corresponding figures for the older member states are zero percent for the general election vote and –2 for the EP election vote.

7 Mixed results have also been found in the US context: see Niemi and. Weisberg 1993: 209.

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Chapter 4

Left-right and the European Parliament vote in 2004

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The importance and meaning of the left-right divide in mass politics

Since the French Revolution, the idea of a left-right divide has gained great importance in modern mass politics, which explains why Laponce (1981: 56) views it as a type of 'political Esperanto'. The left-right political cleavage has functioned as a schema to classify ideologies; as a device to categorize parties and candidates' political orientations and policy proposals; as a communication code between politicians, the mass media and citizens; and as an instrument which helps electors to cope with the complexities of the political realm and arrive at political decisions (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990: 205).

It is true that, from the 1950s onwards, various authors have argued that we are witnessing 'the end of ideology' (Bell, 1960; Lipset, 1981), or, more recently, 'the end of history' (Fukuyama, 1989), and that they have all suggested that, in recent times, the major differences between left and right have been overcome (Giddens, 1994; 2000). And at an empirical level, Mair has shown a decline in ideological polarization between the major political parties in several Western European democracies during the 1980s and the

1990s (Mair, 1998: 131-6). However, it has also been argued that these theses are themselves ideological and, more importantly, since the 1960s have been (at least partly) falsified by the emergence of the 'new left' and 'new right' and, more recently, by the revival of fundamentalism and nationalism (Heywood, 2003: 319-23; Eatwell 2003: 279-90; Tormey, 2004: especially 38-70). Bobbio (1994: 95-101), for example, has noted that social inequalities remain a very important political issue, although this is now more important at a world level (separating the North and the South), thus providing a renewed base on which the left-right cleavage can maintain its prominence. Furthermore, empirical studies with a wider time perspective have shown that, in many countries, the decline in ideological polarization is far from a linear phenomenon (Budge and Klingemann, 2001: 19-50; Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 187, 191-3).

In fact, ever since Inglehart and Klingemann's seminal paper (1976), there has been a consensus that (at least in Western Europe) individuals' self-placement on the left-right axis has had three major components: social, ideological and partisan. The social component refers to the connections between citizens' locations in the social structure, and to the corresponding social identities and their left-right orientations (1976: 245). The value, issue or ideological component refers to the link between an individual's left-right self-placement and their attitude towards the major value conflicts in Western democratic mass politics, be they socioeconomic, religious or 'new politics' (1976: 244; Huber, 1989; Knutsen, 1995; 1997). Finally, the partisan component of left-right self-placement refers to the part of any individual's ideological orientations which reflects mainly partisan loyalties (1976: 244; Huber, 1989; Knutsen, 1997; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990: 207). A similar picture was found for East Central Europe (Markowski, 1997; Kitschelt et al, 1999, pp. 223-308; for the level of diffusion of left-right orientations among post-communist electorates, see Barnes, 2002). Studies on electoral behaviour in legislative elections have shown that individuals' left-right self-placement is a major predictor of their voting

choices, and that, in fact, its importance has been increasing in many countries over recent decades (Franklin et al, 1992; Gunther and Montero, 2001).

There is, therefore, considerable evidence to suggest that there is little empirical support for the 'end of ideology' thesis, and that, particularly at the individual level, the left-right divide is still a very important information economizing device which enables electors to cope with political complexities, mainly in Western Europe, and that a similar picture has been found for East Central Europe (Markowski, 1997; Kitschelt et al, 1999). Thus, the meaning and importance (specifically in explaining the vote) of the left-right divide is well established. Interestingly, European Parliament elections do not seem to be particularly different in this respect. As "second-order" elections, European elections tend to be dominated by considerations pertaining to the national political arena, where the role of left-right orientations is predominant. Thus, several studies have shown the importance of the level right-right divide in explaining voting choices in European Parliamentary (EP) elections (Brug & Franklin, 2005; Brug & van der Eijk,1999; van der Eijk, & Franklin & Oppenhuis, 1996; van der Eijk, Franklin, &. Brug, 1999).

However, the conditions under which the left-right cleavage can become more or less important in explaining the vote in European elections remain somewhat understudied. This paper aims to determine under what conditions the left-right divide is more or less important in explaining the vote in EP elections. We use European Elections as a "laboratory" to examine electoral behaviour in general, precisely because these electoral contests take place simultaneously under different social, political and institutional conditions. Thus, the present paper uses the survey data from the European Election Study 2004 to attempt two major goals.

Our first goal is to examine whether the ideological location of citizens – in terms of left-right self-placement — has a different impact on the vote in

different types of democratic regime. Several studies have suggested that the most consequential difference is that between the former communist democracies and the remaining cases. However, we will examine whether this particular difference between democratic systems is indeed consequential and, above all, whether it resists the introduction of several other contextual variables not considered in previous research.

First, as research on national elections already suggests, countries whose electoral systems are less permissive — i.e., those with greater barriers to the representation of smaller parties — tend to lower the influence of left-right orientations on the vote, by giving incentives to parties and party leaders to adopt centrist and catch-all strategies and appeals. We wish to examine whether this is also true in the case of EP elections. Second, since this relationship between institutional features of the electoral system and the ideological distinctiveness and clarity of partisan alternatives is only a probabilistic one, we will also test the hypothesis that the actual (perceived) clarity of policy alternatives available to citizens makes a difference in the extent to which voters resort to the left-right heuristics in order to make voting choices. Finally, we will test the hypothesis that the particular type of party alignments along both the left-right and anti-pro integration scales that tend to characterize each country also affect the extent to which ideological orientations affect the vote. More specifically, we will test whether left-right orientations become a more consequential explanation of the vote in EP elections when competition within the party system is based on reinforcing or congruent alignments in terms of both left-right and anti-pro integration stances on the part of political parties.

In the following section, we specify our hypotheses (and the rationale behind each of them), the data used, and the methods employed. Then, in the third section, we describe the distribution of the independent variables in the 21 countries/political systems on which we have data. In the fourth section, we

confront our hypotheses against empirical data. In the final section, we present some concluding remarks.

Hypotheses, Data, and Methods

Our initial hypothesis is that *the impact of left-right orientations in voting choices in EP elections should be lower in the former communist countries*. The post-communist consolidating democracies have been seen as particularly distinct from others because of the suppression of class and religious differences, the totalitarian or post-totalitarian nature of previous regimes, and the social structural conditions inherited from the communist past. It has been argued that these have led to a 'flattening' of the social landscape, with consequent weakening of political and ideological attachments and rendering of the left-right schema less useful for voters (Lawson, Rommele & Karasimeonov, 1999; White et al. 1997).

Furthermore, as more recent democratic regimes, they are less likely to exhibit high levels of party system institutionalization — stable and legitimized organizations, regular patterns of party competition, and the existence of relatively strong attachments to existing parties on the part of voters. Where these elements are absent, party ideological placements and electoral choices tend to exhibit high levels of instability and fluidity (Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring and Torcal 2005). This general hypothesis has found confirmation in the work of Brug and Franklin (2005). However, they have also shown that this difference between the former communist and the remaining countries is significantly reduced when other contextual factors are constant. Thus, our first goal is to examine whether this difference between democratic systems is indeed consequential in and of itself and, above all, whether it resists the introduction of several other contextual variables not considered in previous research.

Thus, our second set of hypotheses concerns electoral institutions and the way party competition is structured along the left-right and anti-pro EU integration dimensions. Firstly, we know, at least since the work of Anthony Downs (1957: 114-141), that two-party systems are usually associated with a unimodal distribution of voters' preferences over the left-right continuum, with most of the voters concentrated in the central positions of this political divide, and with political parties competing mainly for the median (centrist) voter. Thus, in two party systems there is a drive towards ideological moderation. However, multiparty systems are usually associated with multimodal distributions of voters' preferences over the left-right continuum. Moreover, the different parties have more incentives to concentrate their appeal within specific segments of the electorate (socially, political, and ideologically defined). Thus, in the latter systems there is usually a drive towards ideological polarization, and sometimes even to centrifugal competition. In a similar vein, see Sartori (1992) and Sani & Sartori (1983). In addition, it is well established in the literature about electoral and party systems that there is a strong association between the level of proportionality of the electoral system and the degree of fragmentation of the party system (see for example, Lijphart, 1994). Furthermore, and even more to the point, Norris (2004) has shown that electoral behaviour in systems with higher thresholds seems to be less determined by cleavage politics, including left-right ideology, given the incentives of parties in those systems to adopt cross-cutting and catch-all appeals.

Therefore, bearing in mind these theoretical contributions, we will determine if the more or less permissive character of a European Parliament electoral system (measured through the effective threshold) influences the strength of the impact of the left-right divide on the vote. Note that this variable is measured at a macro-level, i.e., as a constant for each country/political system. Our second hypothesis states that *the higher the permissiveness of the electoral system the higher the impact of left-right orientatios on the vote* (except if stated otherwise, we are always referring to the vote in EP

elections). It might be argued that, although this is indeed expected, there are other plausible possibilities. Namely, that (especially in European Elections) the more permissive an electoral system is the higher will be the probability that it will allow the entrance of new parties that do not compete (at least mainly) on the left-right axis. We acknowledge that this is a real possibility. However, we also believe that the question of whether a more permissive electoral system indeed increases (or depresses) the importance of left-right self-placement on the vote it is mainly an empirical one.

Furthermore, we need to take into account the fact that the relationship between the electoral system and the extent to which the party system provides clear and distinct policy alternatives is probabilistic. To put it another way, we can find fragmented party systems with both high and low levels of ideological polarization — remember Sartori's (1992) definition of "segmented pluralism" and "polarized pluralism" — because the permissiveness of the electoral system (or the party system format) only defines conditions more or less propitious to the clarity of policy alternatives as they present themselves in the left-right spectrum. Consequently, we also need more direct measures of the construct.

One possible approach is to test if party system polarization has an impact on the extent to which left-right self-placement influences the vote. Several studies have documented the importance of ideological polarization at the systemic level in explaining citizens' political attitudes and behavior (Nie & Andersen, 1974; Bartolini & Mair, 1990, pp. 193-211, 251-285; Knutsen e Kumlin, 2003; Berglund et al, 2003; van der Eijk et al, 2005; Freire, 2006). However, these studies either did not use party system ideological polarization to explain the differential impact of left-right self-placement on the vote (in European or legislative elections), or did it for a very small set of countries (van der Eijk, Schmitt and Binder, 2005).[1] We expect that the more polarized are the policy alternatives that the political parties present to the electorate and the more easily citizens can differentiate between parties on the left-right spectrum; the more prone they will be to think about left and

right in terms of issues; and the greater will be the likelihood that they will relate the left-right divide to social cleavages. Thus, in these conditions, the easier it will be for citizens to use left-right as a short-cut to cope with the complexities of the political universe, and to decide which parties to vote for.

A second approach is to use the "measure of agreement" concerning parties' placements in the ideological scale. Several authors have used the level of "perceptual agreement" (the percentage of respondents in each survey/country that agrees in terms of parties' locations in the left-right scale) as a measure of the clarity of party positions (Brug, & Franklin, 2005; van der Eijk & Franklin & Oppenhuis, 1996; van der Eijk & Franklin & Brug, 1999). This measure has proved heuristic in previous studies by interacting with the effects of left-right self-placement on the vote: the higher the "perceptual agreement", the higher the impact of that political cleavage. In this respect, we follow van der Eijk's (2001) recommendation of the employment of "the measure of agreement". According to this author (2001: 325-326) "the specific case addressed (by that measure) involves the description of the degree of agreement amongst a group of individuals who express their preferences or perceptions in terms of a number of ordered categories. (…) To the extent that respondents express the same preference one may speak of preferential agreement. (…) The term perceptual agreement refers to the extent to which different people have the same perceptions." Thus, the article uses an alternative measure which is the "measure of agreement". In the present case, it measures the respondents' agreement about the parties' locations in the left/right scale in each system. All these measures, however, are used in this paper to test the same generic hypothesis: that *the higher the clarity of the policy alternatives provided by the party system, the higher the impact of left-right self-placement will be on the vote*.

Finally, we want to test the hypothesis that the usefulness of citizens' left-right self-placement in predicting EP vote should be contingent upon the

particular structure of political contestats in each country, and particularly upon the way parties are positioned along the left-right and anti-pro EU integration political divides. There are four models of political conflict in the European Union (Steenbergen & Marks, 2004). The "international relations model" predicts that conflict in the European Union is structured around a single dimension. This is a continuum form: "less integration (defend national sovereignty)" to "more integration (promote supranational governance" (Steenbergen & Marks, 2004: 5-6). According to this model there is no relation between this conflict-axis and the historical left-right divide. The "regulation model" (Tsebelis & Garret, 2000) also predicts a single dimension of conflict over European integration, however it is completely subsumed under the left-right divide: the continuum goes from "left/high regulation at the EU level" to "right/ low regulation at the EU level", and the prominence of the left-right divide is explained by the second-order nature of EU politics vis-à-vis domestic politics. The other two models, the Hix-Lord model (Hix & Lord, 1997; Hix, 1999 and 2005) and the Hooghe-Marks model (Hooghe & Marks, 1999), predict two dimensions of conflict over European integration. However, while the Hix-Lord model predicts two orthogonal dimensions of competition (left vs. right and more vs. less integration), the Hooghe-Marks model predicts that the two dimensions (left vs. right and more vs. less integration) are neither completely orthogonal nor fused. The partial overlapping of these two dimensions results in an opposition between "regulated capitalism" (on the left and more integration quadrant) and "neoliberalism" (on the right and less integration quadrant).

The evidence that resulted from testing these four models is rather mixed (Marks, 2004), but the major lesson is perhaps that the overlapping (or crosscutting) between the two dimensions of conflict varies across countries, issues, arenas, and actors (Marks, 2004; see also Bartolini, 2005; Ray, 2004; Taggart, 1998; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004; Hooghe & Marks & Wilson, 2002; Brinegar et al, 2004; Gabel & Hix, 2004). Our hypothesis is that such variation affects the extent to which left-right self-placements influence

voting decisions in EP elections. More specifically, we know that the usefulness of the left-right scale for voters tends to increase when the nature of party competition within the party system involves unidimensional alignments or reinforcing alignments (Kitschelt et al. 1999). Thus, according to our fourth hypothesis, we should expect that *in those countries where political parties' orientations towards European integration represent a political divide that is encapsulated by the left-right cleavage (i.e., where both dimensions of competition are congruent), citizens' left-right self-placement should also be a more relevant predictor of EP vote; the reverse should be true for those countries where the two dimensions of competition are not congruent*.

The independent variables mentioned above are all contextual variables measured at the macro-level. However, we also employ some independent variables measured at the individual-level, namely: gender; age (a recoding of year of birth); education (age when respondent ended full-time education)[2]; subjective social class (a five-point scale ranging from working to upper class); religiosity (a recoding of the mass attendance variable); and unionization (a dichotomous variable with "0" not a member of a union and "1" self or someone in the family is a member). The European Election Study (EES) 2004 integrated database will be used in this paper.[3] However, for several reasons it was not possible to include all 25 member states in the study. Firstly, it was not possible to field a survey in Malta. Also, Belgium, Lithuania and Sweden were removed from the database since their studies did not ask respondents certain key questions that are fundamental for our paper, namely q14_x and/or q22_x, i.e. those questions that ask respondents to place each party on a left-right scale, and on a pro-anti more European integration scale. Northern Ireland was also excluded. Thus, the list of country cases included in our analysis are the following: Austria, Britain, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.

Institutional and Political conditions for the impact of the left-right divide in each polity

This section considers the hypotheses formulated above, presenting the contextual data that is likely to condition the impact of the left-right divide in each country. The data can be divided into two types: political (parties' policy positions) and institutional (the effective thresholds of each electoral system for EP elections). We will first present the data for all countries in the EES after which respondents' perceived congruence between parties positioning on the left-right scale and on the pro-anti European scale will be discussed in light of previous findings concerning the same measure (van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004).

Table 1 below presents the main characteristics of the electoral systems used in the countries being analyzed. All of the member-states use proportional electoral systems for the EP elections, even though formulas vary. The overwhelming majority of countries have single electoral districts, and average district magnitude is 24.8. The effective threshold, which is the contextual variable being used in the model below, was computed as 75%/(Mean District Magnitude + 1).[4] The lower the effective threshold the more it permits the representation of smaller parties. Table 1 shows that for this measure, if only the average values are considered, there are no significant differences between post-communist countries and the others: the average threshold for both sets of countries is 6.5%.

Tables 2 and 3 present indicators used to capture the extent to which voters perceive the policy positions of parties clearly and distinctively. As we can see in table 2, two alternative measures of party system polarization were computed. Using voters' perceptions of parties' location in the left-right scale (left, 1; right, 10), we started by comparing the ideological distance between the interpolated median[5] positions in the left-right scale of the two extreme parties (one from the left, other from the right) with electoral representation

in the European Parliament, and then computed the ideological distance between the interpolated median positions in the left-right scale of the two major parties (usually, these parties are one from the left, the other from the right; the only exceptions are: Ireland, Latvia, Estonia and Poland) in each polity.[6] Then, we calculated a first measure of party system polarization: *a weighted additive index of the two previous distances between the two pairs of parties*- The weighting factor is the proportion of the vote (in EP elections) for the two extreme and for the two major parties (see also van der Eijk and Franklin 2004 for a different methodology). We also calculated a second measure of party system polarization which also uses party positions in the left-right scale (according to voters' perceptions) as measured by the interpolated medians. After calculating the average value of all the interpolated medians in each system, we computed the *variance vis-à-vis the average value of the interpolated medians in each system*, which is our second indicator of party system polarization.[7]

The indicators do not all point in exactly the same direction. The ideological distance is smaller in post-communist countries between parties on the extremes of the party system, but higher if we take the two largest parties. However, due to weighting, the indicator which combines the previous two measures attributes a higher overall polarization on average to post-communist countries than to established democracies. The countries which are most polarized in this weighted index of polarization are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Spain. The other indicator of party system polarization, the left-right variance indicator, provides a slightly different picture concerning left-right polarization: the level of polarization is slightly lower, on average, in post-communist countries, than in the other group; and the countries with the largest polarization are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, France and Greece. Nevertheless, the correlation between the two measures of polarization employed here — weighted index and variance — is strong: .70. Besides, there is also a predictable correlation between the

permissiveness of the electoral system and the extent to which the party system exhibits left-right integration polarization.

Table 1. The Electoral Systems for EP elections

Country	Electoral Formula	No MEPs	No of Districts	Mean M	Effective Threshold
Austria	Hare /d'Hondt	18	1	18	**4.0**
Britain	d'Hondt	75	11	6.8	**9.6**
Cyprus	PR.(n.a.)	6	1	6	**10.7**
Denmark	d'Hondt	14	1	14	**5.0**
Finland	d'Hondt	14	1	14	**5.0**
France	d'Hondt	78	8	9.8	**6.9**
Germany	Hare-Niemayer	99	1	99	**5.0**
Greece	Hagen-Bischoff	24	1	24	**3.0**
Ireland	STV	13	4	3.3	**17.4**
Italy	Hare	78	1	78	**4.1**[a]
Luxembourg	Hagen-Bischoff	6	1	6	**10.7**
Netherlands	Hare /d'Hondt	27	1	27	**2.7**
Portugal	d'Hondt	24	1	24	**3.0**
Spain	d'Hondt	54	1	54	**1.4**
Average	-	**37,9**	**2,4**	**27,4**	**6,5**
Czech Rep	d'Hondt	24	1	24	**3.0**
Estonia	d'Hondt	6	1	6	**10.7**
Hungary	d'Hondt	24	1	24	**5.0**
Latvia	Sainte-Lague	9	1	9	**7.5**
Poland	d'Hondt	54	1	54	**5.0**
Slovakia	Hagen-Bischoff	14	1	14	**5.0**
Slovenia	d'Hondt	7	1	7	**9.4**
Average	-	**19,7**	**1,0**	**19,7**	**6,5**

Source: European Parliament, authors' own calculations.
[a]In the Italian case, we follow Farrell and Scully (2002) and take into account the allocation of seats on the basis of rankings on regional lists

The correlations, however, although they have the predicted signs (negative: higher threshold, less polarization) are not inordinately strong. The correlation between the weighted measure of left-right polarization and the effective threshold is -.19. Similarly, the correlation between the Left-Right variance indicator and the effective threshold for all countries is -.28.

Table 3 presents the average "measure of agreement" of respondents' positioning of the parties on the left-right scale. We applied the formula proposed by van der Eijk (2001) to obtained one "measure of agreement" for each party.[8] Then we computed the mean "measure of agreement" for each country. On average, agreement on the positioning of parties is lower in post-communist party systems than in the rest of the countries in the sample, but the difference is not large, with countries such as Britain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal displaying levels below the average of former communist countries.

Table 2 Party System's Left-Right Polarization

Country	1st Polarization Indicator			2nd Polarization Indicator L-R Variance
	Difference Median (IM) Two Major Parties	Difference Median (IM) Two Most Extreme Parties	Weighted Sum of Two Differences	Variance vis-à-vis mean value of interpolated medians
Austria	2.64	4.62	2.78	4.9
Britain	1.91	2.14	1.76	0.75
Denmark	3.00	6.42	2.76	6.75
Finland	2.17	6.57	3.72	5.23
France	3.92	8.14	3.39	8.36
Germany	2.91	5.77	2.82	4.73
Greece	2.77	7.28	3.23	9.84
Ireland	.27	3.97	1.80	3.97
Italy	5.72	8.00	5.00	5.88
Lux.	2.76	2.76	2.98	1.56
Netherlands	3.11	6.08	3.29	5.72
Portugal	2.96	5.70	4.36	7.41
Spain	4.96	6.32	6.40	5.6
Cyprus	7.66	7.66	8.13	14.73
Average	**3.34**	**5.82**	**3.74**	**6.10**
Czech Republic	7.76	7.76	7.78	10.88
Estonia	.78	3.06	1.51	1.83
Hungary	5.73	5.73	7.55	6.42
Latvia	.59	5.97	2.98	5.54
Slovakia	4.47	5.06	4.02	5.39
Slovenia	4.24	4.28	3.87	5.12
Poland	.84	6.44	2.58	5.5
Average Post-communist	**3.49**	**5.47**	**4.33**	**5.81**

The countries where measure of agreement is largest are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Spain. The correlation between this measure and the polarization measure shown above, which combined the weighted polarization between the two main parties and the two extreme parties is strong, at .68 (significant at the .05 level), while that with the electoral threshold is -.30 (significant at the .05 level).

Table 3: Average Measure of Agreement for each Country

Country	Measure of Agreement
Austria	.50
Britain	.34
Denmark	.56
Finland	.52
France	.45
Germany	.48
Greece	.43
Ireland	.36
Italy	.54
Luxemburg	.49
Netherlands	.54
Portugal	.42
Spain	.55
Cyprus	.76
Average	**.49**
Czech Republic	.63
Estonia	.36
Hungary	.45
Latvia	.47
Slovakia	.44
Slovenia	.33
Poland	.40
Average Post-communist	**.44**

The final contextual variable contained in our hypotheses is the extent to which left- right and anti-pro Europe party stances exhibit congruence, i.e., the extent to which both orientations form a unidimensional map of political competition. Such congruence has been studied through the lens of voters' perceptions (van der Eijk, and Franklin, 2004), through Euromanifestos data (Gabel and Hix, 2004), through expert surveys (Hooghe, Marks, Wilson and Steenbergen and Scott, 2004), and MEP behavior (Thomassen, Noury, Voeten, 2004). We operationalized *congruence between the European integration issue and the left-right divide* in each country/political system in the following way. Using voters' perceptions of parties' location on the left-right scale and on the European integration scale[9] ("unification has already gone too far", 1; "unification should be pushed further", 10), we mapped the interpolated median positions in each one of the above mentioned scales for

each country and each of the parties represented in the EP. In order to produce a summary measure of congruence, we simply calculated the correlation of these interpolated median positions of all parties in each country, and used the absolute value of that correlation as an indicator of congruence. Thus, the exercise is identical to that performed by van der Eijk and Franklin in Ch. 2 of the Marks and Steenbergen book. However, it is not redundant for at least two reasons. Firstly, the data used by the authors is from EES 1999, whereas we are using data from EES 2004. It has been shown elsewhere that parties' positioning both on the left-right cleavage, and especially on the anti-pro integration stance has varied substantially over the years (Gabel and Hix, 2004: 108-109). Secondly, indicators on congruence for seven post-communist countries and Cyprus are being presented for the first time.

Congruence between respondents' placement of parties on a left-right scale and on a pro-anti European scale is substantially higher in the newer (post-communist) democracies, independently of whether the direction of the relationship is positive or negative. Also, the inverted U-curve is less present in these new members of the EU. Indeed, it is only found in the party placement of the Czech Republic, with all other post-communist countries exhibiting strong, mostly positive, linear correlations.

Looking at all the countries in the table (see also Graph 1 in Annex 1), average congruence is .62. When we compare this with van der Eijk and Franklin's 2004 graphs, there seem to be no significant changes. In twelve countries, the correlation is positive, meaning that there is a tendency for right-wing parties to be viewed as more pro-integration than left-wing parties. This is especially true in Luxembourg, Ireland, Cyprus, Estonia, Slovakia and Latvia, cases where the correlations are particularly strong. In these countries, the correlation of the median (IM) perceptions of respondents concerning parties' positioning on the left-right scale and anti-pro European scale, is positive and equal to or higher than .90. In Slovenia,

and, to a lesser extent, in Hungary, congruence is also relatively high but the direction of the relationship is negative (both above .74). In other words, in these two countries, the leftist parties tend to be more pro-European than the right wing parties. In several other countries, where correlations are lower than in the cases mentioned above, we can identify an inverted U-curve (see Annex 1). These are evident in the following cases: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands. In three countries, there is no discernable relationship between the positioning of political parties on the left-right scale and on the anti-pro European scale: these are France, Italy and Germany.

There are therefore three different patterns: an inverted u-curve; a linear relationship or an orthogonal relationship. These patterns have been explained in two main ways. According to Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt (2004), the variation in party positioning regarding Europe is determined by the type of welfare state in each country. Given that EU integration leads to policy harmonization, integration should be supported by right-wingers and opposed by left-wingers in leftist all-encompassing social democratic states (Scandinavia). On the other hand, in residual, liberal welfare states (UK), the left should be more pro-european, since it expects national conditions to move from the status quo to at least a conservative welfare state. In countries with conservative encompassing welfare states, (Germany, France, Italy) EU integration should not be significantly related to Left/Right ideology.

Another theory singles out extreme parties as the main determinants of the pattern of party positioning. Parties that are successful in the existing structure have little incentive to politicize new issues, whereas parties at the margins of the political institutions try to change the structure of contestation. (Hooghe, et al, 2004). When an inverted u-curve is not present this is due to the absence of extreme parties in the party system, or alternatively to the existence of only one extreme party, leading to a (positive or negative) linear association between the two variables (van der Eijk & Franklin 2004). Both theories may explain our results. The smaller incidence

of the inverted u-curve in our graphs (Annex 1) may be a consequence of the fact that in our sample only parties who succeeded in gaining representation in the 2004 EP elections were considered. These parties tend to be the more mainstream parties, considering the party system as a whole.

Table 4: Congruence between Left-Right and the European Issue Correlation between Respondent's Median (IM) Placement of each Party on the Left- Right Scale and the Anti-Pro European Scale (absolute values)

Country	Congruence
Austria	.59
Britain	.47
Denmark	.32
Finland	.80
France	.01
Germany	.08
Greece	.45
Ireland	.94
Italy	.35
Luxembourg	.86
Netherlands	.59
Portugal	.71
Spain	.41
Cyprus	.95
Average	**.54**
Czech Republic	.39
Estonia	.91
Hungary	.50
Latvia	.99
Poland	.52
Slovakia	.96
Slovenia	.90
Average post-communist	**.74**
Average all countries	**.60**

Testing the hypotheses

A preliminary question that needs to be addressed is whether voting decisions in the 2004 European Parliament elections can be conceived of as being affected by voters' left-right orientations. A large number of studies

have suggested the "second-order" nature of EP elections, which implies, among other things, that they tend to be pervaded by concerns from the national political arena, where left-right orientations have predominated as guides to voting behaviour. And the 2004 European elections still seem to follow this pattern.

Table 4 shows the results of two alternative regression analyses that test the effects of a series of conventional socio-demographic variables as well as individuals' left-right self-placement in two dependent variables. The first codes voting choices on the basis of mass perceptions of the chosen party's policy position. More specifically, each individual vote in a party that elected at least one MEP (Member of the European Parliament) was coded as that party's location in the left-right axis, by use of the (interpolated) median perceptions of respondents concerning the ideological positioning of those parties (variables q14_1 to q14_4). However, we also cross-check the validity of this particular coding by running a second analysis where the dependent variable is coded with an externally imputed six-point ordinal scale based on the party families present in the EP, consistent with available expert surveys of the left-right policy positions of European party families (McElroy and Benoit 2005): Communist – GUE/NGL (1); Greens – EGP-EFA (2); Socialist/Social-democrat - PES (3); Liberal – ALDE (4); Christian Democrat/Conservative –EPP/ED (5); and Nationalist – UEN and IND/DEM (6). Parties that could not be categorized reliably by the traditional left-right scale were excluded from this second analysis.

As table 5 shows, the results are remarkably consistent, regardless of whether we measure the vote on the basis of the policy positions attributed by mass publics to each party in each country or on the basis of a left-right rank-ordering according to the affiliation of each party in the European party families: all variables have the same predictable direction and (with the exception of age) reach the same level of statistical significance, and voter's left-right self-placement is, in both cases, the strongest predictor of the vote, even when a series of socio-demographic controls are introduced.

Table 5: Individual-level explanations of voting choices

	Dependent variable: voted party's interpolated median in left-right scale	Dependent variable: 6-point scale from Communist (1) to Nationalist (6)
Gender	-.032**	-.033**
Age	.003	.051***
Education	.006	.003
Social class	.118***	.072***
Religiosity	.106***	.135***
Trade Union membership	-.080***	-.088***
Left-Right SP	.270***	.223***
N=	8179	7837
Adjusted R^2	.11	.09

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Values are OLS beta coefficients. Data weighted in order to give each country sample the same size.

Having established that voters' policy positions in a left-right scale have remained relevant as an explanatory factor in voting choices in the 2004 election, regardless of the specific way in which we measure the dependent variable, we still need to ask a number of questions about the extent to which this impact is contingent upon contextual factors. Recall that our first hypothesis concerned a basic difference between types of democratic regimes — "former communist" democracies versus "established" democracies. Table 6 presents a model including an interaction term between former communist democracies and, again, left-right ideology. First, we should note that the model does not add much in terms of explained variance to that presented in table 5, suggesting that the inclusion of the contextual variables of democracy-type and of the interaction term falls short of producing any major improvement over the model based exclusively on individual-level variables. Nevertheless, the former communist* left-right self placement (LRSP) interaction term is significant and does show the negative predicted direction in both cases. This provides initial support for the notion that the left-right schema is significantly — albeit slightly — more consequential in western European countries than it is in former communist states, a conclusion already obtained by Brug and Franklin (2005) using a different methodological approach.

Table 6: The impact of left-right contingent upon type of democracy

	Dependent variable: vote as party median in left-right scale
Gender	-.036**
Age	.000
Education	.005
Social class	.128***
Religiosity	.118***
Trade Union membership	-.068***
Left-Right SP	.301***
Former communist	.122***
Former communist*LRSP	-.076***
N=	8179
Adjusted R^2	.12

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Values are OLS beta coefficients. Data weighted in order to give each country sample the same size.

To what extent, however, does this difference between types of democratic regimes generically defined resist the introduction of controls for several other contextual features thought to be relevant in the explanation of the differential effect of left-right orientations in voting choices? Earlier on, we had suggested three additional hypotheses concerning the role of electoral system permissiveness, the clarity of the policy alternatives provided by parties and party system congruence/unidimensionality in terms of left-right and anti-pro integration stances. Table 7 shows the results of the tests of all these hypotheses. Model 1 is that already presented in table 6, while models 2, 3 and 4 include alternative measurements of the clarity of policy alternatives provided by each party system.

Table 7: All hypotheses

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Gender	-.036**	-.032**	-.034**	-.033**
Age	.000	.018	.011	.027**
Education	.005	-.005	.000	-.004
Social class	.128***	.124***	.129***	.115***
Religiosity	.118***	.103***	.110***	.105***
Trade union membership	-.068***	-.070***	-.069***	-.067***
Left-right SP	.301***	.020	.171***	-.953***
Former communist	.122***	.000	.017	-.238***
Former communist *LRSP	-.076***	.111***	.085***	.517***
Effective threshold EP elections	-	.120***	.154***	.248***
Effective threshold EP elections*LRSP	-	-.286***	-.340***	-.554***
Party system LR polarization [a]	-	-.322***	-	-
Party system LR polarization [a] * LR SP	-	.702***	-	-
Variance in LR Parties Positioning	-	-	-.173***	-
Variance in LR Parties Positioning * LR SP	-	-	.378***	-
Perceptual Agreement in party placement	-	-	-	351***
Perceptual Agreement in party placement* LR SP	-	-	-	1.646***
Party system congruence	-	.112***	.026	.095***
Party system congruence*LRSP	-	-.203***	.032	-.172***
N=	8179	8179	8179	8179
Adjusted R^2	.12	.19	.16	.22

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Values are OLS beta coefficients. Data weighted in order to give each country sample the same size.
[a] Index of weighted left-right distances between the two major parties and between the two extreme parties.

The results in table 7 are interesting in several respects. First, unlike what occurred with the inclusion of the "former communist" variable, both as a main effect and as part of an interaction term, there is a noticeable improvement in the overall fit of the model in relation to that tested in table 5 as the remaining contextual variables and interaction terms are added.

Second, in the full model, as we predicted and has been found in other studies, some rather important changes are visible in the coefficient for the "former communist"*LRSP interaction term. However, what is perhaps more unexpected is that, once all variables are added in the model, the sign of the

coefficient becomes positive, i.e, left-right ideology becomes a stronger predictor of the vote in post-communist countries. A more intuitive way of looking at how the effect of left-right self-placement is conditional upon the "former communist" variable is to plot individuals' left-right self-placement (from 1 to 10) against the value of the dependent variables predicted by our "best" model (model 4), and in doing so to use "former communist" as a moderator variable. In figure 1, the solid line shows the variation in the predicted value of the dependent variable brought about by changes in the left-right self-placement when all the remaining variables (except "former communist") are kept constant at their means and the "former communist" variable is kept constant at 0 (western countries), while the dotted line shows the same when "former communist" is kept at 1. As we can see, once cross-national variations in terms of EP electoral systems and party policy positions are taken into account, it seems safer to say that the impact of left-right self-placement in the vote is larger in post-communist countries than in other countries than to say the opposite.

Third, the electoral threshold*LRSP interaction term and those between LRSP and the alternative measurements of clarity of policy alternatives have the predicted effects: negative in the former and positive in the latter. As figures 2 and 3 show, systems where the electoral threshold for EP elections is lower tend to be characterized by a stronger effect of the left-right schema on voters preferences, with the same occurring in systems where the clarity of policy alternatives is greater. In fact, at low levels of perceptual agreement about where parties stand, the effect of left-right positions on the part of voters in their voting choices is practically non-existent.

Figure 1: Interaction between Former Communist and left-right self-placement



Figure 2: Interaction between Effective Threshold and left-right self-placement*



* "High" threshold was computed by keeping the variable constant at the mean threshold plus one standard deviation, while "low" threshold was computed by keeping the variable constant at the mean minus one standard deviation. The same approach was used for the remaining moderator variables.

Finally, we had suggested earlier that the effect of left-right orientations on voting choices in EP elections should be greater in systems where parties were congruently aligned in terms of the left-right and anti-pro integration

scales. In other words, the more unidimensional the structure of political competition, the more useful should the left-right heuristic for voters. As it happens, however, it is the exact opposite than tends to occur. The finding is not particularly robust, considering that it is absent in one of the models (that using variance in LR parties positioning as a measure of the clarity of policy alternatives) and, besides, as figure 4 more vividly illustrates, the effect is rather small even in model 4.

Figure 3: Interaction between Measure of Agreement and Left-Right Self-Placement



However, this result suggests that there might be something wrong with the assumption that, when the left-right and anti-pro integration dimensions are congruent, the conflict about European integration will end up lacking salience, being "subsumed in" or "encapsulated by" a traditional and readily understandable left-right dimension. Instead, it may be the case that, in order to avoid the tensions and internal party conflicts that tend to emerge within traditional parties (Marks et al., 2004), it is precisely in those countries where the sources of support and opposition to European integration are spread across the map of left-right positions that the dominant centrist parties have strong incentives to downplay the salience of the EU integration issue in party competition and electoral appeals, reducing EP elections to their purer

second-order form, i.e, that dominated by concerns related to the national arena where left-right orientations are clearly predominant. Conversely, where the dimensions of conflict along EU integration and left-right lines tend to overlap in the party system — as tends to occur in Eastern Europe — parties can integrate European issues into their electoral appeals and platforms, giving voters cues that are alternatives to the traditional left-right dimension of political competition and potentially reducing the importance of the latter in electoral choices.

Figure 4: Interaction between Left-Right/Anti-Pro Integration Congruence and Left-Right Self-Placement



Concluding remarks

As we stated before, the present paper had two major goals. The first was to examine whether citizens' left-right self-placement has a different impact on the vote in different types of democratic regime, i.e., in terms of consolidating versus established democracies (defined as post-communist democracies versus all the others). The second was to examine whether the generic differences found between democracies in terms of their level of

democratic "consolidation" or "establishment" resist the introduction of controls for three other factors hypothesized as making a difference in the extent to which left-right orientations have a greater (or lesser) influence on the vote: the more or less permissive character of the electoral system; the clarity of policy alternatives presented by political parties to the electorate in each polity (as measured by three alternative indicators); and the congruence (or lack of congruence) between the left-right and the pro-anti European dimensions of party competition. We used European Elections as a "laboratory" to help us understand electoral behavior in general, precisely because these electoral contests take place simultaneously under different social, political and institutional conditions.

Thus, following prior studies of this subject, voting choices in the 2004 EP elections do indeed seem to be to a considerable extent about choosing parties in terms of left-right orientations. Furthermore, we found that the usefulness of left-right orientations as cues to the vote seems to be contingent upon a series of contextual factors. The lower the "effective threshold" of the electoral system, i.e., the higher the permissiveness of the electoral rules in terms of access to parliamentary representation, the higher the importance of citizens' left-right orientation in structuring their EP vote. Greater levels of clarity of the policy alternatives provided by the party system render citizens' left-right self-placement more consequential for their EP vote. In this respect, the indicator that measures perceptual agreement proved to have a stronger interactive effect with the impact of left-right self-placement on the vote than either of the two measures of party polarization, but all these results point in the same direction and the differences are in the relative strength of the relationships.

The last contextual variable measures party system congruence between left-right positioning and pro-anti European stance. This congruence variable was not significant in all the models tested above (it was insignificant in the "variance" model), and when it was significant, it added little to the overall equation. Nevertheless, it is the case that, contrary to the original hypothesis,

more unipolar Euroskepticism renders left-right orientations less (rather than more) consequential for the vote. We suggest therefore that in those cases where there is a higher congruence in terms of party competition on the left-right and on the pro-anti European integration divides, the major parties (like the smaller ones) feel free to structure their electoral appeals around the European integration issue (because that will not disturb the major axis of domestic policy competition, i.e., the left-right divide), and that EP elections can therefore function more as an arena for political contestation around European issues.

Finally, we found that left-right orientations were not equally useful in former communist democracies and in the remaining established democracies. However, unlike previous studies that found a strong reduction in the differences between the established democracies and the post-communist countries (when contextual variables are controlled for), what we found was actually a reversal of the originally advanced empirical relationship. In other words, it seems that the differences initially detected between more established democracies and the postcommunist countries, suggesting that the effect of left-right orientations on the vote was weaker in the latter — differences that were already, admittedly, rather small — disappear and are actually reversed once the systemic diversity among all European democracies — in terms of parties' policy positions and the electoral system — is taken into account. Particularly relevant in this respect seems to be the differences between levels of perceptual agreement about parties' policy placements: it is after the introduction of this variable that the previously detected conditional effect of "former communism" is more clearly reversed.

To some extent, this validates previous research which suggested that difference between types of democracy in this respect might be due to the clarity of the party system and might not be particularly big (Brug and Franklin 2005). What is perhaps more surprising is that, after this is taken

into account, left-right orientations end up being more consequential in post-communist countries than in others. We would like to suggest that this might be a consequence of the fact that in all these countries these were the very first elections for the European Parliament, leaving voters without many other credible cues to help them make voting decisions other than the conventional left-right dimension that characterizes first-order arenas and elections.

Finally, it is important to mention two issues that need to be addressed in the future in this research. The first is that of the dependent variable. Brug and Franklin (2005) analyzed the impact of LRSP on EP elections and created a dependent variable using voter probabilities (which correlate highly with vote) within a stacked data set. In a previous version of this paper we used a dichotomous dependent variable, and we have now adopted a rank-ordered dependent variable, with parties positioned across the left-right scale. Perhaps an alternative conceptualization of the dependent variable might be considered in the future. The second important issue to consider is the importance of left-right as a structuring factor of party competition vis-à-vis other dimensions that might be more important in structuring that competition. In particular, recent work on central and Eastern Europe has argued that party competition in the European political space and/or in European elections occurs not so much along the left-right axis as along the GAL (Green/Alternative/Libertarian)/TAN(Traditonal/Authoritarian/ Nationalist) axis (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2004). Importantly, this GAL/TAN axis is not congruent with the left-right positions of the parties in those systems. However, the EES 2004 questionnaire does not allow us to locate the parties (and the voters) in the GAL/TAN axis. Moreover, to our best knowledge no expert survey (or data from party manifestos) is yet available that covers all the countries in this analysis. Testing the impact of the contextual factors we used for the present paper in a framework of policy competition (and electors' self-placement) structured by the GAL/TAN axis is clearly a task for future research whenever the available data allows for it.

Notes

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1 The only cases considered in the van der Eijk, Schmitt and Binder (2005) paper are Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

2 Those who were still studying were recoded using the year of birth variable. Also France, Poland and Slovakia had a different coding for the education variable and these were harmonized.

3 The data utilized in this publication were originally collected by the 2004 European Election Study research group. The group consisted of Stefano Bartolini (EUI Florence, Italy), Cees van der Eijk (now University of Nottingham, UK), Mark Franklin (Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut, USA), Dieter Fuchs (University of Stuttgart, GFR), Michael Marsh (Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland), Hermann Schmitt (University of Mannheim, GFR), and Gabor Toka (Central European University, Budapest, Hungary). This study has been made possible by various grants. Neither the original collectors of the data nor their sponsors bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations published here. The data are still under embargo, except for the research directors referred above, and the national research directors in each country. The authors of the present paper are the national research directors of EES 2004 in Portugal.

4 See Lijphart (1994; 1999).

5 The interpolated median is computed as follow:

First, define variables as follows:

M = the standard median of the responses;

nl = number of responses strictly less than M;

ne = number of responses equal to M;

ng = number of responses strictly greater than M;

Second, the interpolated median IM is then computed as follows:

If ne is nonzero:

$$IM = M + (ng - nl) / (2ne)$$

If ne is zero:

IM = M.

6 According to van der Eijk (in the spreadsheet used to calculate the "measure of agreement") "Ordered rating scales are often used to gauge respondents' opinions (i.e. "on a scale of 1 to x, how strongly do you agree with this statement?"), preferences (i.e. "where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to x, where 1 stands for <> and x stands for <>?") and perceptions (i.e. "where would you place this party/politician/etc. on a scale from 1 to x, where 1 stands for <> and x stands for <>?"). Traditionally, the arithmetic mean and the standard deviation (or some transformation of the latter) are used to describe such a frequency distribution in terms of central tendency and dispersion. In the case, of finite ordered rating scales these measures can be demonstrated to be biased (by extreme values of the distribution). With respect to the central tendency, see Huber and Powell (1994) and Herrera et al (1992), who recommended the interpolated median. With respect to dispersion, see van der Eijk (2001), who recommends the measure of agreement as an (inverse) of the standard deviation or measures based there upon.

7 Similar measures of ideological distances at the party system level were used in the following papers: Knutsen e Kumlin, 2005; Berglund et al, 2005; Freire, 2006. When using voters' perceptions of parties' location in the left-right divide, the major differences vis-à-vis the present article is that they used the "mean" for parties' locations and we used the "interpolated median" value. We believe that the latter value is more accurate because, first, it is less sensitive to extreme values of the distribution, and, second, it has got a more substantive meaning.

8 The Excel spreadsheet with the macro to calculate the "measure of agreement" was kindly furnished by Wouter van der Brug. For more explanations about how to compute the measure, etc., see van der Eijk, 2001.

9 The question (asked both for respondents' location and for parties' location) is stated in the following way: "Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-scale. On this scale, 1 means unification 'has already gone too far' and 10 means it 'should be pushed further'. What number on this scale best describes your position?

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ANNEX

The Positioning of Political Parties on Left-Right and Pro-Anti EU integration Scales, according to Respondent's Perceptions, EES'2004

X-Axis- Left-Right Scale, from 0-10

(0-5.5 = left-wing ; 5.6-10 = right-wing)

Y-Axis- Anti-Pro EU integration Scale, from 0-10

(0-5.5 = anti-european; 5.6 to 10 = pro-European).



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

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

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

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

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

Estonia



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

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

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

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

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

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

Italy



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

Luxembourg



Netherlands



Poland



Portugal



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

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

Spain

Chapter 5

Information Effects on Vote Choices in European Elections[1]

Gábor Tóka
Central European University

This paper aims to introduce the notion of information effects in the study of second-order elections. Its structure is as follows. Section one elaborates on the notion of information effects and highlights key findings from previous empirical studies. Section two discusses how the most influential theory of voting behaviour in European elections can be further clarified by taking the notion of information effects into account. In the course of this, it offers competing information-based explanations for some previously observed empirical anomalies for the theory of second order elections. The competing theories are shown to have surprisingly different implications about how changes in the context of European elections can ameliorate the second order nature of these contests. Section three discusses the statistical models and the data. Section four tests the explanations developed in section one on data collected in 20 European countries shortly after the June 2004 elections. Section five concludes.

1. Information effects

Nearly any human behaviour can be explained in either motivational terms, arguing that the actors had a particular set of preferences, or with a reference to the information that the actors had about the means of achieving their ends under imperfectly known circumstances. The central ambition of this paper is

to demonstrate that it makes important differences for our understanding of second-order elections and their causes if we explain observed regularities in aggregate outcomes with motivational or information-based theories of micro-behaviour. A sketch of the key arguments and the way I propose to test them is provided in Figures 1 to 3. This first section of the paper explains how information can have an impact on behaviour if preferences are fixed.

The impact of both specific and general political knowledge on voting behaviour is ubiquitous. As path-breaking research by Zaller (1992) demonstrated, well-informed citizens are *ceteris paribus* more likely than information underdogs to update their attitudes and political preferences according to new information. The former are far more likely to receive, comprehend in context, retain in memory, and recall such information when needed (see also Zaller 1996). But everything else is rarely equal: the more informed people are, the more previous knowledge prepares them to resist being swayed by any news. Hence, citizens' political attitudes and choices are intricately, but clearly, linked to their general political information levels. In other words, political attitudes and choices are subject to information effects.

It is almost trivial to suggest that specific pieces of information may have an impact on citizens' political attitudes (for a recent demonstration see Sanbonmatsu 2003). Clearly, it takes at least a good chance of knowing who is responsible for government performance to credit or punish a party for the latter (Anderson 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Wilkin *et al.* 1997). Issue voting, in its turn, seems to increase with knowledge, both across contexts (Andersen *et al.* 2002*;* Tóka 2002) and across individuals (Goren 1997*;* Highton 2004*;* Lau and Erber 1985).

The effects tend to be complex, though: even when we would think that the same information will move nearly everyone in much the same way – think of a revolting financial scandal – cognitive biases strongly mediate the effect

(Dimock and Jacobson 1995). For most of the time, information effects are differentiated by citizens' pre-existing preferences: depending on their party identification people may be more or less prepared to absorb information about the true position of a party on a controversial issue (Merrill *et al.* 2001). Not too surprisingly then, even such ages-old, historically inherited, determinants of party allegiances, such as religious denomination, can affect vote choices in opposite ways among knowledgeable and uninformed voters (Bartels 1996).

Importantly, the political information level of citizens tends to be a one-dimensional phenomenon. Someone who – more or less correctly – "knows" one fact of national or international politics is also likelier than someone who was not aware of the same thing to know any other fact from the same domain (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996*;* Zaller 1986). In other words, however fragmented the electorate may be in terms of personal issue agendas, the horizontal differentiation of specialized issue publics tends to be very limited among citizens of the same country when it comes to factual knowledge about national and international politics. Rather, it is location on a single hierarchy from the poorly to the highly informed that systematically shapes political choices.[2] As a result, determinants of vote choices are remarkably different depending on the general political sophistication of the citizen (Sniderman *et al.* 1990). For instance, the more knowledgeable citizens are, the more their value orientations impact on vote choice (Heath and Tilley 2003). Knowledgeable citizens are not only more likely to rely on such sophisticated cues as party ideology, but also much better able than information underdogs to put any cognitive shortcut to a really good use in supplementing missing information (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). The degree of uncertainty about candidates reduces voting support for them, independently of what citizens' best guess is about the candidates' true profile. As a result, vote choices are less accurate reflections of political preferences among ignorant than among knowledgeable voters (Alvarez 1997*;* Bartels 1986). To be sure, plenty of simple cues assist the making of reasonable political

choices with the inevitably imperfect information available to individual citizens (see e.g. Popkin 1991). Yet, the vote choices of otherwise identical individuals often seem to be significantly different, depending on their general political information level, and at least some national election results are rather different than what they would have been if all citizens had successfully emulated fully informed voting behaviour (Bartels 1996*;* Sekhon 2004*;* Tóka 2004).

Elections to the European Parliament are a particularly appropriate context in which to study information effects. It is hard to dispute that citizens tend to be less involved with European elections than with national ones (Heath *et al.* 1999). This fact in itself may make space for greater variation in voting behaviour by political information level in supranational elections. As a result, election results may express citizens' informed preferences less in European than in national elections. In addition, the European Election Study provides data about citizens' political knowledge level that are as appropriate for cross-national comparison as any other readily available survey material. Yet, there have been few, if any efforts to study information effects on European election outcomes. The present paper tries to start filling this gap by developing a robust measure of general political knowledge from the EES data and demonstrating its usefulness for understanding second order elections better.

2. Second order elections and information effects

The concept and theory of second order elections are central to the literature on European elections. There is no need to recite here the theory and its refinement over time. It is enough to stress where this paper goes beyond previous conceptualizations.

From Reif and Schmitt (1980) on, second order elections theory expected voting behaviour to vary across elections due to differential motivation,

rather than differences in information level among citizens. It was within this general frame that different works attributed slightly different blends of expressive and instrumental motivations to citizens in European elections. Reif (1984) and Schmitt (1990), on the one end, talked of citizens "voting with the heart" in European elections, i.e. picking the parties that they abandon in national elections for tactical reasons, like awareness of their relative irrelevance for government composition. Oppenhuis *et al.* (1996), on the other extreme, put much stronger emphasis on the insincere, strategic-instrumental nature of vote choices in second order elections. They portrayed voters in EP elections as strategic actors entering a signalling game. The voters in this theory recognize that votes in second order elections do not directly influence the composition and acts of national governments. Yet, they also notice that media and politicians nonetheless pay careful attention to these election outcomes, and the latter have relevant political consequences. For instance, unpopular office-holders, coalition formulas, and policies are blamed for poor election results, and are subsequently replaced with newly emerging alternatives.

What is common to both of these sincere-expressive and strategic-instrumental accounts of voter behaviour in second order elections is the assumption that the specific stakes – or rather, the dearth of stakes – directly influence citizens' motivation in EP election. This altered motivation, in turn, is said to be responsible for such empirical regularities as the vote losses of government parties and more generally of big parties in European Parliament elections.

In contrast, one could equally well construe an alternative explanation of the same regularities with reference to strategic reaction to the different stakes in EP elections among politicians, but not among citizens (see Kousser 2004 for a similar reasoning). Citizens' behaviour in EP elections is then no different than in first order elections, except that it responds to a different information environment. It is the differences in the information made available to

citizens by strategic politicians, rather than an altered motivation of citizens, which explains such familiar second order election staples as a reduced turnout, lower support for government parties, and higher support for small parties.

The starting point for an information-based account can be that politicians have much lower stakes in European than in national elections. The reason for this is not necessarily that no executive power is at stake in European elections – in fact, European politicians by now should be able to see at least some link between government formation at the European level and the outcome of European elections. Rather, the stakes of EP elections are low for politicians partly because the jurisdiction of the European parliament – if measured by, for instance, the percentage of European GDP allocated by it – is rather limited compared to that of national parliaments. In addition, many fewer appointments, and especially many fewer patronage appointments, are affected by EP elections than are affected national elections. As a result, politicians show less – and much less credible – campaign effort in European than in a non-concurrent national election, and this is what explains the well-known differences in popular mobilization and turnout.

Similarly, vote gains for small parties and losses for government can be explained by the different information flows from politicians and media to citizens at the time of European than in national elections, rather than by citizens' direct reaction to the different stakes in European elections. At first sight, the distinction between the two accounts may seem to be an irrelevant and overtly pedantic embellishment, but, as I will argue later, their implications are rather different for how turnout, constitutional rules, and campaign intensity may enhance or reduce the second order characteristics of European elections.

Consider the vote losses of governments first. Since incumbents presumably value the prizes in national elections higher than those in European elections,

they presumably aim at timing policy announcements of varying popularity as well as any special vote-boosting efforts so that they maximize their electoral support at the time of the next national election. Because of tradeoffs against the less important goal of remaining popular throughout the term, success in this attempt should generate a cycle whereby government popularity will reach bottom shortly after mid-term in the national legislative cycle, and pick up from then on. If so, then strategic responses among politicians to the differential stakes in European and national elections is the factor that generates the oft-observed relationship between the size of vote losses for governments between national and European elections on the one hand, and the exact time when the EP election occurs during the electoral cycle on the other.

Kousser (2004) presented empirical evidence that macroeconomic conditions can indeed account for the variation in the electoral performance of government parties in European elections well enough to make references to election timing – and thus to strategic voter behaviour – largely superfluous. This would also explain why Oppenhuis *et al.* (1996) found no evidence that government parties would collect more votes in simultaneous national elections if they had been held on the same day as EP elections occurred. Strategic politicians would have surely arranged things differently if they had really expected such a coincidence. But, given that government vote losses in non-concurrent EP elections are a function of actual performance problems, it is no wonder that national voting intentions at the same time make similarly bleak reading for governments – albeit this similarity seems to contradict the motivational account of voting behaviour in second order elections.

Incidentally, the information-based account of government vote losses in second-order elections is consistent with yet another regularity that is not readily explained in motivational terms. As Marsh (1998) observed, the familiar second order pattern of government vote losses varying with the

timing of EP elections is less pronounced in those member states where, due to the complexity of coalition politics, government composition is actually not so directly dependent on national election outcomes. The information-based account of this fact can go like this: in these countries, strategically acting politicians should be less concerned with popularity cycles, and thus be less active in generating that ebb and flow of good and bad news that may elsewhere be responsible for government popularity bottoming around midterm. Note that the motivational theory of second order election can also explain why these governments may experience smaller losses in EP elections than other national governments: because the motivation of citizens is not so radically different between types of elections in countries where neither national nor European elections are seen to regulate access to executive power. However, this motivational account seems to lack a coherent explanation for why the vote losses of the incumbents in second order elections depend less on the electoral cycle in some countries than in others.

Thus, the information-based account is consistent with a broader set of observations than is the conventional, motivational account of second order election effects. A further example of this is a recently discovered anomaly for motivation-based second order election theory. As Schmitt (2004) observed, government vote losses across the new Eastern members of the union in the June 2004 EP elections were unrelated to the timing of the vote within the national legislative cycle. As Table 1 shows, an information-based account of regularities in second order elections can readily explain why. Apparently, the incumbents of these new democracies are less successful than their EU-15 counterparts in getting their popularity curve fit the electoral calendar. Probably the lesser experience of incumbents in new democracies can explain this failure. But, be that as it may, the result is that dissatisfaction with government performance is not only generally more widespread in the East than in old EU member states, but it also tends to be unrelated to the number of months passed since the last national election.

This stands in clear contrast to the pattern showed for the other member states in Table 1.

Consider now the vote gains of small parties – to be precise, of parties that are neither big, nor very small Marsh (1998). Several scholars have argued that at least a part of this gain reflects the direct reaction of citizens to the often more proportional electoral systems at place in European than in national elections (see e.g. Kousser 2004*;* Oppenhuis *et al.* 1996). An information-based account has no problem with accommodating the finding that the gains of these parties in EP elections are larger when the mechanics of the electoral system are more favourable for them in European than national elections. However, it eliminates the need for the rather unrealistic assumption that a purely voter-motivation based account of this regularity has to make about citizens' understanding of subtle details of electoral legislation. Rather, the information-based account would expect that these vote gains occur to the extent that strategic politicians invest in exploiting the opportunities that a more permissive electoral system offers for them.

Table 1: Percentage approving the performance of the national government by the number of months passed since last national election and the age of democracy

		Older democracies	New (East Central European) democracies
Number of months passed since last national election	3	77	-
	15	79	30
	17	36	-
	19	39	-
	20	-	35
	21	18	25
	24	34	19
	26	-	52
	27	38	-
	31	56	-
	33	-	13
	37	43	-
	44	-	57
	60	68	-

Notes: table entries are the percentage of respondents who "approve" the record of the government in percentage of the respondents who either approved or disapproved the record.

In doing so, the information-based account can easily explain why, for instance, support for small extra-parliamentary parties in Hungary fell to a previously unprecedentedly low level in the June 2004 European elections, while the smaller parliamentary parties recorded a major surge in their support. In fact, the Hungarian electoral system for EP elections is far more proportional than the one used for national elections, but both feature a five percent legal threshold. Hence, for the very small parties, the EP electoral system was hardly better than the one used in national elections. For the two just slightly bigger parliamentary parties, the SZDSZ and the MDF, the EP election offered an excellent opportunity to test and prove their widely questioned ability to pass the five percent threshold in future national elections without joining an electoral alliance with their bigger allies. They promptly responded to this challenge with an enormous concentration of resources, activities, and political imagination on the 2004 EP election campaign. In contrast, the extra-parliamentary parties, most notably the Workers' Party and MIÉP, ran, for some idiosyncratic reason, the most lacklustre and least visible campaigns in their whole history in 2004. As a result, the vote for the extra-parliamentary parties hit an all time low in June 2004, while support for SZDSZ and MDF surged to a level considerably above their respective popularity at the time of the last national election, when MDF run merely as part of an electoral alliance, and SZDSZ polled just above five percent of the vote.

As the examples suggest, electorates respond not directly to the electoral system but to party behaviour, and the latter is not simply a mechanical, automatically faithful, reflection of the incentives present in the electoral system. Indeed, it is highly implausible that direct electoral responses to the difference between EP and national electoral systems could explain the differences either in the extra-parliamentary parties' or in the MDF-SZDSZ share of the vote. The information-based account, stressing the crucial intermediating role of strategic politicians, might also explain why previous analyses found that some vote gains of small parties in EP elections could not

be explained simply with the different mechanics of the electoral system used (Kousser 2004*;* Oppenhuis *et al.* 1996).

A further theoretical possibility inherent in the information-based account is to argue that EP election results differ from national outcomes simply because the less intense campaigning by politicians with low stakes in EP elections leaves the electorate acting in a less informed way than they do in national elections. Hence, votes end up more randomly distributed among parties, which implies a vote transfer from the normally bigger to the smaller parties. This explanation would also account for the observation that small party gains in EP elections appear to be higher at midterm in the national electoral cycle (see Marsh 1998). Indeed, previous studies of British, Canadian, Mexican and US voting behaviour demonstrated that the information level of the electorate is higher in the months before and after first-order elections than at midterm, and that there is less variation in electoral behaviour by political information level in first-order elections than at midterm (see Andersen and Heath 2000*;* Andersen *et al.* 2005*;* Fournier 1999*;* Sekhon 2004). What these findings seem to imply is that mid-term voting intentions are based on a more superfluous and haphazard aggregation of less of the available information than choices made at the time of first-order elections. If so, then mid-term voting behaviour must have a stronger random component, especially among the politically less involved and knowledgeable citizens. Greater randomness implies, of course, a more even distribution of the vote among the parties, i.e. a vote transfer between national and European elections from the bigger to the smaller parties. Note that this explanation deviates, at a critical point, from the one referring to different, rather than less, information reaching citizens at the time of second-order elections. Namely, a greater randomness of the vote would imply that vote gains are strictly linearly related to the size of the party: the smaller the party, the bigger the relative increase in its vote will be in second order elections. In contrast, the "different, rather than less information" account allows not-so-small small parties like the Hungarian SZDSZ to

register relatively bigger gains in second-order elections than very small parties do.

Both the less-information and the different-information accounts are quite different from the motivational explanations of small party gains in second order elections. The latter stresses that since no executive office is at stake in EP elections, voters feel free to support those small parties that they abandon in national elections, where they feel compelled to vote strategically for a probably less sympathetic, but bigger, and hence politically more relevant, party. This theory finds it hard to explain why small party gains in EP elections are bigger near midterm in the cycle without referring back to the educational effort of strategic politicians as the factor that actually creates strategic voting in the electorate. If the latter factor is built in the theory, however, then the latter turns from a motivation-based to an information-based account of the differences between EP and national election outcomes.

It would thus seem that voter information could offer a richer, more realistic, and more comprehensive account of the regularities observed in European elections than does the voter motivation presupposed in conventional expositions of second order elections theory. The crucial point is not even whether the information-based account was missing from previous expositions of second order elections theory. Rather, the key point is that it leads to different implications about what factors could increase or reduce the second-order nature of elections to the European Parliament. Under the standard version of the theory, the fate of the European executive would need to depend on the outcome of the election in order to make the latter look and operate like a first order election. Under the information-based account, whatever factor makes European elections more salient for politicians – like an increase in the jurisdiction of the European level of government –can directly impact the supply of campaign information to the citizens, and could thus make European elections function like genuine first order elections.

There seems to be two straightforward empirical tests of whether the motivational or the information-based account of small party gains is closer to the truth. First, the motivational account suggests that citizens are less likely to pick their most favoured party in national than in European elections. We should observe the exact opposite, however, if motivations are the same in the two elections, but decision-making errors and poor voter information are more apparent in second order elections. While no test of this proposition is offered in the present draft, such a test would in principle be possible through a comparison between EES data on the one hand, and, on the other hand, such national election study data – like the Dutch or the Irish – that include vote probability questions.

The problem with this test is not only that it could be carried out for a limited number of countries. More importantly, the theory underlying this test seems to mix up the distinction between motivational and information-based accounts with that between expressive and instrumental accounts. It should be clear that these distinctions do not overlap at all. In fact, under a motivational account of the differences between first and second order elections it would be perfectly possible for citizens to vote more often for a smaller party than their first preference in second order than in first order elections. For instance, some instrumental voters could, in a less consequential election, deliberately experiment with giving a chance to a small party to put some pressure on a bigger party that is their first preference. Therefore, this above test cannot do justice to the theoretical issue highlighted in this paper.

A second test is more suitable in this respect. Here, the key test variable is the information level of citizens. The motivational account seems to suggest that the vote gains of small parties in European elections are concentrated among highly informed voters, because that is where their support reservoir, which remains untapped in national elections, is located. The reason is the combination of two contradictory effects on highly informed voters in

national elections. One the one hand, small parties always suffer from lesser familiarity to voters, which creates higher uncertainty about their offering and lowers electoral support for them – presumably among poorly informed citizens, above all (Alvarez 1997). As a result, small parties are *ceteris paribus* more popular among highly informed citizens than among information underdogs. However, the highly informed voters are also the most likely to possess that extra information which is required from voters to abandon strategically their first preference in national elections because of some complicated calculus about how their vote will actually yield higher returns in the hands of a bigger party. This extra knowledge may involve relatively recent information about the relative standing of each party, a sound judgment about how trustworthy this information is, an understanding of the electoral system and the system of alliances between the parties, the rules of government formation, and so forth. In other words, strategic behaviour of this kind must occur more frequently among politically aware than among relatively ignorant citizens. As a result, the support reservoir of the small parties must be concentrated among highly informed regular voters.

In contrast, an information-based account could suggest that the vote gains of small parties in European elections stem either from errors in decision-making and misinformation among citizens, or from the relatively greater campaign effort by small vis-à-vis big parties in EP elections. The first possibility refers to the less-campaign-information explanation, and the second to the different-campaign-information account. Under the less-campaign-information explanation, small party gains must be concentrated among politically less aware citizens – at any rate among somewhat less knowledgeable citizens than those whom these parties attract in national elections. Under the different-information account, small party gains in EP elections are not systematically concentrated among relatively uninformed voters, but occur more or less evenly across the board. In fact, vote gains for small parties may even be concentrated among highly informed citizens who

are most likely to be reached by such relatively esoteric political information as what small parties do.

It may seem that this possibility undermines our ability to distinguish between motivational and different-information accounts of small party gains in EP elections. However, under all information-based accounts we should see a direct spillover from any small party gains among the highly informed to current national level voting intentions. Under this theory, it is only to be expected that the negative effect of political awareness on small party support in national elections is not the direct result of a different electoral context but of the different campaign information that, shortly before national elections, effectively reminds voters of these strategic concerns in the actual event of a national election, but is not present at the time of a European election. In contrast, under the motivational account, this spillover will not occur, or at least not to the same extent, since small party support among highly informed citizens must be weakened by awareness of the strategic incentives to abandon small parties in national elections. Moreover, under this different-campaign-information account, small party gains in EP elections must occur as a function of campaign efforts by the parties in EP elections. In later versions of this paper, this possibility will be tested with data about campaign intensity in 2004 collected by Jean Blondel and Federica Bicchi. For the time being, I can only examine whether spillovers from EP vote choices to simultaneous national voting intentions occur or not.

Before concluding this section, two points need to be stressed. First, the motivational and information-based accounts are not mutually exclusive. Above, they were presented as contrasting for the sake of conceptual clarity, and their black-or-white juxtaposition will help below too in sorting out their implications for the future gains of small parties in European elections. However, the mechanisms anticipated by the two explanations may well work side by side. Inconclusive results of the above mentioned tests might hint at such a more complicated reality.

Second, while the differences between the two accounts may seem modest, some of their practical implications are strikingly different. If the motivational account were correct, then small party gains in European elections would *ceteris paribus* increase if campaign intensity – and thus voters' information level – would increase. However, a higher turnout, everything else being equal, would add some less involved citizens to the active electorate, and thus reduce small party gains. Changing the actual stakes in European elections to include the composition of an executive as important as national governments are would, in its turn, eliminate small party gains altogether.

If the less-campaign-information version of the informational account were correct, though, then such constitutional reforms would have no direct effect apart from their indirect effect on citizens through politicians' behaviour. A higher turnout would *ceteris paribus* bring more weakly involved and poorly informed people to the polls, and thus further increase small party gains. Higher campaign intensity, however, would presumably reduce small party gains, since it would probably make voting decisions better informed and less haphazard, and thus reduce random errors in voting decisions.

Finally, the different-campaign-information version of the informational account would also expect that small party gains increase with turnout. This is because higher turnout brings more people with weak party attachments to the polls. Less involved voters should be more easily swayed by parties currently going up in the polls. Hence, as long as small parties are making gains in EP elections because of different campaign information, higher turnout should just multiply these gains. In contrast, generally greater campaign intensity, as long as it means a stronger campaign by the bigger parties, may reduce small party gains or may even turn them into losses. Constitutional reforms, in their turn, would probably not have any direct on EP votes, albeit making the stakes in EP and national elections more similar should reduce the observed differences in campaign information.

Figures 1A to 1C summarize these differences between the three theories. Note that the implications are largely the same for hypothesis 2 (the less-campaign-information theory) and hypothesis 3 (the different-campaign information theory), and are almost the exact opposite for hypothesis 1, the conventional motivational account of second order effects.

3. Data and tests

The test of the above hypotheses is relatively straightforward. The size of the party that the respondents voted for in the last national election, in the European Parliament election, as well as in a hypothetical current national election will be regressed on citizens' level of political knowledge. Where appropriate, the size of the party that the respondent supported in the last (national and/or European) election and other control variables are added to the equations. Hypothesis 1 will be supported if the size of the party supported drops with (i.e. is negatively affected by) political knowledge more in European than in either past or hypothetical current national elections. Hypothesis 2 will be supported if the size of the party supported is more positively affected by political knowledge in European than in past national elections. Hypothesis 3 will be supported if the size of the party supported is identically affected by political knowledge in European and hypothetical current national elections.

Figure 1: Alternative hypotheses about the root of the small party gains in second order elections

A: Conventional motivational theory



B: Less-campaign-information theory



C: Different-campaign-information theory



The data in the analysis come from the 2004 European Election Study. The construction of a measure of respondents' political information level is the only technically complex bit of the present analysis, and therefore it deserves a separate discussion. My preferred measure responds to the advice of the recent literature that measures of "chronic" political information – such as basic civics knowledge about the rules of the game – probably capture knowledge acquired in a relatively distant past, and therefore may inadequately reflect knowledge of current political affairs (Jerit *et al.* 2004*;*

Zaller 1992: 336-7). In fact, some may argue that, due to the way the present measure is constructed, it gauges interest in politics and exposure to political communications at least as much as knowledge. While I think that this concern is exaggerated, in the present context this is, in fact, beside the point. If the informational account of second order election effects is correct, then it implies much the same relationship between vote choices on the one hand, and interest in politics or attentiveness to political information on the other, as between knowledge of current political affairs and the vote.

But, be that as it may, the knowledge measure used here is based on how smartly the respondents placed various political parties on two ten-point scales, one running from "left" to "right", and one running from "[thinking that European] unification has already gone too far" to "[thinking that European] unification 'should be pushed further". Having determined how much political knowledge different responses to these questions implied, I simply summed up the "truth-value" of all responses given by the respondents regarding all the parties they were asked about: fourteen parties in total in Italy, four each in Britain,[3] Cyprus, and Slovenia, and some intermediate number of parties in the other 16 countries in the analysis.

I reckon that different respondents probably have different "anchor points" on the same scale. For instance, a left-wing respondent may place left-wing parties closer, and right-wing parties further away from the perceived mid-point of the left-right scale than a right-wing respondents does (see e.g. Kitschelt 1995). Similarly, two equally highly informed respondents may give more or less widely scattered responses about the position of different parties on the same scale depending on minor differences in how they interpret the endpoints of the issue scales, or whether they think that the parties in their country generally offer too little choice or ways too polarized positions on relevant issues. How far from what seems to be the best response category someone places a party on a scale may say something about how knowledgeable the respondent is, but also speaks volumes about

the general ideological perspective or partisanship of the person. There appears to be no way of telling apart the valid information about knowledge from the information about political views.

Given that the purpose of my analysis is an analysis of the direction of relationships between political knowledge and voting preferences, it seemed more important to minimize the systematic error variance on the knowledge variable than to minimize its random error variance. Thus, the absolute party placements on the two ten-point scales were replaced with relative placements involving pairs of parties, and all responses regarding each pairs were recoded into just four categories: (1) party A is to the left of – or less pro-integration than – party B; (2) party A is to the right of – or more pro-integration than – party B; (3) party A and party B have the same position; or (4) the respondent did not answer the question, or responded with a "do not know". This simplification of the responses most probably involved the loss of some valuable information about political knowledge, but almost certainly made the resulting knowledge variable less polluted with systematic biases towards a specific political perspective. Moreover, this simplification of placement codes comes together with a significant increase in the number of variables, and thus a lot of the details in the original responses are nonetheless retained in the subsequent analysis. For instance, even for a country where only four parties were placed on the two scales, altogether 12 relative party placements were obtained this way. In Italy, on the other extreme, the 28 original variables showing the absolute placement of 14 parties on the two scales were replaced with 182 relative placement variables.

The crux of the matter is defining what really is a knowledgeable answer regarding relative party placements on the two scales. Obviously, in everyday political discourse party positions are eminently disputable questions, so we should not believe that there is a single right answer to the respective questionnaire items and that all other responses are simply and

equally wrong. Rather, the truth-value of each answer is a matter of degree, and the responses are sometimes – for instance when everyone gives the same answer or the distribution of answers is the same for generally knowledgeable and for generally respondents – worthless for the construction of a good measure of general political knowledge. Similarly, and heeding concerns voiced in some of the previous literature, I allow for the possibility that "do not know" or missing answers to such questions may not always represent less knowledge than some other responses do (see Berinsky 2002*;* Mondak 2000, 2001*;* Mondak and Canache 2004).

One way of identifying the true position of parties and candidates on scales is to conceive them as the mean or median placement in a citizen sample (see e.g. van der Eijk *et al.* 1996*;* Listhaug *et al.* 1990*;* Macdonald *et al.* 1991*;* Macdonald and Rabinowitz 1997*;* Macdonald *et al.* 1997, 1998, 2001*;* Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989*;* Rabinowitz *et al.* 1991). Given how poorly informed the average citizen usually is, both procedures seem to be inadequate. Surely, once one made the assumption that not all answers are just about equally correct about party positions, the true position cannot be mixed up with the perception of the majority and the like: the perception of the most knowledgeable should reflect it instead.

The usual solution in the scholarly literature is to content analyze party manifestos or to carry out an expert survey to identify the true position of the parties. The drawback of both strategies is that citizen responses regarding the same issue scales may not refer to the same semantic universe as the language used by party manifestos, scholars and other experts. Thus, the differences between citizen responses and the objective party positions determined with the above methods may not say too much about what would be a particularly knowledgeable placement, given how citizens understand the content of the scales.

Because of these considerations, the "truth-value" of each relative party placement is determined here by determining how much more likely a maximally informed respondent was to give that response than was a maximally uninformed respondent. This can be estimated by regressing relative party placements on indicators of citizens' capability, motivation, and opportunity (henceforth CMO) to learn about new political facts as they emerge. The previous literature identified the CMO triad as the key determinants of individual differences in political knowledge (see Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996*;* Luskin 1987, 1990*;* Smith 1989). Differences between respondents scoring very high and very low on CMO variables should thus be fairly similar to the differences that would obtain between the most and least knowledgeable respondents, had we been able to identify them beforehand.

