The Elite, the Natives, and the Outsiders: Migration and Labor Market Segmentation in Urban China

C. Cindy Fan

Department of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles

Established migration theories are mostly based on capitalist market economies and downplay the role of institutions in internal migration and labor market processes. In socialist and transitional economies such as those in Russia and China, however, investigations of migration and the labor market must begin by examining the nature and consequences of state institutions. In this article, I argue that the migration and labor market processes in Chinese cities are deeply influenced by an institution-based opportunity structure. The household registration (*hukou*) system, in particular, is interwoven with distribution of services and job opportunities. Most peasants who enter cities in response to increased demands for cheap labor are not granted urban citizenship and are treated as "outsiders" to the urban society. The experiences of these "temporary migrants" contrast with those of "permanent migrants" who are state-sponsored or have access to institutional resources. Using qualitative accounts from a 1995 village-level survey in Sichuan and Anhui and quantitative data from a survey I conducted in Guangzhou in 1998, this article examines the most salient differences among the three subpopulations with different resident statuses: nonmigrant urban natives, permanent migrants, and temporary migrants. I show that resident status is central to explaining migration processes and labor market segmentation in the Chinese city. The findings indicate that in terms of human capital attributes, mobility resources, and labor market entry and shifts, permanent migrants are the most privileged and successful elite, followed by nonmigrant natives, and finally by temporary migrants at the bottom of the hierarchy. These results hint at a new social order of stratification in Chinese cities, underscore the compelling relations between internal migration and labor market development in transitional economies, and suggest that in these economies the state deepens the bifurcation effects about which labor market segmentation theory is concerned. *Key Words: China, institutions, labor market, migration, transition.*

Theoretical approaches that address the relations between internal migration and the labor market are primarily based on capitalist market economies. Neoclassical, behavioral, and labor market segmentation theories can partially explain changes in transitional economies, as they fall increasingly under the forces of globalization, urbanization, and rural-urban migration. However, these theories do not emphasize state institutions, which happen to be central to spatial and social processes in socialist and transitional economies. When researchers write about institutions, they are primarily concerned with international migration, immigration, or less tangible institutional factors related to ethnicity and occupation-wide internal labor markets. Few empirical and theoretical studies examine policies enforced by the state, such as the registration systems in Russia and China, and their effects on intranational migration.

China's "socialist market economy" is marked by an uneasy blend of "plan" and market. On the one hand, hallmark institutions of the command economy continue to control urban permanent residence and entitlements; on the other hand, market forces are exerting strong "pull" for peasants to migrate to cities and to accelerate the development of an urban labor market (Cao 1995; Knight and Song 1995; Yang and Guo 1996; Cook and Maurer-Fazio 1999). By the 1990s, estimates of the "floating population"—rural people leaving the countryside in search of work elsewhere—were in the range of 100 million (Solinger 1999a, 18). The vastly differing fates among migrants and between peasant migrants and urbanites epitomize the awkwardness of this transitional system. "Permanent migrants" are sponsored by the state and are selective and privileged; compared with them, "temporary migrants" are "outside of state plan," on their own, and inferior. Migrants' varied opportunities are outcomes of differentials in human capital, but above all they are products of socialist policies such as the household registration (hukou) system. The young, distorted, and segmented labor market fully reflects the institutional barriers blocking peasant migrants from prestigious jobs, as well as individuals' positions in a rigid institutional hierarchy.

Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 92(1), 2002, pp. 103–124
© 2002 by Association of American Geographers
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK.

This article's premise is that resident status—whether one has local urban hukou—is at the center of migration processes and labor market segmentation in China. I show that a hierarchy of opportunity structure in which permanent migrants are at the top, followed by urban nonmigrants and finally temporary migrants at the bottom, characterizes China's urban labor market. They form, respectively, the elite, the natives, and the "outsiders." I argue that this hierarchy does not result solely from differentials in human capital attributes such as education, but is also clearly an outcome of the state's control over resident status and access to institutional resources, which reinforces a new social order of stratification.

While existing research on China has dealt with the relations between hukou and migration, their interrelationships with labor market segmentation are poorly understood. Furthermore, most studies employ only macrolevel data that are limited for understanding processes such as migration decision-making, job search, and job change. This article uses a combination of qualitative information from a published study of village households in Sichuan and Anhui provinces in 1995 and quantitative data from a survey I conducted in the city of Guangzhou in 1998. My analysis aims to examine the experiences of peasant migrants and the salient differences among nonmigrants, permanent migrants, and temporary migrants in the Chinese city. The next section reviews migration and labor market theories and how they deal with institutions. I then describe the institutional bases for understanding internal migration and the urban labor market in China and discuss the inadequacies of existing theories for understanding the Chinese case. The article's empirical analysis begins with interpretations of selected accounts from the Sichuan and Anhui survey, followed by descriptive and statistical analyses of the Guangzhou survey.