In the dataset at hand, years of education seemed to be the only available indicator of capability, but given its direct association with social status – and hence possibly with political preferences – I decided not to consider it among my CMO indicators. Instead, the analysis relied on six indicators of motivation and opportunity to learn about political facts. These were interest in politics; interest in the EP election campaign; frequency of watching news on television; frequency of reading newspapers; frequency of reading about the EP election in newspapers; and frequency of talking to friends and family about the EP election (see Appendix A on question wording and coding).

Clearly, socio-demographic background variables may simultaneously influence both political preferences and individual scores on the CMO variables. The simultaneous dependence of both on socio-demographic background may create spurious correlations between the CMO variables and certain patterns of relative party placements, which really reflect just a particular political perspective shared by individuals who, because of their socio-demographic background, are likely to score high on the CMO variables. To filter out these spurious correlations from the process of

determining the "truth-value" of each relative party placement, the multinomial logit analyses that were carried out for each pairwise comparison of parties on each of the two issue scales also included among the independent variables the socio-demographic background variables listed in Appendix A.

The results of these regressions are of no substantive interest here and cannot be reported for sheer reasons of space – the number of national samples and pairwise comparisons between parties for which the regression analyses had to be carried out separately, and for both the left-right and the pro- vs. ant-integration scales is simply too high. The relevant yield of these analyses is merely the predicted probability of each of the four response categories for two fictitious respondents: both exactly matching the national sample mean on the socio-demographic variables, but Mr./Ms. Superinvolved showing the highest, and Mr./Ms. Superuninvolved showing the lowest possible degree of interest in, and exposure to the campaign. The truth-value of each response was determined as the difference between its predicted probabilities for these two respondents.

Suppose now, for instance, that the fictitious Superinvolved respondent had a predicted probability of .2, .2, .4 and .2 respectively to place party A to the left of Party B, to the right of Party B, in the same place as Party B, or fail to place at least one of the two parties at all on the left-right scale, while the corresponding probabilities for the fictitious Superuninvolved respondent were .0, .3, .4 and .3. The modal answer for both – with a probability of .4 – is that the two parties have the same position. Maybe in some objective sense – such as in expert judgments – this is the "correct" answer to this particular placement problem. However, since this answer is given equally frequently both by people who are likely to be highly informed and those who are mostly likely uninformed, we cannot guess from these answers whether the person who gave it is from among the first or the second group. Thus, the contribution of such an answer to a good knowledge scale is exactly zero.

In contrast, the Superinvolved respondent has a twenty, while the Superuninvolved a zero percent probability of placing Party A to the left of Party B. Clearly, this is a minority opinion, but the view of a sophisticated minority. Maybe it reflects some relatively new information, or a very subtle reading of old information, or a more sophisticated left-right semantics than what is most common in the rest of the electorate. Either way, if someone gives this answer, our best guess is that the person is probably rather knowledgeable. So, in constructing the knowledge scale, respondents should be given a plus .2 (.2 minus .0) score for this answer. Similarly, they should be given a negative -.1 score for either not placing both parties on the scale, or for placing Party A to the right of Party B, because these answers are ten percentage point more likely for a Superuninvolved than for a Superinvolved respondent.

This method of determining the relative truth-value of the responses has numerous advantages. It even allows for the possibility – however unlikely it is – that for some parties "do not know" may be the most informed response that any citizen can possibly give regarding their position on certain issues. In yet other instances there may be several equally good answers to the same party placement question and, if so, then this method is capable of discovering that. No matter how small the minority is that gives an answer, it can qualify as the best possible answer according to this method, provided that the probability difference between the Superinvolved and Superuninvolved respondents is higher for offering this response than for any other. The method gives a natural weighting of party pairs and scales for the building of the knowledge scale that can vary across countries as it seems appropriate, and which uses the same metric across the whole universe of between party comparisons and response categories. Summing up the respective "truth-value" of the individual responses is straightforward and yields a very nearly normal distribution of scores within most national samples in the EES 2004 data. To standardize the distribution across countries, the resulting knowledge variable was converted into normal scores

constrained to fall in the 0 to 1 range, with a mean of approximately .5 and a standard deviation of approximately .16.

4. Empirical analysis

As it was already suggested above, the testing of the hypotheses involves a few simple OLS-regressions. The size of the party that the respondents voted for in the last national election, in the 2004 European Parliament election, as well as in a hypothetical current national election will be regressed on their level of political knowledge. Control variables can be added to the equations where appropriate – for instance, all six models reported in Table 2 included 19 country dummies to control for country fixed effects on support for big parties, i.e. for country differences in vote fractionalization.

Remember that the motivational account will be supported if the size of the party supported drops with (i.e. is negatively affected by) political knowledge more in European than in either past or hypothetical current national elections. The less information account will be supported if the size of the party supported is more positively affected by political knowledge in European than in past national elections. The different information account will be supported if the size of the party supported is affected by political knowledge identically in European and hypothetical current national elections.[4]

For the purposes of this preliminary analysis the size of the party that the respondents supported on the different occasions was calculated from the EES 2004 survey data by calculating the percentage of all recalled votes reportedly cast for each party. The size of party variable was set as 1 percent for independent candidates and those small parties that were collapsed into a miscellaneous “other party” category.

Table 2 presents the relevant results.[5] The cases in the analysis were weighted with the demographic weights available in the integrated EES 2004 data file. Only those respondents were included in the analysis reported in Table 2 who reported their vote choice (and thus claimed to have voted) in both the last national and the 2004 European Parliament elections, and who also named a party that they would vote for if there were a national election next week. The weighted number of cases was set to be equal across countries, with the total number of weighted cases in the pooled cross-national data equalling the actual number of unweighted cases in the analysis.

Table 2: Five regression models of the size of the party the respondents supported on different occasions on their level of political knowledge and control variables

Independent variable:	**POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE**	**SIZE OF SUPPORTED PARTY IN LAST NATIONAL ELECTION**	**SIZE OF SUPPORTED PARTY IN 2004 EP ELECTION**
	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)
Dependent variable:			
SIZE OF SUPPORTED PARTY - LAST NATIONAL ELECTION	.010 (.008)	-	-
SIZE OF SUPPORTED PARTY - 2004 EP ELECTION	-.018 (.007)	-	-
	-.022 (.006)	.405 (.007)	-
SIZE OF SUPPORTED PARTY - CURRENT NATIONAL-LEVEL VOTING INTENTION	-.020 (.008)	-	-
	-.025 (.006)	.499 (.007)	-
	-.011 (.005)	.240 (.006)	.639 (.007)

Notes: table entries are OLS regression coefficients (with standard errors in parenthesis). The intercepts and the impact of the 19 country dummies included in all reported equations are not shown. On the construction of the variables, see the main text.

The results obtained with the first model are only interesting for establishing a baseline to evaluate subsequent results. In the last national election, knowledge had a positive, though insignificant effect on the size of the party that a voter supported. In other words, more knowledgeable people tended to

vote for bigger parties, but the relationship – in spite of the rather large sample size in this 20-country pooled data set – was not statistically significant. In the second and third model, the size of the party supported in the EP election is shown to be significantly and negatively related to political knowledge. This definitely contradicts the less-campaign-information account of second order election effects, and is very much in line with the motivational account.[6]

However, when we look at the results from the last three models, the motivational account appears untenable. Although the differences are never statistically significant, in terms of current national level voting intention small party support is even more strongly linked to high political knowledge than in the EP election itself. This is certainly inconsistent with the idea that citizens would directly react to differential stakes in national and EP elections by moving towards smaller parties in EP elections, but strategically returning to supporting big parties in national elections. Instead, it seems that there is something else than a recognition of the differential stakes that makes citizens – and highly informed citizens in particular – move towards smaller parties at the time of European elections: not only in the European electoral arena, but also in the national one. It may well be that when the actual time of a national election come, the strategic considerations that reduce support for the small parties are once again activated by a change in the campaign information environment. This interpretation is consistent with the positive, though insignificant effect of knowledge that we can observe in the top row of Table 2 regarding the last national election.

The implication is that simply moving from the European to the first-order electoral arena does not really change highly informed citizens' support for small parties: the knowledge effect becomes no less negative. Unless we are prepared to believe that strategic voting is unrelated to political knowledge level, this finding undermines the plausibility of the motivational account of second order effects.

5. Conclusions

This paper elaborated a possible distinction between two different micro-logics that can characterize voting behaviour in second-order elections. Most of the previous literature apparently relied either on an implicit and under theorized mix of the two or exclusively on the motivational variants. Yet, on closer inspection, the information-based account – which can be further differentiated into the "less-information" and the "different-information" types – offers a better fit with observed regularities about voting behaviour.

The results returned by the empirical analysis in this paper seem fully consistent with the different-campaign-information version of the informational account of second order election effects, but contradict both the less-campaign-information and the motivational explanation of greater support for small parties in European elections.

Future research may probe these explanations further by analyzing whether tactical voting is more common in national than European elections. The less-campaign information account could also be tested by its apparent implication; that is, by examining whether cross-national and cross-election variance in campaign intensity is causing the observed changes between national and European elections in the micro-level relationship between citizens' knowledge level and the size of the party they support. The most explicit test of the different-campaign-information account of second order effects would probably be whether small party gains in European elections are systematically related to relative changes in individual parties' campaign efforts between national and European elections.

While the present paper must stop short of presenting these additional tests, it nevertheless highlights some novel theoretical possibilities. If the different-campaign-information account is indeed the best micro-theoretical account of second-order effects, then the implications of higher turnout, constitutional

changes, and greater campaign intensity may be rather different for European elections than the conventional understanding of second order effects would lead us to expect. Namely, the second-order nature of these elections may be altered by changes in the stakes that the actors making the campaign decisions sense in these elections. This may not require radical constitutional changes regarding government formation rules at the European level, but rather just changes in the de facto policy-making competence of the supranational versus the national-level organs in the European Union.

Appendix A

Independent variables in the multinomial regression analyses that determined the "truth-value" of each relative party placement on the left-right and anti- vs. pro-European integration scales:

Six indicators of motivation and opportunity to learn about new political facts:

INTEREST IN POLITICS (variable VAR154): responses to "To what extent would you say you are interested in politics?"

INTEREST IN THE EP ELECTION CAMPAIGN (VAR110): responses to "Thinking back to just before the elections for the European Parliament were held, how interested were you in the campaign for those elections?"

FREQUENCY OF WATCHING NEWS ON TELEVISION (VAR034): responses to "Normally, how many days of the week do you watch the news on television?"

FREQUENCY OF READING NEWSPAPERS (VAR069): responses to "And how many days of the week do you read a newspaper?"

FREQUENCY OF READING ABOUT THE EP ELECTION IN NEWSPAPERS (VAR105): responses to "How often did you do any of the following during the three or four weeks before the European election? How often did you … read about the election in a newspaper?)"

FREQUENCY OF TALKING TO FRIENDS AND FAMILY ABOUT THE EP ELECTION (VAR107): responses to "How often did you do any of the following during the three or four weeks before the European election? How often did you … talk to friends or family about the election?"

Socio-demographic background variables:

SEX: coded 2 for women and 1 for men.

AGE: for most national samples this equals 2004 minus the year when the respondent was born. Note that the variable was coded differently for France and completely missing for Luxembourg. Two obviously mistaken values (1856 and 1863) on the year of birth variable in the integrated file were recoded into 1956 and 1963, respectively.

AGE-SQUARED: squared value of the AGE variable.

IMMIGRANT: coded 1 for respondents born outside of their current country of citizenship and zero otherwise.

MINORITY STATUS 1: a dummy variable coded 1 for protestants in Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands and Slovakia; residents of Scotland in the UK; respondents interviewed in Russian in Estonia; Muslims in France; Catholics in Germany, Latvia; residents of Catalonia in Spain; and zero for all else.

MINORITY STATUS 2: a dummy variable coded 1 for Muslims, Buddhists and Hindu in the UK; residents of the Eastern states in Germany; respondents interviewed in Russian in Latvia; residents of the Basque Country in Spain; and zero for all else.

CHURCH ATTENDANCE: frequency of church attendance measured on a five-point scale.

CHURCH ATTENDANCE SQUARED: squared value of the CHURCH ATTENDANCE variable.

EDUCATION: school leaving age, with the „still in education" recoded into three plus the respondent's age; and all valid values above 26 recoded to 26.

EDUCATION SQUARED: squared value of the EDUCATION variable.

RURAL: a dummy variable coded 1 for residents of *„rural areas and villages"* and zero for all else.

SELF-EMPLOYED: a dummy variable coded 1 for self-employed respondents and zero for all else.

EMPLOYED: a dummy variable coded 1 for economically active respondents and zero for all else.

WORKS IN AGRICULTURE: a dummy variable coded 1 for respondents employed or self-employed in agriculture and zero for all else.

WORKS IN PUBLIC SECTOR: a dummy variable coded 1 for public sector workers and zero for all else.

INCOME: natural logarithm of household income per capita.

INCOME SQUARED: squared value of the INCOME variable.

TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP: a dummy variable coded 1 for trade union members and zero for all else.

Note that missing values on the six motivation and opportunity variables as well as SEX, AGE, CHURCH ATTENDANCE, EDUCATION, and INCOME, as well as the squared versions of these variables, were replaced with the sample mean, and eleven separate dummy variables were created to show if the respondent originally had a missing value on each of these

variables. These eleven dummy variables entered multinomial regressions alongside with the respective variables that they referred to.[7]

When a variable was completely missing or a constant for a country – as it was the case regarding age and age-squared for Luxembourg, self-employment for Germany, and one or both minority status variables in several countries -, then a random variable was generated to replace it. The random variable was taken from a Bernoulli distribution with a mean of .06, .15, and .15 for the self-employment and the two minority status variables, respectively. In the case of age, the random variable was taken from a uniform distribution with a minimum value of 18 and a maximum value of 88.

Notes

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[2] Some may argue that applying the term "information effects" to this phenomenon is misleading since it implies that possessing particular pieces of information, rather than general level of political knowledge, makes a difference in attitudes and choices. However, while the use of this term in the literature may indeed cause some communication problems, the point is exactly that the knowledge, comprehension, retention, and recall of any single fact becomes more likely as general political knowledge increases.

[3] The placements of the Scottish Nationalist Party and Plaid Cymru were ignored because these were only available for small regional subsets of the UK sample.

[4] This paragraph appeared with an incorrect wording in the version of the paper distributed among the conference participants.

[5] Note that Belgium, Luxembourg, Lithuania, and Sweden were excluded from the analysis throughout the paper because some of the variables required for the construction of the knowledge variable – or, in Luxembourg, separate measures of vote in the last national election and current national level voting intention – were missing.

[6] It is well known that because of recall bias in self-reports of past votes, support for small parties in past election tends to be artificially understated in survey data (see e.g. Himmelweit *et al.* 1978). One may want to speculate that this bias may have distorted the results reported in the text, but it is hard to imagine why this recall bias would be particularly strong for highly informed citizens. If, as I suspect, it is not stronger for them than for other respondents, then the relevant aspect of the reported findings is correct despite the presence of recall bias.

[7] From the perspective of methodological purism, a multiple imputation procedure may have been more appropriate than mean substitution. However, this method of missing data substitutions was not practical in the given situation because of the relatively small number of missing values on the independent variables and the very large number of multinomial regression equations estimated with the variables in questions – 364 equations for the Italian sample alone.

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Chapter 6

Public Support for Integration in the Newly Enlarged EU: Exploring Differences Between Former Communist Countries and Established Member States

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1. Introduction

In 2004 the European Union (EU) changed dramatically with the inclusion of ten new member states, eight of whom were former communist states of central and eastern Europe. Given their unique historical, social, cultural and political context, are former communist countries different from other member states in terms of how citizens view the EU? Are citizens in former communist countries more (or less) supportive of closer integration than other EU citizens are? If so, why? Are their views on integration driven by the same factors that shape the views of citizens in other EU states (or are citizens in former communist states fundamentally different in terms of what determines their attitudes to the EU)?

Previous analyses of public support for EU integration have *either* focused on (some or all) of the established members (EU 15) *or* a selection of central and eastern European states.[1] Thus, these analyses could not systematically assess the *relative importance* of various theoretical interpretations of support for integration in the two contexts (EU 15 and former communist

states). Here we draw on responses to a core set of questions from the European Election Study (2004) that were asked in all 25 EU member states (apart from Malta). This data source facilitates the simultaneous testing of hypotheses in both 'east' and 'west' and allows us to formally model cross-context differences.

We begin by briefly outlining the key theoretical approaches to understanding public attitudes to the EU. Then, in the context of these theoretical discussions, we suggest ways in which citizens in former communist states might be expected to be different from EU citizens in established member states. We are particularly interested in testing the claim of Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2006) that factors relating to economic utilitarianism (the approach that has dominated scholarship to date) are likely to be less salient in former communist states than in established member states (and factors relating to identity, democratic performance and values are likely to be more salient in former communist states than in established EU member states). In subsequent sections, we describe the data that we use to formally explore possible 'east' versus 'west' differences, report our results and discuss the implications of our findings for our understanding of whether there are indeed one or two 'publics' ('east' and 'west') in the newly enlarged and apparently very diverse EU.

Our findings in brief are as follows. Citizens in former communist countries are somewhat more in favour of closer EU integration than citizens in established EU member states and this difference can be accounted for by variations in how wealthy different countries are. Thus, the relative poverty of former communist states seems to be the key factor leading citizens in such states to be relatively supportive of EU integration. In terms of the *determinants* of attitudes to integration, we find mixed support for Rohrschneider and Whitefield's argument. We find that certain economic factors (namely, prospective economic evaluations) are *more* important in the

east than in the west and certain other economic factors (namely, economic xenophobia) are *less* important in the east than in the west.

2. Theories of Public Support for EU Integration

What are the main interpretations of why some citizens support EU integration and others do not?[2]

Egocentric economic utilitarianism

The 'economic utilitarianism' approach (also referred to as 'economic rationality' or 'economic instrumentalism') focuses on the economic costs and benefits of integration. Simply stated, citizens who are likely to fare well, economically speaking, from further EU integration are hypothesised to support integration while citizens who are likely to economically suffer from further integration are expected to be much less supportive of integration. According to this approach citizens with relatively high levels of human capital will be positively disposed towards integration because such citizens are well placed to avail of the market opportunities that result from the economic liberalisation (free movement of labour and capital) associated with the integration process. Specifically, middle class citizens with relatively high levels of education and occupational skills will be able to successfully adapt to the competitive market environment arising from closer integration (and the competition for jobs in that environment). In contrast, working class citizens with relatively low levels of human capital are likely to be vulnerable to, and therefore fear, the economically competitive environment generated by closer integration (Anderson and Reichert, 1996, Gabel, 1998a, 1998b).

Sociotropic economic utilitarianism

Other economic interpretations are sociotropric rather than egocentric in that they focus on national level rather than personal level economic factors. One

national level factor that may flow from the egocentric utilitarianism just discussed relates to what may be termed 'economic xenophobia'. Some citizens may feel very concerned about the free movement of labour that is such a key feature of the economic liberalisation that resulted from the Single European Act (1987) and may believe that workers from their own country should not be vulnerable to non-nationals from other EU countries coming in and competing for jobs. 'In group' versus 'out group' feelings of animosity may develop whereby citizens believe that there should be economic discrimination in favour of nationals and against non-nationals.[3]

Also, citizens may live in a member state that 'gets a lot out of' the EU while other citizens reside in states that contribute a lot of resources to the EU. Specifically, member states vary in terms of EU budget benefits; certain countries typically contribute much more than others. Citizens in net-beneficiary states would be expected to be supportive of EU integration while citizens in net-contributory states would be expected to be relatively unsupportive of integration. Furthermore, it might be expected that citizens who live in relatively poor countries may calculate that integrating with the other relatively wealthy EU members may result in an increase in their own country's wealth (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000, Christin, 2005).

Finally, citizens' subjective perceptions of national economic performance may effect their views of the integration process. As Hooghe and Marks, for example, state: 'citizens who feel confident about the economic future – personally and for their country – are likely to regard European integration in a positive light, while those who are fearful will lean towards Euroskepticism' (2004, p2). Thus, variation in citizens' evaluations of the national economy may drive support for – or opposition to – EU integration.

Identity

Another theoretical approach that seeks to explain citizens' attitudes to integration relates to identity. McLaren (2004) laments the paucity of analysis linking national identity and opposition to integration and is critical of the assumption that opposition to integration should be necessarily linked to economic instrumental/utilitarian factors:

Even if integration itself has been economic in nature, ordinary Europeans may not perceive it this way. Moreover, with moves to establish a common citizenship with an EU passport, the elimination of national currencies, coordination of asylum and immigration policies and the creation of a European military force, integration is beginning to appear less and less economic in nature … integration seems to pose a threat to national identity by seeking to reduce nationalist sentiment (pp896-7).

One might initially expect that a strong sense of national identity would be associated with opposition to EU integration. However, Hooghe and Marks (2004) make the important point that it is not a strong national identity *per se* that leads to scepticism. Rather, it is an *exclusive* sense of national identity that is likely to lead to scepticism. In other words, it is perfectly possible for a strongly patriotic Welshman to be pro-integration, or for a very strongly Irish Irishwoman to be a keen EU fan. However, a Welshman who is Welsh and Welsh alone is likely to frown upon EU integration (as would a merely Irish Irishwoman). Hooghe and Marks (2004, p2) emphasise 'the basic distinction between exclusive and inclusive national identity'. The authors hypothesize that 'citizens who conceive of their national identity as exclusive of other territorial identities are likely to be considerably more Euroskeptical than those who conceive of their national identity in inclusive terms' (p2). Thus, one's sense of identity is hypothesised to be of crucial importance when evaluating whether one is in favour of or opposed to EU integration.[4]

Democratic performance

Another important possible determinant of attitudes to integration relates to concerns over democratic performance. One of the fundamental aims of the European Union is the preservation of peace and democratic stability. Some citizens may reasonably calculate that further EU integration will buttress, or cement, democracy in their own country. So, citizens who are not very satisfied with national democratic performance and do not trust their domestic political institutions may be in favour of integration, reckoning that tying their country as closely as possible to highly 'democratic' EU states will provide a fairly stable political context in which to bed down domestic democratic processes. On the other hand, citizens who are fairly satisfied with the nature of democracy in their own country may not see any democracy-related advantage to the EU. In fact, some citizens may regard the EU as suffering from a 'democratic deficit' and may not wish to imperil the relatively highly democratic context they live in by tying it into the somewhat flawed institutions of the EU. Essentially, EU citizens who see the EU as highly democratic may support integration while EU citizens who see it as undemocratic may oppose integration (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000, Rohrschneider, 2002, Christin, 2005).

Cues: parties and values

Another theory posits that many individuals are not particularly interested in, or knowledgeable about, EU matters and so rely on domestic cues (or proxies) when generating their attitudes to integration. Hooghe and Marks state that 'the underlying premise of cue theory is that underlying values and interests need to be primed to become politically salient … the cues that appear most relevant to European integration arise in member states' (2005, p424-5). These cues may be taken from domestic political parties (Anderson, 1998, Franklin et al 1994, Franklin 2002). For example, supporters of incumbent governing parties may be more likely than non-supporters to favour moves towards EU integration. Gabel (1998, 339) summarises this argument as follows:

Voters tie their support for integration to their support for their government (president in France). The prime minister of each member state (the president in France) is responsible for negotiating all integrative reforms and for designing and representing his or he national positions vis-à-vis the EU. Consequently … citizens project their evaluations of the party of the national leader onto integration.

Citizens may also rely on their underlying political values when generating their views on integration. Given that the EU has been long associated with economic liberalisation, EU integration may be associated in citizens' minds with free market capitalism, and the eradication of obstacles to free trade, and so integration might be favoured by those broadly on the political 'right'. There is also the possibility that the converse is true, that citizens with 'left wing' political values are likely to be supportive of integration given that integration 'has become a left-leaning project because it holds out the prospect of continental-wide regulation' (Hooghe and Marks 2005, p425).

Cognitive mobilisation

A final theoretical approach suggests that, due to the abstract nature of EU integration, citizens who are relatively highly cognitively mobilised are hypothesised to be relatively supportive of integration (Ingelhart, 1970, Ingelhart *et al*., 1991, Jansen, 1991). Ingelhart (1970) argued that citizens who are relatively highly politically aware (cognitively mobilised) are likely to be relatively supportive of EU integration. This is due to fact that citizens need to be quite cognitively skilled to interpret information relating to the relatively abstract and distant notion of European unity. Ingelhart also argued that the relationship between being cognitively skilled and attitudes to integration is likely to be a positive one. The more information you process about EU integration the less threatened by, and cautious about, integration you are likely to become.

3. Are Citizens in Former Communist States Different from Other EU Citizens?

Citizens in former communist states may differ from other EU citizens in terms of 1/ the *extent* to which they support closer EU integration (i.e. their level of support), and 2/ the *determinants* of their attitudes to integration. First, in terms of 'levels', the simple descriptive graph in figure 1 shows us that citizens in former communists states do tend to be somewhat more favourably disposed toward closer integration than citizens in other states. Following on from the above theoretical discussions, there are a number of possible explanations of this difference, some more plausible than others. Perhaps in former communist states there are relatively large numbers of citizens who have characteristics that are associated with being supportive of closer integration (i.e. who are a/ high in human capital, b/ have positive perceptions of their country's future economic performance, c/ are *not* economically nationalist, d/ live in countries that receive a lot of money from the EU or live in countries that are relatively poor e/ have multiple identities, f/ have positive evaluations of the EU democratic nature, g/ are highly cognitively mobilised, h/ are supporters of the incumbent government, or i/ are left wing (or extreme on the left-right spectrum)). Of the above, perhaps b, c, d and f are the most plausible, given that former communist states are noted for being somewhat poorer that 'western' states and are also likely to see the democratic EU as a means of bedding down their quite recent transition to democracy.

Our second question relates to possible east-west heterogeneity in terms of the factors driving attitudes to EU integration. Do citizens in the east rely on different decision making mechanisms when generating their attitudes to the EU. In other words, are certain of our theoretical approaches much more important (or salient) in the east than in the west. Scholarship on attitudes in the western countries has long been dominated by the economic rationality hypothesis. Gabel (1998a) for example, tested a range of theoretical

approaches and found that economic factors had the greatest predictive power. Some analysts (such as Cicowski, 2000, Tucker *et al*, 2002, Christin, 2005) argue that the economic approach is key to understanding attitudes to European integration in former communist states as well as the western established member states. For example, in their 'winners and losers' model Tucker *et al*. argue that citizens who have economically benefited from the initial transition from communism to democracy/free markets are also likely to benefit from – and therefore support – the transition to an integrated EU. Citizens who have done well materially out of the initial transition will seek to buttress the free market economic approach by advocating close cooperation with other free market states (i.e. they will advocate EU integration). Citizens who have done badly economically out of the initial transition to the free market and democracy are hypothesised to be sceptical of cementing the free market approach via closer EU integration. Tucker *et al*. (2002) analyse the responses of citizens in 10 former communist applicant countries and find support for their model. However, because they focus only on former communist countries their analysis cannot shed light on whether economic factors are *more likely to be important in former communist countries than in non-former communist countries.* Thus, in our analysis we include respondents from both contexts (former-communist and not) in order to systematically assess variation in attitude determinants across context.

At face value, it seems impossible to test the relative importance of the 'winners and losers' model because this is a context specific model based directly on the two transitions in eastern Europe. However, following Caplanova *et al.* (2004) we use education (and other social class factors) as measures of winners and losers and so can quite easily render this apparently context specific model comparable to the more theoretically general egocentric economic utilitarian model discussed above. In short, in both contexts, some people are more likely to do well out of economic integration (the winners) – the highly educated and skilled middle class – and some

people (the losers) are likely to do less well (specifically, the less well educated and lower skilled working class).

In contrast to this emphasis on economic factors, Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2006) suggest that economic rationality is likely to be less important in former communist states than in the 'western' states. They argue that existing literature is inadequate due to 'the predominance of instrumental reasoning about integration' (2006, 141). Their argument is not that instrumentalism will not be evident in former communist states but rather that it will play a *less important role* than it does in western states. Instead, they argue, citizens in former communist states will be more concerned about values, identity and democratic performance when generating their views on European integration.

In terms of the importance of values, the authors state that 'existing literature … may be inadequate, primarily because it has assumed basic value consensus at mass and elite levels over market structure and the predominance of instrumental reasoning about integration' (2006, 141). The argument is that the free market is not fundamentally contested in western states; mainstream opinion is in favour of a liberal market regime and a consensus exists that there is no viable or plausible socialist alternative. Thus, the merits or otherwise of the free market is not a key political issue in the western states. Because of this lack of salience, arguments about the free market do not determine (or shape) citizens' views about the EU. In contrast, the argument goes, in eastern states the merits or otherwise of the free market is a live political issue. Thus, citizens' fundamental political values on economic management (are they leftist interventionists or do they favour the free market?) are at the heart of political debate in the eastern states. Because of the salience of this values area, it is likely to play a key role in determining whether one is in favour of or opposed to EU integration. Citizens who are economically 'right wing' and favour the free market are hypothesised to favour closer EU integration and the reverse is the case for economically

interventionist 'leftist' citizens. Rohrschneider and Whitefield argue that because this debate over political values and ideology is very significant in the former communist states, there is limited space for economic instrumentalism to shape citizens' preferences.

Additionally, in eastern Europe, states themselves are very new entities and are questioned within and outside the state. Thus, according to Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2006), factors relating to nationalism and national independence are likely to be relatively important in this context. The authors also emphasise the importance of democratic performance in eastern states. Citizens in countries which are performing very successfully in terms of their democratic institutions may not feel a strong need to tie their country into 'democratic' Europe (the EU). In contrast, citizens in countries that are performing badly in terms of democratic governance may be attracted to the EU and its strongly pro-democracy values. Whitefield et al, (2006) for example, found that in the Baltic states citizens' judgements about how well national institutions were performing were key predictors of citizens' attitudes to EU integration.

4. Data

We use the European Election Study 2004 pooled data set which contains responses to a core set of questions from representative samples of 24 of the 25 EU member states. Questions were asked which measured social class, education, prospective national economic perceptions, views on non-national EU members availing of jobs in one's country, whether the respondent has an exclusively national identity, and their relative level of trust in their home parliament and the EU parliament. Also asked were respondents' level of interest in politics, and their party support. Additionally data was collected for each country on budgetary contributions to the EU and GNP levels. See appendix for full details of these variables.

Figure 1: ***Support for further EU integration by member state, 2004***



5. Results

Citizens in former communist countries – as noted earlier and illustrated in Figure 1 – are somewhat more in favour of EU integration than citizens in established member states. Why? We attempt to account for their relatively pro-integrationist views by first running a model in which all our individual level predictors are entered as well as a dummy variable capturing whether or not the respondent is a citizen of a post-communist state. As shown in Model 1 in Table 1, the co-efficient for this dummy variable remains highly statistically significant and suggests that, controlling for all included individual level factors, being from a post-communist state means that you are two thirds of a unit more positive on the 10 unit anti- versus pro-integration scale, a reasonably sizeable amount in substantive terms. We now introduce our contextual level economic variables.

Table 1: ***Multi-level linear regression models predicting support for further European integration***

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B	*SE*	*B*	*SE*	*B*	*SE*
Intercept	5.10***	0.18	5.03***	0.18	5.89***	0.44
Degree educated	0.15***	0.04	0.15***	0.04	0.15***	0.04
Age (divided by 100)	-0.34***	0.12	-0.34***	0.12	-0.34***	0.12
Trade unionist	0.08*	0.04	0.08*	0.04	0.08*	0.04
Male	0.14***	0.04	0.14***	0.04	0.14***	0.04
Upper middle class	0.26***	0.07	0.27***	0.07	0.27***	0.07
Middle class	0.12**	0.05	0.12**	0.05	0.12**	0.05
Lower middle class	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.06
Working class	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Political interest	0.06**	0.02	0.06**	0.02	0.07**	0.03
Campaign interest (0 to 3)	0.16***	0.02	0.16***	0.02	0.16***	0.02
More trust in EP than NP (0 to 9)	0.14***	0.01	0.14***	0.01	0.14***	0.01
Retrospective economic perceptions (-2 to 2)	0.15***	0.02	0.15***	0.02	0.15***	0.02
Prospective economic perceptions (-2 to 2)	0.21***	0.02	0.21***	0.02	0.21***	0.02
European and national identity	1.20***	0.04	1.20***	0.04	1.20***	0.04
Exclusive employment rights (0 to3)	-0.36***	0.02	-0.36***	0.02	-0.36***	0.02
Post-communist state	0.66**	0.27	0.58**	0.27	0.26	0.32
Net transfers from the EU (as % of GNP)			0.17	0.14		
GNP per capita (PP adj. $, 2004)					-0.03**	0.01
Log likelihood	-39,682.6		-39,681.8		-39,680.7	

* p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01. N = 17,213, number of groups = 22. Source: EES 2004

Model 2 shows that introducing information relating to net EU budget transfers does not affect the importance of the post-communist dummy. However, as shown in model 3, the introduction of the GNP per capita variable renders the post-communist dummy variable insignificant and dramatically reduced in substantive size (down from 2/3 of a unit from model 1 to one quarter of a unit). This suggests that the reason that citizens in post-communist countries are more pro-integrationist than citizens in other

member states is that post-communist countries are poorer than other member states and this relative poverty leads to pro-EU attitudes.

We now move away from discussion *levels* of support for integration and instead focus on the *determinants* of support for the EU. In other words, do the decision making mechanisms that citizens rely on when generating their views about integration vary according to whether citizens reside in post-communist states or established member states? In Table 2 we report two models including all our explanatory variables, one model for former communist states and the other model for established member states.

Figure 2: ***Predicted changes in levels of support for further European integration for citizens in former communist countries and other member states***



We also show – in bold – which particular variables are statistically significantly different from each other.[5] For ease of interpretation we use the

co-efficients in the models to calculate maximum effects and we graphically illustrate the most important (the substantively largest) of these in Figure 2.

Table 2: ***Multi-level linear regression models separately predicting support for further European integration for the post communist countries and other EU member states***

	Post communist states		Other EU states	
	B	*SE*	*B*	*SE*
Intercept	4.72***	0.76	5.93***	0.45
Degree educated	**-0.01**	**0.08**	**0.18*** **	**0.05**
Age (divided by 100)	**-0.03**	**0.02**	**-0.47*** **	**0.14**
Trade unionist	0.10	0.09	0.07	0.05
Male	**-0.11**	**0.07**	**0.24*** **	**0.04**
Upper middle class	0.17	0.16	0.30***	0.08
Middle class	0.04	0.09	0.17***	0.06
Lower middle class	0.02	0.11	0.05	0.08
Working class	0.00	-	0.00	-
Political interest (0 to 3)	**-0.05**	**0.05**	**0.10*** **	**0.03**
Campaign interest (0 to 3)	**0.23*** **	**0.05**	**0.13*** **	**0.03**
More trust in EP than NP (-9 to 9)	0.14***	0.02	0.15***	0.01
Retrospective economic perceptions (-2 to 2)	0.13***	0.04	0.16***	0.03
Prospective economic perceptions (-2 to 2)	**0.40*** **	**0.05**	**0.15*** **	**0.03**
European and national identity	**0.89*** **	**0.08**	**1.32*** **	**0.05**
Exclusive employment rights (0 to 3)	**-0.11** **	**0.05**	**-0.40*** **	**0.02**
GNP per capita (PP adj. $, 2004)	0.05	0.05	-0.03**	0.01
N (group)	7		15	
N (individuals)	4,621		12,592	
Log likelihood	-10,652.0		-28,964.8	

* p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01. Unweighted N = 19156, number of groups = 23. Source: EES 2004. Statistically significant (at the 0.1 level) differences, as from a pooled model with interaction terms, between post-communist and other EU states are in bold

Overall, we see that attitudes in the post-communist countries are less structured than in established member states and that differences across

context are for most variables not very substantively large. However, for two of the economic variables important differences emerge. Prospective economic evaluations is a particularly important predictor in the east but not in the west. The reverse is the case for the economic xenophobia variable which has a much bigger impact in the west than in the east.

6. Discussion

Public opinion has a key impact on the development of the European Union. The attitudes of EU citizens and their political choices 'shape and constrain the process of European integration' (Gabel, 1998, p333). This is particularly apparent, for example, at the time of referendums. The defeat of the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark in 1992 and the defeat of the Nice Treaty in the Republic of Ireland in 2001 dramatically delayed institutional development. It is also apparent in terms of particular government decisions. For instance, the British Labour party's wavering over whether or not to adopt the Euro is in significant part a result of the British public's scepticism about integration (McLaren 2004). More generally, in addition to referendums and government policy decisions, the attitude of citizens to integration is crucial in terms of generating a political legitimacy for the EU. As Gabel (1988, p333) states, the views of citizens 'provide the political foundation for integration. Since EU law lacks a supranational means of enforcement, the endurance of the EU political system vitally depends on public compliance with and acceptance of EU law'. The EU essentially depends, for its continued functioning, on an acceptable level of backing from the public. The important question thus arises: why do some members of the public back the EU and others do not? This question has received a great deal of academic attention. Many analysts have assessed the relative merits of different theories of attitude formation. However, to date the impact of the recent dramatic enlargement of the EU has not been systematically addressed.

Our examination of possible differences between the new members from central and eastern Europe and established member states is important both in the substantive context of understanding EU politics and also more widely for political science models of individual behaviour. First, for our understanding of EU politics we need to know whether there are one or more 'publics' in the EU. If our different models work very differently in our two contexts ('west' and 'east') then we must concede an extra layer of complexity in our attempts to model EU citizen attitudes, and we must accept that the assumption that all EU citizens are essentially relying on the same decision making mechanisms is an overly strong one. Second, more generally for political science, we here have a test case in which we can assess the robustness of our models. If models of EU citizens' behaviour that were initially generated for EU 15 actually 'work' on the newly democratised former communist EU 8 then this gives quite a deal of credence to the initial theories in that they can travel across what seems like very different contexts. In essence, the theories would have proved worthwhile because they generalise beyond the context in which they were initially elaborated and tested. Individuals would have proved to be pretty much the same wherever they are (or more specifically, individuals in former communist eastern European states would have proved pretty much the same as individuals in the rest of Europe in terms of what drives their views on EU integration). And, insofar as relatively minor differences in the performance of models do emerge, one may interpret this as a need to modify or refine – rather than jettison – existing theories of support for integration.

To a significant extent, our study has been exploratory. We have simply sought to assess the extent to which there is – or is not – variation across context in terms of the determinants of attitudes to the EU. Our results are, we think instructive. We found that it is not possible to conclude that economic instrumentalism *per se* is either stronger or weaker in one particular context. What matters is *which particular type* of economic

instrumentalism is focused on. The two biggest differences across the two contexts relate to economic instrumental variables. Prospective national economic perceptions were much more important in the east than the west and economic xenophobia was much more important in the west than the east. Perhaps the conclusion to draw is that the xenophobia issue is of relatively low salience in the east *because few workers from the west actually want to travel east and compete for jobs there*. In contrast, the issue of economic immigration is of high salience in the west precisely because there is a large flow of workers from the east to the west rather than the reverse. Thus, the relative likelihood of being effected by non-nationals competing for jobs probably accounts for the greater importance of economic xenophobia in the west (rather than citizens in the west being fundamentally more insular than citizens in the east). Furthermore, the high salience of the economic perceptions in the east may perhaps be accounted for by a high level of enthusiasm among entrants. Because former communist countries have just become members of the EU maybe they reckon they will yield some economic dividend fairly quickly (and thus economic perceptions and attitudes to integration are so closely associated in this context at this time).

In relation to all the other factors studied, what emerges is the similarity between west and east. Egocentric utilitarianism, national identity and political interest are all larger predictors in the western context than in the eastern context but in substantive terms the effects are not particularly large. It is also interesting to note that our control variables – age and sex – also act quite differently in the two contexts. Being younger and being male are predictors of a positive disposition towards integration in the west but not in the east. Overall, attitudes to integration are less structured (i.e. less predictable with the theories tested here) in the east than in the west, citizens in both contexts are roughly similar in terms of the reasons that they favour or oppose integration but key differences do emerge in terms of different aspects of economic utilitarianism: economic xenophobia particularly drives

attitudes in the west and prospective economic evaluations particularly drives attitudes in the east.

Notes

[1] On the pre-enlargement EU see, for example, Mclaren (2004), de Vreese and Boomgaaden (2005) and Hooge and Marks (2005. On analyses focusing on central and eastern European states see, for example, Christin (2005), Caplanova et al (2004) and Tucker et al (2002).

[2] We summarise existing models simply in enough detail to provide a theoretical platform for our next section which discusses possible 'east' versus 'west' differences. See Hooge and Marks (2005) for a much more detailed description of current interpretations.

[3] This particular interpretation has not been explicitly addressed in existing research and should not be confused with an interpretation based on general attitudes to immigrants which would incorporate a range of non-economic as well as economic factors and would not be confined to (non-national) EU citizens (see, for example, de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005). Unfortunately the EES 2004 data did not include questions about immigrants and so a measure of attitudes to immigrants could not be included in our analysis.

[4] One's sense of identity may be correlated with one's level of economic nationalism, mentioned above, but the two are conceptually distinct. On identity and attitudes to integration see also Carey (2002).

[5] This was done by running a model of the pooled dataset with interaction terms.

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Appendix: Question Wording

'European Unification has already gone too far' versus 'European unification should be pushed further' (1-10 scale, with high score indicating pro-integration position) [dependent variable]

If you were asked to choose one of these five names for your social class, which one would you say you belong to? Working class, Lower Middle Class, Middle Class, Upper Middle Class, Upper Class, Other [subjective class]

How old were you when you stopped full time education? Please write age in years_____ (Or tick the 'still studying' option) [degree (age 21 or over)]

And now a question about the economy. Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general economic situation in Britain is: A lot better, a little better, stayed the same, a little worse, a lot worse? [retrospective economic evaluation]

And over the next 12 months, do you think the general economic situation in Britain will: get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, get a lot worse? [prospective economic evaluation]

Please indicate how strongly you agree with the following ... statements. 'When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people from [own

country] over citizens from other EU member countries who want to work here': strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree [prioritise own people for jobs]

As well as your current citizenship, do you also think of yourself as a citizen of the European Union? Often, sometimes, never [exclusive citizenship]

To what extent are you interested in politics – are you: very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, not at all interested? [interest in politics]

Thinking back to just before the elections for the European Parliament were held on 10th June, how interested were you in the campaign for those elections? Were you: very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, not at all interested? [interested in EP election campaign]

Please tell me on a score of 1-10 how much you personally trust each of the institution below. "1" means that you do not trust an institution at all, and "10" means you have complete trust. Firstly, how much do you trust [home] parliament, European Parliament, [home] [relative trust in home and EU parliament]

Chapter 7

Mobilization and Attitudes Equals Turnout - A Simple Equation?

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1. Introduction

Since the first European Parliament elections, turnout has been in decline. This is just the opposite of what one would expect from the increasing relevance of the European Union as a more and more powerful political system and the increasing significance of the European Parliament within this system.

The decline in turnout has raised many questions and worries. Whereas the level of turnout compared across countries may not signify political satisfaction where it is high, nor the opposite where it is low, decline across time certainly does indicate that something is going on. Mark Franklin demonstrated the strong impact of demographic change in the composition of the eligible population by lowered voting age. But even then the question remains; why is or was the European system not able to attract (new) voters.

However, the 2004 European Election seems to be an event whose historical relevance can hardly be overestimated. The previous enlargement of the European Union had moved the borders of the community far beyond the former iron curtain to the East. The 2004 EP Elections can be called the founding elections of the new Europe, overcoming the obsolete East-West

divide. For the first time that the sovereign people in the East could express their longing and indicate their preferences for the political course of the Union. And, it was a chance for the people in the old member states to demonstrate the historical significance of the event by participating in it. None of this happened. Turnout was, on average, extremely low in the new member states, and even in the old member states it was a little lower than that of 1999.

In order to explore a partial explanation, two different approaches will be used: an information/mobilization approach, and an attitudinal approach. The two approaches are chosen to investigate the following hypotheses:

1. Mobilization deficit hypothesis

The basic notion of this hypothesis is that political actors, namely parties and politicians, fell short of making the relevance of the election clear to the voters attracting them.

2. Political community deficit hypothesis

The general claim of this hypothesis is that identification with Europe or the EU is too weak to engage political commitment and participation. More specifically, the basic claim is that European identity or the strength of the political community is weaker in the East than in the West, contributing to the difference in turnout.

3. Political System deficit hypothesis

The third hypothesis states that the outcome of the evaluation of particular features of the EU is too weak to generate commitment and participation.

All three hypotheses aim at explaining individual turnout as a first step, and differences in turnout between countries as a second step. The paper is organized into four sections: a brief review of turnout in EP elections; a theoretical exploration of the relationship between political community,

evaluation, mobilization, and turnout; the generation and presentation of the independent variables; the analysis of the relationship between attitudes, mobilization, and turnout at the individual and cross-country level. Finally we draw some conclusions.

2. Turnout at the European Parliament Elections 2005 compared

The EP elections of 2004 mark a second historical juncture after system transformations in Central and East Europe 1989/1990. Not only had the EU experienced the biggest enlargement in its existence prior to these elections but it was the first joint opportunity for the citizens to articulate their will and to determine who should become their representatives at the European level. In this sense, the 2004 elections were the "Founding Elections" of a common Europe.

However, the election outcome does not itself greatly reflect this historical significance. The elections mobilized a smaller proportion of voters than in all previous European elections. This continues a trend, which started with the second EP elections of 1984 and has never been broken. Electoral participation as an indicator of symbolic self-assignment to a political system did not take place on the level which might be expected from the historical significance of the event. Thus, measured in terms of turnout, the EP elections of 2004 were nothing special, old experiences continued. On average, turnout has dropped about 3.8 percentage points in the old member states from one election to the next. Not all countries experienced the same fall: Austria has had a decline of -12.6 since its first participation in 1996, Finland showed the largest single decline of -28.9 percentage points between 1996 and 1999, in Great Britain turnout increased by 1.3 percentage points on average, and in Ireland the highest single increase of 20.7 percentage points could be observed between 1984 and 1989. Variation is large, but on average, there is decline.

From 1999 to 2004, this decline was not dramatic with respect to the old member states (-0.2 percentage points). However, this is a continuation of the trend. More significant is the turnout in the new member states. Here, where it could have been a signal of self-assignment, many less voters felt attracted that in the old member states. Whereas in the old member states on average a little more than half of the electorate (52.7%) went to the voting booth, the corresponding figure was only 40.3% on average in the new member countries. And this figure is so high because turnout in Malta and Cyprus was extraordinary high (71.2%, and 82.4% respectively). The electorates of the new member states in Central and East Europe abstained by more than two thirds. Turnout was as low as 31.2% (figure 1).

Figure 1: Turnout at European Parliament Elections 2004 compared



The reason for this cannot be found in the fact that turnout in Central and East Europe is lower in general. Average turnout at the last national elections is somewhat lower than in the West, but not much. The so-called "Euro-gap", the difference in turnout at national and the European elections, is considerable higher in the East.

The structural reasons for differences in turnout in general are well-known: at the individual level these are age and social structure (Franklin 2002), at the country level compulsory voting and concomitant national elections (Franklin, van der Eijck, Oppenhuis 1996; Rose 2005; Schmitt 2005). In this paper, a different route is taken. We will ask to what extent information/mobilization, identification, and evaluations matter for turnout.

3. Turnout, Mobilization, and Political Community

Elections generate a reciprocal relationship between electors and elected. One the one hand, there is a simple instrumental consideration: elections ought to translate distributions of preferences among the electorate into the distribution of representatives of those preferences in parliament. Thus, elections should provide an effective translation of preferences, and should guarantee the responsiveness of the political institutions and actors. If this is a correct perception of what democratic theory says and democratic systems aim at, then elections make sense in so far as they provide these outputs. If they do, it is worthwhile voting – if they do not, the voter may stay at home.

This consideration is directly related to the *political system deficit hypothesis*. If the system leaves the voters with the impression that elections neither provide an effective translation of preferences nor guarantee responsiveness of the elected, the system has a deficit and voters have little reason to vote.

However, there is more to elections than the output-side of the system. The other side of the coin is the participation of citizens in elections. Democracy is more than or needs to be more than an instrumental mechanism between rulers and ruled. The acceptance of the rules of the game, procedures as well as decisions, demands support in the form of self-assignment and identification with the political order (Fuchs 1999; Fuchs, Klingemann 2002). If this is true, identification with the political community should

matter for turnout. The relationship of elections to political community can be demonstrated by looking to the functions of elections. Rose and Mossawir define the function of elections as follows: elections allow citizens 1) to select the representatives; 2) to exchange influence; 3) to develop an identification with the system; 4) the satisfaction of expressive needs; 5) the expression of distance from the system. Or elections can be meaningless, because they do not allow 6) choices, or do not generate affiliation and identification with the system. Some of these functions relate to the instrumental, some to the affective aspects of democracy and democratic elections. Instrumental or output-related functions are, in particular, points 1 and 2. "The emphasis here is upon the extent to which the need for election or re-election will lead incumbents and candidates to alter their policies in order to retain or gain office" (Rose, Mossawir 1969: 170). Elections should, however, not only be effective, but should also produce an affection of citizens for the norms and symbols of the system (points 2 and 3). They should "contribute to the development or maintenance of an individual's *allegiance* to the existing constitutional regime" (Rose, Mossawir 1969: 171). These functions lead, in a general sense, to a commitment and identification with the political community. Mackencie has described the route to identification in the following way: "It may be said that electoral procedure is functionally analogous to procedure in a marriage ceremony: 'Do you take this man (or women) to be your lawfully wedded husband (or wife)?' 'I do'. The point in time at which 'I do' is said is not psychologically a moment of choice or decision – that came earlier; it is the point at which an individual preference becomes a social commitment" (W. J. M. Mackencie, S. Rokkan 1968: 5).

This argument relates directly to turnout and its relationship to political community and thus to the *political community deficit hypothesis*. If it is true that the decision to participate in an election is taken prior to making a choice about how to vote, and the reason for this is social commitment to the political order, European identity should matter for turnout.

However, given the fact that elections should generate a reciprocal relationship between electors and elected, it can also be claimed that it is not only voters who have a duty to deliver to the system, but also political actors and representatives. As already mentioned, they should be responsive. But in a democracy with competitive elections this is not all. They have to get their message to the people. That message is two-fold from their perspective. It is very much in their own interest to differentiate their respective political offers from those of the competitors, and thus to make choice meaningful. Beside this, it is also their duty to (re-)produce the attachment of the people to the system by mobilization. This is more or less in line with the huge debate about whether there is a European public. The foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany claims in a paper: "Generating a public means generating the cement for the future of any political order. Without a minimum political public, the European Union cannot develop further." A public does not generate automatically. A public is a forum that needs speakers, mediators and an audience (Neidhardt, Koopmans, Pfetsch 2000). Election campaigns are the ideal occasion to generate a public – at least temporarily. It seems to be natural to assume that the speakers at these times are candidates, parties and other officials.

However, if they do not care, why should voters? Given the observation that turnout in EP elections is low rather than high, the *mobilization deficit hypothesis* comes into play: the less efforts there are to inform and mobilize electorates the lower will be the turnout.

4. Political Community, Political Evaluations, and Mobilization

If the claim of the three hypotheses is correct, turnout should be influenced 1) by the instrumental aspect as to how far elections are effective and the system is responsive, 2) by the degree of identification with the political

community, and 3) by the information and mobilization efforts of political actors.

4.1 Evaluation of Electoral Effectiveness, Responsiveness, and Political Identity

The "EOS Gallup Post European Elections 2004 Survey" has a set of indicators, which are well suited to testing the hypotheses. One battery of questions covers the attitudinal, instrumental and affective aspects, namely the questions on electoral effectiveness, political responsiveness and European identity. The following seven questions were asked:

"For each of the following propositions, please tell me whether it corresponds or does not correspond to your attitude or your opinion:

a It is very important for you which particular political party gained the most seats in the European Parliament elections

b It is very important for you which particular candidates win seats and become MEPs in the European Parliament elections

c The European Parliament takes into consideration the concerns of European citizens

d You trust the institutions of the European Union

e The membership of [COUNTRY] in the European Union is a good thing

f You feel you are a citizen of the European Union

g You feel attached to Europe"

Possible answers: "Yes"; "No"; [DK/NA]

Questions a) and b) are directly related to *electoral effectiveness*. They contain the evaluation of whether it makes a difference who gets the majority and who to vote for. If voters assume that it is important who gets seats and which party gains most seats, this implies that they assume that voting makes a difference.

Responsiveness characterizes the ability of political actors, political institutions, and the system as a whole to react to needs and demands of the citizens. Question c) is an evaluation of the European Parliament in this regard. An indirect indicator of the perception of responsiveness might be the trust in the EU (question d). Trust is an evaluation of the future based on the assumption that the one who is trusted will behave according to ones own expectation. Trust will be provided if the experience is that actors behaved according to expectations and will do so in the future. Thus, trust can be read as an indicator of responsiveness.

Finally, questions e, f, and g, relates to identification with the political community. Question e is somewhat more evaluative that the clearly affective questions f and g. But it also relates to the affective or generalized aspect of the country's belonging to the community.

Although, the questions can be sorted clearly in analytical terms, one must ask whether voters do the same. In order to explore the dimensionality of the question battery, an exploratory factor analysis has been performed. The result is obviously in line with the analytical considerations. Three factors could be extracted, with loadings separating clearly between effectiveness, responsiveness, and identity (table 1).

Using factor scores for the respective factors as variables, effectiveness, responsiveness, and political community show huge variations across countries.

With regard to the evaluation of electoral effectiveness, country averages show a greater range in the new member states than in the old. This is, however, a result of the very positive evaluations of the Maltese and Cypriot populations. Otherwise, the range is smaller and the mean evaluation less positive than in the old member states. In both groups of countries, the range

is from rather positive to rather negative evaluations of electoral effectiveness (figure 2).

With regard to the evaluation of the responsiveness of the European political system, the range is narrower across the new members, and on average somewhat more positive than in the older member states. Again, for both groups of countries, evaluations range from negative to positive.

Table 1: Dimensions of Attitudes towards Europe: Political Community, Responsiveness, and Effectiveness

Indicator	Political Community	Responsiveness	Effectiveness
You feel attached to Europe	**0,854**	0,094	0,089
You feel you are a citizen of the European Union	**0,794**	0,243	0,084
The membership of [COUNTRY] in the European Union is a good thing	**0,510**	0,508	0,079
The European Parliament takes into consideration the concerns of European citizens	0,082	**0,848**	0,068
You trust the institutions of the European Union	0,262	**0,756**	0,124
It is very important for you which particular candidates who win seats and become MEPs in the European Parliament elections	0,094	0,062	**0,863**
It is very important for you which particular political party gained the most seats in the European Parliament elections	0,076	0,122	**0,854**
„Explained“ Variance (in %)	38,9	18,4	12,2

Pooled data, 25 countries; 24063 respondents; samples of almost equal size. Source: Eurobarometer Flash 162, EOS Gallup, Post European Election Survey 2004. Possible Answers: Yes, No, Don’t know, No Answer. Coding: 1 (Yes), 0 (Don’t know, No Answer) und -1 (No).

Lastly, with regard to political community or European identity a clear and sharp difference can be observed between new and old members. Only one new member country shows a weak positive identification on average: Hungary. All other countries are at the midpoint or the negative side of the scale. Interestingly enough, Malta and Cyprus, where voters were quite positive with regard to effectiveness and responsiveness, show little

identification with Europe. In contrast, most of the old member states are in the positive end of the scale, the exceptions being Greece, the Netherlands, and, lowest of all, Great Britain. The clear difference in overall level of political community feeling between the new and the old member states seems to reflect what has been argued above: identity needs time, which the new members do not yet have.

4.2 Political Information and Political Mobilization

Election campaigns are generally the periods during which the attention which citizens pay to the political system is increased and attachment actualized. The cyclical development of political interest, party support, and attentiveness between elections supports this observation. Furthermore, it has been shown that support for European integration also follows this path. European Election campaigns serve to re-actualize and re-mobilize support (Wessels 1995).

Clearly this leads to the expectation that election campaigns should also engage electoral participation. What can be assumed to be the traditional channels of information and mobilization? Firstly the most central role in political communication is that of the mass media. Secondly, information seeking also plays an important role. Thirdly, during election campaigns the direct communication between voters and candidates or parties is normally at its greatest. It is likely that these three means of political information serve different purposes: the media producing the agenda, information seeking producing choices, and direct contacts producing mobilization. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore this. Instead the information and mobilization environment of electorates will be explored and related to turnout.

Figure 2: Attitudes – Perception of A European Political Community, European Responsiveness, and European Effectiveness in Old and New Member States (Factor scores)



The "EOS Gallup Post-European Elections 2004 Survey" provides a number of questions on these matters. They read as follows:

"Political parties and candidates campaigned for votes in the European Parliament elections we have just had. For each of the following, please tell me if you have been in this situation or not…

a You have seen or heard things concerning the electoral campaign on television or on the radio

b You have seen advertisements for parties or candidates

c You have read about the electoral campaign in the newspapers

d You received leaflets concerning the European Elections in your mailbox

e You have been contacted by political parties or candidates or their representatives by phone

f Political parties or candidates or their representatives called to your home

g You have been approached in the street by political parties or candidates or their representatives

h You have searched for information on the European Elections on the internet

i You took part in public gatherings or meetings concerning the European Parliament Elections

j You have discussed the European Parliament Elections with your family, friends or acquaintances

k You have been aware of a non-party campaign or advertisement encouraging people to vote in the European Parliament elections"

Possible Answers: Yes, No, Don't know, No Answer.

These questions cover the three aspects of information and mobilization which we sought to examine. a, b, c, and d deal with mediated information, information seeking is covered by h to k. and e, f, and g refer to the direct contacts of candidates and parties with voters.

Again, a factor analysis was performed to check for dimensionality and to reduce data complexity. The result fits the distinction between mediated information, information seeking and direct contacting very nicely. Media or

mediated information items bind most of the variance, followed by direct contacts. Information seeking is the "weakest" factor (table 2).

Again, cross-country variations are striking. The general pattern is that the range of variation is larger among the old member states than among the new member states. On average, media information shows a similar mean across the two membership groups, but both positive and negative extremes are much smaller in the new member states. The highest level of media information in the West can be found in Ireland, the best in the new member states in Hungary. The lowest score for media information can be found in Greece and in the Czech Republic for the West and new members respectively. Direct contacts range positively on the scale only in Ireland, Italy, Great Britain and Belgium for the old members, and only in Malta, Cyprus, and the Czech Republic for the new member states. Info-Seeking is highest in Finland and lowest in Ireland among the old members, and highest in Hungary and lowest in Malta for the new members (figure 3).

The question is, whether these differences also translate into differences in turnout as the *mobilization deficit hypothesis* assumes.

5. Results: Political Community, Political Evaluations, Mobilization and Turnout

5.1 Individual Levels of Turnout

For a first exploration of the relationship between political evaluations and European identity on the one hand, and political information and mobilization on the other hand, factor scales have been recoded and related to means of reported turnout.

Table 2: Dimensions of Mobilization in the European Elections 2004 – Information Channels,– pooled Analysis. 25 Countries

Items	Factor 1 Media	Factor 2 Contacts	Factor 3 Info Seeking
You have seen or heard things concerning the electoral campaign on television or on the radio	**0,6608**	-0,0513	-0,0223
You have seen advertisements for parties or candidates	**0,6537**	0,0506	0,0032
You have read about the electoral campaign in the newspapers	**0,6275**	-0,0100	0,2575
You received leaflets concerning the European Elections in your mailbox	**0,4728**	0,3281	-0,1919
You have been contacted by political parties or candidates or their representatives by phone	0,0714	**0,7192**	-0,0599
Political parties or candidates or their representatives called to your home	-0,0517	**0,6670**	0,0508
You have been approached in the street by political parties or candidates or their representatives	0,0612	**0,5368**	0,2275
You have searched for information on the European Elections on the internet	-0,0223	-0,0266	**0,7414**
You took part in public gatherings or meetings concerning the European Parliament Elections	-0,0274	0,3238	**0,5263**
You have discussed the European Parliament Elections with your family, friends or acquaintances	0,4321	-0,0091	**0,4415**
You have been aware of a non-party campaign or advertisement encouraging people to vote in the European Parliament elections	0,3152	0,0410	**0,3254**
„Explained“ Variance (in %)	18,8	12,5	9,9

Possible Answers: Yes, No, Don’t know, No Answer. Coding: 1 (Yes), 0 (Don’t know, No Answer).

Figure 3: Extent of Mobilization – Media Information, Direct Contacts, Information Seeking in Old and New Member States (Factor scores)



Results can be reported straight-lined. According to the *system deficit hypothesis*, the less effective the elections and the less responsive the system the lower turnout should be. As can be seen in table 3, this is indeed the case. Individuals who show a factor score value smaller than half a standard deviation below the mean, report average turnouts of 39.5% and 50.0 % respectively. For those showing scale values higher than a half standard deviation above the mean, turnout is 77.3% and 69.2% respectively. In terms of Eta, effectiveness has a clearer impact than responsiveness. The *political community deficit hypothesis* claims that low identity goes with low turnout, strong identity with high turnout. Again, this pattern can be observed across all individuals in the analysis. The pooled analysis shows that these differences are true despite country level differences.

Table 3: Turnout in %, Depending on Attitudinal Evaluations

	Community	Responsiveness	Effectiveness
Low	51,0	50,0	39,5
Medium	64,8	61,6	68,0
High	64,1	69,2	77,3
Eta	0,126	0,168	0,347

Low: Factor scale value < -0.5 StdDev. Medium: -0.5 to +0.5 StdDev. High: >+0.5 StdDev.
N. of Cases: 24063.

Table 4 reports results in a similar way for the three factors of information and mobilization. The *mobilization deficit hypothesis* suggests that the lower the information/mobilization level is, the lower will be the turnout. This is indeed the case. The difference in turnout between the lowest and the highest levels of mediated information, information seeking and direct contacts is roughly around twenty percentage points. Etas of all three factors are quite similar.

Table 4: Turnout in %, Depending on Levels of Information and Mobilization

	Media	Contacts	Info Seeking
Low	48,6	56,2	52,1
Medium	60,3	58,5	60,5
High	68,8	72,9	72,4
Eta	0,156	0,120	0,139

Low: Factor scale value < -0.5 StdDev. Medium: -0.5 to +0.5 StdDev. High: >+0.5 StdDev.
N. of Cases: 24063.

These descriptive results all support the hypotheses. Does this finding hold up in a multivariate analysis? The simple answer is "yes". Introducing all six independent variables encompassing the attitudinal and the information/mobilization variables and adding a compulsory voting dummy in a logistic regression produces a model, which "explains" about 20% of the variance in reported turnout. All effects are significant, which does not come as a surprise given the high number of cases (table 5). Among the attitudinal variables, electoral effectiveness has the largest effect. This indicates that if people believe that what they determine with their vote is not relevant, they regard voting as useless. Other aspects being constant, the probability of participation in the European election 2004 increases by 64% if effectiveness increases by one scale point. All other individual level variables increase the probability by somewhat over 50%.

The most influential factor is, of course, compulsory voting. The difference between compulsory and non-compulsory voting in terms of probability of electoral participation is 82%.

However, even if compulsory voting is excluded from the model, it produces a reasonable score of "explained" variance. It is still 15% for the Cox&Snell R-square, and 20% for the Nagelkerke R-square (see table A1 in the appendix).

Table 5: Regressing Individual Turnout on European Attitudes, Mobilization Factors, and Compulsory Voting (Logistic Regression)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Pol. Community	0,238	0,015	267,465	1	0,000	1,269
Responsiveness	0,228	0,015	239,244	1	0,000	1,256
Effectiveness	0,587	0,015	1500,044	1	0,000	1,799
Media	0,287	0,015	352,991	1	0,000	1,333
Contacts	0,257	0,017	234,034	1	0,000	1,294
Info Seeking	0,251	0,016	241,317	1	0,000	1,286
Compulory Voting	1,512	0,051	875,925	1	0,000	4,537
Constant	0,311	0,016	391,803	1	0,000	1,365
Cox & Snell R Square		0,191				
Nagelkerke R Square		0,258				

It is particularly interesting that all other factors beside electoral effectiveness and compulsory voting have a similar weight on turnout. Mediated information is somewhat more important than direct contacts and information seeking; all three are a slightly stronger than political community and responsiveness. However, overall they are of equal weight. Given the fact that the model works without country specific factors other than compulsory voting, the question is whether it can explain country-differences.

5.2 Estimating Country-Differences in Turnout

It is always helpful to identify individual-level factors which can explain why some citizens participate in elections and why others do not. However, the proof of the pudding is whether individual level models contribute to outcome. In order to check this, two different routes are taken in this paper. One is to estimate individual-level probability to vote and to compare country means to the official turnout rates in those countries. The second is to take the aggregate information (means) about the distribution of attitudes and information/mobilization across countries and estimate turnout at the aggregate level. The outcome of this equation is then compared to official turnout figures.

The first route, estimating individual probabilities to vote and comparing country means to official turnout figures, shows that the model captures

country differences very well. The (aggregate) R-square between the means of probabilities and the countries' turnout figures is 0.75. However, the estimates for probabilities are clearly too high. The regression coefficient indicates that, at the lower end, probabilities overestimate turnout by a ratio of 2:1. At the higher end, there is no overestimation (figure 4).

Figure 4: Turnout and Probability of Individual Turnout Estimated by Levels of European Attitudes, Mobilization, and Compulsory Voting Compared



Comparing different models, i.e. one using only the attitudinal variables, one only the information/mobilization factors and one including all of them, reveals that attitudes alone estimate probabilities almost as well as the full model, and that information/mobilization factors alone do rather poorly (table 6). Furthermore, the comparison shows that the full model without compulsory voting is almost as good as the one including compulsory voting.

In the second route turnout is estimated by country-level aggregate information about the means of the respective variables. The result is even more convincing: the (aggregate) R-square is even higher, and the slope is

close to 1 which indicates that not much over- or underestimation is going on (figure 5).

Table 6: Models Compared: Turnout and Probability of Individual Turnout

Models	Without Compulsory Voting Corr coeff.	With Compulsory Voting Corr coeff.	Without Compulsory Voting B	With Compulsory Voting b
Mobilization factors only	0,49	0,85	0,24	0,72
Attitudes only	0,77	0,85	0,59	0,71
Mobilization and Attitudes	0,81	0,91	0,65	0,83

Figure 5: Aggregate Estimation: Turnout and Turnout Estimated by Levels of European Attitudes, Mobilization, and Compulsory Voting Compared



Although using seven variables to estimate a model for 25 cases may be problematic, the result is quite convincing. The overall model is significant, and three variables, electoral effectiveness, direct contacts, and compulsory voting, clearly stand out as significant in the whole model. Using only the information/mobilization and compulsory voting variables, the prediction is

still quite good (adj. R-square 0.66), and information seeking proves insignificant. Taking the attitudinal variables alone, the model predictivity is as good and responsiveness shown to be insignificant.

6. Conclusion: Mobilization and Attitudes Equals Turnout - A Simple Equation?

This paper started out with three deficit hypotheses, claiming that each of the related factors contributes positively or negatively to turnout. The reason why the hypotheses are formulated in terms of deficits is that turnout in the 2004 European Elections was unexpected low. These elections mark a historical juncture because they can be regarded as the "Founding Elections" of a common Europe of East and West which has overcome the obsolete "iron curtain". However, the electorates obviously did not feel that way.

Thus, the basic assumption must have been that there are deficits – deficits in the strength of the political community, deficits in the institutional system of the EU, and deficits in mobilization. These factors are related to each other to a greater or lesser degree. Prior analysis has shown that institutional factors, namely electoral effectiveness and institutional responsiveness, determine the strength of political community. Media information and information seeking, and, to a lesser extent, direct contacts of candidates and parties with voters, influence the feeling about effectiveness, responsiveness and political community. One may assume, that all three general factors – the evaluation of the institutional system, information and mobilization, and attachment to the political EU community – form a syndrome of deficits which prevent voters from feeling sufficiently attracted to engage in the process of voting.

Empirically, the analyses show that all three general factors contribute to turnout – or more accurately prevent turnout. At the individual level, except for electoral effectiveness, there is little difference in the impact of the remaining variables, namely the evaluation of responsiveness and political

identity with regard to the attitudinal variables and media information, direct contacts with political actors, and information seeking with regard to the information/mobilization variables.

However, when we estimate country level turnout, results show that some factors may be more important than others. The attitudinal model performs better in the comparison of estimates of voting probability and turnout than the information model. In the aggregate model, evaluation of electoral effectiveness and direct mobilization, i.e. contacting the voters, stand out.

These results certainly allow us to conclude that political actors, namely candidates, parties and EU officials have to put more effort into making it clear to the voter that voting makes a difference, and into informing and mobilizing them. Although the traditional model of democracy is very much a bottom-up model this is not true in reality. Just as citizens should feel a commitment to the political order and a duty to engage, political actors should feel a duty to attract and to attach citizens to that order. Obviously this can be done – otherwise there would not be such a clear result with regard to country differences.

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Appendix

Table A1: Regressing Individual Turnout on European Attitudes, Mobilization Factors, - *Compulsor Voting Excluded* (Logistic Regression)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Pol.						
Community	0,252	0,014	316,603	1	0,000	1,287
Responsiveness	0,278	0,014	372,574	1	0,000	1,321
Effectiveness	0,619	0,015	1733,781	1	0,000	1,857
Media	0,222	0,015	230,727	1	0,000	1,248
Contacts	0,254	0,017	233,087	1	0,000	1,289
Info Seeking	0,232	0,016	212,700	1	0,000	1,261
Constant	0,506	0,015	1190,340	1	0,000	1,659
Cox & Snell R Square		0,154				
Nagelkerke R Square		0,208				

Chapter 8

Political Representation and Euroscepticism: Evidence from Poland

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Abstract

In our paper, we ask three questions regarding political representation in Poland on the issue of EU membership. First, how important was this issue to both masses and elites? Second, did Polish political parties react in any way to mass political attitudes towards EU membership? Finally, did representation on the topic of EU membership have an effect on how Polish citizens voted, how they viewed political parties, or their overall assessment of the quality of Polish democracy? We address these questions in an effort to expand our understanding of the relevance of EU membership to Poland's domestic politics beyond the question of why certain citizens support EU membership, and in an effort to expand the study of political representation outside the confines of stable established democracies. We answer these questions using the 1997 and 2001 Polish National Election Studies, which surveyed both masses and parliamentary elites. Overall, we conclude that political representation on the issue of EU membership did matter to Polish citizens by helping inform their political choices and attitudes, and that political parties clearly seemed to have been aware of this fact and reacted to it. Although we note that this bodes well for the development of political representation in Poland, ironically it may ultimately prove threatening to the

quality of democratic development by providing mass support for radical and anti-systemic parties.

Introduction

The reaction of citizens in post-communist countries to potential membership in the European Union poses a striking paradox. On the one hand, joining the European Union is likely to have the most significant effect upon the evolution of their countries' political and economic development since the collapse of communism. On the other hand, the received wisdom would have us believe that EU related issues are much less important in the minds of citizens than just about any other issue of domestic politics. Such conclusions are backed up by years of research on the issue in Western Europe, where the near universal consensus is that EU issues are almost always of a second order concern to citizens (with perhaps the recent EU constitutional referenda as a notable exception) (Reif 1980; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Steunenberg and Thomassen 2002). Turnout in EU parliamentary elections in the West has always lagged behind turnout in national elections, and the first round of EU parliamentary elections in the newest states of the EU in 2004 did nothing to change this pattern.[1]

Nevertheless, for all the knowledge we now have of the evolution of public opinion towards EU membership in post-communist countries and the vote in the EU Referenda on membership, we know surprisingly little at this point about how important the issue of representation on the issue of EU membership was for the development on domestic politics in post-communist countries in the years leading up to accession. This is a result of two important trends in the literature. First, almost all of the scholarly work on EU accession in post-communist countries has focused either on the details of elite level negotiations regarding the terms of membership (add citations) or on the question of ascertaining how much mass support for EU membership existed at different points in time and how the supporters

differed from the opponents.[2] At the same time, the scholarship on political representation has almost exclusively involved empirical analyses of stable, established democracies (Miller and Stokes 1963; Barnes 1977; Dalton 1985; Converse and Pierce 1986; Powell 1989). Consequently, we have little knowledge to date of how representation on the issue of EU membership developed in the new member states, or what effect this representation may or may not have had.

The goal of this paper is to begin to fill gaps in both of these literature by providing a thorough assessments of the effects of representation on the issue of EU membership in Poland. We focus on a more in depth analysis of one country as opposed to a comparative analysis of multiple countries as an appropriate strategy for an article length initial exploration of the topic. We feature Poland as opposed to any of the other new member states for three reasons. First, with over 38 million citizens, Poles alone represent over half of the new members of the European Union and far more than any other single country.[3] Second, the stylized facts of the Polish case make it a particularly appropriate case for testing the effects of political representation on the political party system. The 1997-2001 Polish parliament featured no explicitly Euroskeptic political parties, and the 2001 parliamentary elections led to a major shake-up of the Polish party system. Of the six political parties in the previous parliament, only two made it in to the new parliament. Concurrently, four new parties gained seats for the first time in the parliament, two of which were explicitly Euroskeptic. Finally, the Polish National Election Studies (PNES) for both the 1997 and 2001 Polish parliamentary elections were explicitly designed to facilitate measurement of political representation, including both representative mass surveys and elite-level surveys of members of parliaments.[4]

The substantive focus of our analysis is motivated by the literature on political representation, which we discuss in the following section.[5] We attempt to answer the basic questions at the heart of this literature: did

representation on the topic of EU membership have an effect on how Polish citizens voted, how they viewed political parties, or their overall assessment of the quality of Polish democracy?