Migration, Labor Market, and Institutions

The intersection between migration and labor market has been one of the most fruitful areas of social science research. The most popular theoretical approaches that deal with migration, labor market, and/or the interaction between the two emphasize one or more of the neoclassical, behavioral, and structural perspectives. In the neoclassical view, migration is an outcome of the geographical differences in the supply and demand of labor, and at the individual level is an investment in human capital and a result of rational calculations of costs and returns (e.g., Schultz 1961; Sjaastad 1962; Todaro 1969). Accordingly, migration is selective of those whose labor is demanded by the host areas. Later extensions of neoclassical migration theory to including expected and long-term returns (e.g., Todaro 1976) also seek to explain why rural-urban migration flows in developing countries continue despite urban unemployment.

Whereas the neoclassical perspective emphasizes individual human capital characteristics, the behavioral approach focuses on contextual or psychological factors modifying or constraining rational decision-making (Wolpert 1965). The latter's advantage over the neoclassical perspective lies in the recognition that individuals do not behave exactly the same way and that human capital and rational economic calculations only partially explain individuals' decision-making. More recent works on job search (e.g., Granovetter 1974, 1981; Hanson and Pratt 1991; De Haan 1995) extend this argument by highlighting the roles of informal personal communication and nonwage job attributes in the ways in which people go about finding jobs. Focusing on gender, Hanson and Pratt (1991) argue that employees are fully embedded in social relations that drive men and women into different labor market segments. Like the neoclassical approach, however, the behavioral perspective pays little attention to institutions.

Both neoclassical and behavioral approaches examine supply-side factors and the migrants' and workers' perspectives. The structural approach, which highlights wider institutional and market processes, stresses demand-side factors. The bulk of recent research that articulates the structural perspective focuses on how the labor market is segmented into two sectors: the formal and informal sectors, or the primary and secondary sectors (e.g., Piore 1979). To put it simply, labor market segmentation exists when people of similar backgrounds are clustered in specific occupations or jobs (De Haan 1995). Explanations range from market imperfections (Amsden 1980) to Marxian notions of dualism and polarization (Reich et al. 1973). Research on third world cities has focused on rural migrants who are unable to find work in the formal urban capitalist sector and spill over to the informal sector, one that is marked by labor-intensive production, unskilled labor, low productivity and income, and poor job security and protection (Harris and Todaro 1970; McGee 1982; Gupta 1993). At the same time, research on capitalist industrial economies has identified a primary sector, wherein employment is organized in an internal labor market with nonprice mechanisms and well-defined career ladders (Kerr 1954; Sakamoto and Chen 1991; Gordon 1995). In the secondary sector, jobs are less stable and employers tend to minimize their commitments and responsibilities toward labor. The indicators

for the primary-secondary dichotomy vary greatly, but common among them are occupation, industrial sector, firm size, and union/nonunion divide (Sakamoto and Chen 1991). Gordon (1995) shows that primary sector jobs are associated with contracted migration—migration secured with employment—and secondary sector jobs with speculative moves where job search follows migration. Despite the variety of settings in which research utilizing the labor market segmentation theory is conducted, a common thread running through it is the identification of two distinct types of labor market experiences. In this light, the formal-informal dichotomy can be subsumed under the rubric of the primary-secondary dichotomy. Employees in the primary sector have better skills, more bargaining power, and more desirable income, benefits, job security, and career development opportunities than those in the secondary sector.

Applications of the labor market segmentation theory have highlighted two ways in which institutions are important. The first deals with organization of internal labor markets at the firm or occupation level that is usually associated with large firms and unionization (Sakamoto and Chen 1991). Empirical studies have found that this institutional factor works to the disadvantage of women and ethnic minorities, who are more likely to be crowded into the secondary sector (Gordon 1995). Second, studies on international migration emphasize the laws and regulations of immigration and refugee migration (e.g., Farer 1995), foreign worker programs (e.g., Calavita 1992; Solinger 1999b), the incorporation of immigrants into the labor market (e.g., Waldinger 1992), and the less tangible forms of segmentation categories, such as ethnicity and nativity (Wright and Ellis 1997, 2000). In both cases, it is the migrants and the marginalized subpopulations in society that are subject to institutional constraints—firm- and occupation-wide internal labor markets, immigration restrictions, and discrimination—so that they are more likely to enter the secondary sector. These constraints further illustrate the inadequacy of investigations that rely solely on neoclassical and human capital explanations, and suggest that an institutional perspective is necessary for understanding the interaction between migration and the labor market.

Despite the many recent studies that examine labor market segmentation and its institutional bases, few have investigated settings other than capitalist market economies. We know little about the interaction among migration, labor markets, and institutions in socialist and transitional economies (Mitchneck 1991). Yet it is in these societies that institutions, especially state institutions, play most powerful roles in shaping migration and labor market processes. In the former Soviet Union, collectivization campaigns, industrialization drives, and organized recruitment promoted rural-urban migration during the late 1920s and 1930s (Hoffmann 1991). Faced with rapid urban in-migration and overcrowding in cities, the Soviet state established an internal passport system in 1932, requiring individuals aged sixteen or above to obtain a residence permit (*propiska*) (Buckley 1995). Accordingly, migration was subject to official approval and became another area of the society to be organized and planned—just like the effect of five-year plans on industrial production. Most importantly, residence registration was interwoven with government guarantees and distribution of social services, such as state-subsidized housing, education, and health care (Mitchneck and Plane 1995a). Though the registration system was not successful in controlling rural-urban migration, it served an important function in controlling access to social benefits and programs (Buckley 1995).

Since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, most researchers' attention has shifted to the massive migration of Russians and Russian-speakers from newly independent states such as the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to Russia (e.g., Pilkington 1998). Nevertheless, the legacy of Soviet-period institutions continues to be powerful. Buckley's (1995, 915) remark summarizes most effectively the stickiness of socialist institutions: "In any large scale sociopolitical transition, the institutions of the previous regime are not always compatible with the process of change and reform." Despite transition, residence permits are still in use in Russia, symbolizing the state's guarantee of access to official systems of distribution. The notion of a social contract between the state and individuals continues to affect migrants' calculus, so that individuals' decisions and migration processes are influenced not only by human capital and economic considerations but also by access to services and resources tied to the registration system (Mitchneck and Plane 1995a, 1995b).

The case of the former Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia illustrates two distinct features of institutions commonly found in socialist and transitional economies. First, state institutions are tangible entities, and the enforcement of regulations means that internal migration is subject to official approval. Undocumented migrants bear the consequences of fines and refusal of social services. In capitalist societies, these institutional effects exist, but usually for undocumented immigrants and seldom for internal migrants. Second, state and nonstate institutions are interwoven with one another, making it extremely difficult for the effects of a particular institution to change until the entire array of related institutions also changes. In large Russian cities, the registration sys-

tem is steadfast because the housing market is still restricted and because the distribution of benefits is administered through registration (Buckley 1995). This feature at least partially explains the lasting legacies of socialist policies. By contrast, in capitalist societies the provision of and access to services are largely independent of internal migration. These differences suggest that an institutional perspective focusing on state institutions must be central to the investigations of migration and labor market segmentation in socialist and transitional economies. While the neoclassical, behavioral, and structural perspectives are all useful, research on socialist and transitional economies must begin by examining pertinent state institutions and policies. An institutional perspective complicates analyses that assume capitalist market contexts. In the next section, I elaborate on the institutional bases of migration and urban labor markets in transitional China, where the state's role deepens the segmentation effects about which the structural approach is concerned.

Institutional Bases of Migration and Urban Labor Markets in China

Migration and the development of a labor market are the two most compelling and intricately related forces that have transformed urban China in the post-Mao period. Yet both continue to be constrained and monitored by the state.

In pre-reform China, labor allocation was highly centralized and tightly controlled by the state. The system of "unified state assignment" (*tongyi fenpei*) assigned school graduates to specific sectors, occupations, and regions according to the state's development blueprints. Likewise, workers were transferred to new jobs according to the state's plan of labor allocation. As a result, job mobility was low, labor market media were not necessary, and unemployment was rare. With an "iron rice bowl," workers lacked incentives for improving productivity. Though urban efficiency was low, it was absorbed by the state's subsidies to cities. The state sector dominated the urban economy, while the nonstate sector was small and weak. In addition, the urban economy was relatively homogeneous because heavy industry was designated as the key sector. In fact, pre-reform Chinese cities were regarded as "producing" entities where social and residential stratifications were minimized, the tertiary sector was kept small, and city size was strictly controlled (Lo, Pannell, and Welch 1977; French and Hamilton 1979; Lo 1994).

The pre-reform model of urban development could not have been possible without a powerful government and its austere policies. A paramount policy that kept this model operating was the hukou system, which was implemented in the late 1950s and has divided Chinese citizens into two unequal tiers—the privileged urban and the underprivileged rural (Christiansen 1992; Shen and Tong 1992; Cheng and Selden 1994). Specifically, hukou is a household record of an individual's (1) registration classification and (2) registration location, and is usually passed from one generation to the next. Registration classification refers to the "nonagricultural" and "agricultural" categories; registration location refers to where a person's hukou "resides," which essentially records where he/she belongs. This article primarily focuses on registration location in cities—not just having a nonagricultural registration classification but also having one's hukou residing in a city—which in the past provided access to food and other necessities and even today guarantees entitlements to subsidized benefits. Prior to the economic reforms, where a labor market was almost nonexistent, it was next to impossible for peasants who did not have local hukou to survive in cities.

Not only did the hukou system control rural-urban migration, it has in essence reinforced a dualistic system in China that has fostered a deep divide between the city and the countryside (Christiansen 1990; Cheng and Selden 1994; Cao 1995; Wong and Huen 1998). The system reflected the state's bias toward urbanites, to whom it pledged full responsibility in terms of food, housing, work, education, and all sorts of welfare entitlements. The rural Chinese, on the other hand, were expected to be self-reliant in the countryside and were shut out from state support. In this regard, the hukou system is effective because it is coordinated with powerful institutions that oversee important social functions such as public security, housing, and welfare (Chan and Zhang 1999). In another symptom of urban bias, the state used the "unified purchase and marketing" (*tonggou tongxiao*) system that prevailed until recently to set the prices of agricultural goods low and the prices of industrial goods high—the so-called scissors gap—thus extracting value from agricultural production in the countryside to accomplish industrialization on the cheap (Tang, Chu, and Fan 1993; Cheng and Selden 1994; Wang 1997; Chan and Zhang 1999). At the same time, the hukou system guaranteed that peasants would be anchored to the countryside and would contribute to the geographical transfer of value to urban areas.