Since there is so little known on the topic, we begin by assessing the salience of EU membership as an issue in comparative perspective with other issues. Contrary to the received wisdom, we find that in 1997, EU membership was actually one of the most important issues for Poles, although its salience declined by the time of the 2001 parliamentary election. Next, we examine the effect of political representation on the development of the Polish party system by assessing the degree of Euroskepticism among the electorate of Poland's two new populist-radical parties that competed in the 2001 elections, the League of Polish Families (LPR) and Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP), which together captured almost one-fifth of the 2001 vote. Across numerous tests, we find evidence that the electorates of these two parties were more Euroskeptic than either supporters of other parties or non-voters, leading us to suspect that the fact that these parties provided an avenue of political representation on the EU issue area to Euroskeptic voters contributed to their overall political success.

In the final section of the paper, we test the effects of political representation on the issue of EU membership in comparison with the effects of representation on other issues. In the spirit of Easton (1956, 1965), we examine both diffuse effects of representation, on the overall level of satisfaction with democracy, and more specific effects, on both party preference and intensity of party preference. The findings are fairly striking and somewhat surprising: to the extent that Poles are influenced by proximity to a party on any of these issue areas, proximity to parties in terms of attitudes towards EU membership is clearly one of the most important. This is certainly the case in terms of satisfaction with democracy and party preference, although it is not as strong for intensity of party preference. This leads us to conclude that although EU membership was obviously not the

foremost issue on the minds of Poles leading at the time of the 2001 election, there was something fundamental about this issue that helped structure politics.

Political representation: theoretical orthodoxy, innovations and empirical accounts

Among the many traditions and empirical approaches to the study of political representation one is certainly still underdeveloped: the issue of *making of representation(s)* – a dynamic process by which representatives and represented are defined, create the space and content of representation and interact with each other. It is precisely to this subfield of the representation that we hope to contribute. While we do not have access to classical panel data (which would best serve the purpose), we do have rich empirical longitudinal surveys with which some of the ideas we have can be plausibly tested.

Since the paper is not aimed at testing particular ways in which political representation has been conceptualized and operationalized, we will not discuss all problems pertinent to the topic. We have however consciously selected several ideas and approaches to scrutinizing political representation. To begin, the distinction, offered first by Hannah Pitkin, on the difference between "standing for" and "acting for" representation is of crucial importance to us. Holmberg (1989) builds on this point by suggesting one should be aware of (at least) four roles of representation.[6] The first two, "social" and "role" representation, are more or less copies of Pitkin's distinction. However, when discussing the idea of "acting for" representation Holmberg raises the question of the importance of the "will" on the side of the representative (an issue reflected upon earlier by Converse and Pierce [1986]) and the "focus" of representation (an issue debated two centuries earlier by Edmund Burke). Holmberg adds to the Burkean dilemma about whether a representative ought to represent local or all-national interests

another three possible sources of representation: party interests, pressure group interests, and individual interests. The other two representative roles discussed by Holmberg are "policy representation" and "anticipatory representation". The first concentrates on the fit between policy preferences between the elite and the masses, by comparing issue opinions but not actions. "Policy representation" should be distinguished from *acting for* representation in that it need not involve the will to represent. "Policy representation" can be unintentional; Converse and Pierce refer to this as a type of *malgre lui* representation. Finally, it is worth distinguishing "anticipatory representation" – a phenomenon that is based on the will of the representatives to make sure they know what the people they are representing want them to do. This idea is closely related to the Burkean mandate-delegate mode of representation, more recently expanded upon in Manin, Przeworski and Stokes (1999). In what follows we will concentrate mainly on the "policy representation" approach when it comes to the empirical testing of data. We do however pay attention and contextualize our finding by referring to the concepts of "anticipatory" and "role" representation.

What needs to be emphasized at this point is that since we are studying the Polish case - a classical parliamentary democracy, based on PR electoral rules - we design our analyses on the so-called *Responsible Party Model* (RPM), which is different from the model developed by Miller-Stokes (1963) and other typical "representative diamond" relationships, which concentrate mostly on the mandate-independence controversy. The fundamental assumptions of the RPM are based on the premise that on both sides of the "representational bond" we find collective, not individual, entities. On the represented side, this is the electorate, spread all over the country, though geographically constrained. On the side of those who are elected to represent the electorate is the collective entity called a party, and, more specifically, the parliamentary caucus of party members who won seats. The fundamental assumptions of the model can be summarized as follows: (a) the crucial actors of representation are parties, not individual politicians, and politicians

are constrained by the party organization; (b) parties compete by offering programmatic alternatives; (c) policy programs are publicized, are known to voters and the opinion-formation process runs top-down; (d) voters compare programmatic packages parties offer and vote for the ones that fall most proximate to their preferences, as it is envisaged that programs are specific "deals".

For these reasons we adopt – though in a simpler form – Achen's concept of "proximity" as a proxy for representation (Achen 1978). Achen argues that proximity directly taps into the democratic ideal of "citizens equality", or the presumption that everyone's voice should count equally. Achen also highlights "popular sovereignty", or the idea that what people decide must influence political outcomes, as another ideal of democracy, and he identifies responsiveness as a key tool towards assessing its presence or absence. While we are primarily focused on proximity in this paper, we make some preliminary attempts at assessing responsiveness in the Polish case in our longitudinal analyses, where one of our main questions is whether politicians are responsive to their electorates or/and whether the parties are able to socialize their voters to follow their policy proposals. Recently, several studies have been devoted to the top-down mechanisms of political representation (Essaiason and Holmberg 1996; Holmberg 1997), partly derived form the old observation that pure political demands by "the people" are usually vague, divergent and incomprehensible in policy terms.

From the previous discussion, it is clear that the quality of representation depends heavily on the deeds of the representative side. Do politicians have the will to represent? Do they have preferences similar to their electorates? Do they have the capacity to accurately unveil the real preferences of their voters? But the issue is even more complicated than that, as the quality of representation is also a function of the electorates' homo/heterogeneity. If a geographically or socially defined electorate is highly divergent on an issue, there is little a willing-acting-for-and-standing-for and especially accurately-

perceiving-representative can do about it. It might not be an acute problem in a *Majority Control* vision of representation (Huber and Powell 1994), where – among other assumptions – representatives are expected to implement policies that fit the majority's expectations, but it certainly creates a problem in a *Proportional Influence* vision, which aims at representing all citizens. Whether it is normatively desirable or not, the ability of the representatives to do their job properly is a monotonically dependent function of district heterogeneity. Achen also identifies this problem is highlighting a third ideal of liberal democracy as "neutrality towards alternatives", or the concept of fairness about the performance of those who were delegated to represent. In Achen's view, this is a measure of the ability of the representative entity to locate itself "efficiently" so that there is no other position it can take that would represent more of its constituents, regardless of the particular electorate's heterogeneity (see p.487).

The issue of the electorates' cohesion versus diffuseness is even more complicated by the fact that policy preferences and issue stances are both objective phenomena, which have their subjective perception correlates. Human capacity to correctly perceive the reality has been debated for centuries, and countess examples of inaccurate evaluations of social reality can be found. For these reasons it is always worth to control for both objective indicators and peoples perceptions. In what follows we take note of these ideas and control for objective and subjective visions of reality.

Salience of EU Issue Area

We begin with question of whether EU membership was and is considered an important issue for Poles. We do so largely to establish that it is in fact a legitimate topic for the study of political representation; if Poles were completely uninterested in the issue, then it would be questionable whether it even made sense to analyze political representation on the topic of EU

membership. But we also do so to situate our study in a more dynamic framework by comparing data from the 1997 and 2001 Polish NES.

Table 1: Predictors of EU Salience: Voters vs. Non-Voters

A.2001

	Mean	N	SD
Non-Voters	**5.79**	674.5	2.89
Voters	**6.09**	987.4	2.94
Total	**5.96**	1662	2.92
F	Sig.	Eta	Eta2
4.155	**0.042**	0.050	0.2%

B.1997

	Mean	N	SD
Non-Voters	**7.07**	765	2.72
Voters	**7.28**	1050	2.46
Total	**7.19**	1815	2.58
F	Sig.	Eta	Eta2
3.065	**0.080**	0.041	0.2%

Table 2: Predictors of EU Salience: By Vote Choice

A.2001

Vote Choice	Mean	N	SD
SLD	**6.22**	407	2.85
AWSP	**6.23**	34	2.98
UW	**7.60**	20	2.65
SRP	**5.39**	109	2.93
PiS	**6.07**	92	2.96
PSL	**5.20**	81	2.88
PO	**7.13**	132	2.65
LPR	**4.96**	65	3.06
Total	**6.09**	941	2.92
F	Sig.	Eta	Eta2
6.929	**0.000**	0.222	4.9%

B.1997

Vote Choice	Mean	N	SD
UP	**7.32**	40	2.68
N-Ch-D BdP	**5.48**	11	1.86
KPEiR RP	**8.94**	8	2.42
UW	**7.79**	152	2.32
AWS	**7.30**	393	2.49
SLD	**7.27**	256	2.40
PSL	**6.72**	67	2.51
UPR	**6.49**	12	1.97
ROP	**7.41**	51	2.49
KPEiR	**6.85**	23	2.56
Total	**7.30**	1014	2.46
F	Sig.	Eta	Eta2
2.436	**0.010**	0.146	2.1%

Several detailed conclusions can be drawn from comparing the 1997 and 2001 opinions of Poles concerning the salience of EU membership for Poland. First, we clearly see that the issue has become less salient in 2001 than it was four years earlier; the difference is significant – on an eleven point scale more that 1.2 scale-points (from 7.19 down to 5.96, see Table 1). In comparison with nine other issues (not listed in the tables, but see Table 3 for issues), the EU issue in 1997 is ranked right in the middle of the ten issues in terms of importance. [7] Second, at both points in time voters attach slightly more importance to the issue than non-voters. Third, the difference between electorates in 2001 is notably larger than in 1997. Fourth, not only is the difference between electorates larger, but the intra-electorates cohesion is also considerably lower than in 1997 (see the standard deviations in Table 2).

Finally, the two Eurosceptic parties, LPR and SRP, together with the old peasant party, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), scored lowest in terms of the salience of the issue.

From these distributions two broad conclusions are justified: (i) the closer Poles came to voting on EU membership, the less importance Poles attached to this event; and (ii) the closer Poles came to EU entry, the more differentiated the electorates of each party became on how to assess the importance of this event. Moreover, the variation occurs both between parties' electorates as well as within them. Finally, despite this variation, individuals considering EU membership a less relevant issue than other issues support parties that are more eurosceptic.

Greater variance in the salience of EU membership is also visible when we look through a more sociological lens, i.e. checking these distributions by basic socio-demographic categories between group variation in 2001 is much higher than in 1997. In a nutshell the educated, more affluent, urban residents, and younger individuals consider the issue of EU membership to be more salient than other groups. At the same time, the between group difference increases from 1997-2001, as does the within group variance.[8]

Since this paper is concerned with political representation, we also need to uncover the elite stances on the matter. Briefly, most of the details sketched for the voters do not apply to Polish parliamentary elites. First of all, the issue is much more important for elites than for the citizens, not only in absolute terms (on the same 11-point scale as the one used in the mass survey), but also in relative terms. The post-1997[9] parliamentary elites ranked the EU issue[10] third from the top, after "law and order/crime" and "social safety net". And in 2001, the elites ranked EU membership second from the top, after only the issue of unemployment. In absolute location on the scale the EU issues has remained almost constant, in the first point in

time it was – on average, by all MPs – located at 8.1 and four years later at 8.2 of the 0-to-10 scale.

Finally, MPs of the euroskeptic parties look very different both from one another and from the other parties. The LPR parliamentary caucus members rank the salience of the EU issue very high – at point 8.0 on average, but have an extraordinary high internal lack of cohesion (standard deviation of 4.05). The SRP caucus members are at the other extreme, ranking the EU-issue at its lowest, at 3.8 on average, with still very high internal differentiation (standard deviation of 3.44).

Table 3. Correlation of Salience and Position by 10 Issue Areas

Panel A. 2001

	EU	Crime	Priv.	Rel.	Nom.	Unem.	Tax	Agr.	Soc.	Frc
Corr.	**-0.459**	**-0.117**	**-0.185**	**0.238**	**-0.269**	**-0.159**	**0.009**	**-0.158**	**-0.171**	**-0.159**
Sig.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.704	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	1565	1775	1593	1684	1504	1760	1666	1641	1695	1548

Panel B. 1997

	EU	Crime	Priv.	Rel.	Nom.	Unem.	Tax	Agr.	Soc.	Frc
Corr.	**-0.405**	**-0.032**	**-0.400**	**0.272**	**-0.388**	**-0.277**	**-0.053**	**-0.496**	**-0.235**	**-0.109**
Sig.	0.000	0.161	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.022	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	1698	1919	1704	1856	1704	1904	1850	1766	1872	1647

Note: Nom = attitudes towards former nomenklatura; Frc = attitudes towards foreign capital.

What should we make of this decrease in salience of the EU issue area between 1997 and 2001? In Table 3, we compare the correlation between salience on the issue of EU membership with a respondent's position on EU membership; the tables also report on this relationship for the other nine issue areas. A negative correlation reveals that people who consider the issue important are more likely to think that EU membership is desirable (0) as opposed to something to be avoided (10). Two findings are apparent. First, in both 1997 and 2001, there is a high degree of correlation between believing that the issue of EU membership is an important issue, and in favoring EU membership for Poland. Thus a large proportion of the decrease in salience of the issue of EU membership between 1997 and 2001 can be attributed to increasing Euroskeptic views in the Polish populace;

Euroskeptics were less likely to think the issue important than Euroenthusiasts. And indeed, the average position on EU membership also moved in the Euroskeptic direction, from a mean of 3.6 with a standard deviation of 3.2 to a mean of 5.1 with a standard deviation of 3.4. Second, this pattern is not nearly as strong in the other issue areas, especially in 2001. So there may be something distinctive to EU membership as an issue area that equates opposing EU membership with not thinking that EU membership is an important issue at all.

In this section, we have demonstrated the following four points: salience on the issue of EU membership dropped from 1997-2001 while both inter and intra-group variation increased; the issue was much more salient among elites in 2001 than among the masses; one's view of the salience of the EU issue was strongly linked to one's position on EU membership, and overall Poles became less supportive of EU membership. This suggests the following for the development of political representation in Poland on this issue. First, elites were – in the broadest sense – unsuccessful in persuading voters as to the importance of the EU issue area. Second, it would seem that LPR and SRP might face a greater challenge in the future in securing the loyalty of their voters on the basis of the EU issue area, in so far as those voters attach low salience to the issue. At the same time, with greater intra-group electorate variation in both salience and position, political party leaders – including those of LPR and SRP – might in the future have more room to maneuver on the EU issue. Finally, the emergence of a Euroskeptic electorate could offer a potential reservoir of support for these same parties in 2001. It is to this topic that we turn in the following section.

Political Representation and the Polish Party System: The Emergence of Polish Euroskeptic Parties

In addition to the decline in salience over the issue of EU membership and a wider range of opinions among Polish citizens on the subject, the 2001

elections also witnessed a major upheaval of the Polish party system. This included the disintegration of the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) coalition, which was formed in 1996 as an umbrella organization for the numerous rightist parties in Poland and swept to victory in 1997 parliamentary election. In the 2001 election, however, the remnants of AWS failed even to clear the 8% threshold necessary for coalitions to receive seats in the Polish parliament. However, prior to the election several new right-wing parties emerged in the wake of AWS's collapse, one of which was the League of Polish Families (LPR). The core of the new party came basically from what in mid-1990s was the Stronnictwo Narodowe (National Party) and a few other minor nationalist groupings; some of the politicians had also been members Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe (Christian-National Union). Their support came mainly from provincial areas, small and medium size localities, and rather poorly educated and less affluent people. The three most significant traits of LPR's electorate was overrepresentation among women, elderly, and devout Catholics, most of whom were listeners to Radio Maryja.[11]

From its inception until the time of the 2003 Polish Referendum on EU membership, the stance of LPR on the EU issue did not change: at the most basic level, it opposed the idea of joining the EU.[12] In most of their publications, posters and billboards, EU membership was presented as another occupation or partition of Poland by neighbors from the West. "Yesterday Moscow, today Brussels" or "Poland for Poles" were slogans used by LPR. One well known poster proclaimed: "Every Pole will have a job in EU, so lets go there. Every Pole will have a Mercedes… to wash.". In the eyes of the LPR, EU membership represented a danger commensurate to the 18th century partitions concerning all domains of life: economy, religious identity and land.

The main political appeal of the LPR can be labeled as Christian-nationalist right; it was an extreme – and at times anti-systemic – party. Their

programmatic stances and elites' public message can also be dubbed as xenophobic populism, although compared to some of their sister parties in Central (Sladek's Republicans in the Czech Republic or Csurka's Life and Justice Party in Hungary) or Western Europe (Vlaams Blok in Belgium or Heider's party in Austria), the LPR seems somewhat more moderate in terms of both xenophobia and populism. It is important however to emphasize that their anti-EU stance was highly critical mostly because of socio-cultural and civilizational issues rather than purely economic ones. As is often the case with populist parties, they were also highly critical of incumbent Polish political elites. Consequently their anti-European outlook was of a fundamental nature – they rejected the very idea of EU integration as a threat to the "Polishness" of the nation, its fundamental cultural values, and essential elements of national identity.

SRP had been – as a trade union called “Samoobrona” – in place since 1992, and had contested a number of parliamentary election without any even rudimentary electoral success until 2001.[13] For most of the 1990s, a group of activists organized around Samoobrona’s leader Andrzej Lepper became famous for their direct radical actions (road blockades, attacking public buildings, seizing grain transports, and the like). These activists were generally medium to large scale farmers who had attempted to take advantage of the transition to a market economy but had been unsuccessful in doing so; many had defaulted on loans. They blamed international conspiracies and liberals in general, and high interest rates at banks in particular, for their lot. The 2001 election was the first that Samoobrona, now Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (SRP), contested as a party. It can be labeled as a radical populist-left party, as it predominantly concentrates on economic and socio-economic issues. Its programmatic appeal is addressed to "the people" in general as opposed to elites. Their more detailed target group is the rural population and marginalized social groups as well as any outsiders that might be considered victims of the transformation. There is relatively little of religious or cultural elements in their programmatic stance,

if it appears it serves as a corollary of economic considerations. It is strongly anti-elitist, anti-institutional, anti-procedural and de facto anti-democratic, in the sense attached to democracy in liberal representative democracies. Direct version of democracy and referenda are the tools preferred by their leadership.

SRP's unexpected success in 2001 was mainly brought about by the support of middle-aged small towns inhabitants. This electorate is also distinguished by a high overrepresentation of males and those of very low educational attainment; no other party had such disproportionate support from the lowest educational and social strata. Contrary to some researchers' and commentators' opinions, it SRP does appear to have been mainly supported by failed entrepreneurs and the unsuccessful provincial middle classes, but instead more by the excluded, lost, and helpless.

SRP's EU campaign differred considerably from the one offered by LPR. Lepper has argued that his party is not fundamentally against EU entry, but simply rejects these particular terms of agreement as they stand; especially in economic, and more specifically, agricultural policy domains. The Polish foreign policy was accused of contributing to the country becoming a market for production surpluses of the West. The "liberal" elites were responsible for this predicament, which had contributed to the destruction of the Polish enterprises, fishery and agriculture. He claimed to be a "eurorealist", meaning that Poland should not be joining the EU at this point in time and should instead postpone membership until it was able to bargain better terms for accession.

One of the most interesting findings from the 2003 Polish referendum on EU membership was the strong link between voting behavior in the 2001 Polish parliamentary elections and the 2003 referendum. Voters who had supported SRP and LPR in the 2001 parliamentary election were much more likely to oppose EU membership than voters for pro-EU parties. Indeed, the effect of

this one variable – vote choice in the previous parliamentary election – dwarfed the effect of all standard socio-demographic indicators on predicting the likelihood of voting for or against EU membership. (see *Gazeta Wyborcza* 2003; Markowski and Tucker 2005). For scholars of public opinion towards EU membership in Western Europe, such findings might not be particularly surprising, as there is a history of citizens taking cues on their position towards EU membership from their preferred party (Anderson 1998; Taggert 1998). In post-communist countries, however, parties have long been presumed to be weak and less influential on the attitudes of their supporters (Markowski 2002, Lewis 2000).

Attempting to sort out the direction of this effect – whether voters chose parties based on their stance on EU membership or whether voters chose parties based on other issues and then came to accept their party's position on EU membership – can offer an important insight into the nature of political representation on the EU issue, and, more specifically, whether parties reacted to or shaped Polish Euroskepticism. If cues from these two political parties once they entered the parliament led their supporters to their Euroskepticism, then at the time of the 2001 election we should see little if any distinction in the degree of Euroskepticism among voters for SRP and LPR and voters for other parties (as well as non-voters). However, if we can see important distinctions in terms of Euroskepticism between voters for SRP and LPR as opposed to voters for other parties and non-voters, then we can conclude the opposite: that Euroskeptic voters were turning to the Euroskeptic SRP and LPR at the time of the 2001 parliamentary election. From the point of view of this paper, it suggests a very Downsian effect for the issue of representation on EU membership on the development of the Polish party system, or, put another way, a reaction by elites to the lack of representation offered to Euroskeptics in the previous parliament. With this segment of the population unrepresented by any of the current parties in the parliament, Downsian models would predict that new parties should emerge

to take advantage of this unrepresented section of the electorate (Downs 1957). And indeed, this is exactly what our evidence suggests occurred.

In the remainder of this section, we demonstrate the following. First, the supporters of LPR and SRP were significantly more Euroskeptic across a number of different dimensions than voters for other parties or non-voters. Second, supporters of the other parties (besides the LPR and SRP) are *not* distinguishable from non-voters in terms of Euroskepticism. Both of these factors suggest that lack of representation on an important issue in the 1997-2001 parliament may have played an important role in the success of LPR and SRP in the 2001 election. Thus ironically, the rise of two parties with less than sparkling democratic credentials may have demonstrated precisely that representative democracy is alive and well in Poland, at least to the extent that Downs predicts how democratic representation ought to function. We also demonstrate that not only did the LPR and SRP offer an outlet for Euroskeptic voters in the 2001 election, but that they may even have appealed to different types of Euroskeptic voters, thus increasing the degree of representation even further.

We begin with the most direct measure of depth of Euroskepticism at the time of the 2001 election, the 0-10 scale introduced in the previous section; recall that the higher the number, the more Euroskeptic the respondent.

All three panels point to the same overall conclusions. First, voters for the two Euroskeptic parties in 2001 are indeed significantly more Euroskeptic than either voters for other parties in the election or non-voters. This conclusion holds both among the electorate at large (Panel 1) and, interestingly, among only Euroskeptics (Panel 2), who we define as those with a score of 6-10 on the EU issue position.[14] This is an important observation, because had it not been the case, we could imagine that the results in Panel 1 could be a function of just having fewer Euroenthusiasts in SRP and LPR than in the other parties. But the results in Panel 2

demonstrate that not only was the average SRP or LPR voter more Euroskeptic than supporters of other parties, but even among Euroskeptics, SRP and LPR attracted the more extreme Euroskeptics.

Table 4. Attitudes towards EU membership by Non-Voters, Voters for Euroskeptic Parties, and Voters for Other Parties

Panel 1. Average EU Position Score by Vote Choice: Full Electorate

Vote Choice	Mean	Std. Err.
Non-Voter	5.18	.143
Other Party	4.76	.140
SRP	6.11	.317
LPR	6.84	.463

N=1571, NV = non voter, SRP = Self Defense for Republic of Poland, LPR = League of Polish Families, Other = voted for any other party. Means weighted by sample weights.

Panel 2. Average EU Position Score by Vote Choice: Euroskeptics

Vote	Mean	Std. Err.
Non-Voter	8.54	.10
Other Party	8.64	.09
SRP	8.94	.20
LPR	9.28	.22

N=608, Euroskeptics = 6-10 on EU position score. NV = non voter, SRP = Self Defense for Republic of Poland, LPR = League of Polish Families, Other = voted for any other party. Means weighted by sample weights

Panel 3: Proportion of Hard Core (9-10) Euroskeptics by Vote Choice

	Skeptic Instensity weak(6-8)	str(9-10)	Total
NV	106	144	250
	42.40	57.60	100.00
Other	118	152	270
	43.70	56.30	100.00
SRP	18	35	53
	33.96	66.04	100.00
LPR	7	28	35
	20.00	80.00	100.00
Total	249	359	608
	40.95	59.05	100.00

Pearson chi2(3) = 8.4868 Pr = 0.037

NV = non voter, SRP = Self Defense for Republic of Poland, LPR = League of Polish Families, Other = voted for any other party

Second, when we compare the LPR and SRP, voters for the LPR were even more Euroskeptic than voters for the SRP. This too holds across both the entire electorate (6.8 vs.6.1) and among just the Euroskeptic portion of their electorate (9.3 vs. 8.9). Furthermore, four-fifths of the LPR Euroskeptics were hard core Euroskeptics, as compared to a still significant but not quite as large two-thirds of the SRP Euroskeptics (see Panel 3).[15]

Table 5 compares the attitudes of Euroskeptics on 16 EU-related questions by the same categories as Table 4. These questions tap into a variety of different EU-related attitudes, including the effect of EU membership on various facets of Polish life, opinions of the EU and its leadership, one's own sense of national identity, and a few questions about NATO (as indicative of general attitudes towards the west).

Table 5 reveals a similar overall conclusion to Table 4. Simply put, in any instance when respondents from these four categories are distinguished in terms of their degree of "anti-EU attitudes" (e.g., less trust of the EU, belief that EU membership is bad for Poland), it is *always* the case it is either supporters of LPR, SRP, or both parties that have the more anti-EU views.[16] Conversely, it is *never* the case that either SRP or LPR have significantly more positive views of the EU than either non-voters or voters for the non-Euroskeptic parties.[17] Second, similarly to results of Table 4, when comparing LPR and SRP, it is more often the case, although not exclusively so, that LPR supporters have more extreme anti-EU positions of the two.

Table 5: Euroskeptic Positions on EU Related Issues by Vote Choice

		Changes in Borders: Good (1) vs. Bad (2)	Polish owned private industry helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU memb.	Are EU politicians are honest and efficient (1) or corruptinefficient (2)	Trust in EU a lot (1) - a little (4)	Poland can affect NATO a lot (1) to not much at all (4)	On the whole, the EU is good (1) or bad (2) for Poland	Poland can affect EU a lot (1) to not much at all (4)	Identity: all Polish (1) - mostly European (5)	Polish agriculture will be helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU membership	Trust in NATO: a lot (1) - a little (4)	Your family's standard of living helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU memb.	State owned industries helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU membership	Foreign industry helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU membership	On the whole, NATO is good (1) or bad (2) for Poland	People from other countries working in Poland is Better (1) or Worse (2)	Vote because of Economy (1) vs Politics and Culture (2)
NV	**Mean**	**1.45**	**1.66**	**1.47**	**2.79**	**2.90**	**1.59**	**2.95**	**2.24**	**1.82**	**2.27**	**1.73**	**1.85**	**1.12**	**1.12**	**1.58**	**1.25**
	N	173	183	133	220	196	172	192	248	196	225	147	203	201	190	229	154
Other	**Mean**	**1.48**	**1.60**	**1.41**	**2.75**	**2.89**	**1.53**	**2.97**	**2.24**	**1.80**	**2.28**	**1.72**	**1.83**	**1.09**	**1.13**	**1.56**	**1.21**
	N	191	205	135	232	224	202	221	265	220	236	159	216	226	222	245	214
SRP	**Mean**	**1.71**	**1.85**	**1.66**	**3.07**	**3.03**	**1.77**	**3.30**	**2.36**	**1.80**	**2.24**	**1.88**	**1.88**	**1.17**	**1.19**	**1.59**	**1.18**
	N	34	40	32	40	39	37	38	51	46	40	36	43	45	39	47	39
LPR	**Mean**	**1.69**	**1.83**	**1.64**	**3.22**	**3.33**	**1.85**	**3.06**	**1.99**	**1.94**	**2.60**	**1.78**	**1.85**	**1.14**	**1.16**	**1.64**	**1.14**
	N	27	30	22	35	22	31	21	36	33	34	18	25	33	26	32	29
Total	**Mean**	**1.50**	**1.66**	**1.48**	**2.83**	**2.93**	**1.59**	**2.99**	**2.24**	**1.82**	**2.29**	**1.74**	**1.85**	**1.11**	**1.13**	**1.57**	**1.22**
	N	424	458	321	528	482	442	473	600	495	536	359	486	505	476	553	435
	F	4.06	4.68	3.01	5.03	2.88	5.98	2.20	0.71	1.27	2.08	1.34	0.26	1.06	0.52	0.43	0.85
	Sig.	0.007	0.003	0.031	0.002	0.036	0.001	0.087	0.546	0.285	0.102	0.262	0.852	0.367	0.667	0.730	0.468
	Eta	0.168	0.173	0.166	0.167	0.133	0.198	0.118	0.060	0.088	0.108	0.106	0.040	0.079	0.057	0.049	0.077
	EtaSq	2.8%	3.0%	2.8%	2.8%	1.8%	3.9%	1.4%	0.4%	0.8%	1.2%	1.1%	0.2%	0.6%	0.3%	0.2%	0.6%

Of course, one of the advantages of using 16 indicators as opposed to one is that we can tell a more nuanced story. There is some evidence to support the idea that SRP Euroskeptics did appear to more "pragmatic" than LPR Euroskeptics. SRP Euroskeptics were distinguished from other Euroskeptics based on their belief about whether their own material well being would be adversely affected by EU membership, and they were particularly skeptical about Poland's ability to influence EU decision making and the level of corruption and incompetence among EU bureaucrats. They did not, on the other hand, seem to feel any less "European" than other Euroskeptics, nor did they have any less trust in NATO than other Euroskeptics (which could illustrate a more fundamental distrust of the West). So it is possible to the see the foundations of an electorate that might be more attracted to claims that incompetence on the part of the Polish government and intransigence on the part of Polish bureaucrats had combined to produce a raw deal for Poland, as opposed to more fundamental belief that European project itself was "evil".

Turning to the LPR, perhaps the best evidence to support the argument that LPR Euroskeptics were more fundamentally anti-Europe can be found in the

fact that they consistently have the most negative opinions of the EU, especially in questions that ask for the most broad-based evaluation of the EU. This includes the 0-10 scale reported above in Table 4, but also the evaluation of whether EU membership is good or bad for Poland and the extent to which the EU is distrusted. LPR Euroskeptics also had the least European-based identity of any of the Euroskeptics, and they were significantly less trusting of NATO, an organization towards which even the average Euroskeptic had a generally positive view.[18] It is also interesting to note that it is SRP Euroskeptics, and not LPR Euroskeptics, that are most concerned about the impact of EU membership on their personal financial situation, although this is clearly a matter of degree, as both groups lean strongly towards believing that their personal financial situation will be adversely affected by EU membership.

A final way to cut into the question of whether SRP and LPR attracted different types of Euroskeptics is to examine their prior political behavior. In Table 6 (below), we break down our four categories of Euroskeptics by their 1997 vote choice.[19]

Three findings are apparent from Table 6. First, LPR Euroskeptics overwhelmingly came from voters for AWS in 1997. Second, SRP picked up the majority of its Euroskeptics from Polish Peasant Party (PSL), the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), and the Union of Labor (UP). This leads to a very clear observation: LPR was picking up Euroskeptics with a history of right-wing political behavior, while SRP was picking up Euroskeptics with a history of left-wing political behavior. To return to our theme of representation, one could argue that the presence of both a left-wing and right-wing Euroskeptic party may have afforded Polish Euroskeptics even more of an opportunity to vote for a party in 2001 that shared their position on the EU, without having to move too far along the political spectrum to do so. While these patterns mimic the movement of voters across parties between 1997 and 2001 from the electorate as a whole, the patterns were

more extreme among Euroskeptics. For example, LPR picked up approximately 12% of the overall 1997 AWS electorate in 2001, but almost 20% of the Euroskeptic 1997 AWS electorate. Similarly, SRP picked up 3%, 5%, and 19% of the 1997 SLD, UP, and PSL electorates overall, respectively, but 6%, 13%, and 24% of their Euroskeptic 1997 electorates.

Table 6: 1997 Euroskeptic Vote Choice by 2001 Vote Choice

2001 Vote		1997 Vote								
		NV	SLD	AWS	UW	SRP	PSL	ROP	UP	Total
NV	N	85	20	34	3	0	12	2	6	162
	% Non-Voters 01	52.5%	12.3%	21.0%	1.9%	0.0%	7.4%	1.2%	3.7%	100%
	% Vote Choice 97	77.3%	20.6%	29.1%	11.5%	0.0%	26.7%	40.0%	40.0%	38.9%
Other	N	18	70	57	19	0	21	0	7	192
	% Other Parties 01	9.4%	36.5%	29.7%	9.9%	0.0%	10.9%	0.0%	3.6%	100%
	% Vote Choice 97	16.4%	72.2%	48.7%	73.1%	0.0%	46.7%	0.0%	46.7%	46.2%
SRP	N	7	6	3	1	0	11	1	2	31
	% SRP 01	22.6%	19.4%	9.7%	3.2%	0.0%	35.5%	3.2%	6.5%	100%
	% Vote Choice 97	6.4%	6.2%	2.6%	3.8%	0.0%	24.4%	20.0%	13.3%	7.5%
LPR	N	0	1	23	3	1	1	2	0	31
	% LPR 01	0.0%	3.2%	74.2%	9.7%	3.2%	3.2%	6.5%	0.0%	100%
	% Vote Choice 97	0.0%	1.0%	19.7%	11.5%	100%	2.2%	40.0%	0.0%	7.5%
Total	N	110	97	117	26	1	45	5	15	416
	% LPR 01	26.4%	23.3%	28.1%	6.3%	0.2%	10.8%	1.2%	3.6%	100%
	% Vote Choice 97	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

As demonstrated in Table 7 (below), we come to a similar conclusion when we observe the self-placement of Euroskeptics on a traditional left (0) – right (10) scale. LPR Euroskeptics are overwhelming more rightist than the average Euroskeptic, and SRP Euroskeptics are significantly more leftist than the average Euroskeptic. There is also little distinction between Euroenthusiasts and Euroskeptics as a whole, with the average Euroskeptic (4.8) only marginally more rightist than the average Euroenthusiast (4.7). This again points to the importance of both a left and right wing Euroskeptic option for the electorate, as Eurskepticism does not appear by itself to inherently be an issue of the left or right.[20]

Table 7. Average Left-Right Self-Placement of Euroskeptics by Vote Choice

	Mean	N
Non-Voters	4,78	249
Other Parties	4,66	265
SRP	4,19	51
LPR	6,90	36
Total	4,81	600
	F	**Sig.**
	10,2	0,000

Finally, it is important to note what apparently did not happen in 2001: the attraction of Euroskeptics to SRP and LPR does not appear to be a story of mobilizing the formally unmobilized "silent majority". With the appropriate caveats regarding the use of a recall vote question, it is clear that LPR was drawing the vast majority of its support among Euroskeptics from those who were already participating in the political process in 1997.[21] While SRP did receive a more substantial proportion (22%) of its Euroskeptic electorate from 1997 Euroskeptic non-voters, this represented a very small proportion of the 1997 Euroskeptic non-voting population (<7%). Indeed, over three-quarters of Euroskeptic non-voters in 1997 remained non-voters in 2001. This is practically the identical proportion of 1997 non-voters overall that remained non-voters in 2001, suggesting that Euroskepticism did not play an important role in drawing voters into the political process.

Overall, then, we can conclude the following. The emergence of Euroskeptic parties in the 2001 election provided an opportunity for a Polish Euroskeptic voter to support a party that would represent him or her on the issue of EU membership. While certainly not all Polish Euroskeptics chose to swallow the rest of the baggage that went along with voting for the LPR or SRP, voters for these two parties were consistently more Euroskeptic than Euroskeptics who opted to vote for the pro or neutral EU parties or sat out the election altogether. Moreover, these two parties presented a choice for Polish Euroskeptics: those who had voted for the right and had a stronger sense of antipathy toward EU membership were more likely to end up

supporting LPR, while those who had voted for the left and were perhaps more "pragmatic" about their opposition to the EU were more likely to end up supporting SRP. Taken together, we can offer this as a sign that Polish representative democracy in 2001 was indeed responsive, and thus was fulfilling one of Achen's goal of "popular sovereignty" in a liberal democracy.

Effects of Political Representation

We now turn now turn to the final empirical question of the paper. Does representation along the dimension of EU membership have any effect on how Polish citizens view politics and political parties, and, if so, how strong is it relative to other issue areas? As mentioned in the introduction, we consider both *diffuse* and *specific* effects of representation. To measure the *diffuse* effect of representation, we analyze Poles' satisfaction with the way democracy works in Poland on 1 (very satisfied) to 4 (not very satisfied) scale. To measure the *specific* effects of representation, we assess the effect of representation on both choice amongst parties and the intensity of feelings about parties, the latter on a series of 0 (dislikes) to 10 (likes) scales. In all cases, the effect of representation on the issue of EU membership is compared to representation across three other important issue areas: religion, tax, and privatization. These three issue areas were chosen in response to previous research on Polish politics suggesting two primary axis of differentiation: an economic one (reform vs. non-reform, or more generally liberal pro-market vs. populist redistribution) and a socio-cultural one (secular cosmopolitanism vs. a more fundamental religious Polish nationalism) (Markowski 1997, Jasiewicz 1999, Kitschelt et al. 1999). Tax policy and privatization clearly tap into the first of these dimensions and religion into the second; for exact question wording, see Appendix I.

To measure political representation at the individual level, we rely on the technique of proximity scores.[22] We use a simple measure of proximity

whereby the proximity score is a calculation of the distance between one's own view on a position and the stance of whatever institution is doing the representing on that issue. Here we are interested in the representation provided by political parties, so we focus on the distance between one's own view and the position of one's party.[23] To identify one's party, we rely on the following rules. For respondent's who reported voting in the 2001 election, we use the party for which they voted. For non-voters, we look first to whether they identify a party to which they feel close or closer to than other political parties. For non-voters who do not identify such a party, we use the party that they ranked highest on a 0-10 "likes vs. dislikes" scale.

We then calculate two different types of proximity scores. For a "para-objective" measure of where the party stands, we use the average response of the members of parliament of that party on the issue areas (e.g., the position for LPR on EU membership is taken to be the mean score given by LPR members of parliament on the EU issue area). Thus our para-objective proximity score is an attempt to assess how far a respondent is on a given issue from where the party's representatives in the parliament actually stand on that issue. While normative justifications of representative democracy are most concerned with objective representation, it may be the case that citizens are as influenced – or even more influenced – by the degree of subjective representation that they actually perceive. Thus we calculate a second "subjective" proximity score, which measures the distance between a voter's position on an issue area and that voter's belief of where her party stands on that issue, (e.g., the distance between an LPR voter's position on EU membership and her belief as to where LPR stands on the position of EU membership). Table 8 shows both types of proximity scores by issue area, by voters and non-voters, and by party preference of both voters and non-voters. For comparison, we also include objective proximity scores from 1997.[24]

Table 8: Proximity Scores

		2001							
		Objective				Subjective			
		EU	PRV	REL	TAX	EU	PRV	REL	TAX
Voters	SLD	3.88	2.98	1.59	2.95	2.99	2.85	1.47	2.51
	SRP	3.30	2.39	2.43	2.52	2.64	2.81	3.04	2.29
	PiS	3.10	3.51	4.93	3.72	2.82	2.66	2.79	2.77
	PSL	3.31	3.08	2.73	2.61	3.08	2.73	3.28	1.86
	PO	3.27	4.09	2.85	5.61	2.70	3.09	2.30	3.40
	LPR	3.06	2.22	3.78	2.92	2.35	2.71	3.36	1.80
	VOTED	3.52	3.09	2.50	3.32	2.85	2.84	2.19	2.53
Non Voters	SLD	3.91	2.85	1.58	2.95	2.79	2.75	1.77	2.30
	SRP	3.35	2.20	2.20	2.63	3.51	2.20	2.89	2.64
	PiS	2.52	3.98	5.19	4.11	2.64	3.23	2.41	3.29
	PSL	3.00	3.30	3.10	2.32	3.35	2.79	3.22	2.64
	PO	4.09	4.40	2.49	6.13	3.07	3.84	2.44	3.43
	LPR	5.18	2.66	5.02	3.02	3.39	3.36	4.81	3.69
	NV	3.60	3.08	2.58	3.43	3.07	2.83	2.45	2.74
	Total	3.55	3.08	2.53	3.36	2.92	2.84	2.28	2.60

		1997			
		Objective			
		EU	PRV	REL	TAX
Voters	UW	2.91	3.05	2.10	4.30
	AWS	2.61	2.85	3.33	3.93
	SLD	2.55	2.49	1.34	2.99
	PSL	3.03	2.41	2.35	2.75
	ROP	6.44	2.52	3.77	3.86
	VOTED	2.91	2.73	2.54	3.64
Non-Voters	UW	2.62	3.57	2.12	4.04
	AWS	2.93	3.58	3.84	3.98
	SLD	3.03	2.55	1.57	2.90
	PSL	3.25	2.49	2.69	3.36
	ROP	5.74	2.22	2.07	3.05
	NV	3.13	3.12	2.73	3.60
	Total	2.99	2.87	2.61	3.63

Four interesting observations can be made on the basis of this table. First, the EU issue area does not look radically different from the other three issue areas in terms of proximity scores, although in general it has the largest proximity scores. This is most evident in terms of objective proximity scores in 2001, where voters are farther from their party in the EU issue area than the other three issue areas, and indeed are almost a full point farther than in the area of religion. A similar pattern can be found in terms of subjective proximity scores, although the gap with the other issue areas is not quite as large. And in 1997, tax policy actually had the largest proximity scores, while EU had the second.[25] Supporters thus seem willing to vote for parties that are a little farther from their position on EU membership from their party than on other issue areas (and especially religion), but not a significantly larger amount more.

Second, objective proximity scores increased in the EU issue area between 1997 and 2001. In some ways, this should not be surprising, given the overall increased variation in attitudes towards EU membership from 1997-2001. Still, it is worth noting that this pattern was not consistent across all of the issue areas. Average proximity scores for tax (a more salient issue than EU membership) and religion (a less salient issue than EU membership), in contrast, dropped from 1997 to 2001.

Third, most of the subjective proximity scores are lower than their commensurate objective proximity scores. Thus citizens in 2001 thought that they were closer to the position of their party on the issue of EU membership than the average position of the members of parliament would actually suggest. Moreover, this is generally an across the board phenomenon. It is only when we disaggregate to the level of particular party supporters on particular issues (e.g., non-voters who preferred the PSL actually were closer to the PSL on the EU issue area than they thought they were) do we find smaller subjective than objective proximity scores. While this is a very interesting finding that certainly deserves more attention in the future, for now we merely note the similarity of the EU issue area to the other three in this regard and the overall pattern of smaller subjective proximity scores across the same issue.[26]

With these differences in mind, we begin our assessment of the diffuse effects of representation on the EU issue area by assessing whether Poles who are closer to their preferred party on the issue of EU membership are more satisfied with democracy than those who are farther away from their party on this issue. As a first cut, Table 9 calculates the mean satisfaction with democracy score for four categories of respondents on the basis of their proximity to their own party on the issue area at the head of column (1 = High Satisfaction, 4 = Low Satisfaction).

Table 9. Mean Satisfaction with Democracy by Issue Area Proximity to Preferred Party

	Objective Proximity Scores			
	EU	**Privatization**	**Religion**	**Tax**
Most Proximate (<1)	2.57 (243)	2.64 (247)	2.74 (179)	2.63 (187)
>1 & < 2	2.69 (255)	2.73 (233)	2.76 (616)	2.77 (221)
>2 & < 3	2.75 (314)	2.70 (365)	2.72 (355)	2.79 (566)
Least Proximate (>4)	2.83 (490)	2.81 (469)	2.70 (212)	2.69 (371)
Total	2.74 (1302)	2.73 (1314)	2.74 (1361)	2.74 (1345)

	Subjective Proximity Scores			
	EU	**Privatization**	**Religion**	**Tax**
Most Proximate (<1)	2.69 (294)	2.72 (260)	2.62 (387)	2.69 (303)
= 1 , 2	2.71 (305)	2.73 (332)	2.79 (328)	2.75 (337)
= 3 , 4	2.74 (216)	2.63 (240)	2.80 (196)	2.69 (186)
Least Proximate (>4)	2.78 (316)	2.80 (291)	2.78 (232)	2.73 (278)
Total	2.73 (1132)	2.72 (1123)	2.73 (1143)	2.72 (1105)

Number of Observations in Parentheses

Two observations are immediately apparent from examining the objective proximity scores. First, respondents that are the most proximate to their party on EU membership are the most satisfied with democracy of any issue area. Second, dissatisfaction with democracy increases in an almost linear fashion – exactly as predicted in the previous paragraph – as respondents are less and less represented by their party on the issue of EU membership. Somewhat surprisingly, this is not the case for either tax, religion, or privatization.[27] Even more strikingly, these findings hold if we move beyond the four issues contained in Table 9 to the entire range of ten issues on which Poles were asked their opinions: those closest to their party in terms of EU membership were the most satisfied with democracy of any issue area, and

no other issue area has a clear linear relationship between proximity and average satisfaction with democracy.[28]

The findings are not as stark in terms of subjective proximity, although they are largely as expected. There is still basically a linear relationship in the correct direction between being subjectively close to one's party on the issue of EU membership and being satisfied with the state of democracy in Poland, although the magnitude of this effect is much smaller. Those most proximate to their party had an average satisfaction with democracy of 2.69; those least proximate an average of 2.78. And those most proximate on EU membership are no longer the most satisfied of any category (e.g., the most proximate in terms of religion and, somewhat strangely, those in the third category on privatization are more satisfied with democracy) but it remains one of the most satisfied groups.

Of course, breaking down parties into any set of categories to compare mean satisfaction with democracy is always going to be a somewhat arbitrary process dependent on the delineation of the categories. For this reason, we also use regression analysis to assess this same question in Table 10. In both regressions, the dependent variable is the respondent's satisfaction with democracy, and the independent variables are the objective (subjective) proximity scores from their preferred party by issue area. The results of these regressions largely confirm the findings from Table 9. In terms of objective proximity to one's party, being close on the issue of EU membership is clearly the most important of the four issue in terms of having an effect on satisfaction with democracy. While the magnitude of this effect should not be overstated, the effect is in the correctly predicted direction and it is statistically significant.[29] Moreover, it has the largest effect of the four issue areas, and is one of only two in the correctly predicted direction.

Table 10. Regression Analysis of Effect of Issue Proximity on Satisfaction with Democracy

Issue Area Proximity	1 Objective Proximity	2 Subjective Proximity
EU	.045*** (.011)	.014 (.012)
Tax	-.011 (.012)	.014 (.012)
Religion	-.036* (.014)	.023 (.012)
Privatization	.007 (.014)	.008 (.012)
Constant	2.62*** (.073)	2.50*** (.063)
N	740	613

Similar to the Table 9, the coefficients on the subjective proximity scores in Table 10 also reveal the correctly predicted effect, but the effect is not as strong and we can no longer conclude that attitudes towards EU membership is the most important dimension of representation. Instead, proximity in terms of attitudes towards religion appears to be equally important, although neither coefficient is particularly large relative to its own standard error. Nevertheless, there does appear to be significant evidence that both objectively and subjectively representation on the issue area of EU membership is related to a respondent's overall level of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Poland.

So if representation on the issue of EU membership has some of the expected effects on diffuse satisfaction with politics, can we say the same for more specific political effects? In Table 11, we compare the effect of representation on party preferences across our four issue areas.[30] Recall that party preference is defined as the vote choice of voters, and either the most liked or most close party of non-voters. Each model has a dichotomous dependent variable: whether or not the respondent's preferred party is the party at the top of column. The independent variables are the proximity scores between the respondent's position on that issue and the position of the

party of the model.[31] As the dependent variables are dichotomous, the model is estimated using binomial logit analysis.[32] As larger proximity scores represent less political representation on a given issue, we expect to find coefficients with negative signs, signifying that closer proximity to a party increases the likelihood that respondents will prefer that party.

Again, we find a clear pattern of the importance of objective representation on the issue of EU membership. For four of the six parties, we are confident that closer proximity to the party on the issue of EU membership makes the respondent more likely to prefer that party. Not surprisingly, this includes the two Euroskeptic parties, SRP and LPR, as well as the two most Euroenthusiastic parties, the PO and SLD. Moreover, the effect is seen on a larger number of parties than any of the other three issue areas; indeed, only religion is in the correct direction for two of the political parties.[33]

The results in terms of subjective proximity, however, present a somewhat different picture. While the coefficients on the EU issue area are in the correctly predicted direction for five out of the six parties, the standard errors are large enough that we are really only confident that we have found the expected effect in the model predicting support for the SRP. By comparison, subjective representation on the issues of tax and religion appears to be much more consistently important in predicting one's preferred party.

Interestingly, this leaves us with a similar finding to when we tested the diffuse effects of representation regarding EU membership. Objective representation in the issue of EU membership appears to be important to Poles in terms of both satisfaction with democracy and in choosing between political parties; moreover, it is more consistently important than the other issue areas. Subjectively, however, thinking that one is close to a party on the issue of EU membership appears to be less important, and especially in comparison to issues of taxation and religion.

Table 11. Logit Analysis of Effect of Issue Proximity on Party Preference

Panel 1. Objective Proximity Scores

Issue Area Proximity	SLD	SRP	PiS	PSL	PO	LPR
EU	-.047* (.021)	-.118*** (.031)	-.002 (.050)	.051 (.052)	-.086** (.030)	-.095* (.040)
Tax	-.045 (.032)	-.083* (.039)	-.016 (.053)	-.076 (.044)	-.048 (.025)	.093 (.071)
Religion	-.255*** (.035)	.022 (.032)	-.032 (.043)	-.103 (.079)	.046 (.060)	-.305*** (.044)
Privatization	-.007 (.030)	-.046 (.040)	-.070 (.047)	.122* (.060)	-.122*** (.034)	-.015 (.067)
Constant	.445** (.166)	-.945*** (.189)	-1.70 (.288)	-2.32*** (.296)	-.771** (.262)	-1.08** (.366)
N	1357	1357	1357	1357	1357	1357

*** p≤.001, **p≤.01, *p≤.05

Dependent variable in each column is whether or not party at top of column is respondent's preferred party; proximity score is distant of respondent from that party.

Panel 2. Subjective Proximity Scores

Issue Area Proximity	SLD	SRP	PiS	PSL	PO	LPR
EU	-.022 (.022)	-.089** (.032)	-.005 (.044)	.024 (.042)	-.051 (.036)	-.095 (.055)
Tax	-.053* (.024)	-.068* (.034)	-.123** (.047)	-.164** (.052)	-.068* (.033)	-.086 (.057)
Religion	-.130*** (.027)	-.072* (.034)	-.100* (.047)	-.022 (.045)	-.201*** (.043)	-.174*** (.045)
Privatization	-.057* (.024)	-.028 (.035)	-.049 (.044)	.031 (.045)	-.091** (.035)	-.011 (.055)
Constant	.349** (.131)	-.764*** (.199)	-1.07*** (.245)	-1.90*** (.255)	-.402 (.224)	-1.07*** (.309)
N	1036	940	812	948	924	759

*** p≤.001, **p≤.01, *p≤.05

Dependent variable in each column is whether or not party at top of column is respondent's preferred party; proximity score is distant of respondent from that party.

As a final test, we examine the effect of political representation on the intensity of feelings Poles hold about political parties. In Table 12, columns 2-7 are roughly similar to Table 11, in so far as the independent variables measure proximity to the party at the head of the column, although the dependent variable now measures how much the respondent likes the party in

question on a 0-10 score. The first column, however, is set up similar to Table 10: the dependent variable is how much the respondent likes her own party, and the independent variables measure proximity to that preferred party on each of the issues

The clearest result from Table 12 is that none of the variables in column 1 of either the objective or subjective analyses are statistically significant. Put another way, we have no confidence that greater proximity to one's preferred party on any of these issues makes people like their party more intensely. This is in stark contrast to columns 2-7, which reveal numerous examples of cases where being more proximate to any given party makes the respondent like that party more. This is of course a much lower threshold, as it essentially reveals that people who are closer to, for example, PO on the issue of EU membership like PO more than people who are farther from PO on the issue of EU membership. So we can say that while proximity on issue areas increases the likelihood that a respondent will both like a party and prefer that party to all others, it does not differentiate how much the party is liked among its supporters.

Looking across the issue areas, we find that the EU issue area looks similar to the other three in terms of objective proximity, with likes/dislikes scores for three of the six parties being a function of proximity in the correctly predicted direction at a statistically significant level; as in previous cases, this includes both of the Euroskeptic parties.[34] The other three issue areas reveal similar results, although again the magnitude of the effects for religion – when statistically significant – are by far the largest. In contrast to the previous analyses, there is little difference between subjective and objective proximity in terms of the issue area – in both analyses, SRP, PO, and LPR are all more liked among those more proximate on the issue.

Table 12. Regression Analysis of Effect of Issue Proximity on Party Likes/Dislikes

Panel 1. Objective Proximity Scores

Issue Area Proximity	1 Own Party	2 SLD	3 SRP	4 PiS	5 PSL	6 PO	7 LPR
EU	.031 (.032)	-.006 (.031)	-.191*** (.031)	.074 (.042)	.005 (.038)	-.106*** (.027)	-.098*** (.025)
Tax	-.050 (.036)	-.056 (.047)	-.133*** (.038)	-.035 (.046)	-.099*** (.029)	-.095*** (.025)	.055 (.049)
Religion	-.040 (.041)	-.360*** (.041)	.037 (.036)	-.195*** (.037)	-.068 (.056)	-.039 (.061)	-.381*** (.034)
Privatization	.021 (.041)	.006 (.045)	-.175*** (.038)	.020 (.040)	.074 (.042)	-.142*** (.034)	-.097* (.041)
Constant	7.81*** (.210)	6.12*** (.238)	5.38*** (.202)	5.34*** (.259)	4.40*** (.213)	5.50*** (.268)	6.25 (.291)
N	783	1368	1340	1255	1331	1274	1156

*** p≤.001, **p≤.01, *p≤.05

Panel 2. Subjective Proximity Scores

Issue Area Proximity	1 Own Party	2 SLD	3 SRP	4 PiS	5 PSL	6 PO	7 LPR
EU	.003 (.034)	-.009 (.033)	-.146*** (.033)	-.006 (.040)	-.056 (.031)	-.118*** (.032)	-.133*** (.038)
Tax	-.058 (.035)	-.129*** (.035)	-.178*** (.034)	-.083* (.039)	-.132*** (.033)	-.105*** (.031)	-.145*** (.040)
Religion	-.066 (.036)	-.263*** (.037)	-.007 (.036)	-.040 (.039)	-.016 (.033)	-.191*** (.036)	-.178*** (.034)
Privatization	-.030 (.035)	-.060 (.035)	-.085* (.037)	-.134*** (.038)	-.083* (.035)	-.128*** (.032)	-.079 (.042)
Constant	8.16*** (.180)	6.51*** (.193)	5.40*** (.221)	5.45*** (.235)	5.15*** (.190)	5.67*** (.228)	5.76*** (.265)
N	640	1049	942	794	958	912	709

*** p≤.001, **p≤.01, *p≤.05

For both panels: dependent variable is dislikes/likes (0-10) score for party at the head of the column in columns 2-7, and for the party that the respondent voted for in column 1. Proximity scores are relative to party at the head of the column in all columns 2-7 and analysis includes all respondents. Proximity scores are relative to the party the respondent voted for in column 1 and analysis includes only voters for these six parties

Taken together, we can make the following conclusions regarding the effects of political representation on the issue of EU membership. First,

representation on the EU issue area clearly has both diffuse and specific effects on how Poles viewed politics. Second, the representation on this issue has just as much of an effect, and in many cases apparently more an effect, as representation on such key issues as tax policy, privatization policy, and the degree to which the church should be involved with politics. Finally, objective representation on the issue of EU membership is more closely related to both satisfaction with democracy and party preferences than is subjective representation on the issue of EU membership. We take up the implications of these findings, as well as those from the previous sections of the paper, in the final concluding section.

Discussion

In this paper we have analyzed presumably the most unstable, unconsolidated (inchoate) party system of East Central Europe. It has in part been unstable because of recurring changes to its institutional design, especially in terms of electoral rules, which have changed between almost every set of parliamentary elections. Nor has stability on the part of political elites, who have left parties, split parties, and merged parties with surprising frequency, helped (Zielinski, Slomczynski, and Shabad 2004).The result has been very low confidence on the part of Poles in their political infrastructure. Barely half of the population cares about voting at national elections. Nevertheless in the 2001 elections we have witnessed a classical example of elite-level political responsiveness to the will of the people. Irrespectively how one evaluates the credentials of the politicians of the two radical-populist, euroskeptic parties – Samoobrona and LPR – the representativeness of the Polish parliament and the political system has benefited from the emergence of these two new political actors, especially in terms of the EU issue area. The simple relationship between political representation and quality of democracy in principle seems obvious – the more of the former the better for the latter. There are however exceptions and we may be witnessing one, because the long-term consequences of the boosting of this kind of populist

representation is fairly obvious – the Polish political system has radicalized during the last four years. As a result, moderate parties have started competing for radical voters, overbidding in promises and polarizing the scene. Consequently, moderate willingness for cooperation and consensus-seeking attitudes among the elites have evaporated in the 2001-2005 parliament. This developments can hardly be indicative of improving the quality of democracy. And one can only wonder if this trade-off between the quality of democracy and the quality of representation will be an ever more frequent concern as democratic elections spread further around the globe.

The findings of the paper tell us that even in such an inchoate party system, certain basic mechanism nonetheless work: the signaling game between masses and elites seems to be efficient; individuals correctly identify parties' policy stances; and even the intensity of attitudes seems to be logically related to party support (the radically euroskeptic voters being overrepresented among the euroskeptic parties' followers). Additionally, the salience of the issues is reasonably (plausibly) linked to individuals' positive attitudes towards the EU (and other) issue(s). Despite the fact that the issue of EU membership may have been less salient for the masses than elites, it nevertheless ultimately mattered significantly in individuals' electoral choices, and party preferences.

Polish euroskepticism of the turn of the century did not however, as many tend to believe in Poland, mobilize the apathetic part of society. Those who voted for the two euroskeptic parties were already engaged in electoral politics earlier. It is important also to note that there are different euroskepticisms (plural) in Poland: the more fundamental one, which predominantly was attracted by the LPR platform; and the more pragmatic one that went to support this SRP. This distinction is visible both at the attitudinal level of what supporters of these two parties preferences are and from where they were "recruited" in the 2001 election.

Finally, we see how important social dynamics are as compared to static snap shots of political life. Even if proximity – the closeness of individuals to their likely representatives on certain issues at some point in time – is not impressive it can quickly change. This is because the fundamental electoral mechanism is at work, the will to be (re-) elected, makes politicians responsive to voters preferences. And despite the inherent instability of the Polish political scene in the late 1990s, we've clearly registered these fundamental mechanisms at work it in our analyses of the EU issue area in the Polish case.

Notes

[1] See for example Adshead and Hill 2005; for turnout figures, see http://www.elections2004.eu.int/ep-election/sites/en/results1306/turnout_ep/index.html.

[2] For more comparative studies, see Cichowski 2000; Tucker et al. 2002; Doyle and Fidrmuc 2003; Tverdova and Anderson 2004;. For studies of Poland in particular, see McManus-Czubińska et al. 2004; Szczerbiak 2001; Lewis 2002; Bielasiak 2002; Markowski and Tucker 2005.

[3] See McManus- Czubińska et al. 2004 for a similar justification for studying Poland.

[4] Markowski served as the principal investigator and director of both the 1997 and 2001 Polish National Election Studies (in Polish, Polskie Generalne Studium Wyborcze, or PGSW).

[5] For more on the general topic of political representation, see for example Pitkin 1967; Barnes 1977; Fenno 1977; Eulau and Wahlkie 1978; Converse, Pierce 1986; Holmberg 1989; Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge 1994; Essaiason and Holmberg 1996.

[6] For a different earlier proposal, see Eulau and Wahlkie (1978).

[7] All ten issues were carefully selected on the basis of their salience among Polish publics. The exact wording of this question is in the Appendix. At this point let us only mention that the structure of the question expect the respondent to assess the salience of the issue compared to all other on the list.

[8] Tables omitted out of concern for space, but are available from the authors upon request.

[9] The elite surveys, at both points in time, were "in the field" approximately half a year after the parliamentary election, which means they were conducted *de facto* in 1998 and 2002, but for the sake of clarity we will refer to them as elite surveys 1997 and 2001, as they are part of Polish National Election Study 1997 and 2001 projects.

[10] In the 1997 elite and mass surveys, respondents were asked about the importance of NATO and EU membership in a single question. At that time the two issues were almost always publicly debated together and there were very few ideas voiced that they ought to be discussed separately.

[11] Radio Maryja is a Catholic-based radio station which espouses politically radical, xenophobic and nationalistic views. Its non-political programs, however, play an important role in targeting the needs of Poland's more marginalized populations, including especially the poor and uneducated.

[12] Although eventually it would suggest support for the idea either of a "Europe of sovereign nations" or a "confederation of independent states".

[13] Between the 1997 and 2001 parliamentary election, a law was enacted that prohibited all organizations other than political parties or citizens' committees from participating in elections. Thus the Self-Defense (Samoobrona) trade union reorganized as the Self-Defense for the Republic of Poland (SRP) political party.

[14] Later in this section we refer to Euroenthusiasts, who are defined as people who score between 0-4 on the EU position scale.

[15] Defining hard core Euroskeptics as those who provided either just a score of 10 or a score of 8-10 on the EU position question produces largely similar findings for LPR, although less of a distinction for SRP. When hard core is limited to 10, SRP looks more similar to LPR; when it is expanded to 8-10, SRP looks fairly similar to the Other and Non-Voter categories.

[16] We also calculated means across a question asking whether respondents had been more motivated by economic concerns or political and cultural concerns in choosing whether to support or oppose EU membership. We did not include this result in Table 5 because there was no obvious Euroskeptic direction to the question. However, it is interesting to note that overall, Euroskeptics leaned heavily in the economic direction (with a mean of 1.22 on the 1-2 scale, which was the same mean as in the entire sample) and, if anything, LPR (1.14) and SRP (1.18) voters were slightly more motivated by economic concerns than Euroskeptics generally.

[17] As a validation tests of these measures, we compared the means of Euroskeptics as a whole (the total row from Table 5) with the mean for the Euroenthusiasts (0-4 on the EU position scale). Across all 15 variables, the mean Euroskeptic position was indeed always further in the Euroskeptic directions (e.g., less trusting of the EU) than the mean position of Euroenthusiasts. In most cases, this difference was quite substantial, sometimes even as high as 0.5 on a one point scale. The most notable exceptions concerned the degree to which respondents thought EU membership would help foreign firms in Poland – pretty much everyone thought that it would – and the extent to which Poland could influence NATO decision making. Results are available from the authors upon request (or See Appendix I).

[18] Although it should be noted that LPR Euroskeptics shared the views of all Poles that NATO membership was good for Poland.

[19] Readers should note that the 2001 Polish NES study is not a panel study, and thus when we refer to 1997 vote choice we are relying on a question asked in 2001 of respondents' recall of their vote choices in 1997.

[20] In fact, in 1997, the average Euroenthusiast was actually farther to the right (5.69) than the average Euroskeptic (5.13)

[21] It should be noted, though, that roughly one-quarter of our Euroskeptics could not recall or refused to say for whom they voted in 1997 – approximately 7.5% were ineligible to vote in 1997 – so the results in this paragraph should be seen through this lens. In particular, if a significant proportion of people who refuse to say for whom they voted because they were ashamed of the fact that they did not vote then we are likely underestimating the extent to which LPR and SRP may have succeeded in mobilizing non-voters.

[22] For other work using different variations of proximity measure to study political representation, see Achen 1978, 1978; Budge and Farlie 1983; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989, and Kitschelt et al. 1999.

[23] Alternatively, for example, one could look at the degree of representation provided by the government or the parliament as a whole.

[24] Respondents were not asked to place parties on the EU issue area in the 1997 survey, so we can not calculate subjective scores for 1997.

[25] Recall that the EU question in 1997 was bundled with NATO membership as well; see note 11 for details.

[26] One other point worth noting is that although we disaggregate proximity scores by the party preferences of both voters and non-voters in Table 8, there is no particularly interesting pattern for proximity scores on the EU issue area in 2001 by these subgroups. It is worth noting that in both the subjective and objective categories the LPR, the most extreme Euroskeptic party, does have the lowest proximity score of all six parties, but this distinction is nothing compared to, for example, religion, where voters for the SLD have an average objective proximity score of 1.6 as opposed to voters for PiS, who have an average proximity score of 4.9. Perhaps the one interesting finding from within the EU issue area, however, is the sharp distinction between LPR voters and non-voters in terms of objective proximity scores, with the latter having an average score of 5.2 and the former 3.1. With the important caveat that the number of LPR non-voters that expressed an opinion on EU membership is a fairly small group (under 25 respondents), this finding suggests the possibility that people who preferred LPR because of their stance on tax and privatization may have held off from voting for them because of divergent positions on the EU (and religion); this observation also holds using the subjective scores, although the divergences are not as large.

[27] Among the sub-category of voters, the effects are even more dramatic. Those who are most proximate to their party on the EU issue area have an average satisfaction with democracy of 2.80; no other category for any issue area is less than 3.0. And the difference in satisfaction

between the most proximate EU voters (2.80) and the least proximate EU voters (3.44) is an even more substantively significant than across the sample as a whole.

[28] The other six issues are crime, unemployment, agricultural subsidies, social welfare, foreign direction investment, and how to handle old communist nomenklatura. Results are available from the authors upon request.

[29] All else being equal, moving from a proximity score of 0 on the EU issue area (in other words, being in complete agreement with one's party on the issue of EU membership) to a proximity score of 5 (in other words., being 5 points away from one's party on an 11 point scale on the issue of EU membership) would result in a .17 predicted decrease in satisfaction with democracy on a 1-4 scale.

[30] The results are very similar if the analysis is limited to just voters and the dependent variable is vote choice.

[31] So for example, in the first column, the dependent variable is a 1 if the respondent's preferred party is the SLD, and a 0 if it is another party; the independent variables are then each respondents' proximity to the SLD on each of the issue areas.. Respondents whose preferred party could not be ascertained are omitted from the analysis.

[32] We do not employ multinomial logit analysis because the independent variables differ across the six models.

[33] Although it should be noted that the magnitude of the effect of variation in proximity on religion in the two cases where it is statistically significant in the correct direction is significantly larger than any of the effects for representation on the issue of EU membership.

[34] The substantive magnitude of these effects are modest but meaningful. A shift from a proximity score of 1-6, all else equal, would yield a decrease in the likes/dislikes score of between approximately 0.5 to 1.0 on a 0-10 scale.

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Appendix I

Wording of Issue Position Questions in 2001 PGSW

P 54. A variety of solutions and policies aimed at solving the above mentioned issues are conceivable. On subsequent CARDS we present opposite solutions to each issue. Please read them carefully and tell me, where would you place your own opinions and stances. In doing so, please use the 11-point scale, where:

0 -- means full acceptance of the statement (solution) proposed on the left side of the CARD,

10 -- means full acceptance of the statement (solution) -- on the right side,

5 -- means that you favor solutions lying in between both opposite ones, and the remaining scale points indicate different levels of acceptance of each of those opposite statements.

(INTERVIEWER: Subsequently show CARDS 10 A through 10 J; At each point in time the respondent should have only one card. Please code answers according to the scale)

0_____1_____2_____3_____4_____5_____6_____7_____8_____9_____10

A/

00) Crime policies should be „tough" even if they restrict basic freedoms of average citizens

10) Crime ought to be fought against, but the policies should not restrict basic freedoms of average citizens

97) DK

B/

00) State owned enterprises should be privatized quickly; the inefficient ones should be liquidated

10) Enterprises should remain state property and their modernization financed from the state budget 97) DK

C/

00) The Church should be completely separated from the state and should not interfere with politics

10) The Church should exert influence over politics and state policies

97) DK

D/

00) Individuals occupying high positions under communism ('nomenclatura') should now be forbidden to perform responsible state functions

10) These individuals ('nomenclatura') should have the same rights as all others in competing for public offices and state positions

97) DK

E/

00) Fighting unemployment should be an absolute policy priority of the government, even if it leads to higher spending and inflation

10) Many other - more important than unemployment -issues should be governmental priority, i.e. balanced budget, fighting inflation, etc.

97) DK

F/

00) The higher one's income, the higher the percentage at which it should be taxed

10) Everyone should be taxed the same percentage of his/her income, irrespective of the income level

97) DK

G/

00) Our foreign policy should pursue joining the EU as soon as possible

10) Polish foreign policy should not pursue joining the EU, and should instead protect our political and economic sovereignty

97) DK

H/

00) Agriculture should receive subsidies from the budget, otherwise many farms will go bankrupt

10) Agriculture should not receive subsidies from the budget, because no single social group should live at the expense of society

97) DK

I/

00) The state should grant its citizens the widest possible social safety net, i.e. free health care, social welfare, education, etc.

10) Citizens should take their own responsibility for their healthcare, children's education, etc

97) DK

J/

00) It should not matter whether capital is Polish or foreign, as long as it boosts investment, production and creates new employment opportunities

10) Inflows of foreign capital should be deliberately limited as it makes the Polish economy dependent upon foreigners

97) DK

Chapter 9

From Consensus to Competition? Ideological Alternatives on the EU Dimension

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Abstract

According to the literature on EP elections, parties do not offer real choices on European integration to voters. Indeed, in most EU countries there has been broad consensus between the main parties about integration. Importantly, previous research shows that this elite convergence is not replicated among voters. Using EES data from the 1999 and 2004 Euroelections, this paper analyses the ideological dispersal of parties on the EU dimension within the EU member states. This analysis is done in two stages. First we describe longitudinally the development of inter-party competition on the EU dimension between the two elections. Moving to empirical analysis, we then examine the impact of various factors, divided into public opinion, national party system and EU hypotheses, for the breadth of party positions on integration.

Introduction

According to standard wisdom national parties want to stifle debate or contention over European integration. As the overwhelming majority of political parties throughout the European Union (EU) were established on the basis of domestic cleavages, the EU dimension – often referred to as the independence/integration dimension – tends to produce difficulties for them. Hence, parties have a strategic incentive to downplay European issues and to structure competition along the more familiar and thus safer domestic cleavages, primarily along the left-right dimension (Hix 1999; Marks & Steenbergen eds. 2002, 2004).

Indeed, research on elections to the European Parliament (EP) has confirmed that most national parties campaign on the basis of 'national' issues, with issues related to European integration very much in the background (e.g., van der Eijk & Franklin eds. 1996). Euroelections are therefore scarcely 'European', since national politics are reproduced in EP election campaigns, with largely the same set of actors and also the same set of issues. Arguably this situation is gradually changing. The rapid increase in the powers of the EU has resulted in higher levels of Euroscepticism, defined as opposition to further integration. While Eurosceptical parties and representatives remain very much in the minority in the Parliament, 2004 saw such parties or lists performing well in several member states, notably in Denmark, Great Britain, Poland and Sweden (Lodge ed. 2005). The good performance of these Eurosceptical forces did not come as a surprise. Notwithstanding the second-order logic of EP elections, with smaller and opposition parties gaining votes at the expense of mainstream and government parties, public opinion surveys such as Eurobarometers had indicated that people were becoming less supportive of the European project.

These developments would indicate that the days of the famous 'permissive consensus' are increasingly behind us. This is good news for representative

democracy. After all, in the 'responsible party model' parties should offer competing policy alternatives to the voters, with voters also being aware of these differences and choosing their party accordingly (Thomassen 1994). The more contestation there is over Europe, and the more salient integration is both for voters and for parties, the higher will be the likelihood of this basic premise of party democracy being fulfilled.

This paper analyses the range of alternatives national parties offer to the European electorate in EP elections. Using European Elections Study (EES) data from the 1999 and 2004 Euroelections, we first examine the ideological range of parties on the EU dimension in the EU member states. The next section introduces our research problem, and presents the hypotheses that guide the empirical analysis found in the following section. First we describe longitudinally the development of inter-party competition on the EU dimension between the two elections. Moving to the empirical analysis, we then examine the impact of various factors – divided into public opinion, national party system, and EU hypotheses – at the level of alternatives rather than integration. The concluding section summarizes the main findings.

Ideological alternatives and their sources

Parties can present alternatives about two aspects of politics: policy and performance. The former means that parties present different policy programmes to the voters, while the latter refers to the ability of parties to achieve certain goals. We can state with certainty that the latter function is of lesser importance. After all, people and parties do disagree about societal matters (such as how far European integration should go), and hence the alternatives parties offer to the citizens refer mainly to policies.

Our dependent variable is thus the level of ideological alternatives parties offer on the EU dimension. We use three operationalizations of the dependent variable. The first is range. We define range on a policy

dimension as being the distance between the two parties that occupy the extreme positions at both ends of that dimension. The higher the range, the more alternatives citizens have. In their analysis of the left-right dimension in the Nordic party systems, Gilljam and Oscarsson (1996: 26) refer to range as 'wing party distance', meaning the difference between the most left-wing and the most right-wing party on that dimension. In order to avoid a situation where a truly minuscule party would impact on our findings, we include only parties that won at least 3 % of the votes in the respective EP elections or in the preceding national parliamentary elections in our analysis.

However, range or wing party distance is not a concept without its problems. After all, the parties holding extreme positions could well be parties that most citizens would never consider voting for, such as extreme right or left parties, and hence one could argue that one should focus instead on the differences between the ideologically moderate 'mainstream' parties. Hence we also use another measurement of alternatives offered to voters: following Mair and Castles (1997: 154) we measure the difference between the two largest parties on that same policy dimension[1]. As this study focusses on the EU dimension, this clarification is arguably very important. Previous literature has shown that Euroscepticism is mainly the preserve of ideologically extremist or populist parties, i.e. more or less the same group of parties that are excluded from government in their member states (Taggart 1998, Hooghe et al. 2002). As most Europeans are not prepared to vote for such parties, it is also necessary to analyse the differences between the main political parties in each member state.

In addition, we employ a third operationalization that captures the nature of party competition over integration and the existence of choices on offer more effectively. This measurement is variance of party positions on the EU dimension, which we compute without taking into account the weight of parties. We feel that this non-weighted variance is more useful for our analysis, as we are primarily interested in the range of alternatives available

to the electorate and as our second operationalization already measures the differences between the two main parties in each country (see van der Eijk & Franklin 2004: 41).

But what produces ideological differences between political parties? And more specifically, when and why do parties adopt different positions on European integration? In this paper we put forward three rival explanations. According to the first perspective, ideological range on the EU dimension is a function of *public opinion*. The idea is simple: parties' positions on European integration should reflect those of their voters. However, we know from previous research that while parties are fairly representative of their voters on the left/right dimension, the picture is much bleaker in European matters. This strand of research has produced two main findings: regardless of the data used (voter perceptions of party locations or a combination of elite and survey data), there is a gap between the political parties and the voters, with the former more supportive of integration.[2] Secondly, the diversity of opinion found among the electorate is not replicated at the elite level, with the Eurosceptical section of the citizens particularly poorly represented by national parties. (See van der Eijk & Franklin 1991; Thomassen & Schmitt 1997, 1999; Schmitt & Thomassen 2000.)

Two analyses that focus on the same elections that we examine in this paper are particularly interesting in this respect. Using data from the 1999 EES, van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) showed that the diversity of opinion among the electorate was not reflected at party level. There was thus, according to those authors, 'potential for contestation' on EU matters, with the EU issue being a 'sleeping giant' in European politics. The study also showed the parties to be far more supportive of integration than were the voters. Analysing issue agreement in the 2004 EP elections, Mattila and Raunio (2006) concluded that parties were closer to their voters on the left/right dimension than on the EU dimension and that they were more supportive of European integration than their voters. That study also confirmed that political parties, at least in

those member states that joined the Union before 2004, failed to offer enough competing alternatives over European integration to voters.

Research thus shows that there is a gap between the elite and the citizens, with political parties more supportive of integration than are voters. However, there is still good reason to believe that public opinion does impact on parties' locations on the EU dimension. Hence we first argue that the set of alternatives correlates with public support for the EU — the higher the level of support in the country, the smaller the range. When a large majority of voters supports integration there is less need for the parties to compete on EU matters. Using the standard Eurobarometer / EES question ("Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?"), we measure support for the EU as being the share of citizens that holds positive views of their country's EU membership (H1).

Support for EU membership (or the lack of it) may or may not be shared to the same extent by electorates. Hence, it is possible that it is the divisiveness of the membership issue that affects party competition. According to our second hypothesis, the more polarized public opinion is on Union membership, the greater will be the range on the EU dimension (H2). Polarization is measured as being the standard deviation of the responses to the aforementioned membership question, with higher standard deviation indicating more variability in citizens' opinions.[3]

Our second set of hypotheses focuses on the properties of *national party systems*. The argument here is that the dispersion of party locations on the EU dimension is attributable to domestic party-political factors that have nothing or very little to do with European integration. We first put forward two hypotheses about the shape of the party system. According to H3 the more fragmented the party system, the greater the range of alternatives. Party system fragmentation is measured with the Laakso-Taagepera (1979) index

of effective parties, calculated from seat distribution in national parliaments at the time of the 1999 and 2004 EP elections. The rationale behind this hypothesis is simply that an increase in the number of parties should result in more ideological alternatives.

Next we hypothesize that the dispersion of parties on the left-right dimension is reflected or reproduced on the EU dimension — that is, the higher the level of choices on the left-right dimension, the greater the dispersion of parties on the EU dimension (H4). The location of parties on the left-right dimension is derived from the EES question, where the respondents were asked to place themselves and the parties on that dimension.[4] Our final national party system variable focuses on government composition, with the expectation being that the higher the number of government parties (at the time of the 1999 and 2004 Euroelections), the smaller will be the breadth of alternatives (H5). The logic here is that participation in government, particularly the bargaining involved in multiparty coalitions, results in ideological moderation. Additionally, government parties represent their country at the EU level in the Council and the European Council, and this may also facilitate consensus among government parties in EU matters (Mattila & Raunio 2006).

Finally, our last set of hypotheses examines whether specific *EU* factors impact on the choices parties offer over Europe. We expect to find that the timing of membership will matter (measured as the number of years elapsed since a country joined the Union), with the level of alternatives being greater in newer member countries (H6). The argument here is that in the older member countries, particularly in the six founding member states that had already joined the integration process in the 1950s, EU membership is a fact of life that is no longer contested among the political parties. In contrast, in the countries that joined the EU more recently, European integration is a new issue that produces more divisions within and between the parties. Furthermore, the membership referenda that took place in those countries

that joined the EU in 2004 (excluding Cyprus) prior to the June 2004 EP elections had forced parties to express their positions on European integration, or at least on membership, with citizens thus exposed to information about parties' European policies.

Our seventh and final hypothesis explores whether economic benefits derived from EU membership impact partisan contestation over integration. More specifically, we expect the level of alternatives to be greater in countries that are net contributors to the EU budget (H7). The example of Ireland illustrates the logic behind our hypothesis. While the Irish may not support deeper integration, there is broad consensus in Ireland – as shown by Eurobarometer studies – that EU membership has benefited the country, not least in economic terms. Hence there has traditionally been broad agreement among the Irish parties about European integration. However, if the (economic) benefits derived from membership are less visible, and if the country is a net contributor to the EU's budget, then presumably there is more contestation about integration. The three Nordic EU countries are good examples of the latter category of member states. We measure the countries' fiscal position as a net contributor or a net beneficiary to the EU budget using figures released by the European Commission (2005). These figures measure the net budget balance of each member state as a share of GDP. Negative values indicate that a member state contributes to the EU budget more than it receives EU funds and positive values indicate that a country is a net beneficiary from the budget.

The research hypotheses introduced in this section will be analysed in the empirical section. But first we present our data and compare the set of alternatives on the EU dimension in the 1999 and the 2004 elections.

Data and empirical analysis

Our data are taken from the European Election Study project, which consisted (for the most part) of identical surveys carried out in the EU countries just after the EP elections held in June 1999 and 2004. The enlargement that took place in 2004 obviously means that the data sets for the two elections are not identical. Unfortunately not all countries could be included in the 2004 data set. Malta was left out of the survey altogether and in three countries — Belgium, Lithuania and Sweden — the questionnaire did not include the EU scale question necessary for our analysis. This means that we have 37 observations altogether, 16 from 1999 and 21 from 2004 EP[5].

This paper's main interest is the location of parties on the EU dimension. This was operationalized in the EES questionnaire as a 1-10 scale measuring respondents' attitudes towards European unification. The exact wording of the question was: 'Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-scale. On this scale, 1 means unification "has already gone too far" and 10 means it "should be pushed further". What number on this scale best describes your position?' This question was followed by several questions where the respondents were asked to indicate, using the same scale, where the main parties of their respective countries were located. We measure party positions simply as a mean perception of the party location on both the EU and the left/right dimensions calculated from all respondents in a given member state.

It is of course possible that voter perceptions of party locations may not be accurate reflections of reality, with the majority of European citizens probably having quite limited information or knowledge of party policies, or at least those concerning European integration. However, it is important to

emphasize that, while voters may not be able to place parties accurately on political dimensions, they are likely to base their vote choices on their perceptions of party and/or candidate positions. Furthermore, a comparison of different measures of party positions (party manifesto data, expert evaluations and voter perceptions from the EES data) on the EU dimension showed that all measures correlate considerably with each other and, thus, measure the same thing (Marks et al. 2006).

Table 1 compares the dispersion of party locations on the EU dimension in the 1999 and 2004 EP elections, using the three operationalizations of the dependent variable introduced in the previous section. These were distance between the most pro-EU and anti-integrationist parties (range), variance of party positions and distance between the two largest parties (main parties). No clear pattern emerges from the comparison. Examining the distance between the extremist parties in those countries that joined the EU before 2004, we find that the range increased in six member states and decreased in seven. In 2004 there was no essential difference between the old and the new. This was not the case when looking at the positions of the two largest parties: these parties were further apart on the EU dimension in the new member countries. When examining the change between 1999 and 2004, we again notice the lack of a clear trend, since we found that the distance became greater in eight countries and smaller in five countries. The variance measure shows no real difference in 2004 between the old and new member countries. And, in terms of longitudinal comparison, the results are in line with our two other measurements for the level of alternatives: the variance increases in eight countries and decreases in five countries.

Turning our attention to individual member states, we notice that there were quite large differences between them. The range between extreme parties and the variance of party positions were largest in Denmark, Sweden and Greece and smallest in Finland (1999), Spain (2004), Slovenia and Belgium (1999, both Flanders and Wallonia). The wide availability of choices in Denmark

and Sweden is explained by the anti-EU parties and lists which have gained substantial support in the EP elections. The widest distances between the two main parties were found in Cyprus, Sweden and Slovakia while the distances were smallest in the Netherlands, Wallonia and Slovenia.

Our seven hypotheses are tested in Table 2. Given the small number of observations we do not perform multivariate regression analysis with our data but use simple bivariate regression analyses instead. We test the explanatory strength of the independent variables first with the whole data set and then for the 1999 and 2004 EP elections separately. We repeat this procedure for each of our three dependent variables (range between extreme parties, variance among party positions and distance between two main parties). The entries in the table are unstandardised bivariate regression coefficients.

The results in Table 2 are quite modest: most of our independent variables fail to explain the degree of party competition on the EU dimension in a statistically significant way, even if we use the liberal $p<0.10$ as a cut-off point for statistical significance. However, some conclusions can be made from the results. The number of government parties seems to be related to decreased party competition when we use range or variance as the dependent variable. This indicates that the 'quality' of party supply on the EU dimension is worse in countries with large multiparty coalition governments. Parties included in governments often have to revise their EU positions when entering negotiations with their coalition partners, with governments of other member states and with EU institutions. Moreover, parties that have reserved positions towards the EU may feel the need to revise their positions if they desire to be respectable candidates in post-election government formation negotiations.

Table 1. Range, variance and the distance between the two biggest parties on the EU-dimension in 1999 and 2004.

Country	Range			Variance			Two main parties		
	1999	2004	Change	1999	2004	Change	1999	2004	Change
Austria	2,35	3,01	0,66	0,89	1,85	0,97	0,24	0,63	0,39
Britain	2,44	2,07	-0,37	0,88	0,90	0,01	1,47	0,99	-0,48
Denmark	5,39	4,17	-1,22	4,66	3,98	-0,68	0,91	0,25	-0,66
Finland	0,80	3,00	2,20	0,10	0,97	0,87	0,18	1,08	0,90
France	2,11	2,08	-0,03	0,52	1,55	1,02	0,31	0,20	-0,11
Germany	3,03	1,99	-1,04	1,43	0,54	-0,88	0,23	0,53	0,30
Greece	3,64	4,54	0,90	2,33	3,81	1,48	0,22	0,50	0,28
Ireland	2,71	2,01	-0,70	0,88	0,53	-0,35	0,37	0,24	-0,13
Italy	1,92	2,91	0,99	0,48	0,75	0,27	0,28	0,83	0,55
Luxembourg	2,44	2,53	0,09	1,05	1,12	0,08	0,24	0,83	0,59
Netherlands	1,87	2,40	0,53	0,53	0,63	0,10	0,08	0,58	0,50
Portugal	3,06	2,56	-0,50	2,29	1,77	-0,53	0,27	0,19	-0,08
Spain	2,28	1,07	-1,21	1,04	0,24	-0,80	0,39	1,01	0,62
Belgium / Flanders	1,26	-	-	0,19	-	-	0,32	-	-
Belgium / Wallonia	1,09	-	-	0,21	-	-	0,09	-	-
Sweden	4,96	-	-	3,13	-	-	2,14	-	-
Cyprus	-	2,63	-	-	1,27	-	-	2,63	-
Czech	-	2,44	-	-	1,32	-	-	0,95	-
Estonia	-	2,03	-	-	0,52	-	-	1,64	-
Hungary	-	3,24	-	-	1,79	-	-	0,28	-
Latvia	-	1,67	-	-	0,35	-	-	1,62	-
Poland	-	4,13	-	-	2,37	-	-	0,18	-
Slovakia	-	3,68	-	-	1,98	-	-	1,83	-
Slovenia	-	1,08	-	-	0,24	-	-	0,15	-
All countries	2,58	2,63		1,29	1,36		0,48	0,82	
EU15	2,58	2,64	0,02	1,29	1,43	0,12	0,48	0,60	0,21
New member states		2,61			1,23			1,16	

The length of EU membership is clearly not connected to the level of choices offered by the parties. Some of the member states have been EU members for almost fifty years while the ten new member states entered their first EP elections right after their accession in 2004. One might assume that fifty years of EU membership would affect party competition on integration matters but this seems not to be the case. However, there is a statistically significant relationship between the length of EU membership and the distance between the two main parties: the longer a country has been an EU member, the less there is contestation between the main parties on the EU dimension.

Table 2. Bivariate regressions between range, variance and the distance between two biggest parties and the hypothesized factors affecting them (the entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, *p<0.10, **p<0.05).

	All cases (N=37)	EP elections 1999 (N=16)	EP elections 2004 (N=21)
Range			
EU support (H1)	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
EU polarization (H2)	0.60	0.69	1.18
Number of parties (H3)	-0.05	-0.16	0.00
Left/right range (H4)	0.15	0.19	0.12
Nr. of government parties (H5)	-0.22*	-0.30	-0.01
Length of membership (H6)	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00
Fiscal balance (H7)	0.14	0.21	0.04
Variance			
EU support (H1)	-0.01	-0.02	0.00
EU polarization (H2)	0.70	1.15	0.68
Number of parties (H3)	-0.07	-0.03	-0.09
Left/right variance (H4)	0.12	0.14	0.11
Nr. of government parties (H5)	-0.30**	-0.29	-0.33
Length of membership (H6)	-0.01	-0.03	-0.00
Fiscal balance (H7)	0.21	0.24	0.16
Two main parties			
EU support (H1)	-0.02**	-0.03**	-0.01
EU polarization (H2)	1.54**	1.77*	1.03
Number of parties (H3)	0.14	-0.01	0.23*
Left/right distance between main parties (H4)	0.18	0.14	0.17
Nr. of government parties (H5)	-0.02	-0.10	0.23
Length of membership (H6)	-0.01**	-0.01	-0.01
Fiscal balance (H7)	-0.01	-0.09	0.07

We should also ask why the 'quality' of party competition on the left/right dimension is not reflected on the EU dimension. The range and variance of party positions on these two dimensions appear to be quite uncorrelated. The extent of public support for EU membership and the polarization of this issue are not related to the range or the variance of party positions. However, they

do seem to be related to the competition between the two main contestants in the party system. When citizens are divided on the EU membership question, the two main parties are further apart from each other than they are when a large majority of citizens agree on the 'goodness' or 'badness' of their country's EU membership. A large consensus on the benefits of EU membership has an opposite. When support for membership is high, there is less need for the main parties to compete on the EU dimension. Finally, we notice that the number of parties in the party system and the fiscal benefits of the EU budget have little impact on the variability of parties' EU positions.

Conclusions

The results of our empirical analysis are quite interesting and even surprising. The strongest link was found to exist between government size and ideological alternatives, with large coalition governments hindering party competition on the EU dimension. Public opinion did have an effect on party positions, with the level of support for membership and polarization on this question impacting on competition between two main parties. The higher the polarization of support for membership, the greater is the difference between the two main competitors. The level of support for membership operates in the opposite direction: when EU membership is very popular there is less need for the two main parties to compete with each other on the EU dimension. However, overall our hypothesized factors explained only a small portion of between-country differences.

Perhaps more interesting are the findings of the longitudinal comparison between the 1999 and 2004 elections. The results show no clear trend, with the parties offering more alternatives to the citizens on EU issues in some member states and less in others. This is quite surprising, as one might have expected the breadth of positions to have increased. After all, European integration became arguably more 'politicized' than before during this five-year period. The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) held in 2000 produced

the Treaty of Nice, which only entered into force in 2003 after the Irish had first voted against it in a referendum. Then the Convention and the following IGC resulted in the Draft Constitution for Europe, the fate of which remains unknown. Moreover, the enlargement which took place in 2004 brought to the fore questions about the EU's budget and borders, including that of Turkey's membership. That these 'EU level' major constitutional events did not result in more divergence among national parties is quite worrying from the point of view of representative democracy and responsible models of party government. When these findings are analysed together with public opinion research on European integration, we note that parties still fail to offer the citizens alternatives on the EU dimension.

Afterword

We received highly useful comments on our paper in the Lisbon meeting. Below are our reflections on the comments, together with our own ideas on how to revise the paper for future publication.

Most of the comments focused on our hypotheses. Gábor Tóka suggested that we should spell out the logic behind the hypotheses better. He recommended merging hypotheses 1 (the higher the level of support for EU membership in the country, the smaller the range on the EU dimension) and 2 (the more polarized public opinion is on Union membership, the greater the range on the EU dimension), and clarifying the relationship between H3 (the more fragmented the party system, the greater the range of alternatives on the EU dimension) and H5 (the higher the number of government parties, the smaller the breadth of alternatives). He also suggested that we should turn our expectation that range on the EU dimension would increase from 1999 to 2004 into a hypothesis. Finally, he asked why – according to the responsible model of party government – it is a disaster if parties converge ideologically.

Hermann Schmitt recommended that we should have a measure for the saliency of the EU, with the idea being that higher salience would produce more ideological alternatives around integration. Mark Franklin was critical of our operationalization of the economic benefits hypothesis, and suggested that we should look for better indicators than whether countries are net contributors to the EU budget (H7).

Gábor Tóka also commented on the methodological side of our paper. In particular, he pointed out that, in addition to our measures of subjective views of party positions, we could use expert survey data to cross-validate our party position measures. Furthermore, he recommended that we could use factor analysis or structural equation models to reduce the 'noise' in our dependent variable.

We feel that these points, and particularly thoses raised by Gábor Tóka and Hermann Schmitt, must be taken into account when revising the piece. We need to rethink some of the logic behind the hypotheses and to explain in more detail the expected direction of causality. We also agree that we should turn the longitudinal comparison between the 1999 and 2004 EP elections into a proper hypothesis. The point about salience is something we thought about when writing the paper, but we could not come up with a good measurement of salience. This is clearly something we need to address in the future.

In general, the paper is somewhat short. It clearly needs a better theory section, where we should elaborate in more detail on what factors could produce more ideological divergence between political parties. In this theory section we also need to reflect upon why it is important that parties offer rival choices on European integration to the electorate.

Notes

[1] Mair and Castles (1997: 154) refer to this measure as 'degree of core divergence'.

[2] However, some of these studies paint a more positive picture. Comparing voters' perceptions of where parties stand with voters' own preferences from a survey carried out right after the 1989 EP elections, van der Eijk and Franklin (1991: 124) showed that most parties were representative of their voters in integration matters, with 'only a few parties' taking positions that were clearly out of line with the position of their voters. And, based on elite and citizen survey data from 1979 and 1994, Schmitt and Thomassen (2000) showed that while the policy preferences of the voters and the parties did diverge, issue agreement between voters and party elites about the general development of integration ('are you for or against efforts being made to unify Europe?') was as high as on the left-right dimension. Thus they argued that while policy representation may be failing in specific EU policy issues, it did seem to work fairly well as far as the overall development of integration is concerned.

[3] Measuring opinion consensus or the lack of it is not a simple matter and opinions of what constitutes an appropriate measure diverge. For example, in their review of different measures for consensus Conway & Schaller (1998) came to the conclusion that standard deviation is a measure that is intuitively easy to understand and simple to calculate and, hence, a good measure of consensus. On the other hand, according to van der Eijk (2001) standard deviation can be a misleading indicator of the degree of agreement.

[4] 'In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". What is your position? Please indicate your views using any number on a 10-pointo-scale. On this scale, where 1 means "left" and 10 means "right", which number best describes your position?'. This question was followed by a set of questions in which respondents were asked to indicate the positions of the main parties in their country on the left/right scale according to their perception.

[5] We treat the Belgian case as consisting of two different political systems with their own party systems (Flanders and Wallonia). Thus, we have 16 cases from the 1999 EP elections. Although Flanders and Wallonia are not EU member states, for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to our 37 cases as "member states" or as "member countries" in the text.

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Chapter 10

The support base of radical right parties in the enlarged European Union

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Introduction

In the last two decades of the twentieth century many western democracies have seen the rise of parties that have been labelled extreme-right (Ignazi, 1992; Hainsworth 2000), New Radical Right (Kitschelt 1995), Radical Right (Norris 2005), right-wing populist (Van der Brug and Mughan 2007) or anti-immigration parties (Fennema 1997). In this paper we study the motives of citizens in supporting these parties.

Ideologically these parties are a mixed bag. Some of them are directly inspired by fascist intellectuals from the 1930s and speak of the fall of Western civilization (see e.g., Fennema and Pollman, 1998)[1], whereas others have no sympathy at all for the fascist past, and have even criticized the lack of forms of direct democracy in parliamentary democracies. Some have a program that promotes a free market economy, whereas others have objected to free market arrangements, particularly when it comes to international trade. When Fennema (1997) studied the ideologies of the Western European parties that belong to this group, he concluded that the main thing they have in common is their fierce opposition to immigration, which is the reason why he proposed calling them anti-immigrant parties and, more recently, anti-immigration parties. This term is well suited to the description of West-

European parties of the radical right. However, the term 'anti-immigration' does not capture what parties from central or Eastern Europe, or from Latin America, are about. Since immigration into these countries is very limited (apart from former East Germany), they have not mobilized against immigrants. Instead, they have promoted strong right wing nationalism and as such have mobilized anti-EU sentiments, as well as anti-Semitism (in particular the Polish Self Defence and the Hungarian Life and Justice parties) and hate for other ethnic groups, particularly the Roma. So, when we look beyond the context of Western Europe, as we do in this paper, the term radical right is to be preferred (see also Norris 2005).

Until the late 1990s, socio-structural models inspired most research into the radical right. According to this perspective, the rise of radical right parties should be seen as a backlash response to modernization. The crux of these explanations is the suggestion that support for radical right parties comes from citizens who feel threatened by rapid changes in postindustrial societies. Manual workers with low education tend to loose their jobs as a result of changes in modes of production. Moreover, they are competing with immigrant groups for scarce resources such as jobs and houses. These "losers of modernity" (Betz 1998) feel threatened by rapid social change and tend to support radical right-wing parties out of general discontent.

More recent contributions have challenged this perspective, which was dominant until the late 1990s. Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2000) showed that socio-structural characteristics of voters explain less of the variance in support for radical right parties than they do variance in support for the more established parties. This means that radical right parties attract their support across various social boundaries, to a greater extent than do more established parties. Moreover, the authors showed that support for radical right parties is motivated by the same kind of ideological and pragmatic considerations as support for established parties. These analyses were based on 1994 data for 7 electoral systems in the EU. A replicating

study of 1999 data in 8 political systems gave a different picture. For the large and successful radical right parties, such as the FPÖ, Vlaams Blok and Alleanza Nazionale these conclusions were still valid. However, in the case of support for small and unsuccessful radical right parties such as the Wallonian Front National, the German Republikaner and the Dutch Centrumdemocraten, this was not the case. They therefore concluded that two groups of radical right parties had developed by 1999. One group of parties is evaluated by their potential supporters on the basis of the same kind of substantive considerations that also motivate support for other parties. We could thus say that citizens treat them as 'normal' parties. The other group is apparently not evaluated on the basis of ideological and pragmatic considerations.

The purpose of the current paper is to replicate the analyses of 1994 and 1999 with data from the EES 2004. This will enable us to assess whether the situation has changed compared to 1999. Moreover, these data enable us to assess the determinants of the vote for three radical right parties that were not included in previous studies: Laos (from Greece), the LPF (from the Netherlands) and the Hungarian Justice and Life Party. The EES 2004 also allows us to replicate the findings for 6 parties that were also included in 1999: the Austrian FPÖ, the Danish Folkepartit, the German Republikaner, the Italian Alleanza Nazionale and Lega Nord, and the French Front National.[2]

What motivates voting for radical right parties?

Different kinds of theoretical approaches exist to explain support for radical right parties, as well as differences in aggregate support for such parties. These approaches have looked at demand side as well as supply side factors. In this paper we focus on the motivation which leads individual voters to support radical right parties, which is why our focus is mainly on the demand

side: voters and their grievances and preferences. Different explanations have been brought forward.

The first sees the main causes of the electoral growth of radical right parties as being the resurgence of market forces, massive unemployment and the atomisation of risk society. According to this explanation, radical right voting can be partially explained by social isolation. Arendt (1951) was the first to propose this explanation and others have later found supporting evidence. For instance, Mayer and Moreau (1995) found a higher level of social isolation, measured by weak trade union ties and low religious affiliation, among Front National voters and among voters for the German Republikaner. Others have, however argued that community leaders, rather than isolated individuals, decide the fate of the traditional parties and lead the voters to new parties (Hamilton 1982; Martin 1997). It may well be that feelings of social isolation do not stem from social atomisation, but rather from a disruption of the traditional relations between local communities and the political power structure. Martin (1997) has stressed the fact that Le Pen voters are found in traditional communities that have lost their lines of communication with the political elites.

In addition to the social isolation thesis, an ethnic competition thesis has been proposed. According to this explanation, support for radical right parties comes from those citizens who feel threatened by rapid changes in post-industrial societies. Blue-collar workers with low education feel insecure because of globalisation and immigration. They compete with immigrant groups for scarce resources such as jobs and houses. These "losers of modernity" (Betz 1998) feel threatened by rapid social change and tend to support radical right-wing parties out of resentment against immigrants and against politicians in general, who are held responsible for their uncertainty.

Research has shown that voters who fit Betz' profile —the so called "angry white men"— are more likely than other citizens to support radical right

parties (e.g., Lubbers 2001; Lubbers et al. 2002). However, socio-structural models tend to have very limited ability to explain support for radical right parties (e.g., Mayer 1998; Riedlsperger 1998; Van der Brug et al. 2000; Van der Brug and Fennema 2003). On the contrary:, successful radical right parties such as the Austrian FPÖ in 200, and the Dutch LPF in 2002 were more likely to draw their support from all social strata than was the case for established parties (Van der Brug et al. 2000). Recently, Betz (2002) dropped his claims about the "losers of modernity".

Another popular explanation of support for radical right parties is the *protest vote* model (Mayer & Perrineau 1992; Martin 1996; Mudde & Van Holsteyn 2000; Betz 1994; Derks & Deschouwer 1998; Swyngedouw 2001; Belanger & Aarts 2006). Unfortunately little conceptual clarity exists about what we mean by the term *protest vote*. Van der Brug et al. (2000) conceptualized protest voting as a rational, goal-directed activity. They define protest votes by the motives underlying them. The prime motive behind a protest vote is to show discontent with the political elite. Since radical right parties are treated as outcasts by a large part of the elites in their countries, votes for these parties frighten or shock these elites, which is exactly what the protest voter wants to accomplish (see also: Van der Eijk et al. 1996).

In the literature the concept of the protest vote consists of two elements. The first element distinguishing a protest vote from other types of votes is that discontent with politics (reflected in political cynicism, or lack of political trust) should have a strong effect on support for a radical right party (e.g., Van der Brug 2003; Aarts 2006). The second element is, in the words of Lubbers & Scheepers (2000:69) that "political attitudes … are expected to be of minor importance". The main motivation behind a protest vote is, after all, *not* to affect public policies but to express discontent (see also: Kitschelt 1996; Mayer & Perrineau 1992; Kitschelt 1995; Mudde & Van Holsteyn 2000).

In previous studies Van der Brug et al. (2000) and Van der Brug and Fennema (2003) rejected the protest vote hypothesis for most of the radical right parties they studied. These studies were criticized for not having a direct operationalization of discontent (e.g., Norris 2006), and for basing their conclusions instead on indicators of the extent of policy voting for radical right parties. We do not think this critique is warranted. Indeed it was not possible to demonstrate protest voting if it *had indeed occurred*. However, these studies did show that votes for most radical right parties could not be considered protest votes, because the second element of protest voting (a weak effect of policy preferences) did not apply to them.[3]

Another objection to the conclusions of Van der Brug et al. (2000) is that many voters who support radical right parties may combine anti-establishment feelings with substantive policy considerations (e.g., Swyngedouw 2001; Eatwell 2003). While this is certainly true, we are hesitant to use the term *protest vote* for votes that are to a large extent driven by substantive policy considerations. If we follow this line of reasoning, we could call votes for any opposition parties protest votes if they are cast by citizens who are relatively discontented. However, scholars tend to reserve the term protest vote for those who support radical parties (of the far left or the far right). As a case in point, Belanger and Aarts (2006) studied the effect of discontent on the vote in the Dutch elections of 2002. It turned out that discontent exerted an almost equally weak (and statistically insignificant) effect on the vote for the radical right LPF as on the Christian democratic party, which was the largest opposition party. They interpret this effect — even though it is not significant — as evidence in support of the protest vote hypothesis. Yet they did not answer the question of whether Christian democratic voters should be considered protest voters as well.

We therefore propose to make a qualitative distinction between protest voting and policy voting. In this conceptualization, voters who support a party because they agree with it on important policy considerations will be

called policy voters. If these policies are very different from the policies pursued by government these voters will be discontented. But as long as their vote is driven by these policy considerations, they are policy voters according to our definition, no matter how discontented they are. Protest voters on the other hand are voters who support a party out of discontent, but for whom policy considerations are relatively unimportant.

Models of *policy - and ideological voting* have not been popular among scholars who study the support for radical right parties, because many researchers find it difficult to believe that voters would vote rationally for what they consider a racist or neo-fascist party. Policy voting models consider voters as rational consumers of policy programs and political parties as providers of such programs. In elections several parties provide their policy programs and voters choose from these alternatives. Of course voters do not know the content of all these programs. To be able to choose between these programs despite restricted information, voters rely on other indications of the party programs. They tend to rely on general information and images that refer to the ideological profile of the parties. The policy voting model predicts therefore that, even with limited information, the voters' decisions in the ballot box are based on the content of the party programs (i.e., on issues and ideological positions). Electoral research has shown that votes for many radical right parties — particularly the more successful ones — are predominantly based on policy orientations, which are expressed in left/right positions and attitudes towards immigrants and immigration (Kitschelt 1995; Van der Brug c.s. 2000; Lubbers c.s. 2002; Van der Brug en Fennema 2003; Mughan en Paxton 2003). We will now assess the extent to which this is still the case in 2004, and whether it is true for the nine radical right parties that we included in this study.

Data and method

In order to assess whether policy considerations exert a strong or a weak effect on the electoral attractiveness of radical right parties, we must compare the motivations for voting for radical right parties with motivations to vote for other parties. Data from the European Elections Studies provide an excellent opportunity to make this comparison, because the data sets contain comparable information about a large number of parties from all sorts of ideological denominations. For this study we will use data from the European Election Studies 2004, which was conducted immediately following elections to the European Parliament. It consists of cross-sectional surveys using random samples from the electorates of most of the member states of the European Union. In this study we use the surveys from eight countries with one or more parties of the radical right. In Austria 1,010 respondents were interviewed, in Denmark this was 1,317, in France 1,406, in Germany 596, in Greece 500, in Hungary 1,200, in Italy 1,553 and in the Netherlands 1,586. The total sample in these countries thus consists of 9,162 respondents, which is about 1,145 on average per country.

To compare the motives for supporting a radical right party with the motives for supporting other parties we employ a method that was proposed by Van der Eijk and Franklin (1996). In each country voters were asked, for each party in their political system,[4] how likely it was (on a scale of 1 to 10) that they would *ever* vote for it. These questions have been carefully designed to yield measures that can be interpreted as the propensity to vote for each of the parties (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; van der Eijk 2002; Van der Eijk et al. 2006). For ease of exposition these measures can be regarded as preferences, but we know that voters make their choice in each election for the party they most prefer.[5]

Having measures of vote propensity serves many purposes, but in this paper the most important is to provide us with a dependent variable that is

comparable across parties (from the same party system, as well as from different party systems): the propensity to vote for a party. When the data matrix is stacked so that each voter appears as many times as there are parties for which her utility has been measured (and other variables have been appropriately transformed as explained below), we can pose the question, "What is it that makes a vote for a party attractive to voters?" We already know that voters almost always choose to vote for the party to which they give highest propensity to vote (see note 5). An answer to the question, "What is it that makes a vote for a party attractive to voters?" is therefore also an answer to the question, "What determines which parties are voted for?" The use of this measure to analyze the determinants of party choice has been validated elsewhere (Tillie 1995; Van der Eijk et al. 2006). There are three conceptual and methodological reasons for using the `propensity to support' questions as a dependent variable to answer our research questions.

The first is that the `propensity to support' items allow for a research design that is truly comparative (see below). Were we to use party choice as our dependent variable, we would have to conduct separate analyses for each of the countries. Now we can analyse party preference in one single analysis in which all parties from all countries are included. Alternatively, one could do a comparative analysis with a research design proposed by Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers (2002). They estimated a logistic regression model in which the dependent variable has two values: whether the respondent voted for a radical right party (1) or not (0). We cannot use this design to answer our research question, because it does not allow one to assess whether voters use different criteria in evaluating radical right parties than in evaluating other parties.[6]

Secondly, some of the radical-right wing parties that we are interested in attract so few votes that estimates of the effects of different variables on decisions to vote for any of these parties are highly unreliable. Since the

`propensity to support' items are asked of all respondents, the parameter estimates are more robust.

Finally, if we want to understand the choice process, we cannot afford to look only at the result of that process (the party or candidate voted for) so we cannot use party choice as the dependent variable. This is because we lack important information that we need to model this choice process, such as the relative preferences for parties that a voter does not choose as well as the strength of preference for the party that was chosen. This information is essential because we know that most voters in Western European countries find more than one party attractive. Therefore, in order to model the motivations underlying support for radical right parties, we need information about the attractiveness of all parties to all respondents. Since this is what the `propensity to support' questions actually measure, we can analyse the choice process by using them as our dependent variable (this argument has been elaborated in more detail elsewhere. See, Van der Eijk 2002; Van der Eijk et al. 2006; Van der Brug et al. forthcoming).

The EES 2004 asked this question for 9 radical right parties, all mentioned in the introduction, from eight European countries: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy and the Netherlands. To assess whether voters evaluate these 9 parties by the same criteria as they apply to other parties, our study concentrates on the electoral attractiveness of all parties (58 in total) in the eight political systems included in this study. A valid way to analyse individual and inter-party level variations in party preferences simultaneously can be achieved by arranging the data in the so-called `stacked' (or 'pooled') form that was first proposed by Stimson (1985) and after that applied frequently in electoral research (e.g., MacDonald, Listhaug and Rabinowitz, 1991; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Westholm, 1997). In this stacked data matrix each respondent is represented by as many `cases' as there are parties for which (s)he was asked to indicate vote propensity. This matrix allows us to apply multiple regression in order to explain parties'

electoral attractiveness. By adding characteristics of political systems and parties as variables in the stacked data matrix, such characteristics can be included as variables in these regression analyses. In order to assess whether voting for radical right parties involves a different kind of decision than does voting for other parties, we will estimate interaction terms for a radical right party on the one hand and a set of independent variables on the other. Before we do this, let us discuss which independent variables in the equation can predict parties' electoral attractiveness and how these are treated in the stacked matrix.

The first predictor of party preference is the subjectively perceived distance between a voter and his or her party in the data matrix on a left-right continuum. Policy voting implies that the closer a party is to someone's own position in terms of policy position, the more attractive this party will be for the person in question. The questionnaire contained a battery of items in which respondents were asked to indicate their own position as well as that of each political party on a 10-point scale, the extremes of which were labelled left and right. These positions are indicative of very general policy preferences. From these responses perceived left-right distances were computed. The stronger the effect of perceived left-right distance on electoral attractiveness, the stronger the extent of ideological voting.

The likelihood of someone voting for radical right parties will also increase when (s)he agrees with its stance on some concrete issues (e.g., Billiet & De Witte, 1995). The European Elections Study 2004 contains just one position issue for which respondents' positions and their perceptions of party positions were measured: European integration. This item yields one more predictor of party preference, i.e., the perceived distance on this scale between each respondent and their respective party in the data matrix.

Other predictors of party preference are three attitude scales: approval of the current national government, approval of the European Union and

satisfaction with the way democracy works. The latter is not regularly included in models of party choice, but since this paper investigates radical right parties that are sometimes critical of parliamentary democracies, we included this measure. The survey also contained the question "what is the most important problem facing the country?" The responses were coded in categories and we created dummy variables, one for each of the categories. These were used to assess the influence of political priorities on party preferences.

In addition to these attitude scales, we included a number of socio-structural and demographic variables in the model: social class, education, gender, religion and age. Class is measured using a variable asking for the respondent's subjective idea of his/her social class. Religion is a composite variable made up of religious denomination and church attendance.

Creating the stacked data matrix produces a dependent variable, party preference, that is generic in the sense of having no party-specific meaning. The problem here, though, is that the relationships between dependent and independent variables are usually directionally specific. For example, church attendance can be expected to have a negative effect on support for a liberal party and a positive one on support for a Christian democratic party. In the case of the effect of left/right ideology, this directionality problem could be easily overcome when computing the ideological distance between each party and each respondent. This was not the case for the socio-structural and the attitude scales, however, since the surveys do not contain matching party characteristics for them. In order, therefore, to create generic independent variables that can be stacked on top of each other, we adopted a procedure that involves the linear transformation of the original socio-structural and issue variables (see e.g., Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Van der Brug, 2004). One outcome of this transformation of some of the predictor variables is that their influence will *always be positive*.[7]

Finally, we included a variable at the party level, *party size*, which represents a strategic consideration that voters may take into account: when two parties are almost equally attractive on all relevant counts, voters tend to vote for the largest one because it stands a better chance of achieving its policy goals. We called this type of voting `pragmatic'. Party size is measured by each party's proportion of seats in parliament.

In a number of steps we will assess the extent to which support of radical right parties is determined by particular considerations that exert less (or no) effect on support of other parties. These party specific considerations are detected in the following way. First, we will start with an estimation of the regression model using the stacked matrix that includes all 58 parties., We will also do the same for the subgroup of 9 radical right parties, and for the 49 other parties. These analyses will only allow for an *ad oculum* comparison of differences in the effect parameters. As a final step we will therefore explore whether significant interaction effects exist between each of the radical right parties on the one hand and various predictors of party preference on the other. This will be done for the model that was estimated for the total of 58 parties. Such interaction effects, were they to exist, would indicate that support of radical right parties is determined by *party specific* factors. If we cannot find such interaction effects, or if they turn out to be very small, then we will have to conclude that voters treat radical right parties just like any other party.

Results

Table 1 presents the results of three regression analyses. In the first one the model is estimated for all 58 parties, in the second only the 9 radical right parties are included, and the third analysis includes the 49 other parties. In the analyses of all 58 parties a (dummy) variable was included that distinguishes the 9 radical right parties from the 49 others. The regression coefficient for this variable tells us whether any differences exist between the

electoral attractiveness of radical right parties on the one hand and 'mainstream' parties on the other, after controlling for the effects of the other independent variables. In other words, the coefficient tells us whether – after we take the effects of social characteristics, policy preferences, etceteras into account – radical right parties are considered more or less attractive than other parties. Here the findings are somewhat different from those in 1994 and 1999 (see Van der Brug et al. 2000; Van der Brug and Fennema 2003). In those years the dummy variable that distinguishes radical right parties from mainstream parties turned out to yield the only parameter in the equation that did not deviate significantly from zero. However, in 2004 and for the selection of parties included here, the dummy variable for radical right parties is negative and significant. This means that, after all factors that affect preferences for parties have been taken into account, preferences for radical right parties are still on average lower than preferences for other parties (0.65 units on a 10-point scale).

Because different issues are included in the European Elections Studies of 1994, 1999 and 2004, the results presented in Table 1 are not fully comparable to those in previous studies. However, a few general remarks can be made about the model that we tested for 58 parties. In all three years the left/right distance between parties and voters is the strongest determinant of electoral preferences judging by the magnitude of the standardized coefficients. The significance of the left/right dimension for structuring the behaviour of voters has been observed by many scholars (e.g., Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Hix, 1999; Schmitt, 2001).

Another stable finding is that *party size* is the variable with the second strongest effect on party preference. The positive effect of party size shows that, after controlling for policy positions and social characteristics, voters consider a larger party more attractive than a smaller one. Voters who wish to influence policy making take into account the strategic consideration that a

large party has a better chance than a smaller one of realising its policy goals. So, electoral preferences are determined by a combination of *ideological* and *pragmatic* considerations.

Table 1: regressions of full models for the explanation of part support in 8 countries

	All 58 parties			9 radical right parties			49 established parties		
	b	SE	Beta	b	SE	Beta	b	SE	Beta
Social class	0.558	0.037	.075**	0.681	0.126	.077**	0.544	0.039	.076**
Religion	0.625	0.034	.115**	0.813	0.104	.111**	0.607	0.033	.117**
Gender	0.675	0.12	.035**	0.951	0.182	.060**	0.645	0.133	.033**
Education	0.509	0.051	.056**	0.456	0.117	.047**	0.516	0.055	.059**
Age	0.414	0.058	.041**	0.956	0.33	.028*	0.397	0.059	.043**
Importance of issues	0.619	0.045	.076**	0.696	0.09	.111**	0.608	0.05	.074**
EU approval	0.503	0.045	.065**	0.676	0.095	.102**	0.472	0.049	.061**
Government approval	0.655	0.019	.223**	0.597	0.047	.141**	0.649	0.02	.232**
Satisfaction with democracy	0.335	0.04	.045**	0.574	0.086	.077**	0.311	0.044	.043**
Perceived distance European unification	-0.06	0.009	-.044**	-0.062	0.013	-.064**	-0.06	0.01	-.042**
Perceived distance on left right	-0.373	0.009	-.286**	-0.255	0.013	-.262**	-0.402	0.01	-.296**
Radical right party (dummy variable)	-0.651	0.037	-.015**						
Party size	4.353	0.089	.221**	6.133	0.528	.134**	4.301	0.089	.248**
R^2-adjusted	0.365			0.255			0.353		
Number of clusters (respondents)	7,470			7,274			7,461		
Number of units of analysis	56,080			8,358			47,722		

*: significant at p < .01; **: significant at p < .001

The magnitude of the effects of socio-structural variables, issue priorities and attitudes towards the EU, is also remarkably stable. There is only one major difference in comparison with the other years, Government approval has a substantively stronger effect in 2004 than it had in the other election years. In

1999, the standardized effect of government approval was 0.09, whereas in 2004 it is 0.22. Voters tend to base their electoral preferences on their evaluation of the performance of parties in government more than in previous years. Since it is beyond the scope of this paper, we will not explore this matter further here.

How does this general model compare to the model for the 9 radical right parties? The most important conclusion from Table 1 is that most of the effects are quite similar in magnitude. Note that as a result of the linear transformations of most of the independent variables, those parameters are necessarily positive, so that no conclusions can be drawn about the direction of the effects. Socio-structural and demographic characteristics — gender, age, religion, social class and education — have almost the same weak effect on electoral preferences for radical right parties as on electoral preferences for other parties. The effect of left/right distance on electoral preferences is also very similar for the two groups of parties.

Judging by the standardized coefficients, two variables exert weaker effects. The first one is party size, but this difference may be caused by the fact that the variation in party size is substantially smaller among the radical right parties than among the other parties. Note also that the unstandardized coefficient is higher, so that we have to be particularly careful when comparing these effects across different equations. The other effect that is substantially weaker among radical right parties than among other parties is approval of the government. The most likely explanation for this weaker effect is that there are relatively few government parties among the radical right parties, and that this variable has a particularly strong effect on electoral preferences for government parties. We may conclude, however, that support for radical right parties is not strongly determined by dissatisfaction with the government.

In contrast to what one might expect *a priori* on the basis of the nationalist ideologies of parties of the radical right, differences on the issue of European integration exert an effect on preferences for radical right-wing parties that is very similar to the effect it has on preferences for other parties. The same goes for citizens' satisfaction with the EU and satisfaction with the way democracy functions. Despite the anti-parliamentarian rhetoric of these parties, dissatisfaction with democracy is not an important motive for citizens to support these types of parties.

In 1989 and 1994 negative attitudes towards immigrants turned out to be a strong determinant of the vote for radical right parties. The EES of 2004 does not contain measures of attitudes towards immigrants, so the effect of this issue cannot be tested. In many countries the issue will be incorporated in the left/right dimension, so to some extent the strong effect of left/right distances reflects the effect attitudes towards immigrants, but the explained variance of the model would certainly have been higher if these attitudes had been measured.

A final important observation is that socio-structural and demographic variables exert only very weak effects on electoral preferences for either radical right or other parties. Various scholars have observed that cleavage politics is declining in most countries and that this decline is largely compensated for by an increase in policy voting (Franklin, 1992:400). Instead of relying on social positions as a cue when deciding which party to vote for, the increasingly autonomous citizens vote largely on the basis of their policy preferences (e.g., Rose and McAllister, 1986; Dalton, 1996). Our results show that this is just as true of supporters of radical right parties as it is of voters for other parties. Radical right parties do not attract the 'losers of modernity' as Betz used to call them, but they do attract their supporters from across all social strata.

The comparisons between electoral preferences for various radical right parties and those for other parties have so far been made for all 9 parties of the radical right together, and on an *ad oculum* basis. The design of our analysis, with a stacked data matrix in which electoral preferences are studied for all parties simultaneously, provides the opportunity to study differences between radical right-wing parties systematically, and, also to study those between radical right-wing parties and other parties. If a variable has a different effect for one party than it does for all other parties, the regression model should contain an interaction term between the respective party on the one hand and this variable on the other.

To estimate these interactions, we developed two models. The first is the model in Table 1 which is estimated for all 58 parties with three interactions added to the model: interactions between a dummy variable that separates the 9 radical right parties from the other 49 on the one hand, and party size, left/right distance and distance on the issue of European unification on the other.[8] Model 1 in Table 2 presents the parameter estimates of these interaction terms as well as the main effects of party size, left/right distance and distance on European unification. The models also included the effects of the other independent variables presented in Table 1, but these are not presented, because in order to assess whether the determinants of support for radical right parties are different from the determinants of support for other parties, we need only look at the interaction effects.

The analysis using one dummy variable for the 9 radical right parties together, yields significant positive interaction effects for left/right distance and for party size. These interaction effects must be compared with the main effects in order to interpret them. The main effect of left-right distance on electoral attractiveness (for all parties) is -.401. This negative effect is as expected: the larger the ideological distance the less attractive a party is. The positive interaction effect of left/right distance shows that the negative effect of left-right distance is somewhat weaker for radical right-wing parties than

for the other parties: the unstandardized effect for radical right parties is -.252 (-.401 + .148). The positive interaction effect of party size in Table 2 shows that radical right-wing parties gain more by becoming larger than do other parties. We should, however, take into account the fact that the radical right parties in our sample tend to be relatively small. So, the larger effect could be indicative of certain threshold effects for small parties, as a result of which small parties may benefit more from growth than large parties would. The third interaction term, the one for European unification, turns out not to be statistically significant so this issue has the same weak effect on preferences for radical right parties as on preferences for other parties. In other words, anti-EU feelings contribute little to support for the radical right.

Table 2: Interactions with radical right parties

		Ideological distance (Left-right)	Distance European Unification	Party size
Model 1	Main effects	-.401**	-.059**	4.309**
	9 radical right parties	.148**	-.011	1.510*
Model 2	Main effects	-.401**	-.059**	4.309**
	FPÖ	.149**	-.035	-
	Dansk Folkeparti	.068	-.135**	-
	FN (French)	.120**	-.020	-
	Republikaner	.253**	.027	-
	LAOS	.190**	.014	-
	Alleanza Nazionale	-.065	.032	-
	Lega Nord	.148**	-.055	-
	LPF	.073*	-.016	-
	Justice and Life	.193**	.025	-

Source: European Elections Study 2004

* significant at p<.01; **: significant at p<.001

In the second model we look at all 9 radical right parties separately. Therefore, instead of using a single dummy variable for the 9 radical right parties combined, we added a dummy for each one of them. And we added the interactions between these dummy variables and distances on left/right and on European unification. The relevant results of this model (Model 2) are presented in the lower half of Table 2.

Our findings for 2004 have so far largely confirmed the findings of 1999. However, when we look at the differences among the various parties of the radical right, we must conclude that in 2004 things are different from the way they were back in 1999 and much more different from 1994. In 1994 there was only one single party – the Dutch Centrumdemocraten – for which we found weaker effects of left/right ideology. In 1999 there were more parties for which this was the case: the effect of left/right distance was significantly weaker for the Centrumdemocraten, the Wallonian Front National, the German Republikaner, the Lega Nord, the French Front national and the Danish Fremskridtpartiet. In that year there were four exceptions: the FPÖ, Alleanza Nazionale, Vlaams Blok and Dansk Folkeparti., which were the four most successful radical right parties. Their support was at least as heavily determined by ideology as were votes for other parties. Even though a comparison over time is hindered because we are looking at different parties, the results in 2004 suggest that the trend seems to have continued. The effect of left/right distance is significantly weaker for 7 radical right parties (the German Republikaner, the Italian Lega Nord, the French Front national, the Dutch LPF, the Greek Laos, the Hungarian party for Justice and Life, and the Dutch LPF) than it is for other parties. The effects are of the same magnitude for only two parties; the Danish FP and the Italian AN. It therefore appears that the effect of left/right distances on electoral support for radical right parties has declined overall since 1994.

Conclusion and discussion

Are radical right parties different from other parties in terms of how they attract votes? In the analysis we focused on the differences, and indeed we found some important differences between radical right parties and other parties. The most important difference is that the effect of left/right tends to be weaker. However, when we focus on these differences we tend to overlook large similarities.

A first similarity between the processes that generate support for radical right wing parties and processes generating support for other parties is that the effects of socio-structural variables are weak. This means that radical right wing parties, like most other parties, attract their support from across all strata in society. Secondly, left/right distance is the strongest predictor of support for radical right parties as well as for other parties, even though the effect is weaker for the former than the latter. Thirdly, the effect of party size is at least as important for radical right parties as it is for other parties, so that we may conclude that the pragmatic consideration that a larger party is more attractive than a smaller one because it is in a better position to affect public policies, is just as important to voters when judging a radical right party as it is when judging other parties. Finally, neither dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy, dissatisfaction with European unification, nor dissatisfaction with the government exerts a strong effect on support for radical right parties. Because of all these similarities, we should be careful not to think of supporters of radical right parties as being the 'losers of modernity' as Betz (1994) used to call them, or as supporting these parties to express general feelings of discontent.

On the other hand, our analyses have revealed large changes since Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2000) concluded, on the basis of the 1994 EES data, that there were hardly any differences between the determinants of support for radical right parties and the determinants of votes for other parties. Nowadays the main difference is that the effect of left/right is weaker. So, why do voters no longer evaluate these parties by their left/right position as much as they used to?

A possible explanation could be that many of these parties, such as the FPÖ, the Republikaner, and Front National, which were once evaluated in left/right terms, have lost whatever credibility they used to have as a result of poor performance as government parties (FPÖ) and internal party conflicts (which have occurred in all of these three). In addition, mainstream right-leaning

parties in many countries have to some extent co-opted the anti-immigration positions of the radical right. It is conceivable that the single issue character of these parties became more evident and more problematic when their prime issues were co-opted. We expect the effect of left/right to be weaker for single issue parties than for parties with a broader ideological profile, because left/right is a generic ideological dimension. Moreover, when these parties lose their 'unique selling proposition' because the mainstream right co-opts their core issues their protest character may also become more visible.

The parties that resisted this trend, the Dansk Folkepartit and Alleanza Nazionale, have managed to build up a good, functioning party organization. They have either been members of a coalition government (AN) or have passively supported a government (DFP), without creating internal party struggles. Because of this they have been able to promote the further restriction of immigration,[9] but they are still evaluated in generic terms and not only in connection to the issue of immigration. This may be the key to their sustained electoral success.

Notes

[1] Some even used 1930s jargon, such as the "fall of the Occident".

[2] Unfortunately, we cannot include Vlaams Blok from Flanders, Front National from Wallonia, New Democracy from Sweden, the British National Party from Britain and the National Party from Poland, because the relevant variables are missing.

[3] For some smaller radical right parties, such as the Dutch Centrumdemocraten, these studies found only very weak effects of policy preferences. This could mean that the supporters of such parties were indeed protest voters, but in the absence of indicators of discontent, this cannot be established.

[4] In practice the parties asked about included only those with representation in the national parliament or those widely expected to obtain representation in the European Parliament.

[5] In practice this occurs about 93% of the time in established EU member states.

[6] Moreover, a dependent variable that distinguishes only between the radical right and other parties does not realistically reflect the electoral process.

[7] Except for odd cases where statistically insignificant effects can become negative in multivariate models.

8 The method does not allow us to estimate interaction effects for the other variables in the model. This is because their effects were originally estimated using a procedure that involves a linear transformation of the original variables. This procedure provides a valid way to estimate the strength of each of the independent variables, but at the same time rules out the possibility of estimating interaction effects. As this paper focuses primarily on the effect of party size and left-right distance (two variables that were not transformed) we do not consider this to be a problem here.

[9] The position of Alleanza Nazionale on this issue is diffuse. AN's leader Fini was, as a minister ,responible for the Bossi-Fini law to restrict immigration, but he also supported a proposal to grant the right to vote in municipal elections to legal immigrants in Italy. Apparently, AN is an anti-immigration party, but not an anti-immigrant party.

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Appendix

The stacked matrix, combining party preferences for the 58 parties from 8 political systems has a total of 56.080 units of analysis, after deletion of missing cases in the dependent variable. To estimate the parameters of the regression models, units of analyses are weighted in two steps. As a result of the weight factor applied in the first step respondents in each system are weighted in such a way that their party choice in the European Elections 2004 reflect exactly the actual election results. In the second step this weight variable is multiplied by a (different) constant for each system, so that the

eight systems in the stacked matrix contain the same number of cases. This weight variable was used for the analyses in which all parties from the 8 different political systems are analysed simultaneously. Each time groups of parties are selected, the variable generated in the first stage is multiplied by yet different constants for each system, so that in all regressions presented in Table 1 the eight systems in the stacked matrix contain the same number of units of analysis each.

Because we stacked the data, the unit of analysis is no longer the individual respondent, but the respondent/party combination. Since these are not independent observations, we computed panel corrected standard errors, and reported significance on the basis of these tests. To be precise, we did these analyses in STATA, using the robust estimate of variance (known as the Huber/White/Sandwich estimate of variance) and the "cluster" option to adjust for the dependency among observations pertaining to the same respondent (Rogers, 1993; Williams, 2000). Each of the 7.470 respondents was defined as a separate cluster.

Chapter 11

What can ecological inference tell us about the Second-Order-Election-Thesis in the Czech Republic and Slovakia?

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Introduction

On June 10-11 2004 the electorates of the Czech Republic and Slovakia voted in their first European Parliament elections in a European Union of twenty-five member states. These states have much in common given the fact they are both former components of a federation that was dissolved on January 1 1992 and have similar political institutions and have followed a similar electoral cycle with general elections within months of each other. For these reason, one would expect similar kinds of electoral behaviour in their first European Parliament elections. This was not the case. The only common pattern was the relatively low level of electoral participation, which in both cases was considerably less than the previous general election (Czech Republic 58/28 percent; Slovakia 70/17 percent).

In fact the voting patterns observed could be said in some respects to be completely different for at least four reasons. First, the main governing party in the Czech Republic – the Social Democrats (CSSD) suffered heavy losses in June 2004 where their level of support declined to less than a third of that attained in the previous general election in 2002. In contrast, within Slovakia the main governing party – the Slovak Democratic and Christian Coalition

(SKDU) saw its level of support increase from 15 to 17 percent. Second, opposition parties in the Czech Republic maintained or increased their support base. However, in Slovakia many opposition parties were not successful. For example, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) did not get the highest single vote share as was the case in all previous elections.

Third, in the Czech Republic, small parties such as the European Democrats (SNK-ED) and Independents (NEZ) who had not won a single seat in the Chamber of Deputies in 2002 were successful in winning five seats. Within Slovakia only parties that had won seats in the 2002 general election took seats in the European elections, where extreme nationalist, communist or anti-EU parties had no success. Moreover, the governing parties in Slovakia won eight of the fourteen seats while in the Czech Republic incumbent parties won just four seats out of twenty-five.

Fourthly, voters in Slovakia over the last decade have been very mindful of the EU issue. The EU was a central issue in three recent elections (i.e. the general elections of 1998 and 2002 and the accession referendum in 2003). Very few other countries have had a similar level of exposure to the debate surrounding the domestic impact of EU membership. Lastly, during the first four months of 2004, Slovak voters participated in two rounds of a controversial Presidential election where the government's (SDKU) candidate lost out to opposition nominees. The fact that voters in the Slovak Republic were in June 2004 voting in the fourth national election in a two year period was seen to result in "electoral fatigue." Such fatigue for voters and parties was seen as a contributing factor to the low turnout observed in 2004 (Henderson 2004: 3).

This brief review of the differences in voting patterns and immediate political context in the Czech and Slovak Republics highlights an important point. Our expectation that countries with similar political institutions and positions

within the electoral cycle should exhibit the same electoral behaviour in the European elections seems implausible. More particularly attempts to impose the logic of the Second-Order Election-Thesis (SOET) to both of our case studies without taking context into consideration would seem to be disingenuous to both the theory and our understanding of electoral behaviour. Of course, the fact that the Czech and Slovak Republics exhibit different patterns of electoral behaviour is less interesting than the more general question if national patterns identified by the SOET since 1979 are evident in sub-national data?

Consequently, in this paper we will investigate the SOET at the sub-national level using aggregated electoral statistics patterns of vote switching in two recent accession states. We believe that the Czech and Slovak cases represent an invaluable opportunity to test the insights derived from the SOET over the past quarter century in Western Europe. This is because these two cases provide additional variance on many of the variables of interest, but nonetheless allow valuable analytical leverage to be gained from the fact that both states through sharing a common history within the Czechoslovak Federation (until dissolution in 1992) have very similar institutional structures. Moreover, we believe that the relative stability of both party systems makes application of the SOET appropriate (note, Marsh 1998, 2000).

This paper is unique in using an ecological inference technique on both national and sub-national data to examine two of the central hypotheses of the SOET – lower turnout in the European elections and increased support for smaller parties at the expense of established larger parties. In the past researchers have used national level statistics or individual level survey data to study vote-switching behaviour. We will endeavour to extend this line of research by using official electoral data at the district level to demonstrate how both national and sub-national context is important in understanding electoral behaviour for different levels of governance.

The first section of this paper will outline the core ideas behind the SOET. The following section outlines the key features of the SOET and those hypotheses that form the heart of this aggregate level theory of vote switching from first to second-order elections. The third section outlines why an effective testing of the SOET requires use of an ecological inference methodology. The fourth section outlines the data and research approach used in this paper where the insights offered by ecological inference estimates are compared with voter transition estimates from two individual level survey datasets. Thereafter, there is a presentation of our empirical results where various aspects of the SOET are examined in greater detail. In the final section there is brief discussion of the implications of this research and some concluding remarks.

Voting behaviour in systems of multi-level governance

Liberal democracies are composed of a variety of executive institutions based on citizen representation relating to the business of governance at different levels (i.e. municipal, regional, national upper and lower chamber elections, national referendums, presidential polls and European elections). As these various political institutions fulfil different roles where each has different powers and competences this has a determining effect on citizens perceptions of the similarities and differences between different election types. This fact has potentially important consequences for electoral behaviour.

Traditional models of voting such as party attachment and class voting suggest that citizens will participate at the same rate in all elections and make consistent vote choices. This is because the motivation underpinning vote choice is long-term in nature. Consequently, no matter what the election type loyal party supporters will turnout to vote for their party, except in situations of illness and old age or infirmity. However, the empirical evidence from

many political systems that have two or more types of elections is that voter turnout and party/candidate choice is not constant.

This implies that voters modify their electoral behaviour on the basis of election type. Therefore from the party identification literature one can imagine voters under the influence of short-term factors switching their vote to another party or deciding not to participate. However, this is not the only possible explanation. There are a number of other voting theories that start off with the assumption that voters do not see all elections as being equally important – there is in short a hierarchy of elections and this determines electoral behaviour.

The most influential theory of electoral behaviour change in national and European elections is the Second-Order Election-Thesis. This explanation of differential turnout and party switching was developed after the first European elections in 1979 on the basis of insights from regional voting patterns in Germany and differences in vote patterns in mid-term (Congressional) and Presidential elections in the United States (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Marsh 1998).

Second-order election thesis

The Second-Order Election-Thesis is based on the assumption that voters have a hierarchical view of different types of elections. If this assumption is false voters will treat different elections types in the same manner. In political systems where there are high levels of party identification or class voting the patterns predicted by the SOET should not be present. This is because partisan voters would participate in all elections and vote for the most part in a consistent manner.[12]

The empirical evidence for national, sub-national and European elections illustrates that the pattern of electoral behaviour is significantly different

thereby lending general credence to the SOET (e.g. Oppenhuis 1995; Franklin et al. 1996; Heath et al. 1997; Marsh 1998; Mattila 2003; Ferrara and Weishaupt 2004; Carrubba and Timpone 2005). This is not to suggest that the insights derived from the SOET have been observed in all research on European elections or elections in multi-level systems (note, Blondel et al. 1998; Manow 2005; Jeffrey and Hough 2003). Our goal here is not to review the SOET literature, but rather to examine its predictions using similar data from which it was originally developed.

In this respect, it is important to note here that comparison is made between aggregate level electoral data where patterns for the same geographical units at different time points for different election types are compared. It is appropriate at this point to list the main hypotheses made in the SOET as outlined by Reif (1984).

H1:

Voter participation in a European election will be lower than the previous general election and this is an indicator of the relative importance (how much is "at stake") of these types of elections in the eyes of voters.

H2:

Smaller parties that may be new and espouse radical policy proposals will do relatively better in European elections than in general elections. As a result more established large parties will see their general election level of support decline in European elections.

H3:

European election campaigns are a mix of European and national issues where the latter tend to play a more important role.

H4:

Change in electoral support between general and European elections for parties participating in government will be determined by position within the

national electoral cycle. Government parties will lose out most at the mid-term point of this cycle.

Using only aggregate level electoral data, which is the primary evidence upon which the SOET was originally constructed, it is only possible to examine H1 and H2 using the evidence from a single EU member state such as the Czech Republic. H3 requires campaign data derived from individual level survey data or from the content analysis of party manifestoes or mass media. Official electoral results have no such information. Moreover, H4 can only be tested using cross-national data where there is variance on the election cycle variable. However, for the Czech and Slovak Republics the 2004 European elections occurred at the mid-term point of parliamentary election cycle. The last lower house elections were held in 2002 and the next are scheduled for 2006 so the government unpopularity factor should have been at something close to its maximum for the European elections.

Ecological inference and testing the second-order thesis

The act of voting is primarily an individual level phenomenon. Consequently the usefulness of providing explanations of electoral behaviour for whole national electorates across the European Union is limited if it does not address in some manner what individual level motivations determine electoral behaviour. In this respect, an ideal approach to testing all theories of electoral behaviour such as the SOET would involve being able to specify the individual level foundations that underpin the collective preferences of entire electorates.

Transposing aggregate level patterns of voting behaviour to the individual level through a simple process of correlation of aggregate units is problematic and is known as the “ecological inference fallacy” (Robinson

1950; Goodman 1953; King 1997). For example, a central feature of the SOET is that the timing of the European Elections within the national electoral cycle influences the level of electoral support attained by the main governing parties. This hypothesis is based on the simple methodology of *correlating aggregates* where countries that are closest to the mid-term between successive general elections will exhibit the greater losses for (large) governing parties. The reasoning here is that voters in the mid-term phases of electoral cycles vote against incumbent parties at a higher rate than all other voters. However, this conclusion is only valid if the different ratios of 'mid-term' (voters) and all others voters are not in themselves correlated with their voting behaviour.

For example, if government party voters in the last general election are more likely to switch their vote (to abstention, for example) in countries in the mid-term of an election cycle than those in other countries not at this point then the 'correlating aggregates' approach often used to examine this SOET hypothesis will be invalid because of the "ecological fallacy." This is because the loss of support by government parties may simply be part of a more general phenomenon of higher levels of electoral abstention that is itself somehow connected to the electoral cycle (Franklin et al. 1996).

It could well be that in some districts incumbent parties retain higher levels of support in European elections than opposition parties when faced with inflated levels of abstention, while in other districts electoral participation is equally low for all parties. The overall aggregated pattern for a country would suggest (incorrectly) that election cycle effects are correlated with loss in government party support (note, Manow 2005: 11, 14). The key point here is that correlating aggregates at the national level can be misleading as it may hide very differing patterns of electoral behaviour at lower levels of analysis.

Previous research on European elections and level of analysis

Empirical analysis of voting behaviour in European Parliament elections has followed two main research strategies. First, aggregate level analyses have

ignored the ecological inference problem and undertaken correlations and regression analyses of patterns across the EU member states that run the risk of being based on invalid inferences. The individual level patterns could be the opposite of those observed at the national level. Second, voting behaviour in European elections have been investigated using individual level survey data where the problem of unobserved individual behaviour is removed through asking voters to recount their own actions in post-election polls.

Since 1979 there have been European Election Studies (EES) in most or all member states using a standard questionnaire design. Unfortunately, the results of post-election surveys such as EES do not match the electoral results where there is significant over-reporting of turnout (Swaddle and Heath 1989; Granberg, Holmberg 1991; On the sources of over-reporting see Belli, Traugott, Young, McGonagle 1999). For example, in the Czech wave of the 2004 European Election Study over-reporting of voter turnout was 20 percent (perhaps in part the product of selection bias) and the profile of recalled party support in the 2002 Chamber elections and 2004 European elections is also inaccurate.

Consequently, electoral studies have two sources of information with different characteristics. Actual election results aggregated to the national or sub-units thereof are likely to be highly accurate, but are problematic for making inferences of voting decisions at the individual level using simple correlation. Individual survey data has a rich range of attitudinal variables that potentially facilitate explaining voters behaviour, but this data is likely to suffer from systematic and random sources of error. In contrast, officially validated electoral data is known to be accurate, however, individual level information is destroyed in the process of aggregation in order to ensure the secrecy of the vote choice. Consequently, attempts have been made to estimate this information using statistical methods incorporating all available information (Schuessler 1999: 10578; Wakefield 2004).

Ecological inference using the Logit method

The ecological inference method used in this paper is based on an aggregate level model of vote choice derived from an individual level model. Such an approach developed by Søren Risbjerg Thomsen (Aarhus University) over the last two decades is unorthodox because it depends on making some simplifying assumptions rather than simulating aggregate level behaviour from an individual level model. It is assumed that the probability that a single voter will vote for a specific party is based on three main factors (1) level of party attachment; (2) issue congruence and (3) general sympathy toward voting for a party (i.e. model intercept).[3] The individual model of vote choice incorporating these three factors is formulated as a directional model of vote choice (note, Thomsen 2000; Cleave et al. 1995).

Having formulated an individual level model of party choice it is now necessary to scale this model up to district (aggregate) level. Here we proceed by taking advantage of the empirical observation that parties often draw support from specific geographical regions. Moreover, the level of party attachment is assumed to be a party specific function of the voter in an issue space. It is possible to represent the voters' utility of voting for a number of competing parties as a multinomial logit model. If we now consider a typical research situation where we have aggregated electoral data it is assumed that the individual utility for supporting a specific party depends on the values of a series of latent variables representing a voters position on an unknown number of salient issue dimensions.

Within a specific district the (aggregate) number of voters choosing to support a particular party is based on the number or density of voters with similar utilities for parties who have similar positions on these latent issue dimensions. Within each district this aggregated orientation of party voters is assumed to be composed of unmeasured issue variables that are all normally distributed. In order to make a multiparty model tractable for estimation it is possible to approximate the choice for a single party (against all others,

including abstention) as a simple logit model. This means that the logit share of voters choosing a specific party in a particular district may be represented as a linear function of variables representing a series of unknown issue dimensions.

The party identification and issue positions in the linear logit models of aggregated vote choice for each district are interpreted as a general underlying predisposition toward voting for a specific party. This predisposition is seen to vary from district to district perhaps deriving from social class, religion and place of residence. The main implication here is that assuming an underlying predisposition implies that voting districts are not likely to be unique, but can in fact be grouped together into regions within similar political cultures. Therefore, while the issue positions of parties and the socio-demographic basis for electoral choice are most often stable across pairs of elections, these general predispositions toward voting for a specific party may weaken because of short-term factors (e.g. scandals, economic downturns, candidate effects, etc. which are represented by the model intercept).[4]

However, this weakening will depend critically on the strength and nature of the regional political culture. Thus the change in logit share for a party will be constant (despite random error) within regions that have a common political culture. This approach suggests that we should be able to find homogenous political regions composed largely of adjoining political districts that exhibit similar change in party logit scores in adjacent elections. To identify such regions a hierarchical cluster analysis on the level of party support attained in each district technique may be used. Political regions may thus be defined as aggregations of districts that minimise the sum of squares within each cluster (i.e. Wards method). Moreover, in order to reduce the impact of isolated, though dramatic gains, logit change from two consecutive elections for each party is standardised to stabilise the estimates produced.

If we now return to a comparison of party choice (i.e. one party versus all other possible choices) at the both the district and individual levels, we encounter an important problem. At a district level the relationship between votes for a specific party and all other parties (in a simple 2x2 table) in adjacent elections may be expressed as a Pearson correlation. However, at the individual level a similar (2x2) voter transition table representing the relationship between vote choices in two elections cannot be expressed as a Pearson correlation. This is partly due to the fact that individual level vote choice is non interval-scale level data. A more appropriate measure of association is the gamma (γ) correlation coefficient.

Therefore the relationships or correlations observed between vote choices at the district and individual levels are not comparable. This fits with the warnings made by Robinson (1950) that making cross-level inferences based on Pearson correlations is likely to be misleading, i.e. leading to the so-called "ecological fallacy." However, Thomsen (1987: 63) argues that the individual level Gamma correlation approximates the district level Pearson logit correlation when four assumptions are met.[5]

The four assumptions are (1) Functional homogeneity: the same individual level model can be applied to all voters. This is only possible if we have identified political regions using cluster analysis. (2) Isomorphism: the latent variables shaping vote choice at the individual and district levels must be the same. This means districts should not be large and heterogeneous. (3) There should be a high ratio between the variances in the individual and district level latent (issue) variables. This means that the ecological logit correlations can be substituted for the individual Gamma correlations. (4) Each response option alternative should be homogenous, i.e. even in two-party systems voter abstention should be treated as a separate category.

Data and research methodology

The logit method for ecological inference is based on having stable sub-national units where aggregated electoral data is available for at least one pair of elections. In the Czech Republic data was assembled from the official electoral sources of results from 159 geographical units (i.e. all counties are divided into urban and rural areas) for the 2002 lower chamber elections and 2004 European elections.[6] For Slovakia we have similar data for 79 districts for the last general election (also held in 2002) and June 2004 elections. As noted in the last section, one of the key assumptions of the logit method for ecological inference is the identification of homogenous geographic areas where the factors underlying electoral behaviour can be reasonably inferred to be the same.

In order to identify these homogenous electoral regions a hierarchical cluster analysis of the electoral results for all units in the Czech and Slovak Republics were performed.[7] Country and district electoral results for all major parties (plus other smaller parties coded as 'others') and abstention were transformed into standardised logit scores, as outlined in the last section. This data was then subjected to a hierarchical cluster analysis based on the Ward criteria for defining clusters. The results for both countries are shown in figures 1 and 2.

Within the Czech Republic this resulted in a four-region solution that was validated on the basis of location (e.g. the capital Prague constituted one single unit) and previous research. The four units identified by cluster analysis were: (1) Bohemia and urban Moravia; (2) Rural Moravia (3) Prague; (4) Northwest Bohemia.

Figure 1: Political regions within the Czech Republic derived from a hierarchical cluster analysis of electoral results for the 2002 general election and 2004 European elections



Note the regions are numbered as follows (1) Bohemia and urban Moravia (blue); (2) Rural Moravia (yellow); (3) Prague (orange); (4) North-western borderlands (red). Districts with difference coloured solid circles at their centre indicate areas where there were urban/rural differences.

In the Slovak Republic a four-region solution was also chosen where comparison was made with the geography of ethnicity, religion, education, economic dependency, etc. These four regions may be labelled (1) Urban: (Bratislava, Kosice and the districts of Dunajska Streda and Komarno that lie to the south of Bratislava along the Hungarian border); (2) Western Slovakia; (3) Central Slovakia and (4) Eastern Slovakia. Having identified homogenous political regions within both the Czech Republic and Slovakia we are now in a position to employ the logit method of ecological inference on the actual (raw) county/district election results for both elections. However, before embarking on this task it is appropriate to compare the relative merits of using ecological as opposed to mass survey estimates of vote switching.

Figure 2: Political regions within Slovakia derived from a hierarchical cluster analysis of electoral results for the 2002 general election and 2004 European elections



Note the regions are numbered as follows (1) Urban: Bratislava, Kosice and the southwestern border districts of Dunajskă Streda and Komărno (yellow); (2) Western Slovakia (blue); (3) Central Slovakia (red) and (4) Eastern Slovakia (green). For inset maps BA refers to Bratislava and KE to Kosice.

Ecological inference and mass survey estimates of vote switching

It was explained in the previous discussion of the logit method of ecological inference that our ability to produce valid estimates of individual level vote transition behaviour is based on four key assumptions, i.e. functional homogeneity, isomorphism, high variance ratios at the individual and aggregate levels and use of homogenous response alternatives. In practical terms, the first two of these assumptions are the most critical. In this respect, Margolis (1988) has criticised the logit method by arguing that the functional homogeneity and isomorphism assumptions are unrealistic.

In defence of his logit method of ecological inference Thomsen (1987, 1999) has accepted that making of inferences from statistical analyses using ecological inference estimates are likely to suffer from systematic error if the assumptions made are invalid. However, the key merit of seeking to provide ecological inference estimates of vote switching is that (if we can ensure the

assumptions underpinning such inference are not seriously violated) there will be neither systematic nor random error. Ecological inference procedures are thus in theory superior to mass survey based estimates of vote switching because the latter are well known to suffer from response bias (e.g. misreporting) and random sampling error emanating from the surveying process (Berglund and Thomsen 1991: 14-17).