By the 1980s, however, it was clear that the pre-reform model was incompatible with reform efforts aiming at increasing efficiency and productivity. Gradually, therefore, labor market features were introduced into China's urban economy (Knight and Song 1995; Maurer-

Fazio 1995). In large cities such as Shanghai the tongyi fenpei system remained only in a residual manner by the mid-1990s (Davis 1999). School graduates still have access to state-sponsored channels for employment, but they now have the option of using market channels such as advertisements, job fairs, and employment agencies. Enterprise reforms replaced the "iron rice bowl" with performance-based hiring, firing, and compensation. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have begun to use labor contracts, adopt wage reform, and decentralize labor management. The number of private enterprises, foreign-funded firms, and other non-state-controlled businesses has significantly increased. At the same time, cities have begun to evolve from purely productive agents to becoming consuming entities characterized by consumerism, burgeoning markets, a division of labor, a thriving service sector, a growing middle class, and a more international and Western outlook (Lo, Pannell, and Welch 1977; French and Hamilton 1979; Lo 1994; Yang and Guo 1996; Wang 2000). Services such as domestic work, hotels and restaurants, repair shops, and hair salons have expanded side by side with factories that produce consumer goods for the world market.

Both the transformation of the urban economy and the infusion of foreign investment put pressure on labor supply, especially the supply of cheap labor, in urban areas. Many new jobs created, such as nannies, restaurant servers, and garment factory workers, are at the lower end of the occupational stratum and are not desired by regular urbanites. At the same time, labor market reforms and the expansion of the nonstate sector have made labor allocation more flexible and facilitated the hiring of "outside" labor (Christiansen 1992). While a new "pull" for labor is exerted by urban areas, the "push" from the countryside has always existed, and has been further exacerbated by the increasing magnitude of surplus agricultural labor due to improvements in agricultural productivity (Shen 1995; Shen and Spence 1995).[1]

Since the 1980s, in response to the pull and push for labor, the state has created a variety of additions to the hukou system and new identity statuses that facilitate the "temporary" migration of peasants to work in urban areas (see, e.g., Wang 1997; Wong and Huen 1998; Chan and Zhang 1999). Most notable among them are the "self-supplied food grain hukou" (*zili kouliang* hukou) in 1984, the "temporary residence permit" (*zanzhu zheng*) in 1985, and the increasing usage of the "identification card" (*shengfen zheng*) since the mid-1980s. In essence, peasants are permitted to migrate to towns and cities without obtaining urban hukou, but they will not in that case have access to subsidized benefits. The expanding labor market and the marketization of goods and services make their survival in the city possible. These changes exemplify the notion that state institutions constantly readjust and revise themselves in response to new demands and circumstances—an important feature of the transitional economy (Solinger 1999a). Whereas population movements prior to the 1980s were mostly urban to urban or rural to rural (Yang 1994, 120), the above changes have given impetus to rural-urban migration during the past two decades.

However, the state maintains its gate-keeping role over urban permanent residence by denying rural workers in the city local urban hukou. Their migration is considered "self-initiated," and they are considered temporary migrants. Without a local hukou, they are excluded from the more prestigious and desirable jobs—jobs that are reserved for the urban permanent residents. Instead, rural migrants are considered outsiders to the urban society, and most are relegated to the bottom rungs, picking up dirty, dangerous, and low-paying jobs and finding a marginalized and underclass existence in the city (Knight and Song 1995; Yang and Guo 1996). On the contrary, state-sponsored and selected migrants to the city are given urban citizenship and all the advantages that accompany it. These include migrants that have close institutional ties with the state, such as those who move to work in jobs assigned by the state and return migrants from previous state-sponsored migrations (Gu 1992), skilled and educated migrants such as professionals, and university students, who are among the most competitive and privileged groups in China. Their migration is accompanied by a local hukou, and they are considered permanent migrants. Not only do these highly selective migrants (Yang and Guo 1999) have the legitimacy and right to stay in the city, they also have access to an array of jobs closed to temporary migrants, including high-paying positions with full benefits. They and the native urbanites are given priorities in the labor market.

In many ways, the hukou system serves as an internal passport system in China (Chan, Liu, and Yang 1999; Chan and Zhang 1999), granting urban citizenship to migrants deemed deserving by the city but not to peasant migrants brought in because of the cheap labor they provide. Indeed, researchers have compared peasant migrants' experiences with undocumented immigrants in the U.S. and foreign workers in Germany and Japan (Roberts 1997; Solinger 1999b). Though some peasant migrants have become successful entrepreneurs by tapping into family and native-place resources (Ma and Xiang 1998), success stories are by far the exception rather than the rule.

Despite the relaxation of migration restrictions,

hukou continues to symbolize one's geographical (rural versus urban) origin, connotes one's socioeconomic status, and, above all, defines one's access, opportunities, and constraints (Christiansen 1990; Cheng and Selden 1994). In the view of the state, permanent migrants are official, orderly, and "within state plan," whereas temporary migrants are unofficial, haphazard, and "outside of state plan." A variety of other terminologies have been used to describe this dichotomy—hukou versus non-hukou migration, "plan" versus "nonplan" (or self-initiated) migration, formal versus informal migration, and de jure versus de facto migration (Gu 1992; Yang 1994; Li 1995; Chan, Liu, and Yang 1999; Fan 1999). However, the terms "permanent migrants" and "temporary migrants" are by far the most descriptive of these two distinct tracks of migration in China, and are the preferred terms in this paper (e.g., Goldstein and Goldstein 1991; Goldstein and Guo 1992; Yang 1993, 2000; Yang and Guo 1996).

Another addition to the hukou system—the "blue stamp (*lanyin*) hukou"—was formally endorsed in 1992 and has become popular in large cities since the mid- and late 1990s. It aimed at attracting the most desirable elements of the migrant population by providing them with right of abode and certain welfare provisions in cities (Wang 1997; Wong and Huen 1998; Chan and Zhang 1999). The criteria for obtaining a blue stamp hukou include a large investment or home purchase and age, education, and skills. Most rural migrants are not eligible for and cannot afford this relatively new type of hukou, which in essence creams off the highly educated, skilled, and/or monied for the benefit of the local government's coffer and the stimulation of local economies. In this regard, the blue stamp hukou does little to mediate the dualism inherited from the decade-old hukou system. Because the blue stamp hukou is relatively new and is still of small magnitude, it is not included in this article's analysis.

Inadequacies of Noninstitutional Approaches

Most migration and labor market theories developed for capitalist market economies ignore how state institutions shape the opportunity structure in the labor market. Here, I follow Reskin and Hartmann (1986, 75–80) and define opportunity structure as the nature of employment opportunities that are available, known, and open to people. The neoclassical perspective views migration and labor market allocation purely as functions of labor supply and demand, assuming unrestricted labor mobility and unrestricted access to job information and opportunities. In China, peasant migrants do not have unrestricted labor mobility, and their lack of local hukou limits their access to desirable jobs in the city. The supply of cheap labor is not only a function of agricultural surplus labor, but is also—and most importantly—regulated by gate-keeping policies that control who can and cannot be hired. By making only the low-paying and less desirable jobs available to peasant migrants, the state has, in essence, deepened the formation of a secondary sector by maintaining a continued supply of cheap labor to it. Because temporary migrants lack permanent resident status, their calculations tend to focus on short-term monetary gains rather than long-term investment of human capital, which deviates from the Todaro-type (1976) assumption that migrants respond to expected and long-term returns. In addition, the neoclassical logic treats migrants as a homogenous group and does not explain the bifurcation between elitist permanent migrants and disadvantaged temporary migrants.

Though the behavioral approach downplays rational economic decision-making, like the neoclassical perspective it does not emphasize institutional factors. In the Chinese context, permanent migrants' institutional affiliations with the state translate into greater opportunities in the urban labor market; conversely, temporary migrants' lack of these affiliations renders them marginalized labor in the city. Individuals' job search process is not only a function of social network and personal relations; it also reflects the degree of their affiliations with the state.

The structural approach's focus on wider contextual processes and labor market segmentation makes it a more appealing theoretical alternative for China. In the Chinese city, temporary migrants are indeed being channeled into jobs similar to those in the secondary sector in other third world cities. However, the labor market segmentation theory assumes homogeneity among migrants in developing countries (Breman 1976) and does not address their differentiations by their affiliations with the state. In the Chinese city, temporary migrants are not spillovers from the primary sector; rather, they are blocked by state institutions from entering the primary sector. The incorporation of an institutional perspective, especially one involving state institutions, would complicate labor market analyses and highlight the role of the state in shaping the opportunity structure and deepening labor market segmentation.

Another common drawback of noninstitutional approaches is their neglect of the interaction between migration and labor market processes on one hand and the provision of social services on the other. The cases of both Russia and China illustrate that institutions are interwoven with one another and that migration and labor market processes are intricately related to housing, edu-

cation, health care, public security, and other services in the city. Though this article does not examine in detail the provision of these services in China, the empirical analysis reveals evidence that peasant migrants are outsiders to the city not only in terms of access to jobs but also in terms of access to other services. In the next section I discuss qualitative evidence of these experiences based on a survey in Sichuan and Anhui.