Of course the juxtaposition of these two techniques highlights the key advantage of using both ecological inference and mass cross-sectional survey based estimates as a means of cross-validation. This is an important consideration for two reasons. First, it is rare to have access to individual level voting data (which is hardly ever available because of ballot secrecy regulations) in order to directly assess the accuracy of ecological inference techniques. Second, access to large-scale panel surveys undertaken across two elections for cross-validation purposes is also problematic because these costly research enterprises are infrequently undertaken in many countries. The Czech and Slovak Republics typify the situation in most EU member states where such panel studies are rarely if ever undertaken.

The best that can be done in this respect is to use cross-sectional survey datasets that are readily available for cross-validation of the ecological inference estimates derived from the logit method. In the Czech Republic for the European elections of 2004 we have access to an (SC&C) exit poll and the post-election European Election Study dataset (EES 04). Within Slovakia we are restricted to use of the EES 04 survey data. Nonetheless, such data is sufficient for our limited purpose of ensuring that the assumptions underpinning our ecological inference estimates of vote switching between the 2002 and 2004 elections in the Czech and Slovak Republics are not seriously violated.

Cross-validation of aggregate and survey data estimates

For the sake of brevity we will focus here on available survey data from the Czech Republic and the methodological issues that need to be addressed when using such data for cross-validating ecological inference estimates. A key resource in this respect is an exit poll undertaken by a commercial polling agency SC&C for the state owned Czech Television (CT1) after the 2004 elections. By definition this type of survey while having a large number of respondents (n=9,028) relates only to those who voted (and who were willing to be interviewed) and so is likely to have some significant systematic bias in terms of the profile of the entire electorate most of whom (62 percent) did not vote in 2004.

There is also the Czech wave of the 2004 European Election Study (EES 04). This post-election survey was undertaken within a month of the European elections and has a relatively extensive range of attitudinal items for a sample of the total Czech electorate. However, its recalled vote measures while allowing us to construct a voter transition matrix is inaccurate because of well known *response bias* effects (Wright 1993; Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski 2000). Details of all datasets used in this paper are given in the appendix.

In summary, our goal here (in terms of the Czech Republic) is to compare the estimates of vote switching derived from three different sources. Since none of the three data sources can be reasonably considered to be closer to the true (and unknown) voter transitions values we will simply examine how similar are the three sets of estimates using a simple summary measure (Duncan's dissimilarity index). The intuition here is that the variance in these three voter transition matrices encompasses the *true* vote switching values. On this basis, we have confidence in the voter transition patterns that exist in all (three) of our voter transition matrices, although the exact estimates derived from each dataset will most likely be different from the true value due to the presence of different sources of error and bias. As noted earlier, for the

Slovak Republic we will use EES 04 in a similar manner to cross-validate the ecological inference estimates derived using the logit method.

Comparison of ecological inference and survey estimates of vote switching

In order to be able to validly compare the ecological inference estimates with the results of the mass surveys the latter need to be adjusted to the true results at both elections just as is undertaken in the ecological analysis. If this adjustment were not made we would in effect end up comparing different types of estimates. As a result, our transition matrices would disagree in part because of adjustment differences. It is not possible to create a simple weight for two elections simultaneously, so an iterative weighting procedure is required. Here use was made of a log contingency table technique. This statistical procedure reweights the percentages of self-reported vote switching derived from survey data to match the actual election results. In order to undertake this iterative weighting process it is assumed that the underlying distribution of voting data is bivariate normal (for details see, Kostelecký and Čermák 2003).[8]

Empirical results

In this section we present our research findings in four steps. First, we outline the results our cross-validation tests where we compare our ecological inference estimates and those emanating from mass survey data. Second, we discuss our results for voter switching between government and opposition parties from the 2002 general elections and the 2004 European elections. This analysis reflects most directly on H.2 of SOET outlined earlier. Third, we examine the related phenomenon of vote switching between large and small parties. Again, H.2 suggests that smaller parties should draw support away from the larger parties. We test to see was this the case in Czech Republic and Slovakia in June 2004? Moreover, we also investigate the importance of regional differences. For example did the voters of Prague and

Bratislava/Kosice behave similarly thus indicating the presence of an urban voting pattern? Lastly, we will look in greater detail at the voter transition matrices for a selection of parties, i.e. main governing parties (CSSD and SDKU) and Christian Democrat parties (KDU-CSL and KDH) in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Within all of these separate subsections we will make reference to H.1 of the SOET and discuss the impact of differential abstention.

Cross-validation of aggregate and survey data estimates of vote switching

At the heart of the SOET is vote switching between general and European elections. However, official electoral data on vote choice at the individual level is impossible to obtain and consequently completely accurate vote switching data does not exist. In this paper we have examined three separate estimates of vote switching for the 2002 and 2004 elections in the Czech Republic. The tables of vote switching in the appendix shows that the biggest differences between the ecological estimates and values derived from the ESS04 dataset relate to a systematic under-estimation of "core" support for CSSD, KSCM, ODS, KDU-CSL and abstainers by the logit method of ecological inference. The ecological inference estimates are higher for CSSD voters in 2002 deciding to abstain in 2004, while EES 04 estimates a higher level of abstention in both 2002 and 2004 for all voters than that produced by the ecological inference technique.

The implication here is that the logit method of ecological inference estimates indicate lower levels of party support and greater switching between parties (though not toward abstention) than EES 04. A similar pattern is observed for Slovak data except in the cases of the KDH and SMK parties.

More generally it is important to note that the voter switching matrices for making comparisons between the different datasets is based on a different

number of cells. The ecological inference and EES 04 estimates have 80 data points while the exit polls are based on 48 cells. This difference relate to the fact that the exit poll deals only with pre-defined major parties and excludes non-voters. This difference in effective data matrix sizes is likely to have some consequences on the estimation of the Duncan dissimilarity indices where the larger matrices employed in the ecological inference estimation procedure will yield lower dissimilarity values when compared to the surveys. Future research should attempt to identify an alternative dissimilarity measure that is more robust to differences in matrix size.

Figure 3a represents the overall pattern of dissimilarity between the different voter switching matrices used for analysis. These dissimilarity measures suggest that the ecological inference and EESO4 estimates of vote switching are more similar when comparison is made with the exit poll.

If both surveys were ideal in the sense of having only random errors around the true voter switching values they would have a lower dissimilarity value than that measure between each survey and the ecological inference estimates. This is not the case here and most likely relates to the characteristics of these polls noted earlier. Examination of the differences between the ecological inference estimates of vote switching for Slovakia indicates a close correspondence with the survey estimates as shown in figure 3b. This strong similarity between both sources of vote switching estimates may be due to the huge increase in electoral abstention in Slovakia between 2002 and 2004 (30 to 83 percent).

Figure 3a: Comparison of Czech voter transition matrices produced by the SC&C exit poll, the EES 04 survey and ecological analysis estimates derived from electoral data (Duncan dissimilarity indices)



Figure 3b: Comparison of Slovak voter transition matrices produced by the EES 04 survey and ecological analysis estimates derived from electoral data (Duncan dissimilarity indices)



Note the Duncan dissimilarity index is computed as half the sum of the absolute differences divided by two. For more details, see Berglund and Thomsen 1990: 21, 47-50.

Analysis estimates of vote switching between government and opposition parties

One of the central features of the SOET is that large, and most likely governing, parties will suffer losses during European elections. Let us first look at the situation in the Czech Republic. Our ecological inference results shown in figure 4a indicate that opposition party voters (in the last general election) are similar in all regions. More than half (55 percent) chose not to vote in 2004, while 43 percent remained loyal. Less than one-in-twenty (3 percent) switched to government parties.

Figure 4a: Comparison of level of vote switching away from government parties between 2002 and 2004 in the Czech Republic (per cent)



Note estimates based on ecological inference (logit method) technique. The regions illustrated earlier in figure 1 are labelled as follows. Region 1: Bohemia and urban Moravia; Region 2: Rural Moravia; Region 3: Prague; Region 4: Northwest borderlands. The legend labels 'gov', 'opp' and 'abs' refer to government parties, opposition parties and abstention.

Figure 4b: Comparison of level of vote switching between government and opposition parties between 2002 and 2004 in the Czech Republic (per cent)



Note estimates based on ecological inference (logit method) technique. The regions illustrated earlier in figure 1 are labelled as follows. Region 1: Bohemia and urban Moravia; Region 2: Rural Moravia; Region 3: Prague; Region 4: Northwest borderlands. The legend labels 'gov' and 'opp' refer to government parties, opposition parties and abstention.

Turning our attention now to government party supporters we find that the pattern of switching is more diverse. If we take each of the strategies open to voters we observe in figure 4b considerable regional variation. For example, in Prague 45 percent of incumbent party supporters switched to opposition parties in 2004. The national rate for this particular pattern was 18 percent. Differential rates of abstention for government party switchers also exhibit strong regional differences, where in the Northwestern borderland four-in-five did not vote, while in Prague the abstention rate was almost half this rate (45 percent). Rural Moravia was unique in its relatively high rate of party loyalty (i.e. one-in-five) in comparison to the national average of between 9 and 12 percent.

Figure 5a: Comparison of level of vote switching away from government parties between 2002 and 2004 in Slovakia (per cent)



Note estimates based on ecological inference (logit method) technique. The regions illustrated earlier in figure 2 are labelled as follows. Region 1: Urban: Bratislava, Kosice and the south-western border districts of Dunajskă Streda and Komărno; Region 2: Western Slovakia; Region 3: Central Slovakia; Region 4: Eastern Slovakia. The legend labels 'gov', 'opp' and 'abs' refer to government parties, opposition parties and abstention.

The situation in Slovakia was almost the same as in the Czech Republic as the levels of party switching among opposition party voters, as figure 5a demonstrates, were similar for all regions.

Figure 5b: Comparison of level of vote switching between government and opposition parties between 2002 and 2004 in Slovakia (per cent)



Note estimates based on ecological inference (logit method) technique. The regions illustrated earlier in figure 2 are labelled as follows. Region 1: Urban: Bratislava, Kosice and the south-western border districts of Dunajskă Streda and Komărno; Region 2: Western Slovakia; Region 3: Central Slovakia; Region 4: Eastern Slovakia. The legend labels 'gov' and 'opp' refer to government parties, opposition parties and abstention

However, figure 5b shows that the behaviour of opposition party supporters was different in the urban region (i.e. Bratislava, Kosice, Dunajska Streda and Komarno). Here abstention was lower than the national average and the level of loyal opposition party supporters was highest at 30 percent – this was more than twice the national average. Moving our attention toward government party voters in 2002 we can see from figure 5a that most Slovak citizens decided not to vote in 2004 (73 percent). More generally, the most urbanised region of Slovakia was characterised by higher levels of electoral abstention and the highest rates of vote switching from opposition to government parties. In contrast, as figure 5b highlights, the economically

depressed Eastern region exhibited the highest level of defection from government to opposition parties.

If we now compare the patterns in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, our ecological inference estimates suggest some important differences. Within Slovakia incumbent party supporters in urban areas had the highest level of non-participation. In contrast, in the Czech Republic electoral participation of incumbent party voters in Prague was 20 percent higher than elsewhere. However, Prague had the highest levels of switching toward opposition parties. More generally, the pattern of defection between the government and opposition blocs of parties was reversed. In the Czech Republic incumbent party voters tended to switch to opposition parties in 2004 (18 percent) while in Slovakia the opposite pattern prevailed (3 percent) in all regions except the western one.

With regard to the SOET the important fact to emerge from our analysis here is that the ecological inference estimates suggest that there was a much higher rate of switching from government to opposition parties than vice versa. Moreover, in the Czech Republic this form of vote switching was five times greater than the rate of defection from opposition to government parties. In Slovakia this ratio favouring government to opposition switching was three-to-one. The general implication here is that government parties lose support in second-order elections as H.4 suggests, but this effect seems to be primarily the product of differential abstention. This result suggests that the scope of H.1 should be broadened in future research.

Analysis of vote switching between large and small parties

According to the SOET one of the key expectations is that we should observe loss of support for larger parties and a simultaneous gain for small parties with the remainder abstaining. This is the prediction of H.2 outlined earlier and we find in the Czech Republic that the level of switching between both types of parties is almost the same for all regions (with a marginally higher

rate in rural Moravia and the Northwest borderlands).[9] Figure 6a, highlights that the most loyal voters are those who support middle sized parties, i.e. the Christian Democrats and Communist Party – parties that exhibit the highest levels of party identification in previous research. However, there is an important regional difference because outside of Prague supporters of "middle sized" parties (in 2002) tended to remain loyal or switch to small parties, if they voted in 2004. Within the urban setting of Prague these "middle party" supporters (if they voted in 2004) tended to switch to smaller parties at a rate that that was three times the national average (i.e. 13 and 39 percent respectively), rather than remain loyal to their party (16 percent).

Figure 6a: Comparison of level of switching away from big to small parties between 2002 and 2004 in the Czech Republic (per cent)



Note estimates based on ecological inference (logit method) technique. The regions illustrated earlier in figure 1 are labelled as follows. Region 1: Bohemia and urban Moravia; Region 2: Rural Moravia; Region 3: Prague; Region 4: Northwest borderlands. The legend labels 'big', 'middle' and 'small' refer to big parties (> 20 percent support in 2002, i.e. CSSD and ODS), middle parties (10-20 percent in 2002, i.e. Koalice and KSCM) and small parties (<10 percent support in 2002).

Switching our attention now to Slovakia we observe in figure 6b that there is very little switching (3-4 percent) between large and small parties as H.2 of the SOET suggests. Here again there is an important regional difference where in urban areas there is a higher rate of party switching, but the

direction is opposite to that expected, i.e. from small parties to large ones. A brief examination of middle-sized parties indicates little systematic pattern of switching between 2002 and 2004. However, the degree of observed loyalty for this group of parties was highest in urban areas (21 percent) and lowest in central and western Slovakia (9 percent).

Figure 6b: Comparison of level of switching away from big to small parties between 2002 and 2004 in Slovakia (per cent)



Note estimates based on ecological inference (logit method) technique. The regions illustrated earlier in figure 2 are labelled as follows. Region 1: Urban: Bratislava, Kosice and the south-western border districts of Dunajskă Streda and Komărno; Region 2: Western Slovakia; Region 3: Central Slovakia; Region 4: Eastern Slovakia. The legend labels 'big', 'middle' and 'small' refer to big parties (> 15 percent support in 2002, i.e. HZDS and SKDU), middle parties (10-15 percent in 2002, i.e. SMER and SMK) and small parties (<10 percent support in 2002).

If we compare the patterns prevailing in the urban regions of the Czech Republic and Slovakia we observe important differences. In Slovakia there are higher rates of switching among large and small parties, while in the Czech Republic the greatest level of electoral movement is associated with flows from mid-sized parties to small ones. More specifically, this pattern resulted from Koalice supporters shifting support to the European Democrats.[10] Having examined the pattern of vote switching for blocs of

parties in the last two subsections, we will now briefly examine the experience of particular parties and see what other important lessons an ecological inference analysis can tell us about the applicability of the SOET to the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

A key question raised by the SOET is where do the gains made by small parties in European elections come from? Our ecological inference analysis indicates that in the Czech Republic vote switching between small and large parties between 2002 and 2004 was asymmetrical. Supporters of incumbent parties in 2002 who then switched to small parties in June 2004 constituted 2.8 percent of the total electorate. However, those flowing in the opposite direction made up a much smaller portion – 0.4 percent of all voters. Within Slovakia the overall pattern of voter transition is different. This is because large parties witnessed a net gain from small parties. In summary, our ecological inference estimations suggest that H.2 of the SOET applies to Czech Republic, but not Slovakia.

Ecological inference results for vote switching between parties

Having examined the pattern of vote switching for blocs of parties in the last two subsections, we will now briefly examine the experience of particular parties and see what other important lessons an ecological inference analysis can tell us about the applicability of the SOET to the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Rather than examine all parties we will restrict our attention here to vote switching among some of the government parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This is because the electoral flows observed for opposition parties are largely the same for all regions. Looking first to the Czech Republic we can see from figure 7 that Social Democrat supporters had a higher rate of participation in Prague than elsewhere (32 percent compared to 23 percent). However, these voters also had the highest levels of switching to opposition parties (27 percent compared to a national average of 15 percent).

Figure 7: Comparison of level of the rate of switching away from Social Democrat Party (CSSD) between 2002 and 2004 in the Czech Republic (per cent)



Note that CSSD was the main governing party following the 2002 general election. The estimates listed above are based on ecological inference (logit method) technique. The regions illustrated earlier in figure 1 are labelled as follows. Region 1: Bohemia and urban Moravia; Region 2: Rural Moravia; Region 3: Prague; Region 4: Northwest borderlands. The legend labels 'stayers', 'switchers to govt', 'switchers to opposition' and 'abstainers' refer to voters who remained loyal to the CSSD in 2004, switched to Koalice in 2004, switched to opposition parties in 2004 or did not vote in 2004 respectively.

The Czech Christian Democrat Party (KDU-CSL) is interesting because its supporters in rural Moravia exhibited the highest levels of party loyalty (37 percent compared to a national average of 21 percent). Moreover, there was a significant urban/rural divide to electoral participation for this party. According to our ecological inference estimates, Koalice (i.e. mainly Christian Democrats) voters in Prague had an 85 percent turnout rate, whereas the national rate was one-in-two. However, these higher levels of electoral participation were associated with lower levels of loyalty because Koalice voters had a 71 percent switching rate in Prague – a level that was almost three times higher than that prevailing across the Czech Republic.

Figure 8: Comparison of level of the rate of switching away from the Christian Democrat Party (KDU-CSL) between 2002 and 2004 in the Czech Republic (per cent)



Note that KDU-CSL was the junior governing party following the 2002 general election. The estimates listed above are based on ecological inference (logit method) technique. The regions illustrated earlier in figure 1 are labelled as follows. Region 1: Bohemia and urban Moravia; Region 2: Rural Moravia; Region 3: Prague; Region 4: Northwest borderlands. The legend labels 'stayers', 'switchers to govt', 'switchers to opposition' and 'abstainers' refer to voters who remained loyal to the KDU-CSL in 2004, switched to CSSD in 2004, switched to opposition parties in 2004 or did not vote in 2004 respectively.

If we now shift our focus to Slovakia and the main governing party, i.e. the SDKU led by Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda, we can see from figure 9 that this party had the lowest level of party loyalists in urban areas (8 percent, compared to 16 percent across the country) combined with one of the highest rates of abstention. More generally, there were significant regional differences in the profile of loyalty, defection and abstention among those who voted for this party in the last general election in 2002. Such results demonstrate that loss in popularity, due to being in power at the mid-term, as H.4 of SOET asserts, was not a uniform phenomenon.

Figure 9: Comparison of level of the rate of switching away from the Slovak Democratic & Christian Union (SDKU) between 2002 and 2004 in Slovakia (per cent)



Note that SDKU was the main governing party following the 2002 general election. The estimates listed above are based on ecological inference (logit method) technique. The regions illustrated earlier in figure 2 are labelled as follows. Region 1: Urban: Bratislava, Kosice and the south-western border districts of Dunajskă Streda and Komărno; Region 2: Western Slovakia; Region 3: Central Slovakia; Region 4: Eastern Slovakia. The legend labels 'stayers', 'switchers to govt', 'switchers to opposition' and 'abstainers' refer to voters who remained loyal to the SDKU in 2004, switched to KDH, SMK or ANO in 2004, switched to opposition parties in 2004 or did not vote in 2004 respectively.

As in the Czech Republic, the Christian Democrat Party (KDH) in Slovakia had some of the most loyal voters. We can observe from our ecological inference results presented in figure 10 that in two regions, i.e. Central and Eastern Slovakia supporters of this party tended to consider only two strategies – remain loyal to the KDH or abstain. In these regions, switching to other parties occurred among a relatively small number of these partisans (7 and 4 percent respectively).

Figure 10: Comparison of level of the rate of switching away from the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) between 2002 and 2004 in Slovakia (per cent)



Note that the KDH was a junior governing party following the 2002 general election. The estimates listed above are based on ecological inference (logit method) technique. The regions illustrated earlier in figure 2 are labelled as follows. Region 1: Urban: Bratislava, Kosice and the south-western border districts of Dunajskă Streda and Komărno; Region 2: Western Slovakia; Region 3: Central Slovakia; Region 4: Eastern Slovakia. The legend labels 'stayers', 'switchers to govt', 'switchers to opposition' and 'abstainers' refer to voters who remained loyal to the KDH in 2004, switched to SDKU, SMK or ANO in 2004, switched to opposition parties in 2004 or did not vote in 2004 respectively.

Figure 11 demonstrates a similarly high level of loyalty to another (junior) party of government – the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK). Within urban areas such as Bratislava and Kosice and in Western Slovakia more generally there was no switching among SMK voters to any other parties. However, in the Central Slovak region very few SMK voters (1 percent) stayed loyal. Significantly, such switchers only moved to other governing parties where it seems SMK voters often chose to abstain they rarely considered switching to opposition parties. This pattern contrasts with our expectations derived from the SOET where some level of 'protest' voting would have been expected.

Figure 11: Comparison of level of the rate of switching away from the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) between 2002 and 2004 in Slovakia (per cent)



Note that the SMK was a junior governing party following the 2002 general election. The estimates listed above are based on ecological inference (logit method) technique. The regions illustrated earlier in figure 2 are labelled as follows. Region 1: Urban: Bratislava, Kosice and the south-western border districts of Dunajskă Streda and Komărno; Region 2: Western Slovakia; Region 3: Central Slovakia; Region 4: Eastern Slovakia. The legend labels 'stayers', 'switchers to govt', 'switchers to opposition' and 'abstainers' refer to voters who remained loyal to the KDH in 2004, switched to SDKU, KDH or ANO in 2004, switched to opposition parties in 2004 or did not vote in 2004 respectively

In summary, the ecological inference results presented indicate that defection of support away from government parties (i.e. CSSD and Koalice in the Czech Republic, and SDKU and KDH in Slovakia) was primarily an urban phenomenon in both our case studies. In rural areas, the highest levels of party loyalty are observed for Christian Democrat Parties in both countries. These ecological inference results tally with the findings of previous survey based research that Catholic party supporters have high levels of party identification. A similar pattern is observed for only major ethnic based party – the SMK in Slovakia. These findings highlight that where attachment to parties is high, only some elements of the SOET such as increased abstention (H.1) are evident in the electoral data.

Conclusion

Within this paper we have demonstrated how the Second-Order-Election-Thesis can be examined at the sub-national level, and how it is possible to also make cross-national comparisons where the richness of regional political cultures is retained. This is one of the key advantages of implementing an ecological inference approach when examining theories of electoral behaviour such as the SOET. In this respect, we have shown the degree to which expectations derived from the SOET are observed in regional and national vote switching patterns in the our two case studies – the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Moreover, we have illustrated how the estimates of vote switching derived from an ecological inference based analysis of electoral data can be fruitfully compared with mass survey data to deepen our understanding of electoral behaviour. In this respect, the results presented here provide new insights into the original national level analyses undertaken by Reif and Schmitt (1980), and the individual level survey based analyses undertaken by van der Eijk et al. (1996).

Unsurprisingly, our ecological inference based estimates show that when one considers regional differences, which are based on political rather than strictly geographical criteria (though these are often coterminous), one sees a more complex picture than that portrayed in national patterns. More specifically, in this paper we have demonstrated that urban/rural divisions play an important role in shaping the levels of party switching and electoral abstention. A recurrent observation stemming from our research is that regional patterns of electoral behaviour contrast sharply with national patterns.

One key lesson to emerge from the research presented here is that differences in the strength and direction of party switching at the regional level are

strongly determined by sub-national political cultures and local economic circumstances. The key implication here is that the SOET applies mainly to national patterns, it works less well at lower levels of aggregation. Methodologically speaking there is the suspicion here that some features of the SOET may be based on *aggregation effects*. Our ecological inference results suggest that investigation of this suspicion represents an important avenue for future research.

Afterword

In our paper we examined the used of regional electoral data for both the European Parliament elections of 2004 and the previous general election in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2002. These countries represent important case studies as they have a common history and they held their first EP elections in 2004. However, they are also different in significant ways. For example, ethnicity plays an important role in electoral competition in Slovakia, but is largely absent in the Czech Republic.

More generally, the goal of our research was to "unpack" the nature of party competition exhibited in both general and European elections. In this respect, our key interest was vote-switching patterns. Quite often the focus of vote-switching behaviour is cross-national and theories such as the Second Order Election Thesis makes specific predictions as to differences between general and European polls. Such a research strategy makes sense when using mass survey data. However, one limitation of such research is that there is little consideration of sub-national differences. In our research, using an Ecological inference methodology we demonstrated the importance of regional voting switching patterns and compared our results with those estimated using the European Election Study survey dataset.

At the Lisbon Workshop three main points were made regarding the paper we presented.

First, while our research methodology was an interesting one, our paper was too descriptive. In short, future revisions of our paper should focus more clearly on highlighting general features of vote switching behaviour and the dynamics underpinning regional electoral patterns. Consequently, our research would contribute not only to the literature on European elections, but also the wider study of electoral behaviour and political culture.

Second, the theory underlying the ecological inference method used is based on estimating individual level behaviour from aggregated data, i.e. a top down approach. There is considerable research within the social sciences using techniques such as agent based modelling that adopt a bottom up approach. Here simple rules about voter behaviour are used in simulations to generate estimates of likely aggregate level behaviour. In this respect, we were encouraged to consider the theoretical implications of our ecological inference methodology.

Third, our use of aggregated election results needs to be more strongly argued. Most often within political science the main interest is in individual level models of political behaviour. Consequently, use of mass survey data is appropriate for such tasks as individual voters opinions are sought directly. However, using an ecological inference technique involves making statistical inferences about individual level behaviour from aggregated data. Quite often such methods are used when survey data is unavailable, e.g. with electoral history datasets. Therefore, in employing an ecological inference approach we must bolster our contention that analysing aggregated data provides unique insight into electoral behaviour.

Notes

Paper prepared for presentation at the "European Parliament Election of 2004": RG3 – EES Spring Meeting held at Instituto Ciências Sociais, Lisbon, May 11-14, 2006. The research is based on the European Election Survey 2004 survey (EES 04), SC&C exit poll and official electoral data. In undertaking this research both authors gratefully acknowledge funding from

CONNEX; the "Participation, Democracy and Citizenship in the Czech Republic" project financed by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic (Grant No. 403/04/1007, 2004–2006) and "Legitimacy of Political System and Inequalities" (Grant No. 403/06/1421, 2006-2008.

[1] We will not discuss here for reasons of brevity why voters seem to have a hierarchical view of elections. Differential turnout and party support may be due to (1) cognitive factors where voters *know* that some elections are more important than others or (2) mobilisation factors where citizens fail to vote because they are only vaguely aware that an election is taking place.

[2]

[3] This general "sympathy" for a party is primarily a measure of short-term factors, such as candidate effects, sudden downturns in the economy, scandals, etc.

[4] In effect this leads to re-specifying our aggregate logit model of party choice as a random intercept one.

[5] Technically speaking this equality is specified between individual level tetrachoric correlations (the gamma correlation is a reasonable convenient approximation) and the district level Pearson correlations between Probit transformed vote shares (logit transformations are again a reasonable convenient approximation using a constant scale factor). See, Thomsen (1990: 13).

[6] These geographical units are based on seventy counties that have been divided into urban and rural areas. Large cities such as Prague and Brno have been divided into smaller sub-city units. This process of disaggregation yields 159 cases for analysis.

[7] Only electoral data was used for this analysis. It is also possible to use census data such as social class. However, for this analysis our expectation was that political factors would be the primary source for identifying homogenous regional units within the electoral geography of both countries. The assumption of a stable system of underlying factors determining voting behaviour is tenable since there are just two years between the pair of chamber and European elections.

[8] This technique was implemented through use of a dedicated software package called LOCCONTINGENCY that has been developed within the Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague.

[9] We are not talking about absolute levels of support here, but percentages of the share of the vote gained in 2002 that switched in 2004. This is an important distinction that will be highlighted at the end of this subsection.

[10] This trend was mainly due to the migration of Union of Freedom (US-DEU) voters. The US-DEU was a junior partner in the Koalice coalition that fought the 2002 general election under a joint platform with the Christian Democrats. Both the European Democrats (SNK-ED) and US-DEU adhere to a common liberal pro-European orientation.

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Appendices

Ecological inference datasets

The primary source of vote switching information is the official electoral results data provided by the Interior Ministry of the Czech Republic. A breakdown of results is available for all ballot boxes in the Czech Republic. However constructing such a detailed dataset is prohibitive and impossible to match with other relevant data such as occupation, social class, etc. which are available from the Czech Statistical Office from the most recent census in 2001. For the purposes of this research two datasets were constructed. The first is based on a unit called the "Okres" or district and yields 91 units for the entire country. The second is based on the "county" unit and enables us to divide the Czech Republic into 159 units. Cluster analyses were undertaken using these two datasets. For reasons of brevity only the results from the county level of analysis are reported in this paper.

For historical reasons the administrative structure used in Slovakia is similar to that in the Czech Republic. The ecological inference analyses undertaken in this paper were based on district ("Okres") data where there are 79 units for the entire country. This data is available from the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. Using a similar procedure applied to the Czech electoral data a series of cluster analyses were estimated as a basis for identifying electoral regions. These regions were then used as part in making ecological inference estimates of vote switching between the general election of 2002 and the European Parliament elections of 2004.

European Election Study (EES 04) datasets

The data used in this paper is the Czech Republic wave of the European Election Study of 2004. A random sample of the adult (18 years +) population was interviewed within the three weeks of the European elections (June 29 to July 7). A total of 889 interviews were completed. Respondents were asked to recall participation and vote choice in the accession

referendum in 2003 and the 2002 national chamber elections and how they would vote if Chamber elections were held in the summer of 2004. These questions in a sense allow us to impute how the respondents collected would have voted in first and second-order national elections and examine some reasons for differential turnout rates and party preference changes as predicted by Reif and Schmitt (1980). In order to deal the well-known effect of over-reporting of voter turnout the dataset has been weighted to reflect the actual turnout in 2004 using the procedure outlined by van der Eijk (1996).

SC&C 2004 European Election exit poll dataset

These were commercial surveys for Czech Television (CT1) undertaken on polling day(s) outside a quota sample of polling stations giving a representative sample of the total Czech electorate. The samples for these exist polls were 9,028 respondents with response rates of approximately 66 percent. This dataset represents the most comprehensive and probably most accurate dataset relating to the vote choices of the 28 percent of the Czech electorate who voted in 2004 elections. This dataset has been weighted by SC&C to match the socio-demographic profile of the eligible electorate of the Czech Republic.

Voter switching estimates between 2002 and 2004

Czech Republic - European Election Study 2004 estimates

2002/ 2004	*CSSD*	*KSCM*	*ODS*	*KDU*	*ULD*	*SNK*	*SZ*	*NEZ*	Others	Abstainers	Total
CSSD	2.1	0.8	0.8	0.2	0	0.7	0.1	1	0.7	11.1	17.5
KSCM	0.2	4.8	0	0	0	0	0	0.2	0	5.6	10.7
ODS	0.1	0.1	6.5	0.1	0.5	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.2	6	14.2
Koalice	0	0	0.2	2.1	0	1	0.1	0.3	0	4.6	8.3
SN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.4	0	1.2	1.6
SZ	0	0	0	0.2	0	0	0.4	0	0	0.9	1.4
Others	0	0.1	0.5	0.1	0	0.3	0	0.1	0.9	2.3	4.3
Abstainers	0.1	0	0.5	0.1	0	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	40.1	42.1
Total	2.5	5.7	8.5	2.7	0.5	3.1	0.9	2.3	2	71.8	100

SC&C Exit-poll 2004 estimates

2002/ 2004	*CSSD*	*KSCM*	*ODS*	*KDU*	*ULD*	*SNK*	*SZ*	*NEZ*	Others	Abstainers	Total
CSSD	6.4	2.5	1.4	0.4	0	1.1	0.4	1.3	0.8	na	14.2
KSCM	0.1	14.9	0.1	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.4	0.5	na	16.1
ODS	0.6	0.3	21.8	0.4	0	2.3	0.3	2.3	1.2	na	29.1
Koalice	0.3	0.3	1.7	7.5	0	4	0.6	0.6	2	na	17
Others	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.2	0	1.5	1	1.2	2.1	na	6.7
Abstainers	1.2	2.2	4.6	1	0	2.1	0.9	2.5	2.4	na	16.9
Total	8.8	20.3	30	9.6	0	11	3.2	8.2	8.9	na	100

Note with an exit poll abstainers are excluded from the sampling frame by definition.

Ecological inference (logit method) estimates

2002/ 2004	*CSSD*	*KSCM*	*ODS*	*KDU*	*ULD*	*SNK*	*SZ*	*NEZ*	Others	Abstainers	Total
CSSD	0.9	1	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.4	0.2	13.5	17.5
KSCM	0.2	3.4	0.1	0.1	0	0	0	0.5	0.3	6.1	10.7
ODS	0.2	0.2	6.3	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.2	0.3	0.3	5.8	14.2
Koalice	0.2	0.1	0.5	1.6	0.1	1	0.2	0.1	0.2	4.2	8.3
SN	0	0	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	1.3	1.6
SZ	0	0	0.1	0	0	0.1	0	0	0	1.1	1.4
Others	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.2	0.4	3.1	4.3
Abstainers	0.8	1	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.7	0.3	0.8	0.5	36.6	42.1
Total	2.5	5.7	8.5	2.7	0.5	3.1	0.9	2.3	2	71.8	100

Slovakia

European Election Study 2004 estimates

2002/ 2004	HZDS	SMER	KSS	SDKU	SMK	KDH	ANO	Others	Abstain	Total
HZDS	2.3	0.1	0	0	0	0.2	0	0.2	10.7	13.5
SMER	0	1.3	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	7.9	9.3
KSS	0	0	0.6	0.1	0	0	0	0	3.6	4.4
SDKU	0	0.1	0	1.9	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.4	7.6	10.4
SMK	0	0	0	0	1.9	0	0	0	5.8	7.7
KDH	0.1	0	0	0.2	0	2	0	0.1	3.3	5.7
ANO	0.1	0.2	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.6	0	4.3	5.5
Others	0.2	0.8	0	0.2	0	0	0.1	0.8	10.4	12.6
Abstainers	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.2	0	0.1	29.6	30.9
Total	2.8	2.8	0.8	2.9	2.2	2.7	0.8	1.7	83.3	100

Ecological inference (logit method) estimates

2002/ 2004	HZDS	SMER	KSS	SDKU	SMK	KDH	ANO	Others	Abstain	Total
HZDS	1.5	0.4	0.1	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.1	11.2	13.5
SMER	0.5	0.7	0.1	0.2	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	7.6	9.3
KSS	0	0.2	0.3	0	0	0	0.1	0.1	3.6	4.4
SDKU	0.1	0.4	0	1.6	0	0.2	0.2	0.4	7.5	10.4
SMK	0	0	0	0	2.1	0	0	0.1	5.4	7.7
KDH	0.1	0.1	0	0.3	0	2.2	0	0.1	3	5.7
ANO	0	0.2	0.1	0.2	0	0	0.2	0.3	4.6	5.5
Others	0.4	0.7	0.1	0.3	0	0.1	0.1	0.2	10.7	12.6
Abstainers	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	29.7	30.9
Total	2.8	2.8	0.8	2.9	2.2	2.7	0.8	1.7	83.3	100

Chapter 12

Slovak vote in the EP election in broader context of the EU perception

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Abstract

Slovak citizens launched themselves onto the European scene with extremely low turnout - only 17% of eligible voters participated in the selection of 14 Slovak EP members. On the other hand, the election was mainly successful for pro-European coalition parties, in spite of their mid-term unpopularity, but not for parties which tried to mobilize the voters by appealing to anti-EU sentiments. This means that the trend in Slovakia did not follow the prevailing EU pattern by strengthening the opposition and voting for smaller euro-sceptical or anti-EU parties. Euro-phobes such as communists or nationalists failed completely. More mobilized have been voters who stand for Europe/European union, not only as the winners of EU integration. The traditionally better mobilized national populist parties were not motivated by the idea of Europe. The issue has lower salience for them and they perceive it ambivalently. This differential mobilization led to the success of the coalition parties.

The voting pattern for the EP election in Slovakia represents one case study among 8 post-communist countries that joined the Union in 2004. What differentiates the newcomers from the established EU15 and how the second-order model works in the new member states has been analyzed by Marsh

(2005) and Schmitt (2005)? My paper will compare Slovakia with other EU nations in term of EU membership perception and the impact of EU issues on party competition before and after the accession.

I. EU–issue in domestic politics – short overview

Delayed and weak pre-accession public debate

The public and political debate about EU integration was delayed in Slovakia compared to other Visegrad 4 countries. This was mainly because the EU-discourse was overshadowed by debates about the quality/nature of democracy in Slovakia. Although European issues were not absent from the debate before the autumn of 1998, they took a back seat to a domestic conflict over the government's illiberal ruling style. During this period the European dimension mattered because it provided external validation (or lack of it) for the policies of both government and opposition. The broad (anti-Mečiar) coalition government (1998-2002) managed to eliminate doubts about the political stability of Slovakia, and this resulted in technical issues about the accession process and the closing of the negotiation chapters. The black-or-white question "yes or no" was replaced with the question "when" would Slovakia join the EU.

The absence, at the level of both the political elite and the general public, of a broader discussion on the EU also had more general causes - in post communist countries EU membership has been perceived as being an ultimate objective which has no alternative. Between 1998 and 2002, the attitude of Slovakia's political and social elite toward European issues could be described as "Euro-determinism" or "consensus without discussion", which made a genuine public debate virtually impossible. It is worth stressing that during this period, indeed from the mid-1990s onwards, virtually all political parties advocated entry and all governments included it in their declared programmes. HZDS declared its belief in EU membership and Mečiar himself submitted Slovakia's application. In the other V4

countries politicians such as Klaus, Orban and, to a lesser extent, Lepper were prominent critics of the EU, but no one took a similar position in Slovakia. Euroscepticism has, therefore, not been explicitly put before the electorate.

Parliamentary Election 2002

Slovakia successfully negotiated EU membership, catching up with the neighbors, and in 2002 stood in front of the EU door. There was one barrier to overcome – the parliamentary election to be held in September 2002. This election was not as critical as that in 1998 had been, but still there was a question mark – what would happen if Mečiar managed a comeback? The EU and NATO representatives, as well as foreign diplomats, argued that in such a case Slovakia might miss the "integration train". The coalition parties – and above all the Dzurinda´s Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) - campaigned for Slovakia's euro-Atlantic integration. Maintaining the course of Slovakia's foreign policy was extremely important to SDKÚ voters [and leading party figures]; so it was a priority stressed by the party. Furthermore, the SDKU wanted to position itself as the strongest guarantor of integration as well as to present itself as the party which had made the "catching up process" not only possible and but smooth. The Smer party positioned itself between the coalition and the opposition, utilizing the dominant political conflict. Its appeal to voters was based on claims of novelty, modernity and sober pragmatism, as well as on criticizing and blaming the established parties. The party took a pro-EU position but wanted to distance itself from the coalition's integration effort: its bottom line was integration yes, but not at all costs. All in all the EU issue was a 'valence issue'.

EU accession referendum 2003

Positive public perception of EU membership provided ideal conditions for the straightforward course of the euro-referendum. It turned out that the main problem was not the final outcome, but ensuring sufficient voter participation

(there is a 50% turnout quorum in Slovakia), and, in consequence, the validity of the plebiscite. Eventually, turnout reached 52% of eligible voters, which was less than in Poland and the Czech Republic, but more than in Hungary. The "yes" to Slovakia's EU membership was more than resounding, as 92% of those voters who came to polling stations endorsed the country's integration[1].

The experience of other candidates confirmed that in countries where public debates lacked articulated opposition to EU integration, and where public support for integration was high in the long term but also relatively shallow and impersonal, total voter participation in the euro-referendum was lower, and the share of "no" votes was negligible. Other factors that caused low interest in the referendum that were specific to Slovakia included previous negative experience with referenda in Slovakia, generally critical perceptions of recent societal developments, of the use of non-participation to demonstrate disapproval of government policies, the assumption that the result would be positive, and inadequate mobilization activities by political parties. Last but not least, the lackluster campaign reflected the non-competitive nature of the issue, poor structure, and the excessively general nature of the public debate.

II. European Parliament election – parallels and differences with the second-order-election model

On May 1, 2004, Slovakia became a fully-fledged member of the European Union. The first "test" of new EU citizens came shortly after this accession in form of the election for members of the European Parliament in 25 EU member states. The majority of new member states witnessed an extremely low turnout in their first EP election. Slovak citizens introduced themselves onto the European scene with critically low turnout - only 16.97 % of eligible voters came to cast their vote and to choose 14 EP members. This is an absolute "record" not only in the 2004 EP election, but also in the history of

European Parliamentary elections. Voter participation under 30% was also recorded in Poland (20.5%), Estonia (26.8%), Slovenia (28.3%), and in the Czech Republic (28.3%). This contrasted with very high participation in Belgium (90.8%) and Luxembourg (89.0%), who both have compulsory voting. The average participation across the EU 25 was 45.7%; the range stretches from over 90% to less than 17 %.

Since the first election to the European Parliament in 1979 a lot of comparative electoral studies have been developed to describe the main differences between this 'second-order election' and other types of elections. The EP election differs from 'first-order' elections mostly in:

- lower participation
- loss of government parties
- loss of big parties.[2]

Let us examine the first EP election in Slovakia from this perspective.

Table 1: Results of EP election in Slovakia

Political party	% of valid votes	EP seats	% vote in 2002 election
Government parties			
Slovak Democratic and Christian Coalition (SDKÚ)	17.09	3	15.09
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)	16.19	3	8.25
Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK)	13.24	2	11.06
Alliance of a New Citizen (ANO)	4.65	0	8.01
Total government parties	**51.20**	**8**	**42.52**
Opposition Parties			
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	17.04	3	19.50
SMER	16.89	3	13.46
Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS)	4.54	0	6.32
Total opposition parties	**38.46**	**6**	**39.29**
Extra-parliamentary/breakaway parties			
Free Forum (SF)	3.25	0	-
Coalition Slovak National Party / Real Slovak National Party (SNS/PSNS)	2.01	0	3.65/3.32
Coalition Movement for Democracy/People's Union (HZD/ĽÚ)	1.69	0	3.28/-
Civic Conservative Party (OKS)	1.00	0	0.32
Other (6 parties)	2.35	0	7.60
Total parties not elected to the parliament in 2002	**10.32**	**0**	**18.19**

Source**:** Statistical Office of the SR, see also Henderson 2004: 10.

The results of the EP elections in Slovakia do not comply with two out of three above-mentioned differences associated with European elections in general. Eight candidates divided between three government parties, namely the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ), the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK), won seats in the European Parliament. In general, the most successful party was the SDKÚ with 17.09% of votes and three out of 14 mandates in the EP. More than 16% of voters voted for the KDH, which gained three seats in the EP. The KDH recorded their best election result since the 1992 parliamentary elections. The SMK won 13% of the popular vote and gained two seats in the EP. In total the ruling coalition parties received more votes than in the parliamentary elections of 2002. All MEPs from the ruling coalition became members of the EPP-ED group in the EP. In total the opposition parties received 38.5% of the popular vote (the KSS failed to win the 5% of votes necessary for representation) and six seats in the EP, three seats for Smer and three seats for the ĽS-HZDS.

Smaller parties were not successful; despite expectations, two parliamentary parties, namely the Alliance of New Citizens (ANO) and the opposition Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), did not manage to exceed the required 5% of the popular vote. The newly unified coalition of the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Real Slovak National Party (PSNS) received only a tiny proportion of the voter support both parties usually receive in national elections.

In terms of the election results it should be mentioned that, unlike what happened in many other EU member states, the elections to the European Parliament in Slovakia were successful for pro-European ruling coalition parties rather than for the parties mobilizing voters through EU sceptical or EU critical attitudes. Yet given the very low turnout it is not possible to draw any conclusions or to make any prognosis for other elections from the electoral behavior of voters.

As shown by the studies carried out in the old EU member states, the voters are less and less partisan and more and more often they decide how to vote at each type of elections separately, and therefore also often vote for different political parties at different elections. Based on the results of the first EP elections and very low voter turnout in Slovakia one can say that voting decision was to a large extent consistent with retrospectively declared behavior in the parliamentary elections of 2002 (in case of Smer, the SMK and the KDH more than 85% voted identically, in case of the HZDS it was 75%, and in case of the SDKÚ 69%). These findings also indicate that the election results were determined mainly by very differentiated voter turnout which was not based on the difference between the rural and urban environments, but on the mobilizing strength of the issue of the EU (the SDKÚ) and the combination of loyalty and significance of the subject (the KDH).

Table 2: Participation in the EP election – breakdown by party preferences

	Did participate	Did not participate
SDKÚ	42.9	57.1
KDH	42.4	57.6
SMK	29.2	70.8
ĽS-HZDS	26.0	74.0
ANO	24.1	75.9
SNS	17.9	82.1
SMER	14.2	85.8
KSS	13.0	87.0

Source: EES post-election survey June 2004 – Slovakia

Empirical data prove the general assumption that the voters´ perception was focused more on national politics than on the European level. More than 40% of the respondents who did not vote replied that they "do not trust the politicians, they feel election fatigue and they are disconcerted by national politics". Only 12% gave reasons specifically related to European politics or institutions and 15% were not sufficiently familiar with the candidates, party manifestos etc. Voters' indifference also resulted from lack of salience of the European agenda in public debate in Slovakia and from lack of interest on

the part of political parties[3] and the media. This fact became apparent in feeble election competition and an insufficiently visible campaign. Although nearly 12% of respondents justified their absence from the elections by citing specific objections to the EU, this was not, in general, the main reason. The Slovak public is typically supportive of EU membership and evaluates its impact positively, the image of the European Union is also positive among the Slovak public.

Table 3 "Could you tell me, why you did not take part in this election?" (Open-ended question, one response possible, filter question n= 859) (%)

Not interested in the election, politics, election fatigue	22
Disillusion, frustration with politics, "it does not matter, makes no sense", distrust of politicians in general	19
"Objective" reasons - being abroad, ill, etc.	19
Missing information about the candidates, weak campaign, lack of information	15
EU or EP specific critique („nothing will change", "EP is too distant", "I do not care about the EU", "it does not matter which useless individual will represent us", "EU does not help us"…..)	12
I did not want to go (without giving any reason)	1
"Sunday" (inappropriate day)	1
Other reasons	3
DK	10

Source: EES post election survey June 2004 – Slovakia

One of the main reasons for low voter participation was the absence of controversial issues, and because of that the absence of mobilizing debate. Paradoxically, the issue of the European elections became controversial only after the elections, when the politicians looked for reasons for low turnout. Compared to previous (especially parliamentary) elections, the Euro-elections were also influenced by the absence of fear of losing: the voters were not emotionally mobilized by the fear that the direction in which the country was heading would change.

In general we can state that the pattern of voter mobilization and voting decision in EP elections differs from that in national elections. The most motivated were voters for whom the EU means something (in affective rather

than simply instrumental terms). Traditionally loyal supporters of opposition parties (especially the HZDS and the KSS) were not mobilized for the European elections. They are not familiar with this issue and they perceive Slovakia's EU membership in a negative or an ambivalent way, rather than in a positive one. The overall victory of the ruling coalition resulted in part from this distribution of interest in the election. The coalition won the elections despite suffering *mid-term unpopularity*. However, those who voted for government parties (in particular the SDKÚ) are highly appreciative of the country's EU membership and the subject of European integration is mobilizing for them.

Analysis of *European Election Study*[4] data shows that the eight post-communist new member states vary in many aspects from examined and described models of electoral behavior in the countries of the previous EU 15. First of all, the "mid-term dissatisfaction" model, according to which the ruling parties in Euro-elections are particularly likely to lose their support when these are held in the middle of a national election cycle, cannot be applied in general. As for eight new member states, no unifying pattern of election gains and losses depending on election cycle emerged. The dispersion of cases and fluctuations was much larger than within former EU 15 (Marsh, 2005). Provided that the model also includes voter participation, which reached an average of 32% in eight new member states compared to 57 % in other EU countries[5], one may assume that abstaining from voting during these elections expresses voters' dissatisfaction with government performance, especially when there is a lack of EU-sceptical opposition political parties.

Similarly, the findings did not confirm that larger parties do worse and smaller parties do better in Euro-elections. On the other hand, no EU 15 country has experienced such massive losses and gains in voter support as some new member states. As an example we can cite the Czech Republic and the slide in voter support for the ruling ČSSD from 30% in parliamentary

elections to 9% in Euro-elections, or Poland, where the voter support for the SDL-UP dropped from 41% to 9%. On the other hand, the Latvian party TB/LNKK received 30% of votes compared to 5% in the previous parliamentary elections and the support for Moodukad party in Estonia increased from 7% to 37% of all votes. Similarly, all the most significant cases of significant losses of votes have occurred in post-communist countries (Marsh, 2005:155).

Slovakia did not see such dramatic changes in its election results. The results ranged from + 7.94 percentage point (the KDH) to 3.36 percentage point (the ANO). According to the findings of the survey conducted immediately after the EP elections, voting in Euro-elections was to a large extent consistent with voting in national elections. We may therefore state that Slovakia does not copy the model for new EU Members described by Egmond (2005), according to which changes in results of Euro-elections are based on election fluctuations rather than on differentiated voter turnout. In Slovakia it was j differentiated voter turnout that resulted in different results compared to the previous parliamentary elections. The main reason for an exceptionally low voter turnout in Slovakia's first Euro-elections can be considered to be the absence of controversial issues, and therefore the absence of mobilizing debate.

III. Social climate - most urgent problems in the national vs. EU level perspective

In Slovakia, as any other transformation country, the hierarchy of urgent social problems is dominated by unemployment, followed by wages, low standard of living and the health care system (Graph 1). Though popular acceptance of the historical changes that have occurred since November 1989 increased slightly in 2004 (Bútorová-Gyárfášová-Velšic, 2005), the general perception of the economic and social situation remains relatively pessimistic. These trends are accompanied by a gradual deepening in

differences of opinion among various socio-demographic and political groupings. In fact regional disparities are deep and the differences are becoming even sharper due to the implementation of liberal reforms. Residents of the Bratislava region seem well aware of their better opportunities, while residents of eastern parts of the country display a very strong feeling of deprivation. Generally, the frustration of citizens tends to increase from west to east.

Graph 1: "Which of the issues you have specified do you consider most crucial, most significant? (Specify just one)"



Source: EES post-election survey June 2004 – Slovakia

Who is dealing and should deal with the most pressing problems? According to the respondents, urgent social problems are dealt with mainly at national, not regional or European level (Table 4). Even when respondents think that

the EU should find a solution, the national level is seen as the key for dealing with the problems.

Displeasure with the economic and social situation most often turns against the Government. The public often assesses the Government's performance from the perspective of their own wallet. In Slovakia, critical attitudes prevail – almost 2/3 disagree with that what the Government has done so far. The Government's job was positively evaluated by just 22% of the respondents.

Table 4 "In your opinion today, the most significant issue is mainly dealt with at regional, state-wide or European level vs. the issue should be dealt with at regional, state-wide or European level?"

	The issue is dealt:			The issue should be dealt:		
	regional	state-wide	European	regional	state-wide	European
Unemployment, labor market	17	44	14	**23**	46	19
Wages, standard of living	11	48	9	16	53	**18**
Health care	7	68	5	**17**	60	**11**
Corruption	7	46	22	9	**52**	**28**
Economy	12	58	14	12	50	**29**
Pension system	8	61	8	**17**	53	**19**
Social benefits	16	59	13	13	55	**32**
Education	31	38	14	3	**57**	**30**

Note: Bold = significant shifts between "is" and "should be". Source: EES post-election survey June 2004 – Slovakia

IV. Satisfied but indifferent - some paradoxes of the EU membership's perception

Based on several empirical surveys we can say that Slovaks are satisfied and optimistic regarding their country's EU membership.[6] Approximately half a year after Slovakia joined the EU, its citizens continued to be enthusiastic about the move; nearly four out of five respondents (79%) approved of it (Bútorová – Gyárfášová – Velšic, 2005, p. 268). In the months that followed, support increased even further. A survey conducted shortly before the first

anniversary of Slovakia's EU accession put the share of supporters at 83%, the highest level among all Visegrad Four (V4) countries.[7] Similarly, a survey conducted by the MVK agency showed that one year after Slovakia's EU accession, 73% of Slovak citizens viewed it as the right move.[8]

The findings of surveys by the FOCUS agency provide a more structured overview of Slovaks' positive and negative expectations before their country's EU accession, and the extent to which these expectations were met after the first year of EU membership. The findings show that after one year in the EU, Slovaks believed that their country was really getting four out of the five most widely expected benefits of EU membership. On the other hand, three out of the five most widely expected fears had not come true to the extent expected before EU accession (see Tables).

However, we can observe certain ambivalence towards the new phenomenon that is most frequently related to EU accession. For example, free movement is seen on the one hand as providing new opportunities for travel and work abroad, and on the other as threatening a brain drain and the influx of a cheap labor force to the labor market. 48% of respondents in April 2004 expected more opportunities to work abroad, while in May 2005 59% of respondents said these opportunities really existed. On the other hand, 52% of respondents in April 2004 feared the use of cheap labor in Slovakia, while in May 2005 the figure was 46%. Increased bureaucracy is the only area where Slovaks' fears have worsened significantly over the past year.

Table 5 "What benefits do you expect from Slovakia's EU membership?" (April 2004, %) "What benefits is Slovakia getting from its EU membership?" (May 2005, %)

	April 2004	May 2005	Trend
Opportunities to work abroad	48	59	↑
Ability to travel without passport/visa	40	46	↑
Better chances for young people	44	40	↓
Arrival of foreign investors, creation of new jobs	28	34	↑
Chances to draw financial aid from EU funds	20	24	↑
Acceptance of Slovakia in Europe and in the world	12	14	↑
Increased competition	9	10	↑
Improved standard of living for Slovak citizens	19	8	↓
Better chances for domestic producers to export to EU markets	13	8	↓
Improved security for Slovakia	8	8	
Stronger democracy	7	7	
Harmonization of Slovak legislation with EU legislation	7	3	↓

Source: FOCUS, 2004, 2005.

So, one may conclude that Slovaks are generally happy when looking back at the first year of their country's EU membership. This has to do with several circumstances. Most importantly, the negative scenarios that foretold a dramatic increase in prices of foodstuffs, services and other commodities did not come true. Macroeconomic data even indicated an improvement in 2004 against the previous year. Slovakia recorded the highest GDP growth of all V4 countries; real wages saw a moderate increase; inflation remained low and some consumer prices (e.g. foodstuffs or clothes) even showed a certain decline. Of course, this favorable macroeconomic development was not brought about solely by Slovakia's EU membership.

Table 6 "What negatives do you expect from Slovakia's EU membership?" (April 2004, %) "What are the negatives of Slovakia's EU membership?" (May 2005, %)

	April 2004	May 2005	Trend
Use of cheap labor in Slovakia	52	46	↓
Departure of professionals and young people abroad (brain drain)	43	37	↓
Lower standard of living for Slovak citizens	39	33	↓
Influx of products from other EU member states to our market	27	29	↑
Reduced security for Slovakia	21	23	↑
Increased bureaucracy	15	23	↑
Inflow of foreigners from other EU member states	24	17	↓
Adoption of "Western" lifestyle	13	16	↑
Obligation to adhere to EU laws, directives and guidelines	10	16	↑
Surrender of certain decision-making powers – loss of independence	15	15	
Increased unemployment	9	12	↑
Increased competition	7	6	↓

Source: FOCUS, 2004, 2005.

However, the high public support for EU membership is driven not only by economic and social grounds but also by the by the conviction that Slovakia and its citizens have obtained a ticket into a solid and prestigious club in term of more social sensitivity, better prospects for the future, more democracy and more tolerance towards minorities. Of course free movement, Europe without borders and a final farewell to Yalta play important roles as well.

Our last but not least factor has to do with the "cautious optimism" of Slovak citizens' pre-accession expectations: first, people mostly expected advantages for the country as a whole, rather than for themselves; second, they fixed their positive expectations to rather distant time horizons.

As in other countries, support is among younger, better-educated, urban dwellers.

Table 7: Attitudes towards EU membership – breakdown by demographics and party preference

	Good thing	Neither good nor bad	Bad thing
AGE			
18 - 24	**50.8**	40.1	5.6
25 - 34	39.2	44.3	6.1
35 - 44	38.8	46.6	8.3
45 - 54	31.8	51.3	10.8
55 - 59	17.5	55.6	**15.9**
60 and more	22.9	**56.2**	10.5
EDUCATION			
Elementary	26.4	50.6	**13.8**
Vocational	32.3	48.7	8.0
Secondary (high school)	37.9	50.7	7.0
University	**57.4**	34.3	3.7
PROFESSION			
Unqualified workers	18.8	50.0	**20.8**
Qualified workers	34.8	52.0	7.8
Executive professionals	**43.5**	48.3	4.8
Creative professionals	**62.3**	30.4	2.9
Entrepreneurs	**48.8**	32.1	9.5
Pensioners	21.7	**54.8**	**12.6**
Student	**60.0**	33.8	4.6
In the home, maternity leave	44.2	44.2	0.0
Unemployed	23.3	**57.0**	9.3
PARTY PREFERENCE			
ANO	**55.2**	37.9	6.9
KDH	**51.7**	38.3	3.3
KSS	17.9	46.4	**19.6**
ĽS-HZDS	20.6	56.9	11.8
SDKÚ	**75.0**	20.8	4.2
SMER	40.0	50.0	5.5
SMK	**46.7**	44.0	1.3
SNS (Slovak National Party)	34.5	41.4	17.2
Non-voters	21.9	**59.4**	10.4
Undecided voters	**44.1**	36.9	9.0
Slovak average population	**35.3**	**48.4**	**8.5**

Note: bold = significant deviations from the average population. Source: EES post-election survey June 2004 – Slovakia

The differences among social groups are deep, how the main gap is according to the party orientation having the constituencies of the center right coalition parties strongly on the "yes" side and the extreme left (Communist party) on the other (Table 7).

The majority of the Slovak public is in favor of a continuing integration process. Only a small percentage thinks that, "integration has already gone too far". The average reached 5.90 and the median 5.48.

Micro- macro level gap

Slovaks are prevailingly optimistic when it comes to the possible impacts of their country's EU membership. Less than one in seven Slovak citizens expect more disadvantages for Slovakia or their particular region of residence during the first two or three years of EU membership (13% and 14%, respectively). The share of those who expect some sort of detriment in their personal lives is slightly higher, but at 21% it still represents a minority (see Table 1). When anticipating the implications of their country's EU membership, the Slovaks stick to the pre-accession model of expectations, i.e. more advantages for the nation as a whole, fewer for me and my family.

Table 8 "Do you believe that Slovakia's EU membership in the next two or three years will bring more benefits or more costs to the following subjects?" (%)

	To Slovakia	To your region	To you and your family
More benefits	45	36	26
Equally many benefits and costs	36	41	45
More costs	13	14	21
Don't know	6	9	8

Source: Institute for Public Affairs, November 2004.

Representation vs. participation

Despite the extremely low turnout, nine out of ten respondents taking part in the post-election survey said it was good that "Slovak citizens have their representatives in the European Parliament" (Gyárfášová 2005, p. 82). the Slovaks' perception of their country's EU membership may therefore be described as representation without participation. In respect of the EP election, high trust to the European Parliament combined with unusually low turnout in all new member states, although the gap was deepest in Slovakia.

Other indicators also show that in Slovakian perception of the EU lower awareness and a lower level of knowledge is combined with higher than average verbal support. A special Barometer focused on public perception of the EU constitutional treaty shows that Slovak respondents are placed in the middle in the "knowledge test". On the other hand, as was the case for public

support for the European constitution, the document was endorsed by 61% and turned down by 11% of Slovaks, while the average ratio in the EU-25 was 49% to 16%. The highest public support for the European constitution was recorded in Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, followed by Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia. On the opposite pole were Great Britain, Cyprus, Sweden and Ireland, where public support did not exceed 30%. So in Slovakia, an average knowledge of the European constitution's actual content was combined with above-average support for its adoption (The Future Constitutional Treaty, 2005, pp. 7-15).

Conclusion

Slovakia "introduced" itself onto the European scene by its low participation level in the elections for the European Parliament. The reason for that is not that there are reservations about the EU or European politics. The opposite is the case - the Slovak public is satisfied with EU membership and perceives the related impacts as positive. We can say that this lack of interest is based on **indifference and unconcern and not on dissatisfaction or even protest against membership.** Differential mobilization has shown that the salience of EU membership and party loyalty were the most relevant motivations to vote.

The full membership in the EU was a strategic priority not just for the political elites - since the prevailing majority of Slovakia's citizens had desired it. The first months of this "dream come true" show that the pre-accession adaptation definitely does not represent a closed chapter, but rather that the process will be dynamic and non-linear. The Slovak public faces new challenges and the country's increased openness will play an increasingly significant role. From the view point of our future, it would be desirable if the Slovak public would adopt a more active attitude towards European issues now they are within the European Union, even at the price of criticising certain aspects of the EU membership. After two years of

membership, the EU issue is less salient than it was before May 1, 2004 but probably also less salient than it will be in the future, when EU will be perceived as something more related to everyday life.

Notes

[1] In the accession referenda only in two of eight new EU members from CEE a majority of the entire electorate came out to support EU membership: 58% of the electorate in Lithuania and 54% in Slovenia. In Slovakia despite of the high „yes vote voters", the "yes electorate" represented 48% (see: Mudde, Cas: EU Accession and a New Populist Center-Periphery Cleavage in Central and Eastern Europe. Center for European Studies CEE, Working Paper No. 62, p. 2.

[2] See also Hermann Schmitt (2005) The European Parliament Election of June 2004: Still Second-order? (Paper available at www.europeanelection.net

[3] On average, political parties spent one tenth of the amount of money on campaigns for EP elections than they did for national elections (Bilčík, 2004: 446).

[4] Home page of the project European Election Study: www.europeanelection.net

[5] 17 EU member states excluding new members from Central and Eastern Europe

[6] Positive attitude of Slovaks toward European integration was confirmed by the Eurobarometer survey in fall 2004, which was the first such survey following the May enlargement. The survey showed that the Slovaks enjoy being part of the Union and that they trust it: 57 percent of respondents said EU membership was "a good thing" (the average for new member states was 50%) and 62% connected it with benefits (the average for new member states was 54%). The Slovaks also showed a high level of trust toward EU institutions; for instance 70% of respondents said they trusted the European Parliament, which placed Slovakia second among all EU member states (*Eurobarometer*, fall 2004).

[7] Opinions of V4 Citizens Regarding their Countries' EU Membership, a FOCUS press release from April 27, 2005; www.focus-research.sk.

[8] A public opinion poll for the *Sme* daily conducted by the MVK agency between March 17 and 23, 2005, on a representative sample of 1,200 respondents (quoted according to *Sme*, April 30, 2005, p. 4).

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Chapter 13

Who treated the 2004 European Election in Greece as a second-order election?

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the **2004 European Election in Greece**. In the first part of the paper we try to answer whether this election is consistent with the second-order election (SOE) model. Participation in the European Election is compared with that in the March 2004 General Election and we present the trends in participation in various types of elections (European and General ones from 1981 to 2004 and Prefecture ones since 1994). Next we examine the losses in the share of votes for the governmental and big parties and the electoral appeal of the smaller ones. The main conclusion is that the hypotheses of the SOE model are verified. Therefore, the 2004 European Election in Greece was a SOE. Since the answer to the first question is affirmative, the main question that runs through the second part of our paper is an attempt to extend this question one step further: Second-order election, for whom? In other words, we want to find if all voters treated the election as a SOE. We attempt to answer these questions using data on demographic variables from the results of the European Election Study 2004 (EES 2004), from the Flash Eurobarometer 162 and the exit polls by OPINION S.A. conducted on 7 March 2004 for the General Election and on 13 June 2004 for the European Election respectively.

1. Introduction

Besides General Elections, there are various other elections with differing purposes and functions in respect to the institutional background and administrative organisation of each country. The attempt to study systematically and comparatively different types of elections started in the USA and focused mainly on the electoral cycle and the evolution of party performance in presidential and mid-term elections. In 1960, Angus Campbell formulated the 'surge and decline' theory. In Europe, the first study on the electoral cycle and the popularity of the government was done by Reiner Dinkel (1978) and was formulated as the 'minor elections' theory. Dinkel observed that the performance of the federal government parties in the German Länder elections depended on the timing of the election within the federal cycle.

The characteristics of the mid-term and Länder elections led to the formulation of the theoretical model of 'second-order national elections'. Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt's model is a turning point in the study of elections that had been overshadowed by general ones (Reif and Schmitt 1980, Reif 1985, Schmitt and Mannheimer 1991, Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996, Reif 1997, Norris 1997, Marsh 1998. 2005, Freire 2004, Schmitt 2005, Van der Brug and Van der Eijk 2005). They made the distinction between first-order national elections and second-order national elections. In their 1980 article, they studied the first European Election that took place in June 1979 and represented a typical example of a second-order election.

The main hypothesis and novelty of Reif and Schmitt's theoretical model was that the European Election political arena combined nine different second-order political arenas. Each member-state of the European Community (EEC) had a national (first-order) political arena (FOPA) and therefore, the European Election result (second-order political arena/SOPA) was clearly affected by the current national policies and the national first-

order political arena. Thus, at the time of the European Election, the FOPA played an important role in the SOPA (Reif and Schmitt 1980, Reif 1985).

Reif and Schmitt place each European Election within each national electoral cycle and claim that participation will be lower, smaller and new parties will fare better and null votes will increase.[1] They also elaborate on the performance of larger and governing parties or coalitions, and claim that such parties do worse than in General Elections. All these trends derive from the fact that less is at stake, since the national government will not change. The European electorate uses national criteria, the campaign and media focus on national issues, and political leaders ask for the voters' support based on national policy platforms (Caramani 2004: 1). The 'less at stake' dimension is the first axis of the model and most students of European Elections consider it the key point for understanding and analysing second-order elections.

This paper is divided in two parts and tries to answer two questions. In the first part we try to examine the 2004 European Election in Greece with the help of the second-order election (SOE) model. The main question is whether the 2004 European Election in Greece verifies the hypotheses of Reif and Schmitt, according to which, participation is lower in comparison to the national election, government and bigger parties fare worse and smaller parties fare better.

The main question that runs through the second part of our paper is an attempt to extend this question one step further: Second-order election, for whom*?* In other words, we want to find if all voters treated the election as a SOE, or whether certain groups of voters do not change their choices between elections.

2. The 2004 European Election in Greece: second-order elections?

The European Election took place in Greece only three months after the General Election of 7 March 2004. Looking at Table 1, we see that participation decreased and that the ranking of the parties did not change. The New Democracy (Nea Demokratia, ND) party won both elections, leaving the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima, PASOK) second and faring worse in the European Election. Given these facts, we will try to answer whether the last European election in Greece was a second order election (SOE).

Table 1: Electoral Results

	European Election		General Election	
	June 2004		March 2004	
Electorate	9938863		9899472	
Participation	6283637	63.2	7573368	76.5
Valid	6122632	97.44	7406619	97.8
Null/Blanks	161005	1.56	166749	2.2
ND	2633961	43.0	3359682	45.4
PASOK	2083327	34.0	3003275	40.6
KKE	580396	9.5	436706	5.9
SYN	254447	4.2	241637	3.2
LAOS	252429	4.1	162151	2.2
Other	318377	5.2	199979	2.7

Source: official results, Ministry of Interior

Examining the first hypothesis of the model, according to which, participation is lower vis-à-vis the national election, the study focuses on various comparisons. On the one hand, we compare the evolution of participation in European Elections with the respective rate in each previous General Election, and on the other, with the European average. We also compare participation in the European Elections with that in other second-order elections. In addition we try to find the relationship between abstention

and the point in time that the European Election takes place within the first-order electoral cycle.

The last European Election saw the lowest participation ever throughout the European Union (EU): it reached 45.7%, following the steady decrease from 63% in 1979 to 61% in 1984, 58.5% in 1989, 56.8% in 1994 and 49.9% in1999. In Greece, the last European Election was marked by the lowest turnout of any election.[2] It reached 63.2%.[3] This fact is especially relevant since in Greece voting at the European Parliament Elections is quasi-compulsory[4]. In the 1999 election participation was 70.2% and the difference with the respective figure in the 2000 General election has been was 4.7%. Comparing participation in the two elections in 2004, the difference is three times as big: it is 13.3%. For the first time in Greece there is a clear manifestation of increasing abstention in SOEs.

Chart 1: 1a Evolution of participation in European (E) and General (G) Elections in Greece, 1981-2004



1b Evolution of participation in European Elections in Greece, compared with the European average



1c Evolution of participation in European (E) and Prefecture (P) elections in Greece, 1994-2004



Source: official results, Ministry of Interior

Calculating the average participation in General and European Elections since 1981, there is a 3.1% difference (General Elections average =77.6,

European Elections average =74.5). The fact that in the case of Greece voting is quasi-compulsory contributes to high participation in European votes.[5] Chart 1b shows that participation in European Elections in Greece is higher than the average of the other member states. Another comparison is also worth mentioning: that of participation figures between European Elections and the elections for the Prefectures, as another type of SOEs (Mavris 2003). According to Reif and Schmitt participation in European Elections is even lower than in other SOEs (Reif 1985: 16). This feature is also verified in Greece (Chart 1c).

One of the most important defining factors of participation in European Elections is the time of such an election within the electoral cycle of the General elections. According to analyses, European Elections that took place near the start of the electoral cycle have lower participation (the difference exceeds 10% in comparison with General elections). On the other hand, European Elections that take place just before General ones, in the end of the cycle, are characterised by higher participation (Marsh and Franklin 1996: 17-19).[6] Low participation in the last European Election in Greece on the one hand is related to the fact that the election took place at the start of the electoral cycle. It also shows that the complementary and secondary character may also be attributed to the electoral fatigue due to the recent General Election (Teperoglou and Skrinis 2006: 137).

According to the statistics, more than 1.3 million voters decided to abstain, compared to the March General Election. Amongst them, 57% came from those who voted for PASOK in March, 33% came from ND voters and 10% from those who had voted for the rest of the parties (TA NEA (THE NEWS newspaper), 15 June 2004). Undoubtedly, some PASOK partisans chose not to vote for reasons that relate to the ample disinterest that the electorate shows for such elections (a parameter that concerns all the parties, not only in Greece, but even more in Europe in general). Another important section of PASOK voters chose to abstain in order to expressing dissatisfaction with

their party. Irrespectively of party preference and affiliation, abstention by a considerable share of voters indicates the citizens' alienation from the national political elites, and from the process of European integration (Pantazopoulos 2005: 141-63).

Another issue that arises is the timing of the decision to abstain in European Elections. As Flash Eurobarometer (EB) 162 data show, a large part consists of regular abstentionists (24%). An equally large part (23%) decided to abstain a few months before the election, while 38% answered that the decision not to vote was taken on election day or a few days before it. The reasons that the abstentionists mentioned are related to the 'less at stake' dimension of Reif and Schmitt's model: the largest share (31%) claimed that they were 'on vacation, not at home', and 17% claimed 'illness'. On the other hand, the frequency of answers like 'lack of interest for European issues' and 'lack of information about the European Parliament', is quite low, 6% and 3% respectively. It is worth mentioning that no one of those who abstained claimed to be opposed to the EU.

The reasons for abstention are partly related to the core of the electoral campaign and the citizens' lack of information on EU issues. According to a study conducted in Greece, 'enlargement, integration, the European Constitution and EU membership were seldom brought up for discussion by the mass media. […] (T)he Greek media, as is also the case of other member states, pay less attention to Europe and European politics'[7] (Demertzis and Tsiligiannis 2004: 162). Furthermore, in the electoral debate that was conducted on the eve of the election, journalists and party leaders alike focused on domestic issues, avoiding subjects such as the EU in general, and the European Constitution and EU common policies in particular (Kavakas 2005: 134).

In the 2004 European Election, all government parties in each member state fared worse in comparison to the previous General election (except Slovakia

and Spain to a certain degree), thus verifying the Reif and Schmitt model.[8] The dropoff (Van der Eijk et al. 1996: 156) of the ND party in the last European Election, that is the difference in the vote share between the General election and the European Election, reached 2.4%. However, this loss of votes for the governing party is the lowest that has ever been recorded in all European Elections in Greece (Teperoglou and Skrinis 2006:140). This observation is consistent with the hypothesis that government parties fare well in European Elections that take place near the start of the legislature, because they may still take advantage of the honeymoon period. This is the first time in Greek European Elections that this hypothesis has been verified.[9]

Chart 2 Evolution of the aggregate vote for ND and PASOK in European Elections, 1981-2004



Source: official results, Ministry of Interior

A second point that verifies the model in the Greek case deals with the losses in the vote share of large parties as a whole. In the June 2004 election, the share of the two larger parties was clearly lower: it decreased by 8.9% compared with the General election in March (77.0% and 85.9% respectively). Chart 2 shows that the cumulative share of ND and PASOK is

8% higher than the respective figure in 1999. It is the second highest since the 1984 election, which was characterised by total confrontation and polarisation. Thus, we find ourselves confronting a certain particularity: the 2004 European Election took place only three months after ND won the right to form the government and, therefore, it was unlikely that an actual issue would have arisen, especially one concerning the conduct of government. In similar cases, the absence of such an issue is also manifested in the results of European Elections: comparing with the European Election of 12 June 1994 that also occurred during the honeymoon period, one may observe the similar decrease of both major parties PASOK and ND, which were kept to about 80% and 83% of their share in the 1993 General Election (an aggregate fall of 15.8%).

The losses of the larger parties are attributed in the model to the fact that voters in European Elections feel less obliged to stick to their party attachment. This entails vote switching between General and European Elections. Franklin (2005) analysing the European Election Study 2004 (EES 2004) results, has calculated the net vote switching in the last European Election at was about 8.6%.[10] Moreover, exit polls suggest interesting connotations in relation to vote switching. Table 2 shows that of those who voted in March either for ND or PASOK, 13% switched in June: 3% turned to the opposite big party, while the rest 10% turned to smaller ones.