Experiences of the "Outsiders"

The opportunities of peasant and temporary migrants in China are deeply influenced by state institutions. Their migration and labor market experiences reflect their outsider status in the city. To illustrate this, I use selected information from a 1995 study of 300 households in Sichuan and Anhui (NNJYZ 1995),[2] two major origin provinces of rural-urban migrants. The study produces first-person accounts of migration experiences. This invaluable and rare source of qualitative data can shed light on individual-level meanings and experiences in relation to large-scale sociopolitical institutions such as hukou. In the following, I select quotes that capture the typical sentiments expressed by the interviewed migrants in that survey. This Sichuan man who works as a construction worker in Shenzhen, Guangdong stresses the importance of hukou:

> . . . factories and enterprises always recruit workers with local hukou first. We from the countryside have few options; construction is about the only work available to men from rural areas. (NNJYZ 1995, 264–67)

He is joined by this Anhui man who works as a handyman in Nanjing, Jiangsu:

> Peasant migrants are all in menial work—work that nobody else wants to do. (NNJYZ 1995, 355–57)

and by this Sichuan woman who works in an eyeglass factory in Shenzhen, Guangdong:

> We [peasant migrants] are always the frontline production workers. Better jobs like office secretaries are reserved for the locals. (NNJYZ 1995, 59–61)

These three cases illustrate that peasant migrants are disadvantaged in the urban labor market and that they are channeled into jobs that are considered less desirable and are shunned by local urbanites—in essence, the secondary sector in Chinese cities.

Though SOEs do employ rural migrants, such migrants are mostly hired as contract workers and are denied the benefits to which permanent workers are entitled (Maurer-Fazio 1995; Solinger 1999b). For example, a man working in a state-owned construction enterprise in Hefei, Anhui comments:

> Our work is dangerous and difficult. I work at least 12 hours a day and make only 11 yuan (U.S.$1.30).[3] There is practically no compensation for work-related injuries. Our contract states that compensation is provided only for work-related deaths and lifetime disabilities. Even in those cases the compensation is a one-shot deal and is low—maybe 10,000 to 20,000 yuan (U.S.$1,200–2,400). But you are completely on our own if only your arms or eyes are injured . . . so we are very careful not to get injured. (NNJYZ 1995, 411–13)

The inferior institutional positions of peasants legitimize the widespread exploitation of their labor (Knight, Song, and Huaibin 1999; Solinger 1999b). The story of this Sichuanese woman is typical among rural-urban migrants:

> I work in a toy factory in Dongguan, Guangdong . . . I work eight hours everyday, including weekends, and get 1 yuan extra for four hours of overtime. We are not allowed sick leave. Even if I am sick, I must still go to work and would not let my boss know because I am afraid to. We eat and sleep at the factory—12 to a room . . . it's too crowded . . . We are paid by the piece; I don't know how they calculate my wage—the factory doesn't tell us how our wages are calculated . . . I make about 200 yuan a month, and I pay 60 yuan for my meals in the factory. (NNJYZ 1995, 85–86)

The social categorization of peasant migrants as outsiders results from institutional barriers against them and is especially blatant in the workplace. As outsiders, they must apply for and carry all kinds of permits. For example, a worker in a plastics factory in Shenzhen describes:

> Before I started working in the factory, I had to obtain an identity card, a health certificate, and a "single" (unmarried) certificate. At the factory, I obtained a temporary residence permit, a factory permit, and another health certificate. The factory deducted the permit fees from my salary . . . If you are caught in the streets without a temporary residence permit, the Public Security Bureau can fine you 300 to 500 yuan. (NNJYZ 1995, 94–96)

Most factories have gates, which in addition to providing security also symbolize the impermeability between the temporary migrants and the world outside the factory. A migrant woman in Dongguan describes:

> I seldom leave the dorm; the factory has a security guard; everyone of us has a factory permit—without the permit you cannot get in . . . after work I am usually too tired and go to bed early. (NNJYZ 1995, 85–86)

The notion of outsiders is also rooted in the cultural practices of membership in the Chinese society. The concepts and vocabularies of migration connote one's membership with respect to the host community rather than

to the act of migration. For example, the literal translations of migrant—*qianyi zhe* or *qianyi di ren*—are rarely used. In their places come terms emphasizing migrants' lack of a permanent home—for example, the "floating population" or *liudong renkou*—and their lack of membership in the host community—for example, "people from outside" (*wailairen* or *waidiren*) (Duan 1998). Because the bulk of peasant migrants work in industrial and services sectors, their migration is commonly associated with *dagong*—literally "being employed"—and they are called *dagongmei* (young working women) or *dagongzai* (young working men). Their meaning to the Chinese city is mainly tied to their membership in a hardworking, tolerant, cheap, and disposable labor force (Zhou 1998; Knight, Song, and Huaibin 1999). In contrast, the urbanites are the "insiders" or the natives—*bendiren*—who are entitled to the membership in the city. Differences in dialects, cuisine, and regional cultures further segregate the peasant migrants from the urbanites (Duan 1998). These comments from peasant migrants illustrate their precarious and peripheral positions with respect to the urbanites:

> When we *waidiren* walk or bike we give way to the locals. They'll give you a hard time if you're not careful. (NNJYZ 1995, 267–70)

> We don't interact with the locals in Guangzhou . . . we don't understand their dialect. They look down upon us. (NNJYZ 1995, 234–35)

> When we have problems we would never go to the local government or Public Security Bureau to get help. Once they notice your accent they will ignore you and protect the interests of the locals. Regardless of whether you are right or wrong, you are doomed. (NNJYZ 1995, 132–35)

Though migrants without local hukou may have stayed in the city for an extended period of time, they are considered "temporary" migrants in the eye of the state. Many migrants have few options other than returning to their home villages in the future. A man from Sichuan working in a repair shop in Guangzhou comments:

> Will I be staying in Guangdong for good? Absolutely not. We don't have [local] hukou there, which makes life very difficult. My children will be going to school soon. Without a hukou in Guangzhou we cannot afford sending them to school there. (NNJYZ 1995, 30–34)

Peasant migrants are unlikely to have long-term plans in the city, which is simply viewed as a place of employment and income gain (Yang 2000), as one construction worker in Shenzhen comments:

> We [migrant workers] are here to make money, and we will try to be as tolerant as possible. We are tough and will go anywhere and will adjust under almost any situation. (NNJYZ 1995, 225–27)

The lack of job security also results in high job turnover and promotes peasant migrants' emphasis on short-term monetary gain, as illustrated by another construction worker in Shenzhen:

> Bosses can fire you or fine you as they like. I will immediately switch to a new job if it offers higher wage. (NNJYZ 1995, 264–67)

The above quotes support the argument that the state and its institutions and policies, including hukou and those that distribute urban services, have formalized an opportunity structure that induces and legitimizes labor market segmentation based on one's resident status in the city. Though this opportunity structure has been in place for decades, changes in state policies that permit rural-urban migration but not urban citizenship for peasant migrants have brought its segmenting effects to the fore. The rest of this article focuses on a survey I conducted in Guangzhou. The analysis is guided by a comparative approach that seeks to identify the most salient differences among three subpopulations that have different resident statuses in the Chinese city: the nonmigrants, the permanent migrants, and the temporary migrants (Guangdong wailai nongmingong lianhe ketizu 1995; Li 1997).

The Guangzhou Survey

Background

The most appropriate sites for studying migration and labor market in China are cities that have received large numbers of permanent and temporary migrants and where changes in the urban economy have accelerated demands for labor. For these reasons, I selected Guangzhou for this article's quantitative analysis (Figure 1). One of the largest cities in China, Guangzhou is the provincial capital of Guangdong. According to the 1990 Census, Guangdong was the most attractive destination of interprovincial migration and had one of the highest levels of intraprovincial mobility among all provinces (Fan 1996). The census records a total of 35.3 million internal migrants between 1985 and 1990, of whom 12.5 percent, or 4.4 million, were in Guangdong (Table 1).[4] The in-migration rate in Guangdong was 7.8 percent, twice the provincial average (3.9 percent) across China. Temporary migrants were especially prominent in the province, as illustrated by a rate of 4.6 percent compared with the provincial average of 1.9 percent. The 1995 One-Percent Population Sample Survey (SSB 1997)



Figure 1. The city of Guangzhou, the Pearl River Delta, and the Guangdong province. See Lin (1997, 80) for the delineation of the Pearl River Delta.

again documents significant gaps in the in-migration rate between Guangdong and China's provincial average (Table 1).

The 1990 Census estimates a total of 16.2 million temporary migrants in China (Table 1). It is widely known, however, that census-type surveys underestimate the actual volume of migration, especially that of temporary migration.[5] The 1997 Temporary Population Survey (Gonganbu huzheng guanliju 1997) reports a total of 37.3 million temporary migrants[6] who had registered with local Public Security Bureaus, of whom 28.7 percent or 10.7 million were in Guangdong (Table 1). However, even the 1997 survey underestimates temporary migrants, because it excludes those who did not register with local authorities. The standard estimates of temporary migrants made by scholars and journalists were 70 million in the late 1980s and in the range of 100 million by the mid-1990s (Solinger 1999a, 18). Regardless of the discrepancies in estimates, however, Guangdong and its cities are clearly prominent destinations of both permanent and temporary migrants.

Guangdong has benefited immensely from its ties and proximity to Hong Kong, a major source of foreign investment into China since the late 1970s. Such investment has created jobs requiring cheap labor and has been a major reason for the large number of temporary migrants in Guangdong. Within the province, migrants are especially prominent in the Pearl River Delta, which consists of special economic zones, large cities, and rapidly growing urban and rural areas serving as Hong Kong's production hinterland (Sit 1989; Lin 1997). Guangzhou is part of the Pearl River Delta, is close to Hong Kong (150 km), and has received large amounts of foreign investment from and via Hong Kong (Li 1993). Both the diversification of Guangzhou's economy and the infusion of foreign investment into the city have exerted a pull for migrants.