Table 2 Vote-switching: General – European Elections 2004

General Election 2004	European Election 2004					
	ND	PASOK	KKE	SYN	LAOS	Other
ND	87.2	3.1	1.7	1.4	3.6	3.0
PASOK	3.0	86.2	4.0	2.5	1.0	3.3

Source: Exit poll OPINION S.A, 13 June 2004

Consequently, one may wonder whether these 'leaks' have been consolidated. We have checked the question in the exit poll by OPINION S.A. on the timing of the final decision about the party people voted for in

the European Election. Most of those who had chosen which party to vote for early vote systematically the same way in both elections, while very few consistent voters made their decision only a few months before the election. Nine out of ten ND voters (91%) come into these two categories ('always the same' and 'a few months ago'). This has to do not only with the high ceiling that the government party has, but with post-electoral euphoria too. The respective figure for PASOK has been high too (88%).

From those who answered 'a few weeks ago', 'a few days ago' and 'on election day', the main group consists of those who made their choice on the last moment (day of the election). Furthermore, one may observe a U-shape curve. While those who vote always for the same party are quite numerous, the answers 'a few months', 'a few weeks' and 'a few days' are low while the numbers answering 'on election day' rise again. This significant rise may mean that, during the last weeks before the European Election, the campaign had not been too lively and therefore not helpful, so that only a few of the voters could make up their minds. Voters finally decided on the last day because they felt it was compulsory to vote. The main question that arises is which party did those 'last moment' voters vote for?

It appears from Chart 3 that the 'election day' choosers favoured the small parties. Of those voters who had chosen one of these very small lists, 41% did so on the day of the election. The same applies for 26% of the nationalist Popular Orthodox Rally (Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos, LAOS) and 20% of those who voted for the Coalition of the Left and Progress (Synaspismos, SYN). The percentages decrease for bigger parties; thus, 6.8% of the PASOK voters and only 4.5% of the ND ones decided in front of the polling booth.

Chart 3: Those who decided on the day of the election within each party (%)



Source: Exit poll OPINION S.A, 13 June 2004

Looking at Chart 4, the strength of all the small parties increased in the European Election, although their share may be considered relatively low if compared with other European countries. There, the electoral result clearly has favoured those smaller parties most that attract the protest vote of a large part of the European electorate. However, the Greek result complies with the axioms in the literature about the electoral cycle and the honeymoon period, when protest voting is quite low. Besides, the share of the smaller parties might have been higher if participation had not been so low. In our case study, abstention has been another form of protesting (Teperoglou and Skrinis 2006: 143). The choice not to vote, instead of the so-called 'voting with the boot', does not add much to small or new parties, contrary to the case of the 1994 and 1999 European Elections.[11]

Chart 4: Smaller parties' vote share in the General and European Elections 2004



Source: official results, Ministry of Interior

To go into detail, the share of the Communist Party of Greece (Komounistiko Komma Elladas, KKE) increased in the European Election, gaining 3.58% (143,823 votes) more than in the General one, verifying the hypothesis of the model. In addition, this share is also higher if compared with that of the 1999 European Election. In the last European contest, KKE presented itself as the main expression of euro-scepticism in Greece.

The gains of SYN have been limited: 12,908 more voters turned to it in the European Election. This results may be considered to indicate that the party is at a standstill in its electoral appeal compared with the General election (0.9% rise), but on the other hand it could indicate the start of a fall in comparison with the 1999 European Election, when it had won 2 seats, with 5.16% of the votes. All the same, it was expected that SYN would be favoured, gaining sympathy votes, especially in an election where less is at

stake, and would attract voters who would otherwise vote tactically. The share of the 'Women for another Europe'[12] list (0.76%) partly explains SYN's standstill and constitutes an explicit example of 'loose vote' that emerges in European Elections.

LAOS was significantly favoured in this European Election. It got 90,326 more votes than in the March General Election, almost doubling its vote share. Taking into consideration the findings of surveys on the LAOS's electorate (Koukourakis 2005), one may argue that the rise in the party's share in the last European Election came from various groups of voters. To begin with, this share came from ND voters who either were disappointed by their party (although not much time had passed since ND came to government), or who chose to express themselves through a 'loose' choice, as is the case in European Elections. At the same time, a section of LAOS voters, according to the same surveys, describe themselves as 'a-political' and 'anti-political' (non-partisan vote). Besides, LAOS had called for the support of rightwing euro-sceptics (Koukourakis 2005: 139). Thereby, the LAOS choice implies, at least as far as the conscientious voters are concerned, voting with the boot towards the established parties.

Finally, the total share of the rest of the lists rose. An increase of 2.5% compared with the General Election three months earlier, certifies the hypothesis of the SOE model. A question that arises about the vote for the smaller parties is if, and to what degree, does this vote constitute a protest (negative vote) against one of the big parties, or if it is about 'voting with the heart'.

One way to approach this is by examining how close each voter felt towards the party of his/her choice. Looking at the data in the exit poll we have used, we cannot rule out negative voting in this European Election. On the whole, 72.73% felt close or very close to the party they voted for, while 27.27%

either did not feel close or felt far from it. Proximity to each party is shown on Chart 5.

Chart 5: Proximity to the party voted in the European Election 2004



Source: Exit poll OPINION S.A, 13 June 2004

Applying the SOE model in the case of the 2004 European Election in Greece, we conclude that the main hypotheses of the 'less at stake' dimension are verified. Therefore, we are dealing with a SOE. Since the answer to the first question is affirmative, our study goes one step further. In the next part of our paper we are focusing on the question Second-order election, for whom? In other words, we try to find whether the secondary character of the election applies to the whole of the electorate or if there are different trends among different socio-demographic groups.

3. Second-order election, for whom?

We have chosen to do cross tabulations since they allow us to examine frequencies of observations that belong to specific categories on more than one variable. We attempt to answer the questions above using data from the

European Election Study 2004 (EES 2004)[13], the Flash EB 162 and the exit polls by OPINION S.A. conducted on March 7th and June 13th. We have chosen to use the following demographic variables: sex, age, years of education, size of the town. These variables are cross tabulated with abstention and party preference. We try to find if there is any association between the demographic variables and abstention or the size of the party voted for (where large parties are ND and PASOK, and smaller parties, which KKE, SYN, LAOS and 'other' parties).

Abstention

Looking at the EES 2004 and the Eurobarometer Flash 162 data on Greece, we observe certain similarities. Age is the most important variable. As shown in Tables 3a and 3b and Charts 6a and 6b there is a very clear pattern of greater abstention among younger voters (aged 18 to 24). In Europe, according to both surveys, abstention is also high among the second age group (25-39). In Greece, though, abstention decreases almost 20% in comparison to the youngest age group and the European average. The decreasing trend continues both in Greece and in Europe, in the 40-54 and 55+ age groups. The only difference lies on the share of the eldest Greeks in the Flash EB 162, where there is a 5% rise from the previous age group. Consequently, the main trend running through both surveys is that in both Greece and in Europe as a whole it is highly possible that the younger one is, the more one will abstain. It is worth mentioning that according to the EES 2004 data, the difference between abstention rates in the 18-24 and 55+ age groups reaches about 50%. The respective difference in the Flash EB 162 data is 28%.

Table 3a: European Election Study 2004: Demographics and abstention cross tabulation

		EES 2004	
		EU24[a]	**GREECE**
Sex	Male	54.4	**37.7***
	Female	57.3	**34.4***
Age	18-24	70.5	**67.2**
	25-39	63.7	**43.9**
	40-54	54.3	**27.8**
	55+	46.2	**19.1**
Years of education	-15	54.7	**16.4**
	16-20	59.4	**40.5**
	21+	52.6	**39**
	0	69.1	**-**
Area	Large town	55.2	**41.6**
	Middle or small size town	56.4	**32.4**
	Rural or village	52.3	**24.7**

Source: Own calculations based on the European Election Study 2004 data

The sample has been weighted for participation. The results are statistically significant at least at 95%, except the figures with an asterisk (*).

[a] Malta did not participate in the EES 2004

Table 3b: Flash EB 162: Demographics and abstention crosstabulation

		Flash Eurobarometer 162	
		EU25	**GREECE**
Sex	Male	53.6	**37.8**
	Female	54.9	**36.8**
Age	18-24	66.6	**59.4**
	25-39	63.3	**38.6**
	40-54	53.7	**26.4**
	55+	40.3	**30.8**
Years of education	-15	47.4	**31.6**
	16-20	59.9	**34.3**
	21+	49.5	**45.6**
	0	46.5	**53.8**
Area	Metropolitan	54.7	**44.1**
	Urban	52.7	**45.4**
	Rural	56	**25.2**

Source: Own calculations based on the Post European elections 2004 survey- Flash Eurobarometer 162 data

Chart 6: Demographics and abstention

a. EES 2004



Source: Own calculations based on the European Election Study 2004 data

b. Flash EB 162



Source: Own calculations based on the Post European elections 2004 survey-Eurobarometer Flash 162 data

The locality variable is equally interesting. According to the Flash EB 162, there is a clear split between the answers that have been given in Greek

metropolitan and urban areas on the one hand, where abstention lies at 44% and 45%, and rural areas on the other, where it is more limited at 25%. Contrary to the case of Greece, the EU average shows uniformity across geographic areas. Table 3a demonstrates that the Greek EES 2004 data are consistent with the aforementioned trend, even though the coding does not correspond exactly. The same trend is also clear in the March general election, where there is differentiation between metropolitan and urban regions on the one hand and rural regions on the other (see Table 4).

Table 4: Crosstabulation: Abstention by locality

	Large town	**Middle or small size town**	**Rural or village**
Abstention	41,6 [12,3][a]	32,4 [8,5]	24,7 [7,4]

Source: own calculations based on the EES 2004 data

[a] In brackets it is the abstention in the March General Election.

Evidently, according to the answers given in the survey, abstention in large towns increased rather a lot (by about 39%), in smaller towns by 24%, and in rural areas and villages by almost 17%, when compared to abstention in the 7th March election. From the analysis of the relative data we find that in rural regions, citizens do not abstain as much as they do in more populated regions.

Examining the education variable, we observe that the results of the two surveys are not very similar. According to the Flash EB 162 those who have not had any schooling and those who have university education abstained more than those who have primary and secondary education. The opposite is the case for the European average (see Table 3b and Chart 5b). According to the Greek data in the EES 2004 survey, we also see that those with less education participated more than those with more education (see Table 3a and Chart 5a).

Finally, looking at the gender variable and abstention, the cross tabulation table for the Greek data does not give statistically significant results. There is no evidence that there is a difference in attitude between males and females in the population, as there is in the rest of the variables we have examined. At the EU aggregate level, it seems that women abstain slightly more than men (see Tables 3a and 3b).

Voting for large or smaller parties

The 'less at stake' dimension in the SOE model is based on the one hand on participation and, on the other, on the performance of large and smaller parties. Next, we will focus on examining if there is any difference between voting preferences and each of the categories of the demographic variables. We have recoded the vote variable so that ND and PASOK choices are coded as 'large' parties, and KKE, SYN LAOS and rest of the lists are coded as 'smaller' ones. Before proceeding to the analysis it is useful to remind that abstention had increased and that protest voting was limited.

Table 5: Cross tabulation: Age by size of party

a. EES 2004

	18-24	**25-39**	**40-54**	**55+**
Large (ND & PASOK)	65.2 [89.4]	76.8 [83.8]	67.1 [75]	84.9 [90.7]
Smaller (KKE - Other)	34.8 [10.6]	23.8 [16.2]	32.9 [25]	15.1 [9.3]

b. Exit poll OPINION S.A

	18-35	**36-54**	**55+**
Large (ND & PASOK)	73,8 [85,5]	73,4 [84,1]	85,6 [89,7]
Smaller (KKE - Other)	26,2 [14,5]	26,7 [15,9]	14,5 [11,1]

Source: Own calculations based on the European Election Study 2004 and OPINION data respectively

The cross tabulations of the EES 2004 and the OPINION exit poll (the Flash EB 162 cross tabulation was not statistically significant) help us make some interesting observations. Among the three age groups in the exit poll data, voting in the March General Election (see figures in brackets) is rather identical. There is a small differentiation between the first two groups and the last one. If we consider voting for smaller parties as an indication of a 'loose vote' in European Elections, then we find that voters aged 18 to 54 respond similarly to the less-at-stake stimulus. Turning to the EES 2004 data, we see that the results are not the same as those in the exit poll. However, it is clear that older voters tend to vote more for large parties. Comparing voting choices between March and June, it is obvious that young voters change more. Therefore, supporting smaller parties is mainly an characteristic of those in the first age group. Older voters respond differently. Their European Election votes do not loosen too much, and tend to remain constant and consistent with their General Election choice.

Table 6: Crosstabulation: Locality by size of party

a. EES 2004

	Large town	**Middle or small size town**	**Rural or village**
Large (ND & PASOK)	74,1 [81,6]	79 [90]	82 [87,8]
Smaller (KKE - Other)	25,9 [18,4]	21 [10]	18 [12,2]

b. Flash EB162

	Metropolitan	**Urban**	**Rural**
Large (ND & PASOK)	65,1	84,3	83,1
Smaller (KKE - Other)	34,9	15,7	16,9

c. Exit poll OPINION S.A

	Metropolitan		**Urban**		**Rural**	
Large (ND & PASOK)	73,4	[83,7]	82,7	[88,8]	82,5	[90,5]
Smaller (KKE - Other)	26,7	[16,2]	17,3	[11,2]	17,5	[9,5]

Source: Own calculations based on the European Election Study 2004, Flash EB 162 and OPINION data respectively

Turning to the locality variable, we notice that things are not the same as in the cross tabulation with abstention, which showed voters in metropolitan and urban areas have the same electoral behaviour. When it comes to voting choice, the difference lies between voters in metropolitan areas on the one hand, and urban and rural on the other.

The tables above show that big parties do not have the same weight in larger areas (large towns or metropolitan areas), as they do in smaller ones (middle and small-size towns, villages and rural areas). Taking into consideration the result of the 7th March election, we observe that in all of the three groups of localities there are 'loose votes', and in smaller regions the difference between the two elections is lower. To be more precise, according to the EES 2004 the shift from the General Election to the European Election vote is about 7.5% in large towns, 11% in middle and small-size ones, and 5.8% in rural areas and villages. According to the OPINION exit poll the shift is 10% in metropolitan areas, 6% in urban ones, and 8% in rural areas. Consequently, we find that in more populated areas there is more dispersion of votes among parties, while in less populated areas the share of votes is about the same.

The difference that is noted in more populated areas (about 8%) in the EES 2004, and the exit poll and Flash EB 162, may be attributed to the sample of each survey and to the operational definition of the variable, that is the limit which puts each region in one of the three groups.

Table 7: Crosstabulation: Education by size of party

a. EES 2004

	6-15	**16-20**	**21+**
Large (ND & PASOK)	76,8 [85,5*]	72,6 [80,3]	79,7 [88,1]
Smaller (KKE - Other)	23,2 [14,5]	27,3 [19,7]	20,3 [11,9]

*: The General Election figures (in brackets) are not statistically significant

b. Flash EB 162

	Never been to school	**6-15**	**16-20**	**21+**
Large (ND & PASOK)	90	84.1	76.5	67.7
Smaller (KKE - Other)	10	15.9	23.5	32.3

c. Exit poll OPINION S.A

	Primary, not finished (6-11)	**Primary (12)**	**Secondary (13-18)**	**College or University**
Large (ND & PASOK)	86,8 [89,6]	84,9 [90,1]	77,3 [86,9]	71,6 [82,8]
Smaller (KKE - Other)	13,3 [10,5]	15,2 [10]	22,7 [13,1]	28,3 [17.4]

Source: Own calculations based on the European Election Study 2004, Flash EB 162 and OPINION data respectively

Moving next to educational level, as it ensues from the 'age when finished full-time education' question, there are some differences in the choice of party. The EES 2004 data are quite homogeneous. Voting choice seems to be consistent among the three different groups, while the change from the General Election is almost the same. However, OPINION exit poll and Flash EB162 data show that the more years of full-time education one has, the more prone one is to turn away from bipartism and support smaller parties. In the March General Election, differences in voting across educational levels are not significant. In the European Election, however, the 'loose vote' is clearly present among those who have had more years of full-time education. Unfortunately, the surveys do not use the same categories for educational levels, preventing direct comparison.

Gender is the last demographic variable to be examined. EES 2004 data do not provide statistically significant results. Therefore, no safe conclusion may be drawn from this survey. Nevertheless, using Flash EB 162 and OPINION exit poll data, it seems that female voters are more inclined to favour one of the two big parties, while male voters turn slightly more towards smaller and more extreme lists. The exit poll data are more balanced than those from the Flash EB 162, where there is a difference of almost 10%. Moreover, comparing vote shares between the European and the General elections, we observe a similar decrease for the two big parties (about 9%) for both sexes (see Table 8).

Table 8: Crosstabulation: Sex by size of party

a. Flash EB 162

	Male	**Female**
Large (ND & PASOK)	71,9	82,2
Smaller (KKE - Other)	28,1	17,8

b. Exit poll OPINION S.A

	Male	**Female**
Large (ND & PASOK)	75,7 [84,8]	78,6 [87,5]
Smaller (KKE - Other)	24,3 [15,1]	21,3 [12,4]

Source: Own calculations based on the Flash EB 162 and OPINION S.A data respectively

4. Conclusions

This paper has attempted for the first time to apply in the Greek case a theoretical model that has prevailed in the study of European Elections. Trying to answer the main question of the paper, whether the last European Election in Greece consists of a SOE we checked to see if the main hypotheses of the model are verified.

We have illustrated the main patterns within the last European Elections in Greece. Our main conclusion is that this has indeed been a SOE. Starting from this fact, we made some very interesting observations that mark out

important aspects of the European Elections. The result was defined by the current political context and the first-order political arena. Participation was the lowest ever, while abstention did not affect parties equally. The losses of the two larger parties, in particular those of ND (that in comparison with the previous European Elections were rather limited) also verify the relevant literature. They are consistent with the timing of the election in the electoral cycle of the General election and the post-electoral euphoria that favours governing parties. The hypothesis of the SOE model, that smaller parties fare better, is also verified, although the increase in their vote share – attributed to negative/protest voting – might have been even higher, if the European Election had taken place later in the electoral cycle or if participation had been higher.

Applying the SOE model in the Greek case, one may notice that European Elections are used as a 'medium' either to express true party preferences or to protest against the party usually voted for in general elections. However, the large vote share the two big parties recorded in this European Election resulted from limiting the increase of the vote share for the smaller parties. Although the total share was higher than in the General Election, it remained lower than in the previous European Election. Probably, this electoral behaviour relates to the national character that has been attributed to these elections by the parties, and the fact that there has not been any alternative that could motivate the electorate. At the same time, the lack of issues and the new FOPA have given the character of an election with less at stake.

Having studied the June 2004 European Election in Greece with the help of the SOE model, we decided to take one step further. We tried, using demographic data, to see if every voter treated it as a second-order election and answer for whom it actually was one, and for whom there was no question of order between different types of elections (at least for the two that took place in 2004). The two most salient parameters of the model's 'less at stake' dimension are changes in abstention and in the vote shares of

bigger and smaller parties. We cross tabulated demographic variables (gender, age, education and locality) by abstention and party size preference, using three surveys. We presented only statistically significant results.

Based on the results of the cross tabulations, we have noticed that there is differentiation of electoral behaviour from one demographic group to the other. All groups of voters are influenced by the fact that less is at stake in European Elections, but all do not respond the same way. Consequently, trying to say for whom was the 2004 European Election a SOE, we have observed that younger, male, more educated citizens living in more populated areas tend to adopt a pattern of electoral behaviour which accords more to the hypotheses of the 'less at stake' dimension than other demographic groups.

Particularly, there is a clear cut division between younger and older voters. Older ones tend less to abstain and/or vote for smaller parties. A similar reserve towards both abstention and vote switching is also observed amongst voters in rural areas. However, younger voters and city-dwellers tend to abstain more or are more likely to switch their votes in European Elections. All these conclusions are nothing more than trends and indications valid in the election in question. Given that European Elections take place every five years in all member states, regardless of the electoral cycle they may prove a valuable 'laboratory' to study electoral behaviour in General as well as European elections.

Afterthoughts

All the comments offered by participants were useful and helped us improve our study considerably. However, the next step that we should take for a future publication is that of a comparative paper, using our main question as the core point. We have introduced the use of socio-demographic variables in the examination of the hypotheses of the SOE model. We have used the case of Greece, since we are very familiar with the Greek party and political systems. After the discussion in the Lisbon meeting, we have the impression that we can use the same question, but expand it with the use of data by more countries. Professor Franklin's suggestion to use all the countries in the EES 2004 seems to us as a rather ambitious goal, due to the characteristics that comparative studies have. The specificities of each national party system and demographic differences should be taken into consideration.

Instead of this large-scale comparative study, a more feasible step would choose certain groups of the European Union (EU) countries and study whether the 2004 European Election had been treated as a SOE, and if this treatment is related to socio-demographic criteria. In this instance we lean towards two approaches. The first would be geographical, thus focusing on a certain part of the EU, i.e. the South (Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal). The second would entail another question, whether the voters in 'older' member-states behave differently in European Elections than the voters in 'younger' member-states, always in relation to the main question of our study. In this case, we would include one country from each wave of enlargement; one from the countries that have held European Elections since 1979 (probably Germany), Greece from 1981, Spain from 1987, Austria from 1995 and one from the ten of the last wave.

Having mentioned the future prospects of our paper, we would like to underline the importance and the usefulness of the meeting. Moreover, we, as young researchers, consider ourselves benefited by talking with experienced researchers and professors. (Eftichia Teperoglou / Stavros Skrinis)

Notes

This is a revised version of the paper presented at the Conference on the European Parliament Election of 2004, organized by the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon (ICS) with the support of the CONNEX Network of Excellence/ European Election Study (EES) 2004, 11-14 May 2006, Lisbon, Portugal. For helpful comments regarding this paper, the authors would like to thank all the participants in the above-mentioned conference, but especially Cees van der Eijk, Hermann Schmitt, Angelika Scheuer, Mark Franklin and Wouter Van der Brug. Obviously, any shortcomings remaining are the authors' exclusive responsibility.

[1]In his 1997 article, Reif mentions that apart from smaller parties, radical, populist ones and protest parties also tend to fare better in second-order elections (Reif 1997: 118).

[2]According to various researchers, the share of actual participation is almost 13% higher (Franklin 2001: 207). This difference has been attributed to the electoral register that is not updated regularly, but also to the fact that the register for General and European elections had been based on the municipal rolls. These included people who had migrated, their children, etc. (Drettakis 2004: 15-7). For abstention figures in the last European Election see Andreadis (2004) and Drettakis (2004: 18-38). It should be underlined that these percentages are based on official sources and are underestimated. According to calculations in Greece, there is almost universal turnout.

[3]In the period between the General Election in March and the European Election in June, many had feared that abstention would rise. The survey that was conducted for *Standard Eurobarometer* 61 showed that of all Europeans, Greeks were the keenest to vote, at 66%. This figure was close to the official participation, but at the same time it has been the lowest in Greek electoral data.

[4]According to the 2001 amendment of the Greek Constitution (article 51/5), there are no longer any penal sanctions for abstaining.

[5]Equally high participation has been registered in Luxembourg, Belgium and Italy (until 1993) where voting is obligatory. For more in factors of high participation see Franklin et al. (1996: 306-31) and Mattila (2003: 449-68).

[6]Attempting to apply Marsh and Franklin's conclusions in the case of the Greek European Elections, we find that in the 1984 and 1994 ones they are verified. In the first case, the election took place a few months before the General Election and participation was high. In the second, the election was soon after the General contest and participation was low. On the contrary, the 1999 European Election contradicts the conclusions, as participation was low even though the election took place a year before the General Election.

[7]The purpose of the study was a discourse analysis of the European Election campaign by the media. It covered the last fortnight (01/06/2004-13/06/2004) before the election. The data had been compiled from six nation-wide and two regional newspapers, and three private and one public TV network. Prof. Demertzis from the University of Athens was the study supervisor.

[8]The government coalition in Slovakia won almost 10%. In Spain, PSOE increased its share of vote by 1%.

[9]The 1994 European Election took place eight months after the 1993 General Election, during the honeymoon period, the losses of the government party reached 9.23%. The respective figures in the 1981 and 1989 European Elections, which coincided with the General Elections, were 4.53% and 3.17%. The case of the last European Election in Spain may be compared to the Greek one. The Spanish General Election took place one week after the Greek General Election. PSOE's share increased. We assume that this deviates from the SOE model because of post-electoral euphoria, and it fits Angus Campbell's notion of 'surge'.

[10]According to Franklin's calculations, the 1989-2004 average was 8.9. This is the lowest among the 15 member states (Franklin 2005).

[11]The nationalist Political Spring (Politiki Anixe, POLAN) won 8.65% in the 1994 European Election and the populist Democratic Social Movement (Demokratiko Kinoniko Kinema, DIKKI) 6.85% five years later.

[12]The 'Women for another Europe' was an ad hoc list comprised of left-wing women, who formerly belonged to or supported SYN.

[13]This study comprises 26 representative mass surveys conducted after the European Parliament Elections of 2004, in 24 members-countries of the EU. Malta was not covered in this study, while there were two separate studies for Belgium, for the Flemish and Walloon voters, and for the UK, where there were separate studies for Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The methodology used in many west EU member-countries was a telephone survey, while many of the new eastern member-countries preferred face-to-face interviews. In Italy, Ireland and Sweden a postal survey was conducted. For more information on the project, see www.europeanelectionsstudies.net.

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Chapter 14

Scope of government preferences

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Introduction

The question as to what level of government, or decision-making level deals, or should deal with different policy areas, is multifaceted and has been posed by political philosophers for centuries. It is one of the aspects of the political system that is supposed to have a strong effect upon its legitimacy (Thomassen and Schmitt, 1999).

Therefore, in democratic polities the legitimacy of any given level of government is largely based upon its citizens' evaluation of whether a certain division of power is right or not. In the framework of the problems of governance in the EU, the question of which level of government should deal with different areas has been dormant for a long time, given the permissive pro-European consensus. The introduction of the subsidiarity debate has turned it into one of the hot issues in the debate on the legitimacy of and democratic deficit within the EU.

This paper will first examine the degree to which European citizens allocate decision-making responsibilities to the European Union, to the national state, or to their regional level of government. Secondly, we will test a set of hypotheses (distilled from the theoretical discussion in the following section) concerning the socio-demographic, attitudinal and structural characteristics

that affect differences in preferences for government levels. Thirdly, we will suggest paths for future research.

Theories on scope of government

The concept of the scope of governance deals mainly with two related items. Firstly, to what extent can government formulate binding decisions regarding the organization of human behaviour in certain sectors of life (economy, education, health care, etc.) and which sectors have to be reserved to non-public actors (the market, civil society, the nuclear family, the individual citizen, etc.). Secondly, there is the question of the territorial level of government at which this regulation should occur in the sectors where government regulation is considered legitimate: should it be local, regional, national, European or global?

There is a large body of theoretical and empirical research regarding the first question. The rapid expansion of the welfare state and the fiscal crises of the 1970s have turned the "scope of government" into a hot issue ever since (Borre & Goldsmith, 1995:1). Political philosophers, democratic theorists, political economists and political sociologists, from the left to the neo-liberal spectrum[1], have made substantial theoretical contributions. Comparative empirical survey research has also flourished[2], identifying determinants of attitudes about the scope of government with their consequences for the system and culminating in the huge "Scope of Government" volume of the Beliefs in Government project (1995).

However, in this paper we will only focus on the territorial part of the scope of governance problem, although the first aspect regarding the role of government in steering society may influence choices made regarding the second.

Contributions to the scope of government debate beyond the EU

Early political philosophers such as Aristotle first raised the question of the territorial scope of governance and it was prominent in classical works such as those of Thomas Aquinas, Althusius, Hegel, Mill, De Toqueville and Montesquieu.

The debate was expanded and deepened in the 19th and 20th centuries. In the first place it was, and still is, at the heart of theories of federalism (especially in the early decades of the US and later in Germany). The oldest problem is posed in federal states and concerns the question of which competencies should be dealt with at the national and which at the level of the federal entity. In the formerly unitary states currently undergoing a process of federalisation, regionalisation or devolution (Spain, Belgium, France, the UK, Italy) this question figures high on the political agenda, opposing the maximalist demands voiced by ethno-regionalist parties and the desire of the state-wide parties and institutional actors to keep this transfer of competencies to the sub-state level to a minimum (Keating, 1995; De Winter & Türsan, 1998). Furthermore, in consolidated federal countries like Germany and the US, the question is nourished by the increasing dependence of states on the federal government for financial aid, which has enabled the federal government to influence policies that are nominally within the control of the state government. Even in many stable, non-federal democracies, the question of degree of autonomy is desirable at the sub-national level recurs (Hesse & Sharpe, 1991)[3].

Secondly, the disastrous effects of the industrial revolution on the living conditions of the working class raised the question of government intervention in the laissez-faire economy. The spectacular but uneven growth of industrial production also raised the question of government steered protectionism of the national economy vs. global market-guided free trade.

Thirdly, the emergence and expansion of the state (all levels confounded) threatened civil society bodies that had performed certain public functions in earlier regimes (Rokkan & Lipset, 1967) and the relevant intermediary organisations (trade unions, employers associations, mutual health organisations, cultural and youth organisation, non-public educational networks, and even the family) (Wilke and Wallace, 1990). Often these civil society organizations were linked with the (Catholic) church. It was in fact the Catholic Church that developed a comprehensive theory of subsidiarity first (cfr. the encycliques Rerum Novarum, 1891 and especially Quadragesimo Anno, 1931), in order to delimit the role of state and non-state bodies ("natural groups" such as the family, church and guild) in organizing society (especially in pillarised or consociational societies). Here, the concept is used in order to prevent the state becoming too active in certain sectors of social life (industrial relations, public health, education, culture, socialisation, etc.). The Christian doctrine of personalism enshrined in four papal encyclical letters states that each person is invested with legitimate power, whose first constraint is the legitimate power of others. The second constraint is the delegation of his power to social groups, local collectivities, or the state. Hence, the power of the state and other social bodies is only legitimate when individuals agree to be subject to the political bodies that they have chosen to transfer their personal power to (Million-Delsol, 1992). The introduction of the principle of subsidiarity into the debate thus aims at fixing a set of rules with regard to governing bodies (independent from their territorial level) and civil society. By widening the issue of level of government to scope of governance, it introduces the element of consent of citizens and civil society in the debate.

Fourthly, the emergence and empowerment of organized labour raised the question of the role of social partners in organizing the welfare state (cfr. neo-corporatist arrangements promoted by Social- as well as Christian-Democrats) (Schmitter).

Fifthly, the participatory revolution that followed the events of May 1968 eventually led to the slogan "Small is Beautiful" (Schumacher). Decisions should be taken as close to the people as possible (towns, small communities), as this would guarantee more citizen participation (indirect or semi-direct), would make citizens aware of the impact of their actions and would enhance the accountability of decision-makers and thus legitimacy of decisions, leading to wider support for the political system.

The Club of Rome report underlined the global dimension to sustainable growth and the environment, stressing the need for global public intervention in order to save the earth's natural resources and to ensure long-term survival. The latter two currents found voice in the slogan "Think Globally, Act Locally".[4]

The replacement of Weberian concepts of public administration by the New Public Administration paradigm redefined the role of public administration in running the res publica, pleading for more public-private-partnership, multilevel involvement of public bodies and civil society, policy networks, comitology and alternative normative instruments (convenants, soft law, benchmarking, open method of coordination) etc. (Brans 1997).

Since economic and fiscal crisis of the 1970s, neo-conservatives and ultra-liberals have used subsidiarity in their critique of the welfare state and rolling back "big government", stressing minimal state intervention (only tolerated when markets fail), favouring the privatization of most classical government functions (including minimal state functions like law and order and prisons) and thus maximising individual freedom.

The scope of government problématique in a multilevel Europe

Originally the scope of government question was only posed in terms of EC/EU governance vis-à-vis the sovereignty of the national states and was basically treated as being a problem of postwar expansion of forms of

international governance (UN, Nato, etc). International organisations historically emerged and expanded in number and scope precisely because of the fact that more and more issues inherently transcend national borders, and therefore can only by dealt with through some form of permanent international co-operation. In the European context, this question has focused on the policy issues and sectors in which European institutions can operate more effectively than can national member-states. Here several theories compete. Neo-functionalist integration theory states that initially internationalised governance of inherently supra-national issues is to be achieved through the internationalisation of less political sectors (like transport and communication, economy, finance and culture exchange), and that the benefits of the internationalisation of these sectors will entice national government to gradually expand international co-operation into sectors of 'high politics', such as foreign affairs, defence, the judiciary and the police, which are all at the heart of the sovereignty of the nation-state (Haas and Schmitter, 1964).[5]

Within the specific internationalization context of European integration, the scope of government question was already present in the Treaty of Rome, giving member states a choice of methods for achieving Community-fixed objectives. It became politically salient in the traditional two-level debate between intergovermentalist (sovereignist) and supranational (federalist) concepts of international organizations, voiced on the one hand by sovereignists (British Conservatives) and on the other hand by regionalists (German Länder).

The growing critique of "creeping federalism" within the European integration process led pro-European leaders (Tindemans report 1975; Spinelli report 1984 and finally Delors) to revive the concept of subsidiarity in order to appease the growing tension between national governments and the European Commission. Hence, the focus was on the vertical (territorial)

dimension of subsidiarity, not on the horizontal dimension (relations between public authorities and non-public actors).

The federalist ambitions of the founding fathers of the European Community were to some extent tempered by the Maastricht treaty, which puts a strong, though strictly symbolic, constraint on this progressive and deterministic vision of creeping internationalisation. The inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht treaty aimed at explicitly installing a set of rules covering the division of competencies between member-states and European institutions. Art. 3 states that:

"In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can, therefore, by reason of scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community'

Hence, only those policy sectors that cannot be dealt with effectively at a lower level of government are eligible for Europeanisation. Still, this principle is so vague that it serves predominantly political objectives, i.e. putting the Eurosceptics at ease[6], rather than serving as a practical guideline for stipulating which policy sectors should remain national and which not (Estella de Noriega, 1997: 249-270). Nor was it originally 'justiciable', (Schilling, 1995) although questions of violation of the subsidiarity principle are now occasionally brought before the ECJ .[7]

The subsidiarity principle was then successfully seized upon by the regions, who promoted a "Europe of the Regions" with a third, regional, layer within the EU system of "multilevel governance" (Hooghe and Marks, 1996). The principle of subsidiarity implicitly also recognises the potential role of regional and local levels of government. The creation of the Committee of the Regions in 1994 illuminated the fact that the regional level is also willing

to struggle against an irreversible evolution towards gradual increasing the decision-making prominence of European institutions, implicitly and explicitly referring in its opinions to the principles of subsidiarity or 'proximity' (du Granrut, 1994; Hooghe & Marks, 1996; Dony, 1997; De Bruycker, 1997, Vandersanden, 1997).

Finally, the growing disaffection of EU-citizens with the EU and with their national governments (Norris, 1999), as dramatically expressed by the referenda on the Maastricht Treaty and the EU Constitution, has pushed the European Commission to seek the greater involvement of different levels of government ("as closely as possible to the citizen"), and of the wider civil society at different levels (Prodi's White Paper on Governance), therefore also addressing the horizontal aspects of the subsidiarity principle as one of the ways to cope with the "democratic deficit".

The EU debate has raised many questions about the scope of EU-governance:
1) Which territorial levels of government should be recognized and endowed with authority?
2) Who should decide, and on the basis of what arguments, that centralisation of government would ensure higher comparative efficiency or effectiveness (in other words, who carries the burden of proof as to what the "proper" level is: the lower or the higher level)?
3) Should a "competence catalogue" or "no-go areas" be defined or does the current open-ended listing of community goals suffice? (Schmitter, 1997; Swenden, 2004)
4) Should the EU allocate more resources to lower level units in order to bolster their capability and potential for efficient public intervention?
5) Should EU decision-making only deal with setting objectives, letting the sub-units decide how to achieve these ends of their own accord (administrative vs. legislative federalism)?

6) Which institution(s) should deal with conflicts about the application of the subsidiarity principle, and who can introduce a case (ECJ, CoR, CoM, EP, policy experts)?

7) Should opt-outs be allowed, and if so, how can one prevent freeloading?

Note that in most of these debates, a third question is also raised sometimes: it asks not only what can and should government do and where is the most appropriate level of decision-making, but also how should government actions be prepared, decided and implemented?

Political theory contributions to the debate on the scope of EU governance

Apart from federalism studies, political science has until now not contributed much to the discussion of the scope of governance (Dahl and Tufte, 1973). Dahl even argues that it is difficult to deduce the legitimacy of the appropriate level of government from normative political theory, as he suggests that democratic theory cannot sufficiently provide grounds for the justification of the appropriateness of different levels of government (Dahl, 1989:204)[8].

Within the Beliefs in Government project, Sinnott (1995) proposes three criteria for deciding on the question of which level is appropriate.

The first basis for deciding the appropriate level of governance lies in the very nature of issues. Some are intrinsically international, as they penetrate or transcend national borders, and therefore cannot effectively be dealt with at national levels. Others require a larger than national scale in order to mobilise the resources necessary to solve the problem. Likewise, some problems (such as improving traffic security at an accident-ridden crossing in a particular neighbourhood) are so narrow that local government can best tackle them. These arguments fall under what we will call the "endogenous" attribution of levels of governance.

Second, the level of governance can be attributed in an "exogenous" way, when a given level of governance simply claims that a particular issue or policy sector is explicitly) lying within its legally defined sphere of competence(or implicitly derived from the main institutional principles or general function as enshrined in constitutions or treaties.

Last, but not least, issues can be attributed to a given level of government because the citizens, the media or political elites simply believe that this problem ought to be tackled at that level ("normative" attribution of level of governance). This level attribution obviously has a subjective basis, since it does not matter whether the preferred level of government has the legal competence to deal with these issues, nor does it matter whether the nature of the issue in fact makes this level the most appropriate. However, as subjective as this basis may be, it is central to the question of the legitimacy of government levels attributed in an exogenous or endogenous way.

Hence the principle of subsidiarity in its broad sense stipulates that the competencies of a given decision-making level follows not only from the proven but also from the accepted insufficiency of other decision-making levels as well as of civil society organisations. The intervention of a political body should provide for an added value in the search for the common good. Furthermore, the opinion of those represented about the level to which they want to delegate their sovereignty should be fully taken into account for any specific division of competencies to be legitimate.

Hence, under the principle of subsidiarity, the endogenous attribution of level of government should be complemented with evaluation by those represented, while exogenous attribution as such is considered illegitimate. However, the question of which issues or policy sectors are eligible for endogenous internationalisation is not easy to answer. There is no consensus on the range of problems that ,due to the nature of the issue, belong to the remit of local, regional, national, European and international governance.[9]

The degree of endogenous internationalisation of a particular issue can vary between countries due to structural constraints. Firstly, certain countries can be considered to be the cause of the problem suffered by others, as would be the case where cleaner neighbours surrounded a country that polluted its air. In the latter case, the problem of air pollution is endogenously international, in the former it is a problem that can and should be solved by national government.[10] Secondly, in some countries, a particular level of governance (national, regional and local) may be better equipped to deal effectively with an issue. This can be because of the effects of economy of scale, depending on the size of the territory covered and material resources and expertise different levels of governance have at their disposal. The Luxembourg national state is probably too small to issue its own currency and conduct an effective monetary policy. In strongly federal states like Germany, the state governments are much better equipped to deal with environmental problems than is the sub-state level in non-federal states (Massart, 1998). Thirdly, the degree of interdependency of economic and social systems may vary considerably: in a closed, autarchic economy the need for international collaboration and governance may be less than it is in open economies where prices, wage, interest rates, etc. are highly dependent on the policies and economic fortune of the main trading partners. To conclude, establishing the endogenous European character of a given policy problem is a hazardous exercise, as objectively this character may vary considerable from one member state to another.

Hypotheses

In this paper we arranged our hypotheses around four groups of variables: first the classical socio-demographic and socio-political variables, second general political attitudes, third political attitudes towards the EU, and finally structural characteristics of groups of countries.

Socio-demographic and socio-political variables

From the different chapters in the Niedermayer and Sinnott volume (1995) on Public Opinion and International Governance we can derive a number of individual socio-demographic and socio-political characteristics that can be expected to exert an impact on preference for different government levels:

- Education: respondents with higher levels of education may tend to grasp the international dimension and interdependency of problems more easily;
- Age: we expect young people to give greater preference to the European level than older generations given their more open attitude to the world (Reimer, 1992; Gabriel, 1994:112; Elchardus, 1997).
- Gender: if we consider the scope of government preference an indicator of a more general latent pro-European attitude variable, then we can expect women to opt for the national level, as is the case with European identity (Eurobarometers);
- Subjective social class: the Eurobarometers indicate that workers, the unemployed, homemakers and pensioners have a weaker European identity then employers and cadres (and the more highly educated). Hence we can expect that the higher the level of subjective class identification, the stronger the preferences for the European level;
- Union membership: similar reasoning to that above
- Religion: Catholicism is traditionally associated with internationalism, while Protestantism is associated with national democracy. Thus we expect Catholics to be more likely to opt for the European level than Protestants.

General political attitudes

From various chapters in the Niedermayer and Sinnott volume (1995) on Public Opinion and International Governance we can derive a number of individual attitudinal and socio-demographic characteristics that can be expected to exert an impact on preference for different government levels:

- The degree of political interest in national politics: those that display a relatively high degree of interest in national politics will be more likely to prefer national decision-making, as only political levels of which one has a minimal degree of understanding can be expected to be considered appropriate as a level of government.[11]
- Political information seeking behaviour: in terms of watching news on TV and reading newspapers;
- Left-right attitudes: one can expect that left-oriented people, given the association between internationalism and socialism, will give more preference to the European level, while right wing respondents will be more likely to favour the national level, given the general association between national conscience and a conservative outlook (Gabriel, 1994:112; Huber and Inglehart, 1995:84).
- Support for national authorities: this is measured by degree of satisfaction with democracy in one's own country and trust in national political institutions.[12]
- Retrospective and prospective sociotropic economic evaluations: as national governments usually still claim credit when the economy fares well (but blame Europe if things go badly), we can presume that positive sociotropic economic evaluations (retrospective as well as prospective) would lead to a higher preference for the national level;
- Ethnocentrism (expressed in fear of scarcity of jobs and social welfare benefits): for many Europe is associated with economic globalization, leading to dislocation of enterprise and jobs, which puts the welfare state under pressure. We can expect that those with a stronger fear of loss of jobs and of social welfare benefits would be more likely to opt for the national level.

Political attitudes towards the EU

As the wider definition of the subsidiarity principle introduced the notion of support by citizens for the political system, one can expect legitimacy of EU governance to be determined not only by the endogenous nature of policy

problems but also by citizens' consent to the rules of the game in this regime, including the division of labour between different levels of governance. We can therefore expect this consent to be facilitated by a general positive evaluation of EU integration process on the one hand and on the other, by general and diffuse disaffection with the national or regional decision-making bodies (Easton, 1965). In fact, since the supposed ebbing away of the permissive consensus on European integration (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970:41-42; Niedermayer, 1995), the legitimacy of the European Union as an increasingly important decision-making level has become a 'variable', fluctuating in time and space between, but also within member states.[13] We can therefore expect that the preference of European citizens for using different decision making levels to solve their most important problems will be related to their general support for different regime levels and to the democratic legitimacy of those levels (Dahl: 1989: 109).

With our data we will operationalise generalised support for the European regime using the following variables (for a similar procedure, see Schmitt and Scheuer, 1996):

- feeling that one is a European citizen;[14]
- pride in EU citizenship;
- interest in EU politics;
- belief that EU membership is a good thing;
- support for further European unification
- satisfaction with democracy in the European Union.

As argued in the introductory chapter to this volume, there could be a spill-over between specific policies and the way in which different levels of decision-making are considered legitimate. Hence, we can expect that citizens' preferences for levels of government are affected by their evaluation of the usefulness of EU institutions for their individual well-being and that of their country and/or by the incapacity of national or regional governments to

produce satisfactory policy outputs. This 'specific' support for the outputs of the EU will be operationalised using the following variables:

- the perception that one's country has benefited from EU membership[15];
- degree of trust in EU political institutions (Commission and Parliament).

Structural characteristics of groups of countries

Finally, the Niedermayer and Sinnott volume (1995) contains a number of structural features of each country that can be expected to affect preferences for government levels:

- The size of a country: the smaller the country, the less appropriate the level of the national state objectively is and will be perceived to be, as this level will be less adequate for conducting an effective policy with respect to major problems in society[16];
- The duration of EU membership (Niedermayer, 1995): the transfer of competencies from the national level to the European Union is a unique but also a painful learning process. The transfer of competencies from the national to the European level has created a democratic deficit that the expansion of the role of the European and national parliaments has not managed to bridge. This deficit is more likely to be tolerated when the transfers are gradual in time and span (as has been the case for the six founding members of the European Community for Coal and Steel) since they have been socialised for nearly half a century into the process of dismantling national sovereignty 'slice by slice'. The democratic deficit costs are higher and denser in the case of newcomers, which are asked to change large parts of competence hitherto falling under national sovereignty within a short time span;
- The openness of a country's economy[17]: the more an economy is open, the more people will be aware of the necessity of international co-operation in order, for instance, to better face the challenge of the internationalization of economic decision-making in the private sector;

- GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) (EU-25 = 100),
- The level of economic development: in 2004 per capita GNP in $,
- Human development/ quality of life (UN, World bank, etc),
- Annual harmonized index of consumer prices (2004),
- General government deficit as % of GDP (2004),
- Eurozone membership,
- Schengenland membership,
- Degree of decentralization (unitary, federal, regionalized, decentralized),
- General government expenditure as % of GDP,
- Demographic structure (% under 18 and over 65),
- Sectors of employment (primary, secondary or tertiary sector of society in 2004,
- Types of welfare state.

First empirical results

Some remarks regarding the data used

Some countries were excluded from the empirical analyses in this paper: Luxembourg and Lithuania (for lack of the dependent variable "preferred scope"), Sweden (too many variables lacking) and Northern Ireland (not a country).

We also dropped the income variable, given the high number of cases in Italy with monthly net income between 12,000 euro en 820,000 euro! In order to include income in the equation Italy would have had to be dropped. Since income did not seem to be a significant predictor of preferred level of governance when a model was tested excluding Italy it was decided to omit income as predictor variable and gain more information by including Italy in the equation.

This leaves us with 21 countries (table 1). Deletion of missing values reduces the number of cases retained in 16 countries by more than half (overall 9,474 valid vs. 13,365 missing) in the analyses, and in 8 by more than two thirds!

Table 1: Valid and missing cases per country withheld for analyses

Country	N in analysis	N in survey	% retained
AUSTRIA	713	1010	70,59%
BELGIUM	278	889	31,27%
BRITAIN	601	1500	40,07%
CYPRUS	226	500	45,20%
CZECH REP	188	889	21,15%
DENMARK	500	1317	37,97%
ESTONIA	397	1606	24,72%
FINLAND	480	900	53,33%
FRANCE	1026	1406	72,97%
GERMANY	253	596	42,45%
GREECE	240	500	48,00%
HUNGARY	533	1200	44,42%
IRELAND	785	1154	68,02%
ITALY	410	1553	26,40%
LATVIA	289	1000	28,90%
THE NETHERLANDS	860	1586	54,22%
POLAND	210	960	21,88%
PORTUGAL	450	1000	45,00%
SLOVAKIA	303	1063	28,50%
SLOVENIA	290	1002	28,94%
SPAIN	442	1208	36,59%

Scope preferences over time and in space

Table 2: Perceived and preferred levels of decision-making for three most important issues in 1994 and most important issue in 2004[18]

Level/	1994		2004			
Sample	Perc/12	Pref/12.	Perc/12	Pref/12.	Perc/21	Pref/21
Regional	16%	14%	17%	23%	17%	22%
National	66%	47%	64%	54%	64%	56%
European	18%	39%	19%	23%	19%	22%

If we compare the results from the 12 countries that were included in 1994 as well as the 2004 survey over time, we notice little difference with regard to the perception of how decision making currently takes place for the most important problem(s). There are however major shifts in the preferred level of decision-making. The European level tumbles from 39% to 23%, while the

regional and national levels gain importance (+9% and +7 % respectively). Note also that it does not make much of a difference whether we consider the 12 countries included in our 1994 analysis or the 21 countries included in the 2004 analyses.

The overwhelming demand for more europeanisation of decision-making levels of 1994 has been reduced to a small yet positive difference (19% perceived to 23% preferred), while the national level still shows a deficit (64% perceived vs.54% preferred). Contrary to 1994, the regional level enjoys also a positive difference (17% perceived to 23% preferred).

Table 3: Perceived and preferred levels of decision-making for most important issue per country in 2004

	Perceived			Preferred		
	Regional	National	European	Regional	National	European
Austria	16,69%	61,44%	21,87%	13,03%	52,99%	33,98%
Belgium	24,2%	50,71%	25,09%	19,29%	43,78%	36,94%
Britain	26,5%	58,59%	14,91%	34,76%	53,14%	12,1%
Cyprus	4,37%	73,14%	22,49%	5,27%	56,26%	38,46%
Czech Republic	17,32%	59,45%	23,23%	15,09%	63,26%	21,65%
Denmark	20,1%	67,51%	12,39%	26,47%	60,2%	13,33%
Estonia	29,42%	61,83%	8,75%	15%	74,05%	10,95%
Finland	18,47%	63,82%	17,71%	26,75%	62,06%	11,2%
France	17,39%	58,74%	23,87%	30,24%	43,44%	26,33%
Germany	24,9%	51,46%	23,64%	25,4%	46,8%	27,8%
Greece	12,11%	51,76%	36,12%	14,87%	60,99%	24,14%
Hungary	13,3%	80%	6,7%	9,95%	78,12%	11,92%
Ireland	16,98%	65,59%	17,43%	25,11%	56,61%	18,28%
Italy	8,82%	79,55%	11,63%	10,42%	74,29%	15,29%
Latvia	22,37%	61,51%	16,12%	10,86%	57,13%	32,02%
Netherlands	5,34%	78,19%	16,47%	11,55%	57,8%	30,65%
Poland	22,31%	64,71%	12,98%	21,41%	67,82%	10,77%
Portugal	7,64%	58,71%	33,65%	17,39%	56,52%	26,09%
Slovakia	17,85%	64,3%	17,85%	20,37%	57,44%	22,2%
Slovenia	24,49%	65,15%	10,36%	12,53%	81,75%	5,72%
Spain	8,88%	76,25%	14,87%	19,17%	49,6%	31,23%

This dramatic loss of popularity of the European level can be due to several factors, that will have to be tested in a later stage of this project, drawing on comparisons over time of the other contributors. First, it is possible that the EU level effectively lost attractiveness, as the referenda on the Constitution and hesitation of ratification by other countries seem to suggest. This loss can be due to the current enlargement and prospects for further enlargement, the

pressure of globalisation and the failure of a "social Europe", shifts in EU expenditures between policy sectors and countries, etc. Second, there may be a shift in the nature of the most important problems perceived, towards more endogenously national or regional issues, such as traffic security and fight against petty crime.

Amongst the member country populations that favour the European level most, we find in decreasing order Cyprus, Belgium, Austria, Latvia, Spain and the Netherlands, while amongst those that favour the European level least we find Slovenia, Estonia, Britain, Finland and Hungary. Amongst the member country populations that favour the national level most , we find in decreasing order, Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary and Italy. The most region-oriented countries are Britain, France, Denmark and Finland, not exactly those with a strong regional tradition.

Bivariate relations

In order to explore the potential explanatory power of our independent variables (perceived and preferred scope), we ran spearman correlations (see table 4). Amongst those significant at the 0.001 level, we find, amongst the socio-demographic variables, gender and subjective social class. Amongst the attitudinal variables, we find "feeling a European citizen", "pride in EU citizenship", trust in European political institutions, EU membership good or bad, support for further unification, "decisions of Europe are in country's interest" and "decisions of Europe are in my own interest". Note that the bivariate relationships are very weak (best is r= 0.079 for "feeling European citizen". We also find some expressions of pro-EU attitudes as well as expressions of anti-EU attitudes.

Table 4: spearman correlations between independent variables and preferred scope of government

Variabelen	Spearman corr met Gewenste niveau (Q04)	Sign.
Age	-0,013	
Gender	-0,038	***
Education	0,003	
Subjective social class	0,050	***
Union membership	-0,014	
Religion	0,007	
Retrospective sociotropic economic evaluation	0,006	
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluation	-0,013	
Ethnocentrism : scarcity of jobs	0,020	*
Ethnocentrism : social welfare benefits	0,031	**
Feeling European citizen	-0,079	***
Proud of EU citizenship	-0,043	***
Days a week watch TV	-0,012	
Days a week, read newspaper	-0,012	
Left-right self placement	-0,002	
Satisfaction with democracy in own country	-0,028	**
Approval of government's record	-0,021	*
Interest in politics	-0,007	
Trust in national political institutions	0,028	**
Interest in European politics	0,022	*
Trust in European political institutions	0,086	***
EU membership good or bad	-0,061	***
Unification	0,077	***
Satisfaction with democracy in Europe	0,004	
Decisions of Europe are in country's interest	-0,049	***
Decisions of Europe are in my own interest	-0,048	***

*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Multivariate analyses

General multinomial logistic model

Table 5 offers an overview of the strength of the effect of each of the potential determinants on the choice of government level. The strength can be deduced from the ratio L^2/df, i.e. the larger the ratio, the stronger the effect.

The results tell us first that the model does not fit the data well, as the likelihood ratio is significant (0.000). Note however, if the model is run on un-weighted data (not taking country size into account), we do obtain a perfect fit (sign. = 1, table not reported). This suggests that the dataset is quite unstable. This is caused mainly by the German data. If we include Germany and run the model for the remaining 20 countries weighted by

population, the model fits as well as with the unweighted data. As the German sample we use is quite small (253 cases remaining from the survey of only 596), and is then effectively expanded in our weighted data set by the huge size of the German population, the potential deviance of Germany from European trends strongly affects the overall European results.

Table 5: Multinomial logistic model for choosing government model (European, national, regional) for solving most important problem.

Variabelen	DF	X^2	Sign.	X^2/df
Age	8	44,21	0,000	5,53
Gender	2	10,85	0,004	5,42
Education	2	2,10	0,350	1,05
Subjective social class	8	20,71	0,008	2,59
Union membership	2	8,97	0,011	4,48
Religion	8	22,11	0,005	2,76
Retrospective sociotropic economic evaluation	2	62,74	0,000	31,37
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluation	2	17,04	0,000	8,52
Ethnocentrism : scarcity of jobs	2	9,55	0,008	4,77
Ethnocentrism : social welfare benefits	2	10,78	0,005	5,39
Feeling European citizen	4	32,83	0,000	8,21
Proud of EU citizenship	2	6,57	0,037	3,29
Days a week watch TV	2	1,91	0,384	0,96
Days a week, read newspaper	2	2,90	0,234	1,45
Left-right self placement	2	4,01	0,135	2,00
Satisfaction with democracy in own country	2	6,09	0,048	3,05
Approval of government's record	2	2,24	0,326	1,12
Interest in politics	2	47,80	0,000	23,90
Trust in national political institutions	2	27,81	0,000	13,91
Interest in European politics	2	4,33	0,115	2,16
Trust in European political institutions	2	60,20	0,000	30,10
EU membership good or bad	4	6,88	0,142	1,72
Unification	2	33,94	0,000	16,97
Satisfaction with democracy in Europe	2	35,64	0,000	17,82
Decisions of Europe are in country's interest	2	32,12	0,000	16,06
Decisions of Europe are in my own interest	2	7,86	0,020	3,93
COUNTRY	40	672,17	0,000	16,80
Likelihood ratio	18832	21971,04	0,000	

The main explanatory variables (controlling for the effect of all the other variables in the model) are (in decreasing order of importance) retrospective sociotropic economic evaluation and trust in European institutions (Commission and Parliament scores added). Then we find, interest in politics, satisfaction with democracy in the EU, support for unification, trust in national political institutions, the feeling that EU decisions are in one's countries interest, prospective sociotropic economic evaluation, feeling an EU citizen, and, country. The following do not seem to have any effect (controlling for the effect of all the other variables in the model): education,

watching TV and reading newspapers, left-right self placement, approval of government's record, interest in EU politics, and approval EU membership.

Net effects of significant categorical variables

On the basis of the parameter estimates of the model above (table 5), we can now estimate the net effect of each of the significant categorical variables, i.e. age, gender, subjective social class, membership union, religion, feeling European, and last but not least, country (see table 6).

In this table, the "effects" are expressed as the difference in percentage vis-à-vis the average percentage of respondents that opted for a specific government level (i.e. 23.26% regional; 53.92% national; 22.82% European). Once again, the effects are "net effects", the chance of choosing a specific level while taking into account the effect of all other categorical determinants retained in the model.

Note also that when interpreting the strength of the effect, i.e. the difference vis-à-vis the average, one should be taking the size of the average choice for a government level into account. For instance, a difference of 8% in favour of the national level (chosen on average by 54% of respondents) is less important for an equally large difference of 8% for the European level (chosen on the average by 23% respondents). For instance, in table 6 we can notice that Danish choose the European level 8.15% less than the general European average (22.82%). Speaking in relative terms, this is about 35% "less than average" (-8.15 / 22.82), or in other words, Danes chose about 1.5 times less for the European level than the average European. If we look at the Germans, we notice that they choose the national level 8.44% less for than the European average (53.92%). While in absolute terms, the difference from the overall average of choice for a level is about the same as for the Danish vis-à-vis the EU (-8.15 and -8.44), speaking in relative terms Germans choose only about 15% "less than average" (-8.44 / 53.92).

Table 6: Net effects of determinants on the choice of government level

Preferred level of government		**Regional**	**National**	**European**
European Mean		***23.26%***	***53.92%***	***22.82%***
Age				
	<25 year	1,12	-0,72	-0,40
	25-34 year	3,54	0,30	-3,84
	35-49 year	-1,70	0,47	1,24
	50-65 year	-2,04	-0,61	2,65
	65 +	1,85	0,15	-2,00
Gender				
	Male	-1,16	0,37	0,78
	Female	1,42	-0,46	-0,96
Subjective social class				
	Working class	-0,62	1,32	-0,70
	Low middle class	3,53	-1,98	-1,55
	Middle class	-0,59	0,08	0,52
	Upper middle class	-2,00	0,53	1,48
	Upper class	4,89	-3,38	-1,51
Membership Union				
	No member	-0,54	0,88	-0,33
	Member	1,67	-2,70	1,02
Religion				
	Catholic	-0,01	0,53	-0,52
	Protestant	4,54	-2,70	-1,84
	Orthodox	-9,39	6,65	2,74
	Other	-2,28	1,65	0,63
	None	-0,09	-1,43	1,52
Feeling European citizen				
	Often	-2,52	-0,37	2,90
	Sometimes	-1,22	0,87	0,35
	Never	3,40	-0,80	-2,60
Country				
	Austria	-12,20	-2,16	14,36
	Belgium	-3,55	-8,98	12,52
	Britain	4,01	3,23	-7,24
	Cyprus	-14,03	4,10	9,94
	Czech Republic	-9,30	4,48	4,82
	Denmark	-5,73	13,89	-8,15
	Estonia	-4,09	13,40	-9,31
	Finland	-4,37	14,26	-9,89
	France	8,93	-11,90	2,97
	Germany	4,89	-8,44	3,54
	Greece	1,14	0,75	-1,89
	Hungary	-13,67	24,47	-10,80
	Ireland	0,54	5,59	-6,14
	Italy	-12,98	23,96	-10,98
	Latvia	-12,02	-1,46	13,47
	The Netherlands	-13,46	0,47	13,00
	Poland	-0,70	13,97	-13,27
	Portugal	-5,20	3,92	1,29
	Slovakia	-1,77	3,56	-1,78
	Slovenia	-13,16	31,86	-18,70
	Spain	-2,22	-4,42	6,64

In regards to the socio-demographic variables included, we find that age seems to make a noticeable difference only for the 25-34 category: they choose the regional level more (+ 3.5) and the European level less (-3.8) level. Men choose the regional level marginally less and the European level more, while women display the opposite pattern. With respect subjective social class, the lower middle classes as well as the upper classes opt more

often for the regional level (respectively +3.5 and +4.9). The latter also opt significantly less often for the national level.[19] Trade union members choose the national level less (-2.7). Finally, protestants choose the national and the European levels less often (-2.7 and -1.8) and prefer the regional level (+4.5). Orthodox respondents opt in the first place for the national level (+6.5), but also favour more the European (+2.74) while they shun the regional level (-9.4).

In terms of attitudes, those that often feel a citizen of Europe opt more for the European level (+2.9) and less for the region (-2.5). Those that never feel a European citizen display the opposite pattern: they opt more for the regional level (+3.4) and less for the European (-2.6) than the average respondent.

While in all the previous cases the differences vis-à-vis the overall averages are generally weak (less than 10%), the impact of the country variable is very often above the 10% level, even controlling for all the previous socio-demographic and attitudinal variables. The Austrians (+14.3), Latvians (+13.5), Dutch (+13.0) and Belgians (+12.5) opt most for the European level (by more than 10%), followed by Cypriots (+9.9), Spaniards (+6.4), Czechs (+4.8), Germans (+3.5) and the French (+3.0). Amongst those that are significantly less likely than average to opt for the European level, we find in decreasing order, the Slovenes (-18.7), the Polish (-13.3), the Italians (-11.0), the Hungarians (-10.8), the Finns, (-9.9), the Estonians (-9.3), the Danes (-8.2), British (-7.2) and the Irish (-6.1).

Opting significantly more (than 10%) for the national level than the overall average, we find in decreasing order the Slovenes (+31.9%), Hungarians (+24.5), the Italians (+24.0), the Finnish (+14.3), the Polish (+14.0), the Danes (+13.9) and the Estonians (+13.4). Amongst those opting much less for the national level than the overall average, we find in decreasing order the French (-11.9), the Belgians (-9.0) and the Germans (-8.4).

Those opt significantly more (than 10%) for the regional level than the overall average, we find in decreasing order the French (+8.9), the Germans (+4.9) and the British (+4.0). Most countries however opt significantly less (than 10%) for the regional level: we find in decreasing order the Cypriotes (-14.0), the Hungarians (-13.7), the Dutch (-13.5), the Slovenes (-13.2), the Italians (-13.0), Austrians (-12.2), the Latvians (-12.0), followed by lesser "anti-regionals" as the Czechs (-9.3), the Danes (-5.7), the Portuguese (-5.2), the Finnish (-4.4), the Estonians (-4.1) and the Belgians (-3.6).

Finally, the country that fits best the pan-European pattern of scope of government preferences is Greece!

The interpretation of these country effects is not always straightforward. Not only are they often much stronger than the socio-demographic and attitudinal effects, but in the groups that opt clearly for one or the other level we find strange bedfellows. The aversion of Italians to the European level and preference of the national level is quite surprising (Caciagli), as is the aversion of the French to the national level. The preference for or aversion to the regional level is not clearly linked with the existence of regional or federal institutions, as shown by the anti-regional position of the Italians and Austrians, and the pro-regional position of the French.

Net effects of significant metric variables

On the basis of the parameter estimates of the model presented in 5, we can now estimate the net effect of each of the significant metric variables. In table 7, the "effects" are expressed in the additive logistic regression parameters on the binary variables "regional vs. European" and "national vs. European", with European as reference category. Hence, in both dichotomies, negative signs indicate a clearer preference for the European level. Once again, the effects are net effects, the chance of choosing a specific level while taking into account the effect of all other metric

determinants retained in this model. We also checked whether these effects hold when controlling for interaction effects with the country variable.

Table 7: Direct significant net effects of attitudes on the preference for the regional or national vis-à-vis the European government level (additive logistic regression parameters), controlling for all other variables included in the model.

	Regional vs. European	National vs. European
Retrospective sociotropic economic evaluation	0,11**	-0,12***
Prospective sociotropic economic evaluation		0,12***
Ethnocentrism : scarcity of jobs		0,08**
Ethnocentrism : social welfare benefits	-0,06*	
Proud of EU citizenship		-0,08**
Satisfaction with democracy in own country	-0,11**	-0,07*
Interest in politics		0,21***
Trust in national political institutions	0,05**	0,08***
Trust in European political institutions	-0,13***	-0,12***
Unification	-0,06***	-0,06***
Satisfaction with democracy in Europe	0,27***	0,20***
Decisions of Europe are in country's interest	-0,29***	-0,27***
Decisions of Europe are in my own interest	0,14**	0,12**

* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .001

Regarding the opposition between the national and European level, we find significant effects (*** p < .001) for the retrospective as well as prospective sociotropic economic evaluations, but with opposite signs. The better one evaluates the retrospective sociotropic economic situation, the more one prefers the European level, while the worse one evaluates the prospective sociotropic economic situation, the less one prefers the European level. But both main effects disappear when country interaction effects are controlled. The stronger one's interest in politics, the less one prefers the European level (effect remains when controlling for country interaction effects). The more one trusts national political institutions, the less one prefers the European level, while the opposite is true for trust in European political institutions (both effects remain when controlling for country interaction effects). The more one agrees with the principle of further European unification, the more one prefers the European level (but, the main effect disappears if country interaction effects are included). The more one agrees that EU decisions are in the interests of one's country, the more one prefers the European level

(interaction effects could not be tested). However, the more one is satisfied with democracy in the Europe, the less one prefers the European level! (interaction effects could not be tested).

Regarding the opposition between the regional and European level, we find the following significant effects (*** $p < .001$): the more one trusts European political institutions, the more one prefers the European vis-à-vis the regional level (the effect remains for controlling for country interactions). The more one agrees with the principle of further European unification, the more one prefers the European level (but, the main effect disappears when controlling for country interaction effects). The more one agrees that EU decisions are in the interests of one's country, the more one prefers the European level (interaction effects could not be tested). But again, the more one is satisfied with democracy in the Europe, the less one prefers the European level! (interaction effects could not be tested).[20]

Macro-analysis of impact of types of countries

Finally, we searched for the effects of types of countries, using a multinomial logistic multilevel model that also takes micro-level effects into consideration. As multinomial logistic multilevel analysis often suffers from estimation problems if one includes too many macro-variables, it was decided to test the effect of macro-variables by including only a limited number of macro variables in the equation per run.[21] Significant effects were withheld. To test whether these effects remained significant after controlling for the micro-variables, the most important micro-effects (retrospective sociotropic economic situation and trust in national institutions) were included the models (these tests are not reported here). Again, due to estimation problems, it was not possible to test a model with all the significant macro and micro variables. Controlling for the micro variables the effect of the macro variables remained.

Table 8: Multinomial logistic multilevel analysis of macro-variables on the preference for the regional or the national vis-à-vis the European government level, controlling for retrospective sociotropic economic situation & trust in national institutions

		Regional vs. European	National vs. European
Welfare state			
	Liberal / Corporatist	.930***	.963***
	Mixed / Corporatist	.918***	1.406***
	Socio-Democratic / Corporatist	1.945***	1.822***
	South-European / Corporatist	-.243***	.564
Type of state			
	Regionalize unitary / Federal	,148	-,004
	Centralize unitary / Federal	-,291	-,127
	Decentralized unitary / Federal	-1.121***	-,566
Member Eurozone			
	Member / No member	,270***	,154***

*** p < .001

Three typologies of states seem to affect preference for a particular level of government (table 8). The first typology is based on type of welfare state.[22] Compared to the reference category of the corporatist states, we find that the liberal, mixed, and socio-democratic welfare states prefer governance at the regional as well as the national level. Welfare state types in Southern European prefer governance at the European level to the regional level but prefer the national level even more (although our results were not significant).

Regarding degree of centralization, we find that, compared to the reference category of federal states, the decentralized unitary states prefer the regional level less and the European level more, with the highest preference being given to the national level (although this was not significant), while the regionalized and centralized types do not display significant links to either side of the dichotomy.[23] Finally, member countries of the Euro-zone prefer the regional level more and the national level less.

Future directions of analysis

The impact of the nature of the most important problem

From our previous study (De Winter & Swyngedouw, 1999) we know that the preferences for (and perceptions of current) government levels vary strongly across policy sectors (see table 9). Furthermore, in our multivariate analysis of the 1994 data we find that the endogenous nature of the most important problem emerged as being the second most important factor. Hence, now that the recoding of the most important problems is finally available, we intend to classify this as we did before on the basis of their endogenous attribution:

1. Genuine national matters;
2. Problems that are basically situated at national level but whose causes or solutions are partially related to similar problems and solutions in other countries (and therefore may produce distortions of competition, weaken social and economic cohesion, or restrict trade). Amongst the problems mentioned in the survey, this category predominantly includes labour market and social security transfer issues and fiscal and public expenditures (as all these influence a country's competitive position);
3. Problems with main cross-border aspects as well as problems that have international but basically bilateral dimensions. Some of these issues may have larger genuine international dimensions but these are not predominant.[24]
4. Problems with predominantly genuine international dimensions. Sometimes these dimensions are not due to the cross-border nature of the problem, but to long-lasting international co-operation in the policy sector like the Common Agricultural Policy.

Table 9: Most important policy sectors and preferred decision-making levels 1994 (percentages based on responses)

Level / Policy	Regional		National		European	
	Perc/12	Pref/12	Perc/12	Pref/12	Perc/12	Pref/12
Employment/Economy	16	14	67	48	17	39
Public finance	15	15	71	52	15	33
Europe	14	12	57	35	30	54
immigration	16	13	65	46	19	40
environment	18	12	59	37	22	51
criminality	16	13	65	48	19	38
welfare	15	16	71	52	15	32
centre-periphery	22	15	63	52	16	33
international	14	7	59	35	27	58
democracy	12	8	70	53	18	39
education	15	20	70	38	15	42

Identification with European party families and parties

Many authors have pointed to the differences in pro-European attitudes between European party families (Hix & Lord, 1998, Hooghe & Marks, Marks & Wilson). We could recode all the national parties into European party families, according to the typologies of von Beyme and others, and test whether (potential) voters for or identifiers with different party families display different preferences for the scope of government.

However, the within family variation is often very large. Therefore it would be better to use a more exact classification instrument that is now available, such as the new Chapel Hill dataset on national party positioning on European integration, based on expert surveys (http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/chapelhillsurvey). This would allow us to identify the pro-europeaness of every national party.

Preferred scope of government as indicator of latent pro-EU variable

One may wonder whether the preferred scope of governance is more an indicator of a latent general "attitude towards the EU" and less an expression of a reasoned calculation as to the level at which important problems can best be dealt with.

Conclusion

The question as to which decision-making level can most appropriately deal with different policy problems is a central aspect of the legitimacy of a political system. With regard to governance in the EU, the discussion is structured around the meaning and application of the principle of subsidiarity, permitting EU action when member-states or regions cannot take sufficient action to solve a problem, or when, for reasons of scale or effects, actions could be better taken by the EU. This question of which issues or policy sectors are subject to endogenous internationalisation is difficult to answer in the real world. In addition, international governance, like national or regional governance, can only gain legitimacy when the public agrees with the rules of the game, including the division of labour between different governmental levels. Therefore, the opinion of European citizens regarding the appropriate level of government in the EU (European, national, regional) is crucial if present or future divisions of power between these levels are to retain or gain legitimacy.

Our analyses show that the European publics of the 12 countries included in the 1994 survey have clearly lost their enthusiasm for the EU as the most appropriate level at which to solve the most important problem they perceived in 2004. Notice that the inclusion of the 13 new countries does not make much of a difference, as they comprise eurosceptics and euro-enthusiasts equally.

The bivariate and multivariate analyses also produced much weaker findings than in 1994. Multinomial logistic analysis of all potential determinants produced significant effects (controlling for the effect of all the other variables in the model) for, in decreasing order of importance, retrospective sociotropic economic evaluations and trust in European institutions, interest in politics, satisfaction with democracy in the EU, support for unification, trust in national political institutions, the feeling that EU decisions are in the

interest of one's country, prospective sociotropic economic evaluation, feeling an EU citizen and country. If we only analyse categorical determinants, we find some effects of age, gender, subjective social class, religion, and feeling oneself to be an EU citizen. While all these differences vis-à-vis the overall averages are generally weak (less than 10%), the impact of the country variable is very often above the 10% level. In the country groups that opt clearly for one or the other level we find strange bedfellows.

When looking for the net effects of the metric determinants of the opposition between the national and the European level, controlling for the interaction effect with country, we find as significant effects that the more strongly one is interested in politics, the less one prefers the European level; and the more one trusts national political institutions, the less one prefers the European level, while the opposite is true for trust in European political institutions. Regarding the opposition between the regional and the European level, we find that the more one trusts European political institutions, the more one prefers the European rather than the regional level.

Finally, we searched for effects of types of countries, using a multinomial logistic multilevel model, which also takes micro-level effects into consideration. Three typologies of states seem to affect the preference for a level of government. Compared to our reference category of corporatist states, we find that liberal, mixed, and socio-democratic welfare states prefer the regional, as well as the national, level. Regarding the degree of centralization, we find that, compared to the reference category of the federal states, the decentralized unitary states prefer the regional level less and the European level more. Finally, member countries of the Euro-zone prefer the regional level more and the national level to a lesser extent.

Further research is required, especially into including the endogenous nature of the most important problem that emerged, using data that has just become available. Secondly, we should add the EU positions of the parties that voters

identify with or vote for, by using the new Chapel Hill dataset on national party positioning on European integration.

Notes

[1] O'Connor 1973, Niskanen 1973, Bell 1976, Brittan 1975, Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki, 1975, Wilensky 1975, 1981, Douglas 1976, King, 1975 & 1987, Rose & Peters 1978, Baker, Dalton & Hildebrandt, 1981, Clark & Ferguson, 1983, Birch 1984, Flora 1986, O'Conner & Brym 1987, Inglehart, 1977 & 1997, Luhmann 1990, Castles, 1998, etc.

[2] Mainly based on ISSP, EB, Political Action and EES surveys.

[3] See for instance the European Charter of Local Self-Government, drafted by the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, on October 15, 1985 (Duff, 1993).

[4] Think Globally, Act Locally refers to the argument that global environmental problems can turn into action only by considering ecological, economic, and cultural differences of our local surroundings. This phrase was originated by Rene Dubos as an advisor to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. In 1979, Dubos suggested that ecological consciousness should begin at home. He believed that there needed to be a creation of a World Order in which "natural and social units maintain or recapture their identity, yet interplay with each other through a rich system of communications". In the 1980's, Dubos held to his thoughts on acting locally, and felt that issues involving the environment must be dealt with in their "unique physical, climatic, and cultural contexts." (Eblen and Eblen, 1994, p. 702)

[5] For an overview of the other factors that may explain the expansion of the EU, see Schmitter (1996).

[6] The president of the Commission, Jacques Delors, launched the possibility of introducing the principle of subsidiarity in the discussion on the division of competencies.

[7] For an overview of the meaning of subsidiarity in the context of European integration, see EIPA (1991), CEPR (1993), Maillet (1993), Hrbek (1995); Centre for Economic Policy Research (1993), Lourau (1997), Wilke and Wallace (1990), Estella De Noriega (1997).

[8] "In other words, whether the scope and domain of majority rule are appropriate in a particular unit depends on assumptions that the majority principle itself can do nothing to justify. The justification for the unit lies beyond the reach of the majority principle and, for that matter, mostly beyond the reach of democratic theory itself" (Dahl, 1989: 204).

[9] For an interesting attempt at a definition, see the Giscard d'Estaing report (1990) prepared for the Institutional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, which applies criteria of effectiveness of task accomplishment of the Community vis-à-vis the member states, and transnational nature of the task, whose dimensions or effects extend beyond national frontiers. The Council has drafted a similar set of criteria (cited elsewhere).

[10] Fight against drugs has stronger international or cross-border dimension in Belgium, France and Germany than in Portugal or Austria, given the permissive Dutch policy on soft drugs. Pollution matters in case of rivers is more an international issue in Holland, as all their rivers pass other countries, whereas in the insular GB and Ireland this would be much more a national issue. Immigration is maybe more of European issue in Schengen countries than in others.

[11] The questionnaire included the common question on the degree of interest for politics in general.

[12] For a discussion on the substantive meaning of this variable and its impact on European integration attitudes, see Martinotti & Stefanizzi (1995).

[13] In some countries like Spain, Belgium and Italy sub-national actors and authorities also challenge the legitimacy of the nation-state as decision-making level.

[14] Operationalised through the variable of the degree of feeling European (in addition to one's belonging to a nation).

[15] For a discussion on the substantive meaning of this variable, see Bosch and Newton (1995).

[16] See the introductory chapter on the trade-off between size and the scope of democracy.

[17] Measured by the share of exports in the Gross National Product in 1994 (OCDE, 1996: 192-195). The import shares correlate strongly with export shares, so either one could be used. We do not use the difference between imports and exports (as used by Wessels and Kielhorn in the second book) because the absolute degree of openness can be expected to have the major impact on citizen attitudes, not the balance of payments (mostly unknown to most citizens). When a country's imports and exports range around a fifth of the GNP, which is the case in Greece, France and Germany, the necessity for being internationally competitive (and all its consequences in terms of wage and price setting) is less a constant ordeal and worry than in countries where imports and exports constitute three fourth or more of the GNP (like in Belgium and Luxembourg).

[18] The answers to the first, second and third problem and the decision-making levels in 1994 are aggregated using the multiple response technique. Percentages are based on responses, not on respondents. This method makes the percentages add up to 100%, rather than to 300%. In 2004, we have scope perceptions and preferences only for THE most important problem.

[19] Note however that the upper classes only represent 1.4% of the entire population, so it may be wise to merge them with the upper middle classes.

[20] Note that we also get puzzling, but less significant, results for the belief that EU decisions are in one's own interests, for the national vs. European as well as the regional vs. European dichotomy. It also seems that the more one is satisfied with democracy in one's own country, the less one opts for the regional and national vs. the European level.

[21] The macro-variables that were included in our test were population size of country in thousands, duration of membership EU of country (in 1958-2004 period), GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) (EU-25 = 100), the level of economic development: in 2004 per capita GNP in $, human development/ quality of life (UN, World bank, etc), the openness of a country's economy (OECD data), Annual harmonized index of consumer prices (2004), General government deficit as % of GDP (2004), Eurozone membership, Schengenland membership, degree of decentralization (unitary, federal, regionalizsed decentralized), General government expenditure as % of GDP, demographic structure (% under 18 and over 65), sectors of employment (primary, secondary or tertiary sector of economy in 2004, types of welfare states, and Operating budgetary balance : % GNI Financial net-payer or net-receiver country.

[22] Sources: Esping Andersen (1990), Scharpf (2002), MISSOC (2004) : "Social Protection in the Member States of the European Union, of the European Economic Area, and Switzerland. Situation on 1 January 2004, Brussels, European Commission", MISSCEEC (2002):"Study on the Social Protection Systems in the 13 Applicant Countries - Synthesis Report, European Commission").

[23] Source: Loughlin (2001), Loughlin and Delcamp (2003), Levrat (2005), Committee of the Regions Studies (2003)

[24] For instance, with regard to environment, Golub (1996) rather convincingly argues that most issues of environmental protection can be solved at the level of the national state, as many do not have a significant cross-border character. Also, in terms of market distortion, competitive strategies based on ecological dumping have negative effects for those member states that employ them, and therefore market distortion only occurs in the short run.

Chapter 15

European Citizenship and Identity

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1. Introduction

This paper is part of a larger project trying to systematically assess the legitimacy of the European Union. There are two main methods for assessing the legitimacy of a political system. The first one is to evaluate the political system against normative theory, inquiring to what extent a political system conforms to certain normative criteria. The second is to empirically determine to what extent the political system is right in the eyes of the relevant beholders - the members of a particular polity (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999).

In order to apply the first method, it is necessary to elaborate a normative theory and then specify criteria against which political reality can be evaluated. In order to determine these criteria we rely on the work of Beetham and Lord (1998). These authors distinguish two key normative principles of liberal democracy, *popular sovereignty* and *the proper ends and standards of government*. The first principle refers to the main components of the concept of democracy, *demos* and *kratos* (literally: rule by the people). It assumes that the only source of political authority lies with the people. This belief that the people constitute the ultimate source of political authority makes the question 'who constitutes the people' one of the most fundamental aspects or dimensions of legitimacy, and makes issues of political identity

equally crucial for political legitimacy (Beetham and Lord 1998: 6). Therefore, any idea of democracy in the European Union must start with a description of the European *demos*. This we will refer to as the first dimension of legitimacy.

In addition to the *demos,* popular sovereignty also refers to the question of what it means for the people to rule. Because modern democracy is nearly identical with representative democracy, this aspect of popular sovereignty refers to the electoral authorisation of government and stipulates the requirements of *representation and accountability* (Beetham and Lord 1998: 6). In order to understand what democracy in a specific context means, we need to specify the mechanisms of representation and accountability that are needed within a given polity with a given *demos*. This we refer to as the second dimension of legitimacy.

The second principle of liberal democracy, 'the proper ends and standards of government', can be summarized in its most classic form as the protection of the Lockean rights (life, liberty and property), complimented more recently with welfare rights and securing the conditions for economic growth (Beetham and Lord 1998: 4-6). This principle yields criteria by which to judge the *performance* of government, the third dimension of legitimacy that we distinguish.

Summarising, from the main principles of liberal democracy three dimensions of legitimacy can be deduced - identity*, representation and accountability, and performance.* For each of these dimensions more specific criteria for evaluating a specific political system can be developed. These three dimensions are reflected in most normative theories of democracy, although different words may be used. The most concise summary is Abraham Lincoln's famous triad requiring government *of*, *by* and *for* the people.

The second method for assessing the legitimacy of a political system, by determining to what extent the political system is right in the eyes of the people, requires an analogous approach. In order to apply this method, we should first determine which aspects of the political system are relevant for people's attitudes toward the legitimacy of government. This can only be decided on the basis of criteria deduced from a normative view.

Most empirical research using this method to assess the legitimacy of a political system as perceived by the people is based on the theoretical framework originally developed by David Easton (1965). He makes a distinction between three objects of support: the *political community*, the *political regime* and the (performance of) the *authorities*. Although Easton's original framework is more encompassing and refined, for the purposes of this project we will interpret the political regime in terms of political institutions. As can be seen in table 1, the three objects of support basically are referring to the same normative dimensions of democratic legitimacy distinguished in the first column.

Therefore, this conceptual triad helps us to develop and apply both methods of assessing the legitimacy of European democracy. As they stand for fundamental normative principles they form the basis for the development of criteria against which the performance of the democratic system can be evaluated. The Eastonian framework will help us to assess to what extent the system is supported by the people.

Table 1: Three dimensions of liberal-democratic legitimacy and related concepts

Dimensions of Democratic Legitimacy	Objects of Support
Identity	Political community
Representation and accountability	Regime- political institutions
Performance	Performance of authorities

In this paper we will limit ourselves to the first dimension of legitimacy. Also, we will limit ourselves to the second method to assess the legitimacy of a political system. More precisely, we shall try to develop an instrument of measurement to be used in mass surveys that might help us to assess to what extent the European Union from the perspective of this first dimension is legitimate in the eyes of the people.

It is beyond dispute that the very idea of democracy, and of people's sovereignty, presupposes the existence of a people, a *demos*. What is disputed though is what 'the people' really means. A basic issue is whether 'the people' is more or less a legal construct, in the sense of all people who are subject to the jurisdiction of a particular polity, or whether the notion of 'the people' is based on a more sociological or even ethnic concept, which stresses the subjective affiliation of the people with a community as a prerequisite for the constitution of a *demos* as a collective actor. In the next section we will present a short summary of this debate. We will argue that one needs to distinguish between people's identification with a political community or sense of citizenship and their sense of communal identity. The latter might enhance the former but the two concepts are not identical. In sections three and four we will develop an operationalization of these two concepts. In section five and six we will present a preliminary descriptive analysis of the degree to which people across the European Union have developed both an identification with the European Union as a political community and a sense of a European social community.

2. European identity and European citizenship

Different views on the feasibility of a legitimate democratic system at the level of the European Union are partly due to different historical views on the relationship between citizenship and nationhood. In the traditional German view, established in the 19th century by philosophers like Fichte and Herder (Bruter 2003) nations are based on a common culture, in particular a

common language. This view that the pre-existence of a collective identity is the very condition for the establishment of a legitimate democracy is well represented in the German academic literature on the feasibility of a legitimate European democratic political system. According to Graf Kielmansegg, the concepts of *demos* ('*Volk'*), community ('*Gemeinschaft'*) and nation are almost identical. Once one accepts this view, it is obvious what the verdict on the feasibility of a European democracy will be. European democracy cannot succeed because a democratic constitution in itself cannot establish a legitimate European democracy. As long as there is no European community, every attempt to establish a democratic Europe is bound to fail. Against this background, it is easy enough for Graf Kielmansegg to demonstrate that the European Union is far removed from a community with a common identity. The European peoples do not share a common language; they lack memories of a common history that might help to develop a collective identity; and they do not take part in a common 'European' public sphere ('*Oeffentlichkeit'*); there are only national public spheres (Kielmansegg 1993). In a similar vein Scharpf argues that the democratic principle of majority rule will only be accepted in polities with a 'thick' collective identity, i.e. in polities based on pre-existing commonalities of history, language, culture, and ethnicity. Because such a collective identity does not exist at the level of the Union, input-oriented legitimacy is out of reach for the EU for the foreseeable future:

> 'Given the historical, linguistic, cultural, ethnic and institutional diversity of its member states, there is no question that the Union is very far from having achieved the 'thick' collective identity that we have come to take for granted in national democracies -- and in its absence, institutional reforms will not greatly increase the input-oriented legitimacy of decisions taken by majority rule' (Scharpf 1999).

According to this view input oriented legitimacy requires a pre-existing collective identity. This same philosophy is reflected in the famous decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the compatibility of the Treaty of Maastricht with the German Basic Law (BVerfGE 89, 155 – Maastricht). According to the decision, democracy cannot be exclusively grounded at the European level as no European *demos* has developed yet (Shaw 1997: 35).

However, the argument that a *demos* and *citizenship* require the pre-existence of a community with a collective or national identity is disputable. It presumes a conception of citizenship along the lines of the *ius sanguinis*, the rights of kinship. Until quite recently this *ius sanguinis* defined the German concept of citizenship. However, at least since the French revolution, there has been a competing notion of citizenship that is based on the *ius solis* whereby citizenship is acquired through permanent residence (under specific conditions) within a certain territory (Brubaker 1992). This alternative concept of citizenship is predominant in Europe. It allows for the possibility that European citizenship need not be the political projection of a cultural idea of Europe, but can essentially be regarded as a legal construct: 'Citizenship should be the ultimate basis of legitimation for institution-building, not ambiguous cultural identities' (Delanty 1995: 163). This seems to be consistent with the history of many nation states. The argument that a shared common identity, a *demos* in the ethno-cultural sense, should precede the constitution of a *demos*, that is a community of citizens sharing the rights and duties of citizenship, has little ground in history. In many European countries the formation of the state preceded the development of the nation (Fuchs 2000: 230).

This view is shared by Easton. First, he makes a clear distinction between a *sense of social community* and a *sense of political community*. Sense of *social* community is an indication of the cohesiveness of *society*. The sense of *political* community 'indicates political cohesion of a group of persons [ ] the

feeling of belonging together as a group which, because it shares a political structure, also shares a political fate.' (Easton 1965: 185). But in Easton's view even a sense of political community is not a prerequisite for a feasible political system.

> '…this approach does not compel us to postulate that before a political system can exist or even it is to persist, a sense of political community must first rise to some specified level. Although we may adopt the degree of mutual identification as one kind of measure of the input of support for the political community, it is conceivable that for considerable periods of time, the sense of political community may be low or non-existent. [ ] It is possible for a political structure to bind a group together before feelings of mutual identification have emerged. We may go further. Frequently the imposition of a common division of political labour has itself made possible the slow growth of sentiments of political solidarity; this reverses normal expectations of the significance of sentiments of solidarity as a pre-condition for the emergence of a political community. A political community may precede and become a condition for the growth of a sense of community.' (Easton 1965: 185-6)

While this view explicitly accepts the reciprocal reinforcement of ideas of community and the practice of citizenship, the causal sequence is reversed. Therefore, one may well argue that the constitution of a European democratic polity and the establishment of a European citizenship, first by the Treaty of Maastricht ('Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union' (Article 8.1)) and confirmed by the draft constitution (article I-10.1) is a prerequisite of the development of a European identity. To use a phrase from O'Leary: European citizenship may be regarded as an 'evolving concept': starting from the free movement of persons, through its legal formalisation, to a full-fledged identity (O'Leary 1996).

A final possible argument against equating citizenship with nationality is that it reflects an outdated concept of citizenship. It is based on the idea of undisputed national sovereignty of autonomous states. However, the process of globalisation has made national states gradually less self sufficient and autonomous. They have become more and more dependent on each other and have surrendered part of their autonomy to supra-national arrangements. Also, their citizens have become more and more dependent on all kinds of provisions and regulations that surpass the national borders. As a consequence, the 'statist' concept of citizenship and of a *demos* can no longer make a claim to exclusivity over the individual, but is becoming part of a structure of concentric circles encompassing not only national but also supra-national and sub-national identities (Shaw 1997: 35). This leads to the development of a multiple citizenship, where people do not exclusively claim to identify with the nation state, but share this identity with other identities (Soysal 1994). Accordingly, the very idea of European citizenship should lead to a radical decoupling of concepts of state, nation, national identity and nationality and yield to a form of post-national membership which is fundamentally different from a (nation)-statist concept of citizenship (Shaw 1997: 37).

However, the argument that the *demos* need not be defined in terms of an exclusive identification of the people with a cultural or social community does not imply that there is no empirical relationship between the two or that this relationship would be unidirectional. It is generally recognised that the feasibility and stability of a democratic political system are related to its political culture. Not withstanding a formal definition of a *demos,* a democratic community undoubtedly benefits from citizens identifying themselves with the *demos* as a collective entity and with other members of this *demos* (Fuchs 2000: 219). Also, a *democratic* political community requires that people identify with the norms and values underlying a democratic political system, not only in the abstract, but also accepting them as being applicable to all their fellow citizens (see a.o. Klosko 2000). But the

essential thing is that the identification with a European *political* community (what Jürgen Habermas has called 'constitutional patriotism') is not the same thing and takes priority over any cultural identification with a European collective community (Habermas 1994).

To a large extent this is a normative debate. Different positions taken in this debate can have far reaching implications for the further process of European integration, as the verdict of the German Constitutional Court on the Treaty of Maastricht proves. However, the two different views on the meaning of a European demos and their mutual relationship have empirical implications as well. It is to these empirical implications we now turn.

3. Conceptual framework and operationalization

Concepts

The argument in the previous section implies that social, cultural or national identity should be clearly distinguished conceptually from the concept of citizenship. McCrone and Kiely define the difference as follows: 'nationality and citizenship actually belong to different spheres of meaning and activity. The former is in essence a cultural concept which binds people on the basis of shared identity – in Benedict Anderson's apt phrase as an 'imagined community' – while citizenship is a political concept deriving from people's relationship to the state. In other words, nation-ness and state-ness need not be, and increasingly are not, aligned (McCrone and Kiely 2000: 25). Citizenship is usually conceptualised as a package of rights and duties bestowed on individuals by the state. T.H. Marshall described citizenship as 'a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to rights and duties with which the status is endowed' (Marshall 1950: 28-29, as summarised by Jamieson (Jamieson: 14-15). In a more or less similar way[1] Bruter makes a distinction between the *civic* and *cultural* component of a European political identity. The European *civic identity* of people can be understood as the degree to

which they see themselves as citizens of a European political system, whose rules, laws, and rights have an influence on their daily life, whereas cultural identity refers to citizens' identification with their political system as an institutional frame, that is, their state. Civic identifiers will identify with European integration as a political project whether or not they feel a sense of commonality a priori with the citizens of the European Union. In Bruter's conceptual framework the 'European cultural identity of citizens is best described as individuals' perceptions that fellow Europeans are closer to them than non-Europeans. That means that cultural identity refers to their identification with their political community as a human group, regardless of the nature of the political system.' (Bruter 2003 :155-6).

In our operationalization of citizenship we will try to stay as close as possible to Marshall's definition. In our view the concept of European citizenship implies, first, that European citizens are prepared to accept without exception all citizens of the (enlarged) Union as their fellow citizens, and to accept that all EU citizens are therefore entitled to all rights that come with the citizenship of the Union. Examples of these rights are the rights of free movement and residence, voting rights in municipal elections, diplomatic protection and the right of appeal to EU institutions (art. I-10 draft constitution). The extent to which people in different member states are aware of these rights and their consequences, and their willingness to accept them as applying equally to the citizens of each and every member state, is an indicator of the support for the very idea of European citizenship. A second indicator of European citizenship is that people do *consider* themselves as citizens of the European Union, in addition to, not necessarily instead of, considering themselves as citizens of their country.

As an indicator of the cultural or social component of identity we prefer to use the 'sense of community' as originally developed by Deutsch et al. It is defined as 'a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of 'we-feeling', trust and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and

interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action in accordance with it' (Deutsch et al. 1957; Niedermayer 1995; Scheuer 1995; Sinnott 1995)

Operationalization

In the European Election Study 2004, which was conducted in 24 of the 25 member states[2], we tried to operationalize the three concepts developed above:

- The acceptance of citizens from other EU-countries as fellow European citizens;
- The sense of being a European citizen;
- The sense of (a European) community.

The following set of questions refers to the extent to which people across Europe are willing to accept citizens from other EU countries as fellow European citizens, entitled to all the rights coming with European citizenship, although only Q20 refers to a formally recognised right.

Q19 Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following three statements. When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to [Irish] people over citizens from other EU-member-countries who want to work here.'

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree

Q20 'Citizens from other EU member-countries who live in [Ireland] should be entitled to vote in local elections.'

- strongly agree etc

Q21 'Citizens from other EU member-countries who live in [Ireland] should not be entitled to social security or unemployment benefits.'

- strongly agree etc

Two questions trying to measure respondents' sense of European citizenship were included:

Q23 'Do you ever think of yourself not only as an [Irish] citizen, but also as a citizen of the European Union?'

- often
- sometimes
- never

Q24 'Are you personally proud or not to be a citizen of the European Union? would you say you are…

- very proud
- fairly proud
- not very proud
- not at all proud'

The 'sense of community' as introduced by Deutsch has several components. Because of the limited space in the questionnaire the operationalisation had to be limited to only one of these components, mutual trust. This is an important component as it can be considered as a measurement of European social capital. This aspect of the sense of community is measured by the following question:

Q26 Now I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. Let's start with the Austrians: do you trust them a lot or not very much? And the Belgians?

This question was then repeated for the people of 28 countries in total, including the Bulgarians, the Romanians and the Turks in addition to the people of the 25 member states.

4. Research questions

The basic question we are interested in refers to the mutual relationship between the sense of community and the sense of citizenship, as indicated in figure 1. Does the development of a sense of citizenship depend on the pre-existence of a sense of community, or can it develop despite a lack of a feeling of community and can it in turn be instrumental in the development of feelings of community?

Figure 1: Sense of community and Sense of citizenship



It is obvious of course that if we want to make a serious effort to explain either people's sense of community or their sense of citizenship, or both, a reference to the other variable will not be sufficient. Since we have developed instruments of measurement for both variables at the individual level, we might develop a multivariate model in which both variables figure as the final dependent variables.

However, for several reasons we will not do this, at least not in this paper. First, our main priority in this paper is just developing of an instrument of measurement for both concepts and making a preliminary assessment of their usefulness in empirical research. But more important are methodological considerations. We are interested in the causal sequence of the two variables. At a single point in time we can assess the correlation between them and test

a causal model, but we can never give a definite answer to the question of causality. Even if we would have at our disposal panel data over a longer period of time, the usefulness of those data might be limited. Feelings of citizenship or community are not volatile attitudes, but they can be assumed to belong to the category of basic attitudes that will not easily change during people's lifetime. As far as changes at the level of society as a whole occur, it is more likely that these changes are due to generational replacement. Basic values are developed mainly during people's adolescence and tend to be persistent during their lifetime (see a.o. Inglehart 1977). In order to test to what extent changes at the aggregate level are due to generational replacement rather than a life cycle or a period effect we need cohort analysis on data collected over a longer period of time. For most of the variables involved here such data do not exist.

Therefore, we will limit ourselves to a simple descriptive analysis at the country level in order to get a first impression of the usefulness of the instruments of measurement we presented in the previous section.

5. Citizenship

In section 3 two sets of survey questions on citizenship were introduced, two questions on people's self orientation as a European citizen and three questions on people's recognition of the citizen rights of their fellow European citizens. In order to see to what extent the conceptual difference between these two sets of attitudes corresponds with the way people's attitudes are constrained in reality, we first computed the correlations between these items and then factor analysed them. The results are shown in table 1 and table 2 respectively. We might be satisfied if we were to take into account only the outcome of the factor analysis. This analysis nicely confirms our conceptual distinction. The two self-orientations form a strong first factor whereas the three questions on citizen rights come together in a second factor. However, the mutual correlations between the three items on

citizen rights are disappointing. Pearson correlation coefficients are between .16 and .20. Therefore, although the covariance between the three items might be explained by a common factor, there is not much covariance to begin with. The correlation between the two self-orientations is much higher (.56). Because of the low correlations between the first set of items we will abstain from an attempt to scale them and just present our findings for each item separately.

Table 2: Correlations between items on citizenship

Q17 Employment – priority to citizens of [country]				
Q18 Citizens of EU countries entitled to vote in local elections	-.17			
Q19 Citizens of EU countries entitled to social benefits	.19	-.20		
Q23 Not only [country] citizen, but also European citizen	-.21	.19	-.14	
Q24 Proud of EU citizenship	-.16	.20	-.13	.56
	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q23

All coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 3: Factor analysis of items on citizenship

	Component	
	1	2
q17 Employment - priority to [country] members	-,155	,612
q18 Citizens of EU countries in [resp. country] vote in [resp. country]	,205	-,601
q19 Citizens of EU countries in [resp. country] social benefits of [country]	,036	,768
q23 not only [country] citizen, but also European citizen	,861	-,155
q24 Proud of EU citizenship	,873	-,110

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

In table 4 a preliminary descriptive analysis of the variables on citizenship is presented per country. For this purpose the five variables were dichotomised. Only the pro-European answers are presented. The countries are grouped in order of their admission. A summary measure for each group of countries is added.

Table 4: Attitudes on European citizenship (% pro-European)

Country	European Citizenship				
	Labour market	Elections	Social Benefits	European Citizen	Proud to be European citizen
Belgium	34		43	67	62
France	48	60	34	73	75
Germany	54	60	74	61	54
Italy	31	60	19	78	76
Luxembourg	31	63	18	70	79
Netherlands	28	59	28	49	29
Original six	**38**	**60**	**36**	**66**	**63**
Britain	43	61	45	40	47
Northern Ireland	25	33	57	36	32
Ireland	26	71	39	69	76
Denmark	51	63	38	57	54
1973 enlargement[1]	**40**	**65**	**41**	**55**	**59**
Greece	18	60	32	75	63
Portugal	27	70	31	79	77
Spain	19	74	24	59	77
1980s enlargement	**21**	**68**	**29**	**71**	**72**
Austria	37	62	35	56	41
Finland	20	64	30	66	38
Sweden	30		51		38
1990s enlargement	**29**	**61**	**39**	**61**	**39**
Cyprus	9	46	19	84	77
Czech Republic	9	48	52	46	36
Estonia	16	47	42	46	28
Hungary	5	40	59	24	59
Latvia	11	37	47	42	26
Poland	10	79	29	53	54
Slovakia	8	63	41	51	46
Slovenia	15	55	37	60	46
2004 enlargement	**10**	**52**	**41**	**51**	**47**

[1] Northern Ireland was excluded here because otherwise its weight compared to Britain would have too high.

The percentages in the first column of table 4 leave little doubt about people's attitudes towards a free labour market. In all member states but Germany and Denmark a clear majority is against it; in some countries this

majority is even close to a 100%. There is a clear difference between the older member states in North-western Europe and the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe. All six founding states are among the ten most liberal countries of the enlarged Union. Therefore, it is tempting to attribute this difference to the longer process of socialisation into the idea of a European political community that the people of these countries have been subjected to. However, since Austria, Britain, Denmark and Sweden are also part of this group of ten, this interpretation is disputable. The more positive attitudes in these countries might just as well be due to a longer tradition in liberal democracy with its self-evident value of equality for all citizens. But an equally plausible explanation is that the differences are due to differences in economic development. It is remarkable that despite the fact that 'Polish plumbers' have become proverbial for the fear that after enlargement Western Europe will be flooded by cheap labourers from Central and Eastern Europe, this fear is not reflected in these figures. It is not the people in Western Europe but those in Central and Eastern Europe that are most inclined to reject a free labour market. On average, no more than 10% of the people from these countries are willing to accept this. It is not unlikely that a general feeling of being economically behind Western Europe is responsible for this more negative attitude.

The entitlement of people from other EU countries to national social security and unemployment benefits is very unpopular in all EU countries, in particular in some of the older member states. This is the only question where people from the accession countries are not less European minded than the people from the older member states. Here an interpretation in terms of self-interest seems to be obvious.

Only the right to vote in local elections is accepted by a clear majority of the people across Europe.

The percentage of people who see themselves, at least sometimes, as European citizens in addition to being citizens of their own country is on average above 50%. Also, a majority of the people in just over half of the countries are proud to be a citizen of the European Union. However, on both questions there are huge differences between countries. There is not much of a pattern in the extent to which people across Europe differ in their reaction to either question, at least not if we try to interpret the existing differences in terms of geography or the length of membership of people's home country. In general the people from the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe are less inclined to see themselves as a European citizen or to be proud of being a citizen of the Union than people in the older member states, but this is not a uniform pattern. The differences between some of the founding member states (the Netherlands and Luxembourg for instance) are as large as between any other pair of countries. In particular, the low percentage in the Netherlands on the second question is strikingly low.

6. Trust

As mentioned above, mutual trust is one of the main components of Deutsch his concept of sense of community. A sense of community can exist only if the people of the EU evaluate each other positively, i.e. if they trust each other. An increase in the level of mutual trust over time would indicate a growing sense of community (Niedermayer 1995: 228). Mutual trust was measured repeatedly in Eurobarometer surveys from the 1970s on. From previous analyses of these data two conclusions can be drawn.

First, the mutual trust between the peoples of EU countries increased substantially during the 1970s and 1980s, but fell back somewhat in the early 1990s (Niedermayer 1995; Scheuer 1995). In particular the trust in the people from the countries of the second enlargement (Greece; Portugal and Spain) increased during this period. This might suggest that the establishment of common political institutions does indeed enhance a sense of community

as was suggested by a.o. David Easton. Secondly, previous research makes it highly unlikely that the same level of trust will immediately extend to the people from the 2004 accession countries. In the European Election Study 1994 people from the then 15 member states were asked whether they would welcome each of a number of countries as new member states of the EU. Whereas countries like Switzerland and Norway would have been most welcome, this did not apply to most candidate member states in Central and Eastern Europe, let alone to Turkey. These countries were hardly, or not at all, part of the 'mental map of Europe' of the people of the, then, mostly West-, European Union (Scheuer 1995: 41). Therefore, it is most likely that the recent enlargement will have a negative effect on the sense of community in the European Union as a whole.

Figure 2 Trust in other peoples



In figure 2 (see also table A1 in the appendix) countries are ordered according to the level of trust people across Europe have in the people of these countries. This figure contains one very clear message. The further East we move in Europe, the less peoples are trusted by their fellow Europeans. The left part of the figure is occupied by West-European countries (Swedes, Danes, the Dutch etc). In particular the people from the Nordic countries and the Benelux countries are well trusted. All of them are relatively small

countries. Of the older member states the Italians and British are traditionally the least trusted. With the exception of the Maltese the people of all the new member states are in the right tail of the figure. But the tail of the figure is occupied by the people from the candidate countries: Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. Trust in the people from these countries is very low.

What we are basically interested in is the extent to which there is a sense of community across the several countries of the European Union. Figure 2 gives a clear indication that the recent enlargement might have increased the tensions in the Union by admitting people that are far less trusted than the people from the older member states. Why this is the case is not immediately clear. Is it because their countries have only just entered the Union, is it because of their weak economy or is it for the simple reason that from the perspective of Western Europe they are far(ther) away and unknown? It is all but impossible to disentangle these possible explanations because each of them lead to the same categorization of countries.

The bars in figure 2 refer to the level of trust in the people of a particular country as expressed by *all* the people in the 24 member states in our surveys. What might help to understand these feelings is to see to what extent they are mutual and whether there are sub-communities of countries within the EU the people of which trust each other but not the people from other parts of Europe.

In tables 5 and 6 we have grouped the member states in two different ways. In table 5 this is according to the length of membership; in table 6 it is according to geographic location. Both tables are asymmetric because people in EU countries were asked to what extent they trust the Bulgarians, the Romanians and the Turks, but not the other way around, as no survey was conducted in these three countries. Also, the question was not asked in Britain.

Table 5: Levels of Trust by Admission Year

	Original 6	1973 Enlargement	1980's Enlargement	1990's Enlargement	2004 Enlargement	Bulgaria	Romania	Turkey
Original 6	79,5	72,6	75,0	82,8	51,3	31,4	29,4	23,3
1973 Enlargement	74,5[1]	81,6	68,5	84,7	50,3	38,1	32,1	28,1
1980's Enlargement	66,9	59,1	72,6	68,2	47,8	40,8	33,8	25,4
1990's Enlargement	74,3	76,8	70,3	90,3	56,7	32,2	26,6	28,4
2004 Enlargement	64,6	67,7	60,8	70,0	58,3	40,4	29,9	24,9

[1] The table should be read horizontally. E.g. 74.5 % of the people from the countries that joined the Union in 1973 trust the people from the six original member states.

Table 6: Levels of Trust by Geographic Location

	Original	Nordic	Southern Europe	Central Europe	Baltic States	Islands	Ireland	Austria	Britain	Bulgaria & Romania	Turkey
Original Six	79,5[1]	87,6	75,0	49,3	53,5	53,2	79,9	79,2	51,7	30,4	23,3
Nordic	78,6[2]	95,1	72,3	56,3	55,3	60,1	85,0	87,8	83,4	37,0	30,7
Southern Europe	66,9	70,1	72,6	47,7	44,2	53,3	62,3	64,3	45,2	37,3	25,4
Central Europe	67,3	76,2	67,2	67,9	49,9	55,8	69,1	61,7	64,5	35,5	29,9
Baltic States	61,9	75,5	43,5	48,1	74,2	43,0	73,0	67,3	65,5	35,9	19,5
Islands	49,4	51,6	66,2	36,8	32,8	75,9	40,6	40,0	14,5	29,7	3,7
Ireland	69,1	77,3	63,8	47,4	44,3	53,3	83,3	72,8	52,8	33,7	25,2
Austria	72,0	80,1	69,8	49,5	59,0	59,1	72,5	82,5	57,5	24,6	27,0

[1] This is the average percentage of the trust people from each of the original member states have in the people from each of these same countries, including the people from their own country. Note that the smaller the number of countries in a category is, the heavier the weight of the trust people have in the people of their own country.
[2] The table should be read horizontally. E.g. 78.6% of the people from the Nordic countries trust the people from the six original member states.

Year of admission does not explain very much. If social integration were a consequence of EU membership, of the existence of a European polity, we would expect the highest levels of mutual trust among the people from the six founding member states. This, however, is not the case. Although trust among them is relatively high (80%), it is even lower than the trust people from these countries have in the people from Austria, Finland and Sweden, countries which did not join the Union before the 1990s. Therefore, any attempt to explain these differences in trust in terms of a clear distinction between who belongs and who does not belong to the political community of the EU is bound to fail.

The only indisputable finding is that trust in the people from the 10 new member states is relatively strikingly low. Only the people from the candidate countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, are trusted even less. A remarkable result is that people from the new member states trust the people from the older ones more than they do each other. But, other than the clear difference between the newcomers and the older member states, the length of membership does not explain very much.

In table 6, countries are classified according to their geographic location. The reason to do so is that, as far as mutual trust is based mainly on familiarity and a common culture, geographic vicinity is a proxy for familiarity and a certain commonality of cultural traditions.

We have grouped together the original six, the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland), the Southern European countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain)[3], the new member states in Central Europe, the Baltic States, and the two islands, Cyprus and Malta. Ireland, Austria and Britain were left as separate countries because it was difficult to include them with one of the other groups or with each other. We might consider including Britain and Ireland in one group, but the expectation that the British and Irish would trust each other because of their geographical proximity assumes too much

historical ignorance. The reverse side of the proximity argument is, of course, that neighbouring countries often have a long history of wars. It is obvious indeed that the Irish hardly trust the British[4]. Other than that, geographic proximity seems to breed trust. In particular, the countries in Northern and Western Europe (the original six and the Nordic countries) form a community of countries where mutual trust is very high. The mutual trust between these countries on the one hand and the three Southern European countries that joined the Union in the 1980s and Austria and Ireland on the other hand is somewhat lower, but still clearly on the positive side.

But the relationship between the people of the European Union as it existed before the recent enlargement and the people from the new member states, let alone the people from the three candidate countries, is a totally different story. It is quite obvious that the recent enlargement had an enormous negative effect on the mutual trust of the peoples now constituting the European Union.

7. In conclusion

In this paper we have tried to make a clear conceptual distinction between European citizenship in the sense of a legal construct on the one hand and a sense of European communal identity on the other hand. Next we tried to operationalise both concepts in order to be able to test two rival theories. According to the first theory a sense of European communal identity is a necessary condition for the development of a legitimate European political community. The second theory claims that there is indeed an empirical relationship between these two concepts, but the causal sequence is not necessarily unidirectional. Once a political community is established it can breed a sense of community.

The instruments of measurement we developed for European citizenship turned out to be pretty poor. The mutual correlation between the three items referring to European citizenship rights is very low. Also, only one of them refers to a formally recognised right.

But this is not the only reason why we cannot draw a definitive conclusion about the causal sequence of European citizenship and communal identity. We also would need a longer time period to assess the causal sequence of these two characteristics.

Still, the limited relevant data we were able to present offer little evidence for the hypothesis that formal citizenship breeds communal identity. In Western Europe mutual trust in general is high, but there is no relationship with the length of European Union membership, as one would expect.

Trust in the people of at least some of the accession countries, not to speak of candidate countries like Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, is so low among the citizens of the older member states that one should wonder whether formal citizenship can gradually remedy this serious blow to what at least might have been the beginning of a European community.

The argument in the literature that in European history citizenship in most cases preceded national identity is only party relevant for the development of the European Union. In most of the cases often referred to, citizenship was forced upon the people. This fortunately went out of fashion in Europe. The feasibility of the European Union as a polity strongly depends on the consent of the people. If the Union extends too fast beyond the borders within which its citizens feel more or less comfortable, this is bound to have a negative effect on people's support for the European project. This might be at least part of the explanation for the misgivings that people across Europe apparently have with the development of the Union, as became so obvious in the recent referenda in France and the Netherlands.

Notes

[1] More or less because what Bruter defines as the cultural component of European identity still refers to the *political* community.

[2] Although centrally organised by a group of principal investigators, the surveys in each country were funded and conducted by national study directors. They were: Günther Ogris (Austria), Marc Swyngedouw and Lieven Dewinter (Belgium), James Tilley (Britain) and John Garry (Northern Ireland), Bambos Papageorgiou (Cyprus), Lukas Linek (Czech Republic), Jorgen Goul Andersen (Denmark), Alan Sikk and Vello Pettai (Estonia), Mikko Maatila and Tapio Raunio (Finland), Pascal Perrineau and Bruno Cautres (France), Hermann Schmitt and Andreas Wüst (Germany), Ilias Nikolakopoulos and Eftichia Teperoglou (Greece), Gabor Toka (Hungary), Michael Marsh (Ireland), Renato Mannheimer and Roberto Biorcio (Italy), Ilze Koroleva (Latvia), Algis Krupavicius (Lithuania), Patrick Dumont (Luxembourg), Cees van der Eijk (the Netherlands), Radoslaw Markowski (Poland), Pedro Magalaes (Portugal), Olga Gyrfasova (Slovakia), Niko Tos (Slovenia), Juan Diez Nicolas (Spain), and Sören Holmberg (Sweden). For more information on the specifics of the 2004 surveys, see www.europeanelectionstudies.net.

[3] One might argue that Italy should be included in this group rather than among the original six.

[4] In principle the same argument might be applied to the rest of Europe of course, in particular to Germany and its neighbour countries. However, taking into account that bigger countries in general are less trusted, 60 years of peaceful cooperation in Western Europe had a very positive effect on trust. As figure 2 shows, Germans are pretty well trusted, in particular in Western Europe.

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Appendix A1: Trust in other peoples

Swedes	82.5
Danes	80.1
Dutch	79.2
Finns	77.7
Luxembourgers	77.6
Belgians	73.2
Irish	72.2
Spaniards	72.1
Austria	70.5
Portuguese	69.1
Germans	66.7
French	66.4
Greek	61.3
Maltese	60.8
Italians	60.1
Czechs	58.7
British	57.4
Hungarians	57.1
Latvians	54.1
Estonians	52.7
Lituanians	52.2
Poles	52.1
Slovenes	50.2
Slovaks	48.7
Cypriots	46.9
Bulgarians	36.2
Romanians	29.8
Turks	24.7

Chapter 16

Europe as our new nation: trust and legitimacy in the EU

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Abstract

Citizenship as a set of roles and expectations on a level of individual is in a process of transformation. In a modern view it was attached to a nation state. The question for an empirical research is if the EU as new institutional and political entity resembles the type of emotionally leaden attachment typical for national states, or is the attachment of citizens to it of a more dispersed and unaffected kind. The transformation resembles that of a change in territorial identity in a process of globalisation. Moreover it is interesting to compare the old and new members of EU, and to look at the factors influencing the support to institutions at different levels in a hierarchy. One may contemplate different strategies that actors are choosing fulfilling their interests as members of groups in a political and social spectrum, much of it traversing national state boundaries, but including also national elites' interests, like exit or veto strategies. The topic is important for evaluation of legitimacy of institutions.

Introduction

The relationship between citizens' evaluation of democratic institutions on a national and on a European level has received considerable attention in recent studies. Most of the studies dealt with the impact that evaluation on a national level might have on support for integration, European identity and evaluation of regime performance. A common finding is that correlations are high and positive. Our analysis starts from that perspective. We have set a modest goal of exploring possible factors that might lay behind those correlations in a comparative context. Our emphasis is to put East European new member states on the research agenda. We know from previous studies that national contexts are important in understanding patterns of relations among various levels of explanation (Brinegar and Jolly 2005, etc.).

Initial explanations for the considerable support in some countries for European institutions as compared with national institution starts from perspective that the meaning of what is European is different in contexts where there is no particular political and interests cleavages in relation to European institutions. Italy is quoted as a case in that respect. (M. Koenig-Archibugi). In East European countries European accession and reforms associated with that are often perceived as inevitable. There is basic consensus that it is better than to staying outside, as ideal that brings benefits to all.

Low levels of trust and support for political entities at the national level in Italy is connected with sharp cleavages in historical periods of a process of nation state building (M. Koenig-Archibugi). Again the East European political situation can stay in parallel with the generally low level of trust and support of national institutions, as a consequence of sharp political dissensus about national priorities. Divisions, which are consequences of "ideological wars", make national identity weak (M. Koenig-Archibugi, 86). There is

hope that European influence would enhance better functioning of national institutions.

Support for institutions in societies with long established democratic traditions and in new democracies has different sources and different meaning. Therefore, the relationship between support of national and European institutions can tell us a lot about the formation of attitudes.

Citizens' identity

A concept of national citizens' identity has specific meaning when European level is taken into consideration. There is the thesis of a protest vote or secondary elections, when citizens that are not satisfied with the national government can chose to punish national government by withdrawal of a support for European processes and institutions. The European level is but one additional problem of internal political debate.

The conception of citizens' identity in that context is very much a consequences of negotiations between political actors and interest groups, it represent type of a 'thin' locality on a national and European level. It does not suppose strong connection among members of a group.

Politics at the domestic level is a 'nested game'; here strategies that are suboptimal at one level can be optimal if political outcome at another level is taken into account. (Hix and Goetz 2000:271). Actors may choose to exit the domestic area, or can use veto strategies to promote their cause, or use information advantage to achieve additional benefits in domestic area (Hix and Goetz 2000:271). There is an inherent interplay between the two levels.

Citizens' identity on European level does not resemble that of a nation state; citizenship is separate from national identity. Allegiances that the EU seeks to elicit are of post-national kind (Fossum 2005). The EU is pursuing the

modern idea of statehood, as divorced from nationhood: the polity is not bound by pre-political bonds. (Eriksen and Fossum 2004)). Europe citizens' identity consists of networks independent of national boundaries and as such is not in a conflict with national citizens identification, which itself is in a process of transformation.

What constitute a citizen's identity is a social power as a potential that can be realised by expressing opinions and making judgement about national and European institutions as one of a form of citizens activity. Both positive and negative support of political system shows that kind of identity and belonging. (Franklin and Van der Eijk, 1996).

We can conceive of a theoretical relationship between different types and objects of support to political system and broader identification with the system. This can be conceived more as a latent trait that lies behind various manifest forms of expressing judgements. Among synonyms of political trust or, in parallel to social capital, political capital are also citizenship as well as civic duty, political participation, political interest and knowledge, and so on. It signals a common political identity with fellow citizens (Newton 1999:5)

Explicit symbolic identity with European symbols is not necessary part of a broader citizens' identify formed on a base of democratic character of a system (Bruter, 1149). A definition of citizens' identity remains based on identification with the political system as an institutional framework that supports a base for commonality with other citizens. (Bruter, 1155). In that definition we have explicit mention of a relationship between citizens and an institutional framework. That itself is, on a concrete level, encompassed in relationship to functioning of political institutions. And there is no reference on formation of belonging to a social group (Bruter, 1156).

Connected with the definition of citizens' identity in a context of evaluation of institutions at European level is a question of democratic deficit. The European Union can be conceived as an elitist project without widespread public support (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005). What constitute a debate about democratic deficit is reconsideration of Identity and legitimacy in a European context. (Cerutti, 2003) Citizenship can be made through active searching of post-national identity (Eriksen 2005), a new conceptualization of culture and feelings of belonging, where ambivalence, transition and being more historically informed are some key elements. (Stråth 2002).

Reforms imposed on European level have indirect distributional effects. Many of the reforms are also of common benefit. The enlargement/integration process constrained democratic principles because of its inevitability, speed and requirement for expertise. However, as globalization weakens the overall ability of nation-states to control developments in society, one can talk about a global citizenship (Turner 2002). The new Eastern EU members would hardly have more space for choice in domestic politics if they had stayed outside the EU. (de Vreese, and Boomgaarden 2005)

The European governmental model can be conceived also as a pluralist model (Coultrap, 1999) Institutions that are deemed inefficient in a parliamentary democracy model can be efficient in a pluralist model.

We use two pairs of indicators of trust in political institutions on a national and European level. We want to reveal what is common and what remains specific in attitudes to institution at different levels, while sets of measures are parallel in a form of scales and referents. Attitudes to National and European political representative and executive institutions are used as measures of that broader citizens identity. Correlations between the two levels are a result of congruence of specific and general factors of identity formation.

Explanatory factors

Therefore we use explanatory variables that can shed light on specific components of each of the aspect, national or European. We allow for contextual factors to reinforce the character of that specific background in meaning of each level nationally. We allow exploring domestic politics as explanatory factor in relation to European institutions – and also a reverse effect, European as an explanatory factor in domestic political situation (Hix and Goetz 2000).

The variables that are expected to have more in common with the national institutions are those that are directly related to their evaluation. Trust in national institutions is dependent on institutional performance, both in old members and in new EU members. In post-communists societies there is a situational component more in at front then deeply rooted cultural gained trust in institution (Mishler and Rose (2001; 2005). In evaluation of institutions citizens evaluate the representational capacity of national institutions (Rohrschneider, 2005). We use retrospective and prospective sociotropic economic evaluation and approval of [country] government's record. Attendance at religious services is used as a proxy for the cultural political cleavages that are effective in most of the European countries. These same variables would affect also trust in European political institutions. A simple explanation here would be that those institutions are deemed accountable for what happened in a national frame as well (Gelleny and Anderson, 2000), or a second order elections (Hooghe and Marks 2005; similar to a punishment trap theory (Ray). Cue theory follows the reasoning that national political elites that are strongly divided lead the followers of the parties to express similar opinions (Kitzinger 2003)

Two measures of perceived benefit from the EU societally and individually – EU in the interest of [country] EU in respondent's interest – tap the factors that connect the evaluation of European institutions to national institutions. It

is those two measures that one would expect to see evidence of a transfer of evaluation between European institutions and domestic ones, showing also a degree of interconnectedness of national and European interest. (Franklin and Van der Eijk, 1996; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000)

Three other measures directed to European level show openness and tolerance towards a notion of social welfare and political rights of non-national citizens, where there is possibly a conflictual relationship at national level, on employment - priority to [country] members, citizens of EU countries in [resp. country] vote in [resp. country] and citizens of EU countries in [resp. country] social benefits of [country], and respondent's attitude to European unification (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005, Luedtke 2005). Attachment to a nation is a question of emotional investment and rational expectations. One can preserve emotional investments by taking an inclusive identity, where e.g. ethnic and citizens identity do not overlap. (Kjerm: National Identites….Acta Sociologica 1998)

Anti-immigration attitudes are expected to be more important in old members then in new. Finally, two measures of what we may call European symbolic identity, a non-exclusive national identity and a European national pride: not only [country] citizen, but also European citizen and proud of EU citizenship, are close to a notion of undivided European and national identity(Hooghe and Marks 2005).

Individual political ideology, general political interests, subjective middle and upper class, media exposure, education, and gender and generation cohort are among the remaining variables that are candidates for showing additional meaning of two indices of citizens identity, European and national trust.

Method section: Results

Cross-country variations in levels of trust in institutions at European level are profound already on the level of expressed opinion (Figure 1). Due to a lack of information despite pre-accession media coverage and referendum campaigns, at the very low levels of opinion expression about EU institutions in new member states. This might reflect a notion of inevitability of European frame of living, which is consistent with the democratic deficit thesis that one has no influence and thus no need to act, and which lead to a political alienation, widespread among Eastern European countries, a power potential is also one of the basic prerequisites of citizens identification.

Excluding Slovakia and Cyprus, who are on the borderline, all new member countries citizens trust EU institutions more than national institutions are, (Figure 2). Those join old members Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. Italy is a special case because of its historical process of state building and rather unproblematic pro-European stance. New member states are all exposed to positive expectations from Europe, e.g. have also a positive budget exchange with the EU. On the other side, euro sceptic sentiment gains established position in public debate and in overall count of institutional support in Denmark, Sweden and Great Britain.

Figure 1: No opinion on composite indices of trust in European and National institutions.



Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Northern Ireland (NI), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE),

Do levels of national trust determine levels of EU trust in a country? Having an exclusive national identity would mean that it would suppress EU orientation. What is more common is having inclusive relations with both levels: one normally trust political institutions at both levels or do not trust any of them.

Figure 2: Means on composite indices of trust in European and national institutions



Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Northern Ireland (NI), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE),

This is confirmed also at the individual level correlations among indices of trust. These range from 0.2 to 0.9, with most of them around 0.6. This level of correlation is by most standards confirmation of a suggestion that both indices, at least in a large part, measure the same trait, a general citizens' identity and sense of participation in a common political space. Yet it is a notion of an undivided identity that is more profound in some of the countries than in other. This might show a congruence of effects of factors on both levels or a general congruence of national interest fulfilled also at European level. The remaining specificity of the two levels of citizens evaluations are subject of further inquiry.

Figure 3: Correlations between composite indices of trust in European and national institutions



Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Northern Ireland (NI), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE),

To test some possible explanations of congruence and divergence of two levels of trust in institutions, a set of factors is correlated with both levels and compared side by side in a Table 1. We have selected cases from different locations in previous results but most of East European new member states. Results again reveal a general congruence of indices. Most correlations, irrespective of the fact that some are measuring 'outputs' of institutions on a national level while others on a European level, are of a roughly same size and direction. Literature suggests that this might change after some powerful variables are controlled in a multivariate fashion. The highest correlation with the national institutional trust is government performance, followed by economic considerations and, what confirms a similarity of contents of both variables, indices of European symbolic identity and European interests variables. The exceptions in later indices are Italy and to some extent Denmark, which both show that there is a conflict in perception of national

and European level. This can be explained by the overtly eurosceptic orientation of respective governments. On the other hand these are the countries that show lowest correlations of national performance indicators with the European evaluation, which is a reverse side of a coin just mentioned.

Table 1: Correlations of predictors with national political institutions trust and European political institution trust

Country:	AT		GB		CZ		DK		FI		DE		HU	
Trust/ factors	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eu.	Nat.	Eu.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eu.	Nat.	Eur.
ret_ec	0,19	0,15	0,30	0,24	0,19	0,17	0,27	0,09	0,25	0,20	0,21	0,16	0,35	0,18
pro_ec	0,24	0,21	0,23	0,22	0,29	0,27	0,24	0,12	0,29	0,25	0,29	0,25	0,22	0,06
gov_app	0,38	0,19	0,48	0,30	0,47	0,25	0,39	0,07	0,39	0,28	0,28	0,18	0,40	0,13
rel_at	0,18	0,02	0,08	0,05	0,07	0,00	0,11	0,07	0,13	0,03	0,04	0,03	0,02	0,02
cou_int	0,20	0,36	0,26	0,52	0,28	0,43	0,29	0,53	0,26	0,38	0,30	0,44	0,22	0,31
ind_int	0,22	0,35	0,24	0,51	0,23	0,45	0,28	0,53	0,29	0,43	0,32	0,39	0,21	0,31
empl	0,00	0,12	0,08	0,19	0,03	0,08	-0,02	0,12	0,03	0,06	-0,04	-0,05	-0,04	-0,03
loc_vote	0,08	0,30	0,08	0,24	0,10	0,27	0,05	0,12	0,07	0,16	0,14	0,17	0,14	0,07
soc_ben	0,11	0,14	0,09	0,16	0,09	0,16	-0,02	0,04	0,19	0,16	-0,10	-0,13	0,00	0,04
eu_cit	0,14	0,29	0,18	0,37	0,13	0,32	0,21	0,32	0,23	0,32	0,21	0,23	0,02	0,17
EU_prou	0,19	0,34	0,20	0,44	0,15	0,36	0,24	0,41	0,29	0,40	0,22	0,29	0,22	0,34
far_right	0,03	0,04	-0,03	-0,06	-0,06	-0,03	0,11	0,02	-0,07	-0,07	-0,10	0,05	-0,10	0,02
pol_int	0,13	0,10	0,10	0,05	0,10	0,15	0,15	0,13	0,17	0,11	0,20	0,11	0,02	0,12
mi_clas	0,14	0,17	0,06	0,04	0,10	0,18	0,26	0,20	0,10	0,17	0,07	0,01	0,01	0,04
up_clas	0,14	0,17	0,06	0,04	0,10	0,18	0,26	0,20	0,10	0,17	0,07	0,01	0,01	0,04
watch tv	0,03	0,01	0,09	-0,02	-0,06	-0,03	0,01	-0,05	-0,02	-0,01	0,06	0,00	0,10	0,11
read newspaper	0,03	0,00	0,04	-0,07	-0,04	-0,04	0,16	0,09	0,14	0,07	0,09	0,07	-0,04	0,03
age full-time education	0,11	0,18	0,09	0,15	0,13	0,20	0,14	0,18	0,23	0,20	0,15	0,00	-0,12	-0,02
men	0,02	0,02	0,08	-0,06	-0,06	-0,04	0,12	0,00	0,06	-0,01	-0,02	-0,08	-0,07	-0,02
year of birth	-0,05	0,13	0,03	0,21	0	0,16	0,05	0,21	0,04	0,1	-0,03	-0,04	-0,12	-0,01

Table 1 (continued)

Country:	IT		LV		PL		PT		SK		SI	
Trust/ factors	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eur.
ret_ec	0,27	-0,09	0,19	0,18	0,24	0,27	0,28	0,24	0,25	0,29	0,28	0,25
pro_ec	0,34	-0,05	0,28	0,27	0,21	0,25	0,20	0,14	0,36	0,35	0,30	0,32
gov_app	0,48	-0,01	0,44	0,24	0,37	0,20	0,47	0,40	0,38	0,46	0,46	0,26
rel_at	0,17	0,08	0,10	0,04	0,09	-0,09	0,18	0,09	0,07	0,07	-0,12	-0,03
cou_int	0,08	0,43	0,15	0,32	0,27	0,38	0,33	0,41	0,34	0,36	0,28	0,40
ind_int	0,04	0,40	0,18	0,32	0,26	0,38	0,34	0,42	0,33	0,34	0,27	0,35
empl	-0,02	0,20	-0,04	0,00	0,05	0,06	-0,04	-0,07	0,07	0,08	0,03	-0,04
loc_vote	-0,08	0,17	-0,02	0,04	0,05	0,17	0,11	0,08	0,19	0,22	0,09	0,11
soc_ben	-0,06	0,04	-0,02	0,00	0,14	0,13	-0,05	-0,08	0,16	0,13	0,09	0,11
eu_cit	0,03	0,23	0,22	0,30	0,11	0,22	0,11	0,15	0,27	0,26	0,23	0,33
EU_prou	0,09	0,40	0,14	0,34	0,16	0,35	0,25	0,28	0,38	0,41	0,24	0,38
far_right	0,12	-0,01	-0,03	-0,04	-0,08	-0,05	0,20	0,17	0,09	0,13	0,02	0,15
pol_int	0,03	0,12	0,07	0,11	0,04	0,13	0,16	0,18	0,03	0,06	0,15	0,20
mi_clas	0,04	0,01	0,15	0,15	0,09	0,17	0,09	0,11	0,16	0,20	0,06	0,14
up_clas	0,04	0,01	0,15	0,15	0,09	0,17	0,09	0,11	0,16	0,20	0,06	0,14
watch tv	0,06	0,08	0,03	0,02	-0,05	0,07	0,07	0,05	0,04	0,04	0,11	0,06
read newspaper	0,02	0,01	0,12	0,04	0,04	0,15	-0,04	-0,03	0,08	0,08	0,05	0,03
age full-time education	-0,04	-0,02	0,01	0,05	0,00	0,08	-0,01	0,06	0,16	0,15	0,10	0,07
men	0,00	0,01	-0,04	-0,07	0,00	0,03	-0,03	-0,05	-0,06	-0,06	0,03	0,02
year of birth	-0,08	-0,06	-0,02	0,06	0,09	0,1	-0,1	0,02	0,09	0,08	-0,08	-0,01

Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), Germany (DE), , Hungary (HU), , Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI);

ret_ec - retrospective and pro_ec - prospective sociotropic economic evaluation, gov_app - approval of [country] government's record; rel_at - attendance at religious services; cou_int - eu in the interest of [country]; ind_int - eu in respondent's interest; empl - priority to [country] members, loc_vote - citizens of eu countries in [resp. country] vote in [resp. country], and soc_ben - citizens of eu countries in [resp. country] social benefits of [country]; eu_cit - respondent's attitude to european unification; eu_cit - not only [country] citizen, but also european citizen, and EU_prou - proud of eu citizenship. far_right - Individal political ideology, pol_int - general political interests, mi_clas - subjective middle, and up_clas - upper class, All original non-intervale measurement scales are dichotomised.

New member countries are, as expected, not divided on the issue of limiting access to foreigners to employment and other benefits of nationality.

Table 2: Differences among correlations of predictors with national political institutions trust and European political institution trust

	Country													Avarage	Avarage	
factors	AT	GB	CZ	DK	FI	DE	HU	IT	LV	PL	PT	SK	SI	Total	Old	New
ret_ec	0,04	0,06	0,02	0,18	0,04	0,06	0,17	0,36	0,01	-0,03	0,04	-0,04	0,03	0,07	0,10	0,03
pro_ec	0,03	0,02	0,03	0,12	0,04	0,04	0,15	0,39	0,01	-0,03	0,06	0,02	-0,03	0,06	0,09	0,03
gov_app	0,19	0,17	0,22	0,32	0,11	0,10	0,26	0,50	0,20	0,16	0,07	-0,07	0,20	0,19	0,20	0,17
rel_at	0,17	0,03	0,07	0,04	0,10	0,02	0,00	0,08	0,07	0,18	0,09	0,00	-0,09	0,06	0,09	0,04
cou_int	0,17	0,26	0,16	0,23	0,12	0,14	0,08	0,35	0,17	0,11	0,08	0,02	0,12	0,15	0,19	0,12
ind_int	0,13	0,27	0,22	0,25	0,13	0,07	0,10	0,37	0,15	0,13	0,07	0,00	0,09	0,15	0,18	0,13
empl	0,13	0,11	0,04	0,14	0,03	0,00	0,00	0,22	0,04	0,01	-0,03	0,01	-0,07	0,05	0,09	0,02
loc_vote	0,22	0,16	0,17	0,06	0,09	0,03	-0,07	0,26	0,06	0,12	-0,03	0,02	0,02	0,09	0,13	0,07
soc_ben	0,03	0,07	0,06	0,06	-0,03	-0,03	0,04	0,10	0,02	-0,01	-0,03	-0,03	0,02	0,02	0,03	0,02
eu_cit	0,14	0,19	0,19	0,11	0,10	0,01	0,14	0,20	0,09	0,11	0,04	-0,01	0,10	0,11	0,12	0,11
EU_prou	0,15	0,25	0,20	0,17	0,11	0,07	0,12	0,31	0,20	0,19	0,02	0,03	0,14	0,15	0,15	0,15
far_right	-0,01	0,03	-0,03	0,09	0,00	-0,16	-0,12	0,13	0,01	-0,03	0,03	-0,03	-0,13	-0,02	0,01	-0,05
pol_int	0,03	0,05	-0,05	0,01	0,06	0,09	-0,10	-0,09	-0,04	-0,10	-0,02	-0,03	-0,05	-0,02	0,02	-0,06
mi_clas	-0,03	0,02	-0,08	0,05	-0,07	0,06	-0,03	0,03	0,00	-0,08	-0,02	-0,04	-0,08	-0,02	0,00	-0,05
up_clas	-0,03	0,02	-0,08	0,05	-0,07	0,06	-0,03	0,03	0,00	-0,08	-0,02	-0,04	-0,08	-0,02	0,00	-0,05
watch tv	0,02	0,11	-0,03	0,05	-0,01	0,06	-0,02	-0,02	0,01	-0,13	0,02	0,00	0,04	0,01	0,03	-0,02
read newspaper	0,04	0,11	0,00	0,07	0,07	0,01	-0,07	0,00	0,07	-0,11	0,00	0,00	0,01	0,02	0,04	-0,01
age full-time education	0,07	0,06	0,07	0,04	-0,02	-0,15	0,10	0,02	0,05	0,08	0,07	-0,01	-0,03	0,03	0,02	0,04
men	0,00	0,14	-0,02	0,13	0,07	0,06	-0,05	-0,01	0,03	-0,03	0,02	0,01	0,01	0,03	0,05	-0,01
year of birth	0,17	0,18	0,16	0,16	0,06	-0,02	0,11	0,03	0,07	0,02	0,12	-0,01	0,08	0,09	0,11	0,08
Total	0,08	0,12	0,07	0,12	0,05	0,03	0,04	0,16	0,06	0,02	0,03	-0,01	0,02	0,06	0,08	0,04

Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), Germany (DE), , Hungary (HU), , Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI);

ret_ec - retrospective and pro_ec - prospective sociotropic economic evaluation, gov_app - approval of [country] government's record; rel_at - attendance at religious services; cou_int - eu in the interest of [country]; ind_int - eu in respondent's interest; empl - priority to [country] members, loc_vote - citizens of eu countries in [resp. country] vote in [resp. country], and soc_ben - citizens of eu countries in [resp. country] social benefits of [country]; eu_cit - respondent's attitude to european unification; eu_cit - not only [country] citizen, but also european citizen, and EU_prou - proud of eu citizenship. far_right - Individal political ideology, pol_int - general political interests, mi_clas - subjective middle, and up_clas - upper class, All original non-intervale measurement scales are dichotomised.

Table 2 shows the same results in terms of differences between correlations between parallel institutions and respective predictors. Positive differences show a dominance of a national character. Citizens of new countries can more easily make the jump in understanding of their self in terms of abstract European and national citizens. This, however, might be a process of cognitive opinion formation based on most salient information which one

have, and not an indication of discernment of the subtleties of differences between institutions on different levels.

The extremes of correlations between two trust indices in Figure 3 are matched well in a tendency of parallel correlations with predictors. Where there is a divergent pattern of correlations with predictors, this might explain a weaker correlation among indictors of trust, as in the case of Italy, Denmark, Austria and Great Britain. And a convergent pattern might be a common source of covariation, as it is in Finland and Portugal. New member states have on average more congruent patterns of predictors.

Conclusions

In this preliminary analysis we followed a logic that citizens identity can be conceptualised as based on simultaneity of judgement about institutions in political soundings at different levels. Both national state level citizenship and European level citizenship influence one another in actors' strategies to seek gains and influence in on one or another level.

A positive message of a story for new eastern European members is that, despite internal difficulties in reaching a consolidated democracy with certain above minimum level of trust in national institutions, citizens in those countries did not project the same criticism onto European level. There is a broad consensus that EU common future is inevitable and, overall, good.

A general conclusion is that situational factors, some deeply routed in a country's historic tradition, as is case with the eurosceptic attitude in Great Britain, some probably also accounted for by the composition of current government coalitions, underlie the correlation of two measures of trust.

What remains to be checked is to reveal are some possible interaction effects between types of trust in different levels, like inclusive, exclusive and

cosmopolitan identities, in relation to underlying factors. A multivariate model also remains to be tested.

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Chapter 17

Dynamics in European Political Identity

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1. Introduction

This paper deals with one core question: whether and to what degree the citizens of the European Union share a common political identity, and if so, what the most recent wave of enlargement of the EU has done to it.1 The existence of a collective identity is generally seen as one of the central preconditions for EU democracy (e.g. Scharpf 1999). A collective political identity constitutes a political community. The idea of a political community, in turn, is intimately linked with the concept of citizenship. The creation of a citizenry, i. e. the codification of the rights and duties of individual citizens, was a core element of the process of nation-building (Kuhnle 1993). This citizenry, at the same time, is the source of authority of any democratic government: the principle of democracy requires that powers and executive competencies must originate in, and be justified by, the citizens subjected to them.

European integration started out as an alliance of nation-states. It concerned first and foremost economic issues. Economic integration reached a peak with the realization of the Single European Market when member-states transferred important policy-making competencies to the European Community. The Maastricht Treaty, which codifies this transfer of competencies, is actually said to have shifted the balance of European Union

government from a formerly predominantly intergovernmental to a now mainly supranational mode. In policy areas where intergovernmental decision-making was replaced by supranational decision-making, the position of the European Parliament as the representative body of EU citizens has been strengthened.

The increasing role of supranational, as opposed to intergovernmental, decision-making and the establishment of a European citizenship might have promoted the development of a political community of the European Union. But the growing together of a political community depends at least as much on people's self-perception and identification as on the provision of rights of citizenship or on predominant modes of government. Therefore, the central question of this paper can be reformulated as follows: do EU citizens identify themselves as such? Do they perceive their fellow EU citizens to be alike? Have European citizens developed a 'sense of community' that unites old and new members alike?

2. The common European heritage

History has shown that the emergence of a sense of belonging and community and related attitudes such as perceptions of identity and solidarity takes a long time. Compared to the time that nation-states took to consolidate, the history of European integration is still rather short. Feelings of identity and solidarity can hardly have fully developed during these brief periods of history. But, of course, centuries of common European history elapsed before European integration began. Are there traditions in European history upon which perceptions of a political community could be based? Is there a European tradition of unity? Is there something like a historical European identity?

The tradition of the Greek *polis* and the Roman Empire influenced in similar ways the development of institutions in the legal system, the armed forces,

and the administration of European nation-states. Later, family relationships of the nobility and aristocracy created alliances above and independent of national borders. The Catholic Church established Latin as a universal language, created a continent-wide network of monasteries, and founded the first universities. All over Europe, the same sequence of reference cultures came into force: first Greek and Roman, then (during the Renaissance) Italian, and German and Austrian during the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Likewise, Europeans used to refer to common cultural achievements (literature, music, architecture) and to common European symbols: Roman monuments, the victory over Islam, the Crusades, the French Revolution (Pfetsch 1997: 104–5). Last but not least, Europeans consider themselves to be a community of values and ideas. The idea of liberty, of democracy, of the modern nation-state, individualism, human rights, freedom of speech, rationality, the political republic, and the separation of Church and State—all this is considered to be genuinely 'European' (Mintzel 1997: 325–6). However, these characteristics have become central elements of a world-wide political culture and are no longer distinctly European. As a result, they probably cannot provide much cement for a European political community because the existence of distinctive properties is a central prerequisite for the evolution of any community and common identity (Lübbe 1994: 111).

3. Sources of conflicts and diversity

Europe is not characterized only by its common heritage. There is as much diversity and conflict as there are common roots. Three religious cleavages are at the basis of distinct socio-cultural areas on the European continent: the division between Latin and Orthodox Christianity, that between the Christian and the Islamic world, and finally the division between Catholics and Protestants. In addition, Europe exhibits a great variety of languages which has become even more distinctive with the development of the nation-states in the nineteenth century. It is against this background that some think of

Europe as a huge 'multicultural society' composed of a variety of religious, national, and regional cultures (Mintzel 1997: 332–6).

European diversity, of course, also has political aspects. Starting with the break-up of the empire of Charlemagne, Europe's history has consisted of divisions and violent conflicts. Throughout, fellow Europeans have waged wars in changing coalitions on the European continent. Examples are the Hundred Years' War between France and England; the rivalry between France and Habsburg with Spain, The Netherlands, and Austria about European prevalence; the bitter confessional wars between Catholics and Protestants preceding the Pax Westfalica; the Holy Alliance of Restoration against the Revolutionists in the nineteenth century; the Entente Cordiale against the European middle states in the First World War; the German–Italian axis against most of the rest of Europe in the Second World War; and the 'cold war' between Western democracies and the communist bloc after 1947 (Pfetsch 1997: 102–3).

4. A European political community?

This short review of the history of Europe suggests that the traditions of diversity, division, and conflict are at least as strong as the common cultural heritage. This history of diversity has not necessarily inhibited the evolution of a European political community. However, the sheer existence of nation-states based on a century of cultural and political autonomy constitutes an obvious obstacle. First of all, these nation-states are linguistic communities which guarantee the communicative competence of every citizen.2 European Union citizens, by contrast, are confronted with an immense linguistic variety. As a result of this apparent Babel, a European public has not yet really emerged, more or less segmented national publics are perpetuated, and there is very little communication that covers the whole EU. Moreover, a genuine EU system of opinion formation and interest intermediation has not yet fully developed (e.g. Schmitt 2005). As a result, processes of legitimizing

EU government still depend on the effectiveness of the respective national (sub-) systems. This might suggest that objective conditions for the development of a European political community have been fulfilled only to a small degree.

However, there are other factors that might have promoted the development of a European political community. Not least among them is the obvious economic success of the process of European integration. Also, the greater permeability of national borders after the agreement of Schengen as well as the ever-increasing frequency of contacts between European citizens as a result of progressing economic integration might have promoted perceptions of community and mutual solidarity among EU citizens.

The prime purpose of this paper is to determine the degree to which the European Union has developed into a political community. After this brief review of objective conditions, we will now turn to both a more subjective and empirical view. According to Easton (1965: 177), a political community exists when members show some readiness or ability to work together to resolve their political problems. That a European political community in such terms exists is unquestionable, but we are interested in knowing whether European citizens, during almost half a century of European integration, have developed a European 'sense of community'. The existence of a political community does not necessarily require that its members are aware of it — i. e., the prior existence of a sense of community. However, the more strongly developed is such a sense of community, the greater are the system's stress-reducing capabilities (Lindberg 1967).

This concept *sense of community* was first introduced by Karl Deutsch. He defines it as 'a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of "we-feeling", trust and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of co-operative action in accordance with it' (Deutsch et al. 1957: 36). Easton

(1979) follows Deutsch in his conceptualisation of the 'sense of *social* community'; in his view, cohesion emerges between people regardless of the type of political regime they live in. He therefore distinguishes this 'sense of *social* community' from a more specific 'sense of *political* community'. In his typology of political support, the latter represents the highest (i. e. the most basic and enduring) category of diffuse support for the political system.

Our empirical investigation of the sense of a European community distinguishes two basic dimensions. *Identification* refers to the citizens themselves: do they consider themselves as European citizens and are they proud to be European? *We-feeling* refers to fellow citizens: do European citizens consider their fellow Europeans to be as trustworthy as their countrymen? Figure 1 illustrates this conceptualization and specifies the operationalization strategy pursued in this chapter.

Figure 1: Concepts, indicators, and data sources



These notions of *identification* and *we-feeling* are compatible with modern theories of inter group relations. Their starting point is the distinction between in-groups and out-groups. Minimal differentiation is sufficient to

give rise to an in-group/out-group distinction. This is reinforced by overstating intra group similarity and out-group differences. In-group membership is an important factor in the formation of personal identity. In-group–out-group relations are driven by social processes of categorization, comparison, competition, and conflict. As a result of these dynamics, perceptions of in-groups are biased toward homogeneity, and the attitudes towards out-groups and their members are characterized by stereotyping and hostility.

In this view, the evolution of a sense of community among EU citizens is the result of in-group formation. Shortly after World War II, inter group conflict between European societies was still extremely high. One of the central aims of the founding fathers of the European Union was to reduce this conflict and overcome the hostility between European societies by creating a new, superior in-group that would lead eventually to the development of European identification and we-feeling. This chapter aims at measuring the success of European in-group formation after half a century of economic and political integration, and after four successive waves of enlargement. The data that are used for this purpose are from the European Election Study 2004 plus selected Eurobarometer trends. The indicators are discussed one by one, in the sequence suggested by the analytical scheme above.

4.1. Identification

The aim of this section is to monitor the evolution of European identification. First, mass perceptions of European citizenship are tracked over a period of twelve years (1992 to 2004). Secondly, the pride in being European is compared.

Perceived citizenship

Eurobarometer have used two different instruments for the analysis of European identifications. The first was fielded eleven times between 1982–1992, and is repeated in the European Election Study 2004. This question

asks whether people, in addition to their national citizenship, also consider themselves as European citizens.3 The second instrument started a new Eurobarometer time series in 1992 when the first was discontinued. In 18 surveys between 1992 and 2004, people were asked to think about their future political identification.4 The two measures are not strictly comparable. In this paper, we concentrate our analyses on the second because it offers the longer time series.

Detailed results are documented in Table A1. These figures report, country by country, proportions of respondents who think of themselves as European citizens. Here, we concentrate on average proportions for five country groups—the original six plus the countries of the four successive expansions (see Figure 2). This presentation of the data follows the expectation that duration of membership has a positive impact on identification levels: the longer a member, the higher the identification. We expect to find a pattern similar to the one identified for the development of general EU support (see e. g. Schmitt and Treiber-Reif 1990; Dalton and Eichenberg 1991, 1992; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Bosh and Newton 1995). This expectation, however, is not fully borne out by the data. While citizens in the original six member countries are consistently the most "European", the first and oldest expansion (adding the UK, Ireland, and Denmark to the Community) brought in more Euro-distant publics. Contrary to this, the second expansion (adding Spain, Portugal, and Greece) integrated distinctly pro-European publics; these citizens consider themselves almost as "European" as those in the founding member-countries. The third expansion of the Union (adding Austria, Sweden and Finland) is somewhere in between: fewer "European self-perceptions" than in southern Europe, but more than in Britain, Ireland and Denmark. The latest and largest expansion of the Union — adding in 2004 eight post-communist countries of central and eastern Europe plus Cyprus and Malta — brought in surprisingly European-minded citizens: One in every two citizens of the youngest member-countries thinks of herself as a European citizen.

Figure 2: Those who think of themselves as European citizens (percent "only European", "European and national" & "national and European")



Source: Table A1.

The duration argument also implies that European identification should more or less steadily grow over time. This expectation is again not fully in accordance with empirical evidence. The general pattern is not one of linear trends. Rather, we observe fluctuations that affect the different publics in more or less the same way. Tentative explanations for these ups and downs refer to two factors: first, the change in basic economic conditions (recession), social welfare (cutbacks), and security (dissolution of the communist bloc and war in former Yugoslavia) and, second, the increasing importance of EU policy-making for everyday life (Niedermayer 1997). In addition, in the early Nineties, the debate on European Monetary Union in particular may have depressed European identifications (Lilli 1998). While these irritations were quickly overcome in most of the Union, they lasted much longer in the UK, Ireland and Denmark.

Pride in being a European Citizen

Pride in being European is another indicator of European identification.5 When we test the dimensionality of European pride and self-perceptions as a European citizen, we find that both attitudes indeed originate in the same latent attitudinal construct (Table 1). This is so everywhere, though in some countries it is somewhat more pronounced (e.g. in the Netherlands) than it is in others (e.g. in Greece).

Table 1: Mokken scaling of European pride and identifications as a European citizen

	H-value
Netherlands	.77
Finland	.76
Northern Ireland	.74
Cyprus	.69
Estonia	.69
Italy	.66
Latvia	.66
Czech Republic	.65
Austria	.64
Slovakia	.64
Ireland	.60
Belgium	.58
Britain	.53
Denmark	.53
Hungary	.52
Slovenia	.52
Poland	.49
France	.46
Luxembourg	.46
Portugal	.46
Germany	.43
Spain	.42
Greece	.41

Source: EES 2004. Mokken scaling tests for the unidimensionality of a set of items. A H-value > .30 indicates a weak scale, > .40 a medium scale and > .50 a strong scale.

This is not to say that the two indicators are equally distributed if it comes to country patterns (Table 2). Other things being equal, southerners seem to be prouder than citizens in the northern member countries. To be sure, geographical location provides a poor explanation for political attitudes. Whether this "southern" pattern has to do with economic factors (the South is a major receiver of transfers from the structural fund) or with cultural factors ("Latin Europeans" are arguably more expressive than others if it comes to

emotions like pride) cannot be answered at this point. In addition to geography, the duration of membership seems matter somewhat more here, with younger non-southern member-countries' citizens being less proud than others.

Table 2: Pride to be a Citizen of the European Union (percent 'very proud' or 'fairly proud')

	EES2004	Flash 1995	2004-1995
Luxembourg	76	70	6
Ireland	74	64	10
Portugal	74	64	10
Cyprus	74		
France	73	65	8
Spain	67	66	1
Italy	64	80	-16
Greece	61	47	14
Belgium	60	60	0
Hungary	52		
Germany	49	42	7
Poland	46		
Britain	43		
Denmark	43	49	-6
Slovenia	42		
Austria	40	46	-6
Slovakia	37		
Finland	37	41	-4
Northern Ireland	31		
Czech Republic	29		
Netherlands	26	45	-19
Estonia	25		
Latvia	24		
Sweden	23	37	-14

Source: EES 2004 and Eurobarometer Flash 47 (1995), weighted data.

If we move on to dynamics, we see signs of a growing gap between proud and non-proud national publics over the last decade. In 2004, we find an even spread of between three quarters and one quarter of our respondents being proud of their European citizenship, both in old and new member countries. Significant decreases are notable in the Netherlands (-19), Italy (-16) and Sweden (-14), the steepest increases are diagnosed for Greece (+14), Portugal (+10) and Ireland (+10).

4.2. We-feelings

Our operational definition of 'sense of community' distinguishes two dimensions: identification and we-feelings. In this section, we turn to the second and investigate whether EU citizens trust their fellow Europeans. Mutual trust is a fundamental condition for the development of a sense of community. It is expected to grow with growing experiences of positive conduct of fellow citizens. So, here again, duration of membership should play an important role. Moreover, the existence of a common enemy is a factor potentially contributing to the development of a sense of community. For most of the post-war period, the communist threat was an external reference point that might have fostered perceptions of a common bond amongst the people of the European Union. Actually, since the collapse of the Soviet Empire, observers had been complaining about the return of nationalism, and fears had grown that the community may fall apart without the Eastern threat. This did not happen, however, as we now know. Rather, the European Union was able to integrate a major part of the former communist bloc. How successful this integration was in terms of we-feelings remains to be seen.

Trust in people of various countries has been measured repeatedly in Eurobarometer surveys between 1970 and 1994 using a four-point scale.6 As the list of member- and candidate-countries became longer, another instrument with a dichotomous answering scale proved to be more suitable.7 Earlier work on mutual trust has shown that trust between EU member-countries is generally higher than between members and non-members, and that mutual trust between the EU member-countries is growing over time (Niedermayer 1995). We rely on the question with the dichotomous answering scale and analyse for every country how much its peoples are trusted by people from the other member-countries. First descriptive results are in Table 3.

Table 3: Mutual Trust (figures are percent)

	2004 EU25	2004 EU15	1995 EU15	Diff EU15 2004-1995
Swedes	83*	86	84	2
Danish	79	82	81	1
Finns	79	81	81	1
Luxembourgers	78	82	84	-2
Dutch	78	81	80	1
Spaniards	77	80	71	9
Belgians	75	78	82	-4
Portuguese	73	76	68	9
Germans	71	73	65	8
Austrians	70	73	75	-1
French	67	70	63	7
Irish	66	73	71	1
Italians	66	68	61	7
Greeks	66	66	62	4
Maltese	59	61		
Hungarians	59	59	56	3
Czech	56	55	50	6
Estonians	51	53		
British	51	50	66	-15
Latvians	50	52		
Cypriots	50	48		
Lithuanians	49	50		
Poles	47	48	46	2
Slovenes	47	46		
Slovacs	46	44		
Bulgarian	35	35		
Romanian	28	29		
Turks	26	26		

Source: Eurobarometer 45 (1995) and European Election Study 2004; trend distributions based on weighted data. Note that this question was not asked in the Belgian, British, Lithuanian, Maltese and Swedish survey of the EES 2004. * Read: in 2004, 83 percent of all non-Swedish EU25 citizens considered the Swedes to be trustworthy.

In 2004, the people from all but one of the 'old' member-countries are trusted by a two-third majority of fellow Europeans. Only the British miss this threshold. They are down at 51 percent and have actually lost 15 percentage points of trust over the past decade.8 Considering the rather stable levels of trust (compared to the rather volatile pride figures in Table 2, for example), this is a major drop indeed. What could have caused such a dramatic downfall? The only likely reason we can think of is the role that the UK played and continues to play in the Iraq war. It seems that the close alliance of the British with the Americans in this case has severely damaged the trust they can rely on among their fellow Europeans.

The other major finding with regard to the level of trust among EU citizens is that there are indeed three classes of countries—old members, new members, and present candidate countries, with old members enjoying highest trust, new members somewhat less trust, and candidate countries only little trust. With the exception of the case of Britain, these three classes are accurately sorted one after the other. We also note that it does not make much of a difference for the levels of trust whether we analyse opinions of citizens in the old EU15 or include the samples from the new member countries.

Another way of analysing these data is to identify the dimensionality of mutual trust among EU citizens. The question we are asking, in other words, is: what are the stereotypes in peoples' minds that guide them in deciding whether they do or don't trust the British, the Greeks, the Poles, etc. This perspective helps us identify the mental map of European citizens. It is based on a pooled confirmatory factor analysis of the EES 2004 data sets. As in our previous analysis, the country list that was presented to the interviewees included the members of EU25 plus the current candidate countries Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. In a few surveys, additional stimuli were asked — like Norway, Switzerland, etc. — but these are not considered in our dimensional analysis. The results of this final analytical step are presented in Figure 3.

This figure identifies in bold lines the mental map of mutual trust among Europeans. European Union citizens look at people significantly differently depending on whether they are from Northern Europe, Southern Europe, or Eastern Europe. In the latter category, there are a few sub-categories that deserve a mention: people from Cyprus and Malta are judged very similarly, as are people from the two states former Czechoslovakia plus Slovenia, the three Baltic states and from the not-yet member-countries Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. This rather parsimonious structure fits the data quite well as is indicated by a GFI value of over .9.

Figure 3: Dimensions of Mutual Trust Among Europeans (results from a confirmatory factor analysis)



GFI (Generalised Fit Index) = .926

5. Summary

Over the past centuries, the common cultural and political roots of the people of Europe could seldom prevent long-standing hostilities from erupting violently. It was only after World War II that political elites started to initiate the process of European integration, which deliberately aimed at creating a common framework of social and political identifications. The political–

institutional success of these efforts is obvious, but how about its social basis? Have the people of Europe grown together into a political community; is there a 'sense of community' among EU citizens?

The general answer is yes. Over half a century after World War II, a majority of EU citizens identifies with the new political community European Union.

Lacking pertinent and comparable survey information for most of this 50-year period, we cannot determine when and how these identifications came into being. However, based on our findings from the analysis of available data, we must assume that they have been growing slowly. Over the last decade or so, there was not much of a secular change in European identifications; seasonal effects prevailed. Would we draw a map of European Union identification in the early 2000s a centre–periphery picture would come to the fore. The highest level of identification exists in the six original member-countries, closely followed by European South; the farther away from this core of the Union one gets in geographical and/or temporal terms, the weaker identification becomes.

Majorities of EU citizens trust the people of other member-countries.9 The people of the new member countries in central and eastern Europe, however, are somewhat less trusted, and those from the candidate countries Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey are trusted least.

Not only do majorities of citizens identify with the Union and trust their fellow Europeans; they also have a rather clear-cut mental map of the Union, a shared understanding of who is alike and who is different. Most different are the new Eastern member-countries; it will take a while for them to be fully integrated and accepted. An additional but somewhat minor difference is commonly seen between people from the North and the South of Europe.

Notes

1. This is an updated and revised version of a chapter that was originally published by the first author in Schmitt & Thomassen (1999).
2. This is not to say that states must be linguistically homogeneous; Belgium and Switzerland are obvious examples of nation-states that are not. However, in order to meet democratic requirements, every citizen must be able to communicate with state authorities in his or her own language (BVG 1993: 438). This implies that in places there is more than one official language (such as three in Belgium and four in Switzerland).
3. 'Do you ever think of yourself not only as a [nationality] citizen but also as a citizen of Europe? (1) often, (2) sometimes, (3) never.'
4. 'In the near future do you see yourself as (1) [nationality] only, (2) [nationality] and European, (3) European and [nationality] or (4) European only?'
5. The relevant question wording is: 'European Union Member States are "European Citizens". Are you personally proud or not to be a "European Citizen"? Would you say that you are (1) very proud, (2) fairly proud, (3) not very proud or (4) not at all proud?'
6. The following question was asked: 'I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have (1) a lot of trust, (2) some trust, (3) not very much trust, or (4) no trust at all.'
7. The following question was asked: 'Now I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. Can you please tell me for each, whether you have a lot of trust of them or not very much trust. If you do not know a country well enough, just say so and I will go on to the next. How about the Austrians: do have a lot of trust of them or not very much trust? …'
8 In order to avoid distortion through composition effects, over-time changes are calculated on the basis of EU 15 countries only.
9.

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Appendix

Table A1: Those who consider themselves as European citizens ('only European', 'European and national' and 'national and European')

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Belgium	58	65	66	61	50	47	53	56	56	52	62	54	62
France	67	65	75	68	63	64	64	59	62	63	65	63	68
Germany	55	54	66	60	47	48	49	49	54	57	60	61	61
Italy	69	70	71	73	62	63	68	71	73	66	77	72	65
Luxembourg	69	63	76	75	71	73	67	72	73	75	74	74	66
Netherland	56	59	65	60	57	57	57	56	57	54	58	54	59
Denmark	51	50	51	46	42	44	49	44	47	59	62	62	58
United Kingdom	43	37	48	42	37	38	35	30	31	28	34	33	38
Ireland	46	49	58	53	47	47	45	44	47	43	53	47	53
Greece	60	56	54	47	38	46	46	40	44	41	49	48	43
Spain	60	55	61	55	54	52	60	63	70	59	67	65	61
Portugal	58	52	55	53	46	39	37	47	48	47	53	49	51
Austria				46	44		47	51	48	52	55	48	51
Finland			59	47	40		45	38	41	40	44	42	42
Sweden				38	34		39	37	40	48	47	47	46
Cyprus (South)													69
Malta													66
Poland													54
Czech republic													42
Slovakia													61
Hungaria													35
Slovenia													55
Estonia													54
Latvia													51
Lithuania													43
Bulgaria													54
Romania													53
Turkey													28
Cyprus (North)													48
Croatia													63
Original 6	*62*	*62*	*69*	*65*	*56*	*57*	*59*	*58*	*62*	*61*	*66*	*64*	*64*
1st extension	*44*	*39*	*49*	*43*	*38*	*39*	*37*	*32*	*33*	*31*	*37*	*36*	*41*
2nd extension	*60*	*55*	*59*	*53*	*50*	*49*	*53*	*56*	*61*	*54*	*62*	*59*	*56*
3rd extension				*43*	*39*		*43*	*42*	*44*	*47*	*49*	*47*	*47*
4th extension													*50*

Source: Eurobarometers, figures based on weighted data (national weight for country figures, EU-weight for country groups).

Chapter 18

The Democracy Deficit and the Enlarged European Union

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Introduction

In 2004, the European Union (EU) was enlarged to include several countries of East Central Europe. A timely expansion as older member countries were starting to show signs that this ongoing endeavor might be reaching a critical period. More widespread in the West was the popular perception that the EU was becoming a decreasingly transparent and less democratic elite playground. Therefore the recent integration of the new member states provided a moment of anticipation, possibly renewing hope in the future of the EU. Therefore, we ask: do citizens of these newest member states feel represented by the EU? And are citizens' evaluations of the representative capacity of the EU determined similarly as in the West? These are the questions this paper attempts to answer.

Theoretically, this paper examines whether theories developed in the context of Western Europe can be transferred to the new democracies. Citizens' support for the EU and integration has been understood in largely economic terms (Gabel 1998) as individuals base their attitudes on the output of institutions. That is, individuals' evaluations of their personal economic well-being and/or national economic performance shape their support for the regime. However, for the newer members, previous research on democratic

transitions has further suggested that the citizens of this region also integrate perceptions of institutions' "democracy-ness", or quality of representation, into their assessments. (Mishler and Rose 2001). Rather than these two evaluative heuristics being mutually exclusive, we argue that in fact they play a symbiotic role in determining citizens' assessments of the EU. In order to further our understanding of EU attitudes, we provide empirical evidence that individuals evaluate the representational capacity of the EU on two criteria. The first, we argue, takes into consideration the output or economic capacity of the regime and the second stresses the procedural or political integrity of the regime. These criteria are not independent but move together. When economics is the primary integration concern, individuals not base their evaluations on economic criteria. As economic integration is overshadowed by issues of political integration, not only do individuals shift the basis of their evaluative criteria from economics to politics. We will develop these implications of this change for the unified Europe.

Two Dimensions of Political Representation

How do citizens evaluate regimes? Any discussion of the democracy deficit must consider the criteria which citizens use when they evaluate institutions. The literature on democratic transitions provides several criteria. Our premise here is that the EU represents yet another (democratic) transition for East Central European citizens; and it constitutes a first transition for most West European publics, particularly outside of southern Europe. Although some dispute that there is a democracy deficit in the European Union (Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002), most would agree with the proposition that citizens' views about the EU-wide representation process are important for our understanding of the evolving EU (Dahl 1994; Scharpf 1999; Schmitter 2000). We therefore suggest that the transition literature may have something to tell us about how citizens of the European Union evaluate the development of new, Europe-wide institutions.

An important insight of the democratic transition literature is that citizens not only use economic criteria when thinking about a new regime, but also evaluate institutions on the basis of their political performance (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Mishler and Rose 1997; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999). Therefore, the first simple lesson we might draw in understanding how individuals' perceptions of the EU are shaped includes assessing not only economic but political determinants as well

Figure 1 provides the basic summary of how citizens evaluate the EU in the context of the EU's democracy deficit (Rohrschneider 2002). We argue that citizens evaluate the representational capacity of a regime on the basis of two basic mechanisms: one that stresses the output capacity of regimes; another one that stresses the procedural integrity of a regime; that is explicit economic and political criteria, respectively.

Figure 1: The Conceptual Categories



The distinction between these presentational dimensions is based on Robert Dahl's insightful discussion of these representation components. Dahl argues that representation means, substantively, that citizens must get what they want some of the time, though not necessarily all the time. As he notes: a "democratic government provides an orderly and peaceful process by means of which a majority of citizens can induce the government to do what they most want it to do and to avoid doing what they most want it not to do" (1989: p. 95). Although citizens rarely obtain every valued good all the time,

they would be unlikely to support a system that never delivers goods they prefer. The substantive dimension of representation underlies most empirical representation studies, such as analyses of the congruence between public and elites' views on various issues, both in the context of nation-states (Dalton 1985) and the EU (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999).

In addition to the substantive dimension, however, the concept of representation contains a procedural component. "Fairness need not require equality in allocation," Robert Dahl writes. Rather, fairness in a representative democracy requires "that each person should receive an …equal chance to gain the scarce item" (Dahl 1989). If citizens' interests receive a fair expression within policy-making institutions without becoming public policy, citizens may still conclude that their interests are adequately represented. The procedural dimension is especially important in light of the fact that individuals rarely obtain everything they value—what counts, to a considerable degree, is the belief that institutions provide a proper articulation of individuals' interests.

This distinction is important because most citizens in Europe's parliamentary regimes experience its capacity through the fairness of output institutions (Rohrschneider 2005). Consider that most people in advanced industrialized democracies experience a country's institutions through their contacts with courts and bureaucracies. Given the limited number of times that citizens actually vote or contact politicians, their contacts with the output institutions of a regime during ordinary transactions between citizens and the state constitute a major source of information about the fairness of a regime. When these *arbitrating institutions* are impartial, and they evenhandedly consider the concerns of citizens, citizens obtain valuable information about how well a regime works. Consequently when arbitrating institutions work well, citizens in advanced industrialized democracies are more likely to believe that politicians are doing a good job, or that representative institutions generally function properly than when arbitrating institutions do

not function well. In short, citizens rely on more than economic affluence when evaluating the extent to which a regime represents their interests, although that is certainly something that most citizens do take into account. In short, citizens' support for institutions is higher when arbitrating institutions function well.

Representation and the European Union

The recognition of these two elements of political representation, and the fact that they influence how citizens perceive the political process, is the starting point for our discussion of how Eastern and Western Europeans might perceive the democracy deficit. Let us start with what we know about how West Europeans evaluate the EU. A range of studies argue that citizens take economic conditions into account when evaluating the EU. Those who were optimistic about their personal economic situation, or the national economy, both in the past and future, were more likely to support the European Union (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998). And citizens who expected to do worse economically in the near future or had done so in the past usually were less supportive of the integration project. These patterns provide strong support for the idea that citizens evaluate the European Union in part based on the perceived economic performance. In the language of representation research, these studies focus mostly on the output capacity of the European Union.

More recently, however, some analysts began to suggest that citizens do not just generalize the national performance of the economy to the integrated market, but that they actually compare the quality of domestic institutions with those at the supranational level. Thus, if citizens live in countries with well-functioning institutions, they are less supportive of the EU as they use national institutions as a comparative metric to assess the institutions of the EU. Some maintain that the effect is direct (Sanches-Cuenca 2000); others argue that the effect is more indirect via perceptions of the democracy deficit

(Rohrschneider 2002). Both, however, agree that citizens do take into account the political performance dimension of the European Union when forming an opinion about it, just as the democratic transition literature proposed.

This argument about taking the domestic institutional environment into account is plausible. However, it is based on two implications that, while immediately plausible in the context of Western Europe, lead to counter-intuitive predictions in East Central Europe (more of this below). First, it assumes that as integration shifts from the economic to the political domain, citizens *change the criteria* they use in evaluating the performance of the European Union. Obviously, when the economy dominates the integration process, citizens presumably rely mainly on economic criteria when evaluating the EU. However, once economic integration nears completion, citizens presumably increasingly take into account the political performance of the EU, such as a democracy deficit. We are not suggesting that they ignore the economy; what we do suggest instead is that political criteria become more important relative to the period when economic integration was at the foreground. In short, as integration proceeds from economics to politics, the criteria by which citizens use to evaluate institutions also shift from economic to politics.

In addition to this shift of criteria, a second implication concerns citizens' *way of thinking* about the EU and their national context. As the quality of national institutions becomes more salient to individuals, we hypothesize that they increasingly compare the quality of national institutions to that of the emerging EU. Let us explain this.

First consider how citizens think about the national economy and the integrated market. In the context of economic issues, it makes sense for citizens to use the national economic context to assess the EU. For the only way that the success or failure of the integrated economy manifests itself for

citizens is through their evaluations of their personal economic circumstances or through their perceptions of the national economy (or some combination thereof). In the economic domain, nearly everyone agrees on what good economic performance is: low unemployment rates, low inflation rates, higher personal and national income. How do citizens know that the Europe-wide, integrated market performs well? They look at the national economy. If it works well, the integrated market presumably performs well; if it does not, the integrated market works poorly. Therefore, regardless of whether citizens use personal or national economic information, this logic suggests that when citizens evaluate the EU and the economy dominates the integration process, citizens employ a proxy logic (Anderson 1998). Rather than assuming that the proxy mechanism emerges primarily when individuals lack information, we would suggest that that proxy mechanism is a key for citizens to know how the integrated market economy works. This leads to the general expectation that a poor economy lowers evaluations of the EU, and a good economy leads to positive perceptions of the European Union (figure 2a)—a linear relationship.

Now consider how a country's quality of output institutions influences how citizens evaluate the EU. As a starting point, we note that a key difference to the economic domain is that successful political integration does not have a straightforward manifestation at the national level. That is, there is no simple and easily accessible indicator in the political domain which citizens could use to evaluate the performance of the EU. Instead, political integration manifests itself as a separate set of institutions: one at the national level, another one at the EU level. Thus, one difference to the economic domain is that that there are two discernable sets of political institutions.

Figure 2: The Economy, Institutions, and the Democracy Deficit

Figure 2a: Proxy



Figure 2b: Proxy and Contrast



Another difference to the economic domain is that citizens do not necessarily use their observations about the national context to the EU-level. Imagine first a scenario where countries are plagued by notoriously low institutional performance. Here, corruption is rampant, the judiciary is unreliable, and bureaucrats are known for playing cronyism and nepotism. When citizens live in countries with under-performing output institutions, they have ample reason to distrust the EU. They distrust national input institutions – including the politicians which make decisions at the EU level on behalf of citizens. And EU laws are implemented by national output institutions which do not work well. Therefore, to the extent that citizens focus on this experience, this, too, suggest a proxy mechanism: individuals use the national experience

to infer how the EU level works. Thus, here citizens are given no reason to trust the EU.

At the other end of the institutional quality spectrum, however, citizens are actually given a reason to *distrust* the EU: citizens stand to lose well-functioning, domestic institutions. Given that they have well functioning domestic institutions, citizens may actually incur a loss in institutional quality through Europe's political integration. This situation, in turn, establishes a context where citizens are more likely to compare what they have now with what they may get. The incentive structure is to contrast the two levels rather than to apply a proxy mechanism. Empirically, we know that citizens do not generalize from the national to the supranational level when output institutions work well: citizens in these nations are indeed the most *negative* about a range of EU institutions (Sanches-Cuenca 2000; Rohrschneider 2002).

In a highly stylized form, what this argument suggests, is that as one moves from the context of low quality institutional environment to one with high quality institutional environment, we would expect to find a curvilinear relationship between institutional quality and perceptions of the EU (figure 2b): when domestic institutions work poorly, citizens apply a proxy logic. Consequently, as institutions begin to improve, they view the EU more positively (because people generalize from the national to the supranational level). At some point, however, this improvement turns into a liability for the EU because individuals begin to worry about the loss of their domestic quality environment as a result of political integration. Therefore, after the tipping point, increasing institutional quality leads to a more negative evaluation of the EU.

We are not suggesting that citizens would never generalize from the national to the supranational level. Clearly, there is a mix of incentives in place. For example, the integrated economy is largely evaluated on the basis of the

proxy mechanism in low and high-quality institutional environments. What we do suggest, however, is that the more people perceive the EU against a high quality institutional environment at home, the more likely they will rely on a contrast logic.

We should also note that we do not want to place the entire burden of the changing criteria and ways of thinking on citizens alone. As integration increasingly emphasizes the political aspect, then political elites no doubt change their ways of framing integration issues in domestic political debates (Franklin 1994; Marks, Wilson et al. 2002; Ray 2003). They may emphasize different issues, or they modify previously held positions. An important question therefore is how political parties in different countries respond to the changing character of European integration in varying context when framing EU integration. This is the topic of a separate investigation. What we do argue here, is that how ordinary citizens respond to changing environmental conditions defines the context for party level analyses. If citizens all over Europe view the EU similarly regardless of varying national conditions, then it raises a different set of questions for party level analyses than when citizens' views about the EU systematically and predictably reflect countries' socioeconomic conditions and political institutions.

In sum, our argument suggests that a twofold change takes place as integration moves from the economic to the political domain. First, their criteria shift accordingly and second, they change the way of thinking from the proxy logic to the contrast logic.

Hypotheses

In order to develop testable hypothesis from this general discussion, consider figure 2. Based on our discussion, we would expect that citizens in Europe use the national economic experience in evaluating whether the EU represents their interests.

Hypothesis 1:Positive economic perceptions increase support for the EU.
Furthermore, our discussion suggests that citizens increasingly contrast the national and supranational institutions. This argument implicitly states that citizens do not rely as much on the economy where they must be concerned with a loss of high-quality institutions. If this argument is correct, we should see a weakening of economic perceptions as a predictor of the democracy deficit as we move across the range of countries, from poor countries to wealthy nations. In other words, there should be an interaction effect between socioeconomic affluence and economic perceptions.

Hypothesis 2: The greater the socioeconomic affluence of a country, the weaker the influence of economic perceptions on the democracy deficit.
A third expectation is directly derived from our discussion of the relevance of nations' institutional quality. We expect a curvilinear relationship between institutional quality and perceptions of the EU's democracy deficit.

Hypothesis 3: Countries' institutional quality and perceptions of the democracy deficit are curvilinearly related: in countries with institutions which function poorly citizens do not feel represented by the EU; as do citizens who live in countries with well functioning institutions. In contrast, those in the middle should feel more represented than those at the two endpoints of the institutional quality continuum.

Data and Measurement

We use the 2004 European election study in order to measure citizens' attitudes about the representation process. The surveys contain the following two questions:

"How much confidence do you have that decisions made by the European Union will be in the interest of [country]?

And:

"And how much confidence do you have that decisions made by the European Union will be in the interest of people like you?"

Response categories are "a great deal of confidence, a fair amount of confidence, not very much, no confidence at all. We included the fairly small number of missing values as a neutral middle category. The responses suggest that citizens in East Central Europe are as reluctant as West Europeans to evaluate the representative capacity of the European Union positively. For example, about 49% in the East and 50% in the West have no confidence in the European Union to represent the interests of respondents' country. Similarly, 51 percent in the East and 54 percent in the West do not believe that the EU represents respondents' interests at the outset. These patterns are remarkable because they indicate that the EU has a representational deficit not just in the West but in the East from the moment of EU enlargement onwards. If one considers that the European Union has made a significant effort to remake the institutions and economies of East Central Europe, this result is surprising as East Central Europeans shortly after joining the EU are already as ambivalent about its representative capacity as West Europeans are.

For Western Europe, the results confirm previous analyses which indicate that Europeans have no more confidence in the EU than they have in national level institutions in representing their interests.

These two variables strongly interconnected (r=.75). We therefore constructed an additive indicator of the two variables which will be the dependent variable in the ensuing analyses.[1] High scores indicate perceptions that the EU is a good job in representing citizens. Figure 3 highlights the overall patterns. The figure suggests that there is no clear difference across the East-West divide, which reflects the fairly weak correlation coefficient

between representative perceptions and living in Eastern or Western Europe (r=. 03).

Independent Variables. Our theoretical discussion emphasized the import of economic factors in influencing perceptions of the democracy deficit. We are especially interested in whether perceptions of the national economy, as we argue, influence respondents' evaluations of the EU's representative capacity *differently* across the socio-economic spectrum. At the individual level, we use the following question:

'What do you think about the economy? Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general economic situation in this country is a lot better, a little better, stayed the same, a little worse, a lot worse.

Figure 3: Perceptions of the Democracy Deficit in Europe



Note: Pearson's correlation coefficient between East-West dummy variable and perceptions of the deficit is r=.03.

We again included the small number of missing data as a neutral middle category. Another question asked about the future economy for the country over the next year. Because these two variables are fairly strongly inter-connected (r= .55), we constructed an indicator of the two variables.[2]

Figure 4 shows the relationship across the East-West divide because eastern countries are less affluent than those in Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, we see a fairly significant increase in positive evaluations of the EU as we move from the category of respondents, who believe the economy is doing poorly, to the category of respondents who believe that the economy is doing quite well. In contrast, the relationship is considerably weaker in Western Europe, although it exhibits the same basic pattern: positive evaluations of the economy help the EU. This difference is summarized by a correlation coefficient of r=.35 in East Central Europe and a coefficient of r=.16 in Western Europe. This provides initial support for our claim that the economy matters more in the East than in the West.

Another hypothesized relationship concerns the relationship between the countries institutional quality and perceptions of the democracy deficit. Recall that we predicted a curvilinear relationship between the two variables. However before we present the initial evidence, we must address one critical issue: namely how to measure the quality of national institutions.

It is often the case that analyses link subjective perceptions of the national system to subjective perceptions of the EU. After all, the logic of our argument dictates that--if we would like to assess how citizens evaluate the two levels-- we should use indicators taken from public opinion surveys gauging subjective evaluations of both institutions.

Figure 4: The Economy and the Democracy Deficit



Note: Pearson's correlation coefficient is r=.34 and r=.14 in the East and West, respectively.

The problem with the strategy is that there's a high degree of endogeneity among these variables. It is hard to sort out whether citizens like the EU because of the national system, or the national system because of the EU. Thus, it is hard to attribute unambiguous causality to one level. In addition, most surveys ask citizens about institutions either in the same question or in adjacent questions. For example the satisfaction with national democracy indicator and satisfaction with the EU democracy are often asked in adjacent questions. This survey design no doubt introduces an artificially high correlation between the two indicators, further complicating an assessment about which attitudes are the cause and which ones are the effect.

Our solution to this quandary is to use objective indicators of how well output institutions work. Specifically, we use indicators developed by the World Bank which summarize a large amount of information about the

procedural quality of arbitrating institutions. The World Bank data about institutional quality uses the assessments of various independent institutions to evaluate the procedure or quality of bureaucracies and judiciaries (Kaufmann 2003). We know from prior research that these institutions strongly predict individuals' evaluations of a range of national institutions such as parliaments, governments, or politicians. We therefore believe that this is a reliable indicator for how well national institutions work in Europe.

Figure 5: The quality of output institutions in Europe



Source: Kaufman at all 2003

Not surprisingly, institutions of the West work considerably better than institutions in the East (figure 5). Clearly, output institutions in East Central Europe fall short of the best-performing countries in the West. At the same time though, note that some West European countries do not outperform some countries in the East. For example Slovenia's output institutions (2.8) obtain higher ratings then Greek (2.16) and Italian (2.53) output institutions. This is helpful for our analyses because we have a continuum from poor to well functioning institutions across the East-West divide, rather than having a continuum that duplicates the East-West dichotomy.

The question, therefore, becomes whether the quality of output institutions is related to how the democracy deficit is perceived. The next figure plots the mean scores on the democracy deficit variable on the y-axis, with national output institutions on the x-axis (figure 6). Recall that we predicted a curvilinear relationship. And the prediction is met to a surprising degree. Countries with lower institutional quality are substantially less likely to feel represented by the EU than countries that are at the midpoint of the scale. In turn, publics who reside in nations with well-functioning arbitrating institutions are also among the nations with the lowest evaluations for the EU. In contrast, when citizens reside in the medium-range countries on this national performance indicator, they tend to be the most satisfied with the EU.

Figure 6: Institutional Quality and Perceptions of Representation



However, another possibility for this pattern is that countries from East Central Europe, which score lower on the socioeconomic dimension, trust the EU less because of its economic problems, for countries with lower institutional quality also tend to be poorer. Indeed, we do observe a curvilinear relationship of socioeconomic affluence with perceptions of the

EU's democracy deficit (figure 7). This similarity of the relationship to that of the previous figure is not surprising given that there is a strong relationship between institutional quality and socio-economic affluence (.87). This similarity also raises the question of which of the two factors actually predicts citizens' evaluations of the EU's democracy deficit. The multivariate analyses below will provide an answer to this issue.

Figure 7: Socio-economic Development and Perceptions of Representation



Before we present the multivariate analyses, we would like to present evidence about plausible rival hypotheses. For instance, one might speculate that citizens from countries which receive more from the EU than they contribute to the EU budget also feel that the EU effectively represents countries and citizens. Ireland is a case in point as a country which has benefited significantly from the EU over the past decades. Similarly, the EU has contributed to rebuilding the economies of East Central Europe. This might lead one to suspect that a critical factor in influencing perceptions of the EU's capacity to represent nations is how much the country proceeds from the EU beyond its contribution to it.

Another argument might be that citizens who live in nations with powerful institutional representation at the EU level feel more effectively represented by EU institutions. Nations like Germany, Italy, and Poland have larger representation in both the Council and the European Parliament.

The next two figures, however, lay these possibilities to rest (figures 8 and 9). Not only is the relationship between these two indicators is very weak, but they also defy a clear linear (or curvilinear) pattern. On one hand, there is some indication that countries which benefit disproportionately from the EU feel more represented than citizens in countries that benefit fairly little. At the same time, countries which are roughly at the 0 position on the x-axis--reflecting balanced payments and receipts - hold widely differing opinions about the EU's democracy deficit. In short, the relationship is fairly modest. Similarly, when citizens reside in nations which are well represented at the EU level, they are no more likely to view the democratic process more favorably than when citizens reside in smaller countries which typically have fewer representatives in the European Parliament and the European commission. Given the weak relationships of these factors on evaluations of the democracy deficit, we do not expect them to eradicate any effect of the institutional quality indicator on evaluations of the EU's democracy deficit.

Figure 8: Net Budget Contributors and Perceptions of Representation



Figure 9: Country Voice in EU-Institutions and Perceptions of Representation



Multivariate Analyses

In order to sort out the unique influence of these factors on perceptions of the democracy deficit, we conducted several multivariate analyses. We begin by testing the influence of economic perceptions on evaluations of the democracy deficit. Because our argument predicts that the effect emerges especially in nations with lower socioeconomic affluence and institutional development, we again begin by showing the results separately for post-communist and West European EU member states (table 1).

It is immediately apparent that economic perceptions have a much stronger effect on the democracy deficit in the East then in the West. In the West, the unstandardized coefficient (0.079) is about one third the size of the unstandardized coefficient in the East (0.208). Note also that the standardized regression coefficient, shown in parentheses, indicate that economic perceptions have the second-strongest influence on evaluations of the representative capacity of the EU at the micro level. This clearly indicates that citizens who do not perceive to be represented among the Central Europeans base their dissatisfaction with the EU on perceptions of the national economy.

Another important predictor at the individual level is citizens' evaluations of the perceived benefits a country receives. When they believe the EU benefits a country, they are considerably more likely to believe that the EU also represents the interests. This pattern emerges both in the East and the West. It is unclear, of course, whether the causal force is uni-directional; we expect that respondents' perceptions of the benefits coming to a country EU is partly shaped by whether they perceive the EU to represent them in the first place. However, we include the identification variable in order to assure that the results for the economic variable emerge regardless of respondent's general predispositions towards European integration. And the results support this contention, especially for post-communist democracies.

Table 1: Individual-level Predictors of Perceptions of the Democracy Deficit[3]

	West	East
Nat'l Economic Perception	0.102 (0.081)**	0.252 (0.197)**
Government record (un)favorable	0.266 (0.120)**	0.268 (0.112)**
Government vote in last election	-0.128 (-0.028)**	-0.032 (-0.007)
Most Important Problem: No Party	-0.402 (-0.072)**	-0.201 (-0.038)**
Most Important Problem: DK	-0.190 (-0.023)**	-0.197 (-0.031)*
Country Benefits from EU	-1.143 (-0.352)**	-1.118 (-0.348)**
Political Interest	0.147 (0.056)**	0.137 (0.050)**
Ideological Orientation		
Left/Right 1	0.158 (0.023)**	-0.056 (-0.008)
Left/Right 2	0.163 (0.031)**	-0.080 (-0.013)
Left/Right 4	-0.073 (-0.014)	0.122 (0.022)
Left/Right 5	0.138 (0.018)*	0.344 (0.051)**
Employment		
Self Employed	0.013 (0.002)	0.044 (0.006)
Unemployed	-0.250 (-0.027)**	0.119 (0.012)
Retired	0.038 (0.006)	0.154 (0.029)
Student	0.125 (0.016)	0.140 (0.013)
Other	0.165 (0.023)**	-0.129 (-0.016)
Self-Reported Class		
Working Class	-0.100 (-0.018)*	-0.061 (-0.012)
Lower Middle Class	-0.112 (-0.018)*	-0.190 (-0.034)**
Upper Class	0.183 (0.030)**	0.228 (0.025)*
Other	-0.104 (-0.006)	-0.099 (-0.007)
Socio-Economic Position		
Education	0.003 (0.007)	0.013 (0.024)
Age 2	-0.067 (-0.011)	0.085 (0.014)
Age 3	0.033 (0.007)	0.221 (0.047)*
Age 4	0.181	0.207

Remarkably, few of the other variables have much of an influence on the dependent variable. Respondents at the extreme left or right wing do not

differ significantly from those with a centrist ideological identification regarding the evaluations of the democracy deficit. Neither does employment status, social class, or respondents' age. All in all, the one factor that most significantly affects evaluations of the democracy deficit is individuals' economic perceptions, especially in post-communist democracies.

The Country Context

These analyses provide initial support for our argument by endorsing the first hypothesis. But they do not consider yet the contextual factors we deem important, especially the institutional quality of a country's output institutions or their socioeconomic affluence. In order to consider these factors, we need to address one methodological issue which is related to the multi-level data structure.

Since we have data from both the individual level and the country-level, OLS is inappropriate because it under-estimates the standard error for contextual data(Snijders and Bosker1999). We therefore use HLM which takes into account the multi-level structure of our data. In particular, it estimates coefficients by considering the two levels of the data structure simultaneously; and by including an error term in the estimation of coefficients that the individual level and the macro level. This means, among other things, that we do not have to assume, in contrast to OLS, that the contextual variables explain all the variance at the country-level (again see Snijders and Bosker for a discussion of this point).

Given that we have individual level and country level data, HLM requires the specification of two sets of equations. A first equation models the influence of individual level variables on perceptions of the democracy deficit:

$$EU\ Representation = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j\ Perceived\ Economy\ldots} + \beta_k x_{kij} + e_{ij} \qquad (1)$$

The second equation captures the influence of contextual variables on cross-national variation in representational assessments. This is captured in HLM through the influence of macro variables on the intercept from equation 1:[4]

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01Quality} + \gamma_{02QualitySquared} + \gamma_{03Affluence}\ \gamma_{04AffluenceSquared} + \gamma_{05EU\ Benefits} + \delta_{0j} \quad (2)$$

Note that we hypothesize a curvilinear relationship between institutional quality and perceptions of the democracy deficit; this argument also applies to a country socioeconomic affluence. This is the reason why we include a squared term for both country characteristics. We also included a measure of whether net beneficiaries from the EU more likely to feel represented than net contributors.[5] In short, this equation captures the influence of contextual variables on perceptions of the democracy deficit.

Since our argument also predicts that economic perceptions are less important in countries which are economically affluent, this is represented by an interaction term between a country's socioeconomic affluence and the individual level coefficients from level 1:

$$\beta_{economic\ Perceptions\ j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11Affluence} + \delta_{1j} \quad (3)$$

Together, the three equations model the effect of individual level variables on perceptions of the representational capacity of the EU (equation 1), the effects of contextual variables on countries' average perceptions of the democracy deficit (equation 2), and the hypothesized effect of social economic affluence on the strength of the coefficients of economic perceptions (equation 3).

Table 2: Individual and Contextual Effects on Perceptions of the Democracy Deficit

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Level Predictors:					
Performance	1.28		0.80	0.75	1.22*
Performance Squared	-0.16*		-0.12*	-0.11*	-0.15*
HDI 2003 scores	-12.29	378.7			-7.57
HDI 2003 scores Squared	-12.85	-214.2			
Net Giving to European Union				-0.06	-0.06
ion: Economic Perf. * HDI 2003					-1.40*
-level Predictors:					
Government vote in last election	-0.10**	-0.10**	-0.10**	-0.10**	-0.10**
overnment record (un)favorable	0.26***	0.26***	0.26***	0.26***	0.26***
Left/Right 1	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Left/Right 2	0.09*	0.10	0.10*	0.09*	0.10*
Left/Right 4	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
Left/Right 5	0.22***	0.22***	0.22	0.22***	0.22***
Education	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Age 2	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Age 3	0.11*	0.11*	0.11*	0.11*	0.11*
Age 4	0.18***	0.19***	0.20***	0.19***	0.19***
Economic Perception[i]	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***	1.42*
Self Employed	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Unemployed	-0.13*	-0.13*	-0.13*	-0.13*	-0.13*
Retired	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
Student	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*
Other	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
Lower Middle Class	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06
Middle Class	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
Upper Class	0.26**	0.26***	0.26***	0.26***	0.26***
Other	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
EU Integration	-01.14***	-1.14***	-1.14***	-1.14***	-1.14***
st Important Problem: No Party	-0.34***	-0.34***	-.034***	-0.34***	-0.34***
Most Important Problem: DK	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.18***
Political Interest	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15**
of Random Effects:					
Constant	.33***	.33***	.33***	.31***	.31***
Economic Perceptions	.012***	.012***	.012***	.012***	.009*
N=	17667	17669	17669	17668	17666

**p<.01, ***p<.001

Note: Entries are Full Maximum Likelihood estimates of Coefficients (HLM 6.02).

[i] The residual parameter variance for this level-1 coefficient has not been set to zero.

In a first step, we included a country's institutional quality indicator – both the main and squared terms – and nations' socioeconomic affluence as a predictor of the mean scores on perceptions of the democracy deficit (model 1 in table 2). The results clearly support the argument about a curvilinear relationship. The squared term for the institutional quality indicator is significant statistically, even though we only have 17 degrees of freedom. Surprisingly, countries' socioeconomic influence does not come even close to being statistically significant—not even when we exclude the institutional performance indicators (model 2), whereas the institutional performance

variables remain significant when they are estimated alone (model 3). Substantively, this means that despite the overlap and the strong correlation between socio-economic affluence and institutional quality, how citizens experience output institutions has a direct impact on perceptions of the representation process at the EU level. In short, at the lower *and* higher end of institutional development, citizens' experience with institutions reduces their support for the EU democracy deficit.[6]

Of course, we are not arguing that economic factors are irrelevant. To the contrary, our argument is precisely that these variables are more important because they influence representation perceptions directly, and because socioeconomic affluence shapes how much importance people attribute to economic issues. We find several pieces of evidence in support of this argument. First, economic perceptions remain a strong predictor. However, our argument suggests – indeed requires – that economic perceptions are less important influences of perceptions of the democracy deficit when citizens reside in nations with higher socioeconomic affluence. In order to test this premise of the argument, we re-estimate the model, this time including an interaction term between socioeconomic perceptions and countries' economic affluence (Model 5). And it clearly shows that the influence of economic perceptions is weaker in socio-economically advanced nations, just as we hypothesized.

Conclusion

The democratic deficit in the EU has become endemic among mass publics and should provide cause for concern for the enterprise of further EU integration and expansion. For the high performers of the EU, strong national-level institutions seem to challenge the legitimacy of the EU, a consistent finding that does not bode well for new members and aspirants alike. In terms of Dahl's thesis (1989), although the original intent of the EU was market integration, it has become a political institution and as such is

being evaluated not only on its ability to deliver as an 'output' institution but also increasingly as representational institution—and is coming up lacking.

The literature of democratic transitions has something to say to the 'second' transition in the East and the 'first' in the West. Understanding the determinants of citizens' assessment of the EU requires researchers to incorporate several components of economic and political integration. Despite the similar levels of popular discontent across both regions of the EU, our understanding of how citizens arrive at evaluations of the EU must admit to two processes. The first is that economics provides only some of the answer. As countries progress economically, citizens rely less on these criteria as the basis for evaluating a regime and are slowly replaced by political criteria. As this shift from one set of criteria takes place, individuals also demonstrate a shift from using national institutions as proximate yardsticks for evaluating supra-national regimes to comparing the performance of these institutions.

The recent expansion of the EU has allowed us to test these claims, as we have done here. From the individual-level data, we find that for the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe, dissatisfaction with the representation in the EU is more strongly driven by economic concerns than their Western counterparts. In the multi-level section we also found that although socio-economic affluence and institutional quality are strongly correlated, citizens' attitudes toward the EU respond to institutional quality more acutely such that *both* low and high institutional quality is a strong predictor of high levels of dissatisfaction with the representational quality of the EU. This finding strongly supports our argument that individuals shift from proxy to contrast logic as the quality of national institutional performance increases. That, however, does not diminish the role of economics entirely but rather underscores the role of economics as it directly impacts individuals particularly in countries in which socio-economic development places economic issues at the forefront of national interests.

Notes

[1] The additive index has an average inter-item covariance of 0.3921 and scale reliability coefficient (*alpha*) of 0.8513.

[2] The additive index has an average inter-item covariance of 0.5480 and scale reliability coefficient (*alpha*) of 0.7082.

[3] OLS estimated beta coefficients (Robust normalized beta coefficients). Significance: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Reference categories for dummies: Left/Right – center; Occupation – Employed; Class – Middle class; Age –oldest cohort (see variable description); Countries – Belgium (West), Czech Republic (East).

[4] Countries in this analysis include: Austria, Belgium, Britain, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain

[5] Preliminary analyses show this to be the most important control variable. Given the small degrees of freedom in the country-level data (N=22), we focus the analyses on the most important zero order predictors.

[6] Given these results, we dropped the squared economic affluence term from the model.

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Appendix: Variable description

Democratic Deficit: The democratic deficit is the additive combination of the following questions: (q31) "How much confidence do you have that decisions made by the European Union will be in the interest of [country]?" & (q32) "And how much confidence do you have that decisions made by the European Union will be in the interest of people like you?" The response categories are 'a great deal of confidence', 'a fair amount', 'not very much', and 'no confidence at all'. These responses were recoded to make the output intuitive: 2 Doesn't feel represented -- 10 Feels represented. A middle category – dk – was added as a neutral category. The resulting additive index has an average inter-item covariance of 0.3921 and scale reliability coefficient (*alpha*) of 0.8513.

Economic Perception: Economic perceptions are the additive combination of the questions: (q15) "What do you think about the economy? Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general economic situation in this

country is…" (q16) "And over the next 12 months, how do you think the general economic situation in this country will be?" The response categories are the 1-5 scale from 'get a lot better' to 'get a lot worse'. A middle category – dk – was added as a neutral category. The resulting additive index has an average inter-item covariance of 0.5480 and scale reliability coefficient (*alpha*) of 0.7082.

Government record favorable or unfavorable: This is variable (q29) "Let us now come back to [country]. Do you approve or disapprove the government's record to date?" Recoded to reflect: 0 disapprove, 1 DK, and 2 approve.

Government vote in last election: (q11) "Which party did you vote for at the [General Election] of [Year of Last General Election]?" Coded to reflect voting for parties in government.

Most Important Problem: No Party & Most Important Problem: DK: were dummied from (q02) "Which political party do you think would be best at dealing with <the most important problem>?" If a 'DK' or 'No Party' answer was given, a 1 was coded, others were 0.

European Identification: The European Identification variable is (q23) "Do you ever think of yourself not only as a [country] citizen, but also as a citizen of the European Union?" The response categories are 'often', 'sometimes', and ' never'.

Political Interest: The political interest variable is (q20) "To what extent would you say you are interested in politics? Very, somewhat, a little, or not at all?" The response categories are ' very', 'somewhat', 'a little', and 'not at all'. These were recoded to be intuitive.

Ideological Orientation: The Left/Right variables are the collapsed version of (q14) "In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". What is your position? Please indicate your views using any number on a 10-point-scale. On this scale, where 1 means 'left' and 10 means '"right,' which number best describes your position?" The response categories range from 1 (left) – 10 (right). Left/Right 1=1-2; Left/Right 2=3-4; Left/Right 3=5-6; Left/Right 4=7-8; Left/Right 5=9-10.

Employment: The Employment status dummies are (d06) "What is your current work situation?" Are you: self-employed; employed; in school; working in the household (included with other); retired; unemployed; other.

Class: The class dummies are (d07) "If you were asked to chose one of these five names for your social class, which would you say you belong to - the working class, the lower middle class, the middle class, the upper middle class or the upper class?" The response categories are: 'working class', 'lower middle class', 'middle class', 'upper middle class', and 'upper class'.

Education: The education variable is (d02) "How old were you when you stopped full-time education?" Countries were assigned country means.

Age: The age variable uses (d04) "What year were you born?" to construct the following dummies: Age 1: Pre-EU (1900-40); Age 2: Montan (1941-50); Age 3: Market (1951-70); Age 4: Polity (1971-90).

Macro-Level Variables

Institutional Quality: Described in the main text.

Net EU Beneficiary: BBC website, 2004

HDI: 2003 Human Development Index Scores of the UN (UN website).

Country Representation: Additive index of standardized scores of 1. Country's number of MEPs; 2. Votes in Council.

Chapter 19

Saying and Doing (Something Else?): Does EP Roll Call Voting Reflect Euromanifesto Content?

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Introduction

In modern democracies, citizens no longer meet in a central 'agora' (as Rousseau assumed they would) to decide on the future of the political system and its policy output directly. Instead, modern democracies are representative democracies and the link between citizens (or put more precisely: voters) and policy output is established through the institution of democratically elected representatives. Hence, for representative democracy to be successful the output of the political system must be closely connected to the will of the people.[1]

For European democracies, Aldrich's statement, according to which modern democracy is "unworkable save in terms of parties" (Aldrich 1995: 3), is even more true than it is in a presidential democracy like the USA. This fact is not only reflected at the national, but also at the European political level. Article 191 of the Treaty establishing the European Community states: "Political parties at the European level are important as a factor for integration with the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union."

Taking such a perspective makes us ask what the consequences for parties are. One can refer to the main conclusion of the report 'Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System', published by the American Political Science Association's Committee on Political Parties in 1950. It reads: 'The party system that is needed must be democratic, responsible and effective' (APSA 1950). According to the report, parties and party systems are 'responsible', if, and only if, they offer a set of clearly distinguishable manifestos that voters can chose from on election day. 'Effectiveness' requires that parties (by means of their elected representatives) cohesively pursue their proposed policy goals in parliament after election day. Taken together, responsibility and effectiveness yield a party system that is democratic in the sense that voters can choose from a set of manifestos that are implemented after the election. But "[i]f electoral results do not produce any policy consequences, elections become mere devices to legitimate arbitrariness and contingency" (Schedler 1998: 195).

Research Questions

This idea of (party-based) representative democracy is the topic of our research. We build on earlier results which showed that even for the "beauty contests", as European Parliament elections are often labelled, parties show considerable variance in issue emphasis and issue positions (Wüst/Schmitt 2006). Voters perceive programmatic differences based on parties' positions on the Left-Right and on the pro-anti-EU dimensions, and increasingly not only take the Left-Right dimension, but also the pro-anti EU dimension into account when making a voting decision in EP elections (Wüst 2005) so there seems to be improvement at the beginning of the chain of representation (Figure 1). But what happens at the end of it? Do the parliamentary activities of the elected members of the European Parliament (MEPs) reflect the content of the manifestos their parties issued for EP elections? Or do MEPs not care what is written in their own party's election program?

Figure 1: A Chain of Political, Party-based Representation in Europe



For parties to be effective, the parliamentary presence and cohesion in parliamentary voting of their MEPs should be linkable to issue emphasis and issue positions taken in the Euromanifesto they published for the preceding EP election. So if an issue or an issue area is more salient for one party compared to other parties, that party's MEPs should attend parliamentary votes diligently and should also vote cohesively. Similarly, attendance and cohesion are also expected to be higher if a party has a particularly strong position on an issue or in an issue area. On the other hand, if parties do not emphasize an issue or do not take a clear position on an issue in their Euromanifestos, their respective MEPs will be expected to attend these parliamentary sessions less frequently and to vote less cohesively.

Data and Research Methods

The unit of analysis is each national party represented in the EP. For the overwhelming majority (90%) of these parties, Euromanifestos (EM) have been collected for each EP election since 1979.[2] These EM have been coded according to a coding scheme (EMCS=Euromanifesto Coding Scheme) based on the Manifesto Research Group's (MRG) coding frame used for the coding of each argument in national election manifestos (Wüst/Volkens

2003). A sub-domain covering the institutions of the EU has been added to the existing policy domains and categories of the MRG coding frame,. Wherever possible, sub-categories have been introduced for specific EU issues to channel the coding of these into existing (MRG) categories on the one hand and on the other to enable researchers to separate these issues in later analyses if necessary. Finally, the so-called governmental frame or political level in which each argument is embedded has also been coded. This additional information is important for our analysis, since not all Euromanifesto content is clearly framed as being European. So we have an option to limit the analysis to issues parties which have explicitly put into an European frame, neglecting Euromanifesto content which is either limited to the national political level or not framed at all (see Wüst/Schmitt 2006 for details).

The attendance and voting behaviour of each party's MEPs are useful indicators of party effectiveness in the EP. As in other parliaments, the voting behaviour of MEPs is only recorded for Roll Call Votes (RCVs).[3] These records and its minutes are made available by the European Parliament. They have been collected by Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland (2005) and contain information on the voting of each MEP (and also implicitly on attendance) for the complete period ranging from 1979 to 2004 (886 RCVs for the first EP, 2,135 for the second, 2,733 for the third, 3,740 for the fourth and 2,124 for the fifth).[4] The Hix data provides additional information on each RCV such as that on the author of the bill (rapporteur).

The Hix team has also grouped about 6,300 of the RCVs into policy domains. Such categorization is necessary to sort the RCV data according to information provided by the Euromanifesto data or vice versa. However, the ascription of policy areas for the RCVs was done on the basis of face validity using the long description of the subject of the RCV provided by the EP. Since policy area is a crucial variable for our research, we use an additional

data source in an attempt to improve its validity and reliability. In principle, the source of the data is identical: Again, it is obtained from the website of the EP and the minutes of the plenary sessions provided there. However, the second source of data (details of which can be found in Faas (2003a, 2003b)) uses a different approach to determine policy areas. By focusing on reports that have been discussed in committees before being subject to debate in plenary sessions, one can use the allocation of committee responsibility to determine policy areas. As yet these data are only available for the fifth European Parliament. A total of 2,582 votes on such reports – amendments as well as final votes – are used for analyses here.

Table 1: Policy Areas in the Hix Dataset and Corresponding EM Categories

policy area (Hix categories)	**EMCS categories**	**EMCS cat. number**	**position availability**	**European level availability**
agriculture	agriculture	7031, 7032	yes	yes
external/trade	internationalism protectionism	107, 109 406, 407	yes	yes
social	welfare state social justice education	504, 505 503 506, 507	yes	yes
economy	Domain 4 (economy) (protectionism excluded)	401-416	yes	yes
environment	environmental protection	501	no	yes
inter-institutional	Sub-Domain 3.2 (EU complexity excluded)	306-317	yes	only

Tables 1 and 2 documented exactly how the data (RCV and Euromanifestos) are linked. Since the categories are not the same ones in each pair of data sources, we have tried to sum up the Euromanifesto categories to match the RCV policy area/committee categories as closely as possible. Sometimes this results in just one or two categories being used (environment, agriculture) while sometimes we use whole policy domains (like domain 4=economy). This is an important detail of data construction that should be kept in mind during the data analysis and the interpretation of the results.

We calculated a number of analytic variables. In the case of manifesto content, *issue saliency* was calculated by simply adding the share of codes falling into the respective policy areas. Issue positions were calculated by subtracting negative positions (rejections) from positive positions (support) in a policy area (theoretically ranging from –100 to +100). For our purposes, however, the clarity of a position is more important than the position itself. We therefore used the absolute number of the calculated issue position as an indicator of *position clarity* (theoretically ranging from 0 to 100). This value for position clarity is not independent of issue saliency and we argue that a clear position should be one which has sufficient room in a manifesto, and is not one which is simply mentioned along the way.

Table 2: Policy Areas in the Faas Dataset and Corresponding EM Categories

policy area (EP committees)	**EMCS categories**	**EMCS cat. number**	**position availability**	**European level availability**
citizen's freedom	freedom and human rights	201	no	yes
constitutional	constitutionalism Sub-Domain 3.2 ("complexity of EU" excluded)	203, 204 306-317	yes	yes
economic affairs	Domain 4 (economy)	401-416	yes	yes
employment	creating jobs job programs	4081 5041, 5051	yes	yes
regional policy	structural fund	4041, 4011	yes	only
environment	environmental protection	501	no	yes
foreign affairs	Domain 1 (external relations)	101-110	no	yes
women's rights	women	7061	no	yes

In the case of RCVs, we first calculated the *mean attendance* of MEPs for each party separately in all RCVs (theoretically ranging from 0 to 100). This was also done for all policy areas (*mean policy attendance*). In addition, the *deviation in attendance* was calculated by subtracting mean attendance from mean policy attendance to give an indicator of the relative importance of a policy area based on the parliamentary attendance of each party's MEPs. Finally, *party cohesion* in RCVs was calculated using Attina's "Index of Agreement" (Attina 1990; theoretically ranging form –33 to 100). Using Attina's index does, however, limit the respective analyses to parties with at

least 3 MEPs. The *deviation in cohesion* was calculated by subtracting mean cohesion from mean policy cohesion.

These variables are used to test whether issue saliency and position clarity in Euromanifestos is reflected in attendance and cohesion in RCVs in the EP. An alternative analytical strategy is paired comparisons of all pairs of two parties each: For a given RCV, two parties can vote in a perfectly identical way (e.g. both vote cohesively "yes"). In this case, the difference in voting would be 0. However, it could also be the case that one party votes cohesively "yes", the other party votes cohesively "no". If one counts "no" as –1, "abstention" as 0 and "yes" as 1, the difference in voting would be 2 in absolute terms – the maximum difference in voting. One can calculate this difference score for each RCV and finally calculate the mean over all scores. These differences have also been calculated for each policy area analyzed and we would expect the difference in voting in policy areas to follow the difference in issue positions and saliency.

Empirical Findings

When we start with the policy areas defined by Hix, Noury and Roland, the empirical results of the correlation analysis support our hypotheses only sporadically. For all legislatures since 1979 combined (table 3), issue saliency and attendance only correlate positively in the "social" and "environment" policy areas. The opposite is, however, the case in the areas of "agriculture" and "economy". This also holds true for the relationship between position clarity and attendance, and results obtained by using differently calculated values for issue saliency and position clarity based only on content that is framed European (table 4) are differ very little. While "attendance" does, at least in most cases, correlate significantly with issue saliency and position clarity (though sometimes in an unexpected direction), "deviation in attendance" shows only a single correlation stronger than 0.1.

"Cohesion" produces a similar number of results which confirm our hypotheses as it does those opposing them, with all three significant correlations going in the wrong direction. And except for the "agriculture" policy area, the "deviation in cohesion" variable does not correlate significantly with issue saliency and position clarity. So, all in all, the results of these data analyses are inconsistent.

The inconsistencies in the empirical results could be caused by variance in included Euromanifesto categories (see data construction above) or by considering all five legislative periods since 1979 in combination. Therefore, the analysis has been carried out separately for every five-year period, but the results show only moderate improvement. Tables 5 and 6 display the results for the last EP, 1999-2004. While the majority of correlations point in the hypothesized direction, few are significant, and many others go in the opposite direction. The best results are produced with respect to "deviation in cohesion". Except for economic and inter-institutional issues, parliamentarians of the fifth EP did indeed vote more cohesively if the issue area was more important for their parties and in cases where the parties had an explicit position on the issue area.

Table 3: Correlations (Pearson's r) for EP1 to EP5 (1979-2004), framing neglected

	policy area (Hix categories)	**mean attendance** (N=299)	**deviation in attendance** (N=299)	**cohesion (seats > 2)** (N=182)	**deviation in coh. (s > 2)** (N=182)
issue saliency	agriculture	**-,202**	,001	,090	**,224**
	external/trade	-,037	,000	**-,166**	-,074
	social	**,151**	-,050	,108	,057
	economy	**-,126**	,007	-,055	-,045
	environment	**,277**	-,025	,095	-,062
	inter-institutional				
position explicity	agriculture	**-,264**	,086	,130	**,153**
	external/trade	,023	-,004	-,143	-,040
	social	**,142**	-,052	,104	,059
	economy	**-,178**	,007	-,016	-,115
	environment				
	inter-institutional				

Significant correlations (p<,05) are shown in bold.

Table 4: Correlations (Pearson's r) for EP1 to EP5 (1979-2004), European framing

	policy area (Hix categories)	**mean attendance** (N=299)	**deviation in attendance** (N=299)	**cohesion (seats > 2)** (N=182)	**deviation in coh. (s > 2)** (N=182)
issue saliency	agriculture	**-,123**	,003	,050	**,229**
	external/trade	,060	,029	**-,268**	**-,176**
	social	**,127**	-,088	,105	,126
	economy	-,071	,007	-,051	-,017
	environment	**,249**	-,010	,068	-,069
	inter-institutional	,028	**,118**	-,114	-,060
position explicity	agriculture	**-,166**	,017	,059	**,206**
	external/trade	**,145**	,060	**-,209**	-,131
	social	**,115**	-,090	,106	,127
	economy	**-,147**	,006	-,020	-,114
	environment				
	inter-institutional	-,081	,069	0,35	-,009

Significant correlations (p<,05) are shown in bold.

Table 5: Correlations (Pearson's r) for EP5 (1999-2004), framing neglected

	policy area (Hix categories)	**mean attendance** (N=102)	**deviation in attendance** (N=102)	**cohesion (seats > 2)** (N=59)	**deviation in coh. (s > 2)** (N=59)
issue saliency	agriculture	-,045	0,12	,242	**,361**
	external/trade	**,269**	**,214**	,074	,221
	social	,003	-,153	,147	,142
	economy	-,064	-,054	**-,296**	-,212
	environment	,167	-,167	,138	,178
	inter-institutional				
position explicity	agriculture	-,093	,005	,057	**,271**
	external/trade	**,251**	,155	,104	,217
	social	,005	-,142	,139	,139
	economy	-,112	,018	,056	-,252
	environment				
	inter-institutional				

Significant correlations (p<,05) are shown in bold.

Table 6: Correlations (Pearson's r) for EP5 (1999-2004), European framing

	policy area (Hix categories)	**mean attendance** (N=102)	**deviation in attendance** (N=102)	**cohesion (seats > 2)** (N=59)	**deviation in coh. (s > 2)** (N=59)
issue saliency	agriculture	,014	,040	,174	**,302**
	external/trade	**,207**	,191	,025	,086
	social	-,021	-,162	,223	**,314**
	economy	-,020	-,011	**-,260**	-,216
	environment	,181	-,179	,149	,077
	inter-institutional	,159	,121	-,076	,009
position explicity	agriculture	-,038	,062	,018	**,294**
	external/trade	**,266**	**,223**	,109	,046
	social	-,030	-,152	,214	**,304**
	economy	-,010	,046	,038	**-,277**
	environment				
	inter-institutional	,004	,106	,071	-,013

Significant correlations (p<,05) are shown in bold.

Let us switch from the Hix to the Faas database to test whether parliamentary committees are a better tool for linking RCVs and Euromanifesto content (table 7). Despite some outliers and predominantly weak correlations, these results tentatively support two of our hypotheses, if only for the fifth EP. First, in most cases parliamentary attendance increases when a policy area is salient for a party, and attendance is then higher than the attendance of the party's MEPs in general. Second, cohesion is higher in policy areas that are more salient for parties, especially when compared to the party's average cohesion in RCVs. Both hypotheses are also weakly confirmed when only relating attendance and cohesion to Euromanifesto content framed European (table 8). These correlations are however not significantly stronger than the ones neglecting the governmental frame in Euromanifesto content analysis.

Most outliers are found in the "economic affairs" and "employment" policy areas. This might be caused either by EM categories not matching the EP committees' well enough or by the possibility that, although parties are talking about these issues a lot, their MEPs do not care as much (and may care less than average) about them in parliament. While we are unable to say which of these explanations is more likely, we assume that in the area of

employment the respective categories of the EMCS might be too narrow and in that of economic affairs the categories might be too broad. It is probably no coincidence that the "economy" policy area also produced the worst results using the Hix categories. Additional outliers (3) are to be found in the mean attendance column, yet in all but one case, there is a positive correlation between issue saliency and deviation in attendance. This means saliency does not correlate with attendance at first sight, but it nevertheless does so when compared to attendance in other issue areas. This is not the case with respect to "foreign affairs" and this may again be caused by a possibly imperfect match of categories or by the ineffective behaviour of the MEPs. Combining external relations with trade issues, the combination of the EM categories and the Hix category produced better results for the fifth EP.

Table 7: Correlations (Pearson's r) for EP5 (1999-2004), framing neglected

	policy area (EP committees)	**mean attendance** (N=100)	**deviation in attendance** (N=100)	**cohesion (seats > 2)** (N=58)	**deviation in coh. (s > 2)** (N=58)
issue saliency	citizen's freedom	-,047	,115	,064	,091
	constitutional	,187	**,210**	,151	,226
	economic affairs	,007	,115	-,077	-,097
	employment	,004	,086	-,064	-,009
	regional policy				
	environment	**,214**	**,214**	**,366**	**,347**
	foreign affairs	-,146	-,160	,093	,095
	women's rights	,072	,064	,112	,161
position explicity	citizen's freedom				
	constitutional				
	economic affairs	-,034	,081	-,099	-,157
	employment	,109	-,108	-,062	-,030
	regional policy				
	environment				
	foreign affairs				
	women's rights				

Significant correlations (p<,05) are shown in bold.

Based on this analytical step, we tentatively conclude that issue saliency in Euromanifestos has an influence on parliamentary attendance and cohesion, but that this influence is weaker than expected. At this point, we are more reluctant concerning the existence of a relationship between an explicit

position in Euromanifestos and both parliamentary attendance and cohesion There are more grounds for our hypothesis to hold than not, but, considering the deviating results, the positional categories in the EMCS were too few to sustain a conclusion.

Table 8: Correlations (Pearson's r) for EP5 (1999-2004), European framing

	policy area (EP committees)	**mean attendance** (N=100)	**deviation in attendance** (N=100)	**cohesion (seats > 2)** (N=58)	**deviation in coh. (s > 2)** (N=58)
issue saliency	citizen's freedom	,010	,037	,106	,153
	constitutional	**,201**	**,218**	,164	,216
	economic affairs	,035	,102	-,127	-,161
	employment	,091	,005	,014	-,105
	regional policy	-,074	**,220**	,000	,130
	environment	**,217**	,136	**,347**	**,359**
	foreign affairs	,090	-,042	,036	,086
	women's rights	,045	,051	,153	,228
position explicity	citizen's freedom				
	constitutional	,027	,045	,107	,041
	economic affairs	,057	,128	-,130	-,209
	employment	,130	-,095	-,072	-,152
	regional policy	-,069	**,221**	,030	,120
	environment				
	foreign affairs				
	women's rights				

Significant correlations (p<,05) are shown in bold.

In a final analytical step, we look at each pair of parties. Table 9 displays the most extreme cases of mean difference in RCV for pairs of parties (with at least 3 MEPs). Where mean differences are small, parties showed very similar voting behaviour in the 2,852 RCV of the fifth EP. Where mean differences are large, parties showed very different voting behaviour. Looking at the 18 most extreme pairs, similarities and differences in RCV appear to be very plausible. Green parties are particularly likely to show similar voting behaviour and both and left parties differ a great deal from conservatives in RCV. At the bottom of table 9, the mean total, the mean within pairs of the same EP groups, the mean within the same party family and the mean within the same political system (Belgium and the UK are divided into two parts) are calculated. We learn that pairs of parties within

the same parliamentary groups show a considerably higher congruence in RCV than is shown in all pairs of parties or in parties within party families. Within identical groups or families, congruence is even stronger. Further, party pairs within the same political system show more differences in RCV than party pairs across systems.

Table 9: Mean Difference in RCVs By Pairs of Parties (extreme cases) for EP5

party 1	party 2	Mean Difference in all RCVs
BE-ECOLO	FR-Les Verts	,066
FI-VAS	SW-V	,070
FR-Les Verts	NI-GroenLinks	,074
DE-CDU	DE-CSU	,075
FR-PRG	FR-PS	,079
FR-Les Verts	A-GRÜNE	,079
FI-VIHR	FR-Les Verts	,079
BE-ECOLO	FI-VIHR	,082
NI-GroenLinks	A-GRÜNE	,082
FR-Les Verts	UK-Cons.	1,200
NI-GroenLinks	UK-Cons.	1,203
BE-ECOLO	UK-Cons.	1,208
FI-VAS	IT-CCD	1,223
FI-VIHR	UK-Cons.	1,224
IT-CCD	SW-V	1,225
LU-Déi Gréng	UK-Cons.	1,229
FR-LO	IT-CCD	1,232
GR-KKE	IT-CCD	1,247
MEAN	(N=4851)	**,722** (,268)
within EP groups	(N=627)	**,227** (,122)
within party family	(N=698)	**,419** (,303)
within pol. system	(N=281)	**,744** (,243)

We would expect that the difference in RCV in the policy areas defined by EP committees will be linked to issue saliency and issue positions within party manifesto content. Yet, as table 10 documents, this is only sometimes the case. Except for the constitutional and institutional issues (which more or less reflect the pro-anti-EU dimension), the differences in RCV are not systematically linked to differences in issue saliency and in issue positions. This is borne out in regression analyses (table 11) for the policy areas using

indicators for saliency and position. Belonging to the same EP group reduces differences in RCV substantially, belonging to the same political system reduces them only weakly. Yet, except in the area of constitutional issues, there is no systematic influence of Euromanifesto content on bigger or smaller differences in the RCV of parties.

Table 10: Correlations for Pairs of Parties (Pearson's r) for EP5

	policy area (EP committees)	**Difference in saliency** (general)	**Difference in saliency** (EU framing)	**Difference in position** (general)	**Difference in position** (EU framing)
	citizen's freedom	,003	,015		
	constitutional	**,182**	**,160**		**,213**
	economic affairs	**,046**	-,002	**,048**	,018
difference in RCVs	employment	**-,060**	**-,058**	**-,036**	**-,049**
	regional policy		,000		,006
	environment	-,010	-,008		
	foreign affairs	,014	-,025		
	women's rights	**-,077**	**-,081**		

For parties with at least 3 seats in the EP (N=4.851); Significant correlations (p<,05) are shown in bold.

Table 11:Linear Regressions for Differences in RCVs (Pairs of Parties) for EP5

policy area **indep. variables**	**const.** (EU frame)	**economy** (all)	**employment** (all)	**reg. policy** (EU frame)
difference in saliency	**,046**	,019	**-,060**	–
difference in position	**,138**	**,023**	-,004	**-,024**
same EP group (dummy)	**-,504**	**-,672**	**-,635**	**-,697**
same pol. system (dummy)	-,022	-,017	-,002	**-,025**
adj. R^2	,298	,454	,406	,485

For parties with at least 3 seats in the EP (N=4.851); Significant Betas (p<,05) are shown in bold.

Conclusion

The empirical analyses presented in this paper were tests of the hypotheses that the roll call behaviour of members of the European Parliament reflects issue saliency and issue positions within their parties. Based on our findings,

we cannot say that this is definitely the case. Most results point in the right direction, so attendance and cohesion is very often higher when a RCV tackles an issue within a policy domain more relevant to a party. And there is also some indication that the link was stronger in the last European Parliament than in previous ones. However, we had hoped for consistent and statistically significant results which we did not get.

This could mean that party-based political representation in the European Parliament is not working. However, there is also reason to think data is insufficient. We know that roll call votes are not necessarily representative of all EP votes (Carruba/Gabel 1999; Thiem 2006), so including all votes (which are not available) might have produced better results. Further, the categorization of both RCV and of Euromanifesto content is difficult *per se*, and matching these categories does not make it easier for the researcher. A narrower research design focusing on only one or two policy areas and maybe also on fewer countries and parties could prove to be more fruitful. So we are optimistic that there will be more research on the link between Euromanifesto content and the voting of elected representatives in the European Parliament.

Notes

[1] See, e.g. Miller/Stokes (1963) or Wlezien (2004) for mechanisms how these are actually linked.

[2] The percentage of Euromanifestos (EM) collected ranges between 57% in 1984 and 98% in 2004: See http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/manifestos/collcodsum.pdf for a summary of Euromanifestos collected and coded. Based on countries and elections, the respective percentages range between 14% (Italy 1984) and 100% (altogether there were 48 cases (countries) in six elections): See http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/manifestos/iprogress.html for details on specific countries.

[3] According to the EP's rules of procedure, the normal voting procedure in the European Parliament is by show of hands. However, each party group or a certain number of individual MEPs can request a roll call. In this case how each MEP voted is recorded. Official statistics

suggest that about 15% of votes are taken by roll call. The problem is that those 15% are not necessarily a representative sample of all votes. In fact, there are good reasons to believe that roll calls are called for strategic reasons, thus leaving serious doubts about their representativeness (Thiem 2006). Carrubba and Gabel have set up a model of why roll calls are taken. They argue that roll calls are taken to produce a voting behaviour that would have been different otherwise. In terms of party cohesion, they actually conclude that cohesion in roll calls votes might be inflated. Their conclusion is that findings based on roll call analysis are "conditional on a RCV being requested" (Carrubba/Gabel 1999: 5). This is probably true. However, since there is no other way to determine how MEPs have voted so far, one has to accept the shortcomings and keep them in mind when interpreting the results.

[4] We would like to thank Simon Hix for providing a provisional data set for the fifth EP (1999-2004). See http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hix/HixNouryRolandEPdata.HTM for details. The number of RCVs for the fifth EP is larger, but complete data was available only for the given number of 2,124.

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