Detailed examinations of migration and labor market processes call for in-depth information that census-type surveys lack. In order to examine these processes, in 1998 I conducted a questionnaire survey in Guangzhou[7] that includes three types of respondents—305 nonmigrants, 300 permanent migrants, and 911 temporary migrants. A larger number of temporary migrants were included because they are the newest and most dynamic migrants in Chinese cities and because their migration and labor

Table 1. Estimates of Migration Volumes in China and Guangdong

	1990 Census		1995 One-Percent Population Survey		1997 Temporary Population Survey	
	China	Guangdong	China	Guangdong	China	Guangdong
Migrants (000s)	35,331	4,400	33,230	4,090		
Rate (%)	3.9	7.8	3.3	5.8		
Intraprovincial migrants (000s)	23,797	3,202	22,569	2,143		
Rate (%)	2.3	5.7	2.1	3.0		
Interprovincial migrants (000s)	11,534	1,198	10,661	1,947		
Rate (%)	1.6	2.1	1.2	2.8		
Permanent migrants (000s)	19,128	1,801				
Rate (%)	2.0	3.2				
Temporary migrants (000s)	16,203	2,599			37,275	10,682
Rate (%)	1.9	4.6				
Less than one year (000s)					27,501	8,271
One year or more (000s)					9,773	2,412

Sources: Gonganbu huzheng guanliju (1997); SSB (1997). Also, see endnote 4.
Notes: Please see endnotes 5 and 6 for the variations in definitions among the three sources. Migration rate is defined as the proportion of migrants among the population ages 5+ in 1990 for the 1990 Census, which only records migrants ages 5+. Since the 1995 One-Percent Population Sample Survey includes migrants of all ages, the respective migration rates are computed as proportions of the entire population in 1995. Migration rates for the 1997 Temporary Population Survey cannot be computed because the survey includes large proportions of migrants excluded from the official population estimates. In all cases, the migration rate for China refers to the provincial average.

market processes are less well understood. Rather than examining only permanent migrants and temporary migrants, the survey was designed to reveal a more complete picture of the urban labor market involving the urban nonmigrants as well. Though nonmigrants and permanent migrants both have local hukou, I treat them as different groups because of permanent migrants' selectivity and their close ties to state institutions.

The survey sample was arrived at using stratified quota sampling, with stratification across both major occupational categories and geographic districts in Guangzhou. The appendix to this article describes the sampling framework and the sampling process in detail. Specifically, the sampling framework aims at including a wide variety of occupations and at adjusting for the expansion of commerce and services in the city between 1990 and 1998. In the survey, "nonmigrants" refers to individuals who had lived in Guangzhou for at least fifteen years and whose hukou were in Guangzhou; "permanent migrants" are those who had moved to Guangzhou since 1990 and whose hukou were in Guangzhou; and "temporary migrants" refers to those who had stayed in Guangzhou for at least three months but whose hukou were not in Guangzhou. The survey included only individuals ages 15 or older.

The Guangzhou survey has two limitations that must be taken into consideration when interpreting the findings. First, a survey of one site, albeit a major city, is not necessarily representative of other urban areas in China. Second, unlike the census, the size and occupational and gender distributions of the survey sample are functions of the sampling framework (see the appendix). Despite these limitations, Guangzhou is a major magnet for migrants of all kinds, it has a large, diverse, and changing economy, and it has a rapidly expanding urban labor market. For these reasons, Guangzhou is among the best field sites for studying the relations between migration and the urban labor market in China.

Demographic Characteristics

Comparisons between the Guangzhou survey sample and the 1990 Census's Guangzhou sample[8] are instrumental for assessing the quality of the survey data. The details are reported elsewhere (Fan forthcoming) and are not repeated in this article, but the similarities between the two samples in age and sex structure, migration origin, and educational attainments are worth noting. As in the 1990 Census, migrants in the Guangzhou survey were younger than nonmigrants (Table 2), and both permanent and temporary migrants were heavily concentrated in the 15–39 age group. Migrants had higher sex ratios than nonmigrants, and permanent migrants had higher sex ratios than temporary migrants. The vast majority of nonmigrants and permanent migrants held nonagricultural registration classification; only a minority of temporary migrants did so. Also, the place-of-birth data show that compared to nonmigrants and permanent migrants, who are largely of urban origin (cities and towns), temporary migrants are mostly of rural origin. Finally, the educational attainments of the survey sample

Table 2. Demographic and Migration Characteristics: The Guangzhou Survey

	Nonmigrants	Permanent Migrants	Temporary Migrants
N	305	300	911
Age			
Mean	35.9	29.8	27.5
15–39 (%)	65.2	89.7	90.2
Sex ratio (M/F)	107	142	128
Nonagricultural registration classification (%)	92.1	97.7	32.4
Urban place of birth (%)	90.8	69.4	29.9
Education (%)			
Illiterate/primary	8.9	2.7	17.3
Junior high	26.2	5.3	53.3
Senior high	35.7	13.7	19.1
Above senior high	29.2	78.3	10.2
Occupation (%)			
Professional	17.2	46.0	7.2
Commerce	26.0	27.9	26.5
Services	18.2	16.1	27.9
Industrial	32.8	8.1	33.9
Agriculture	5.7	2.0	4.5
Origin type (%)			
City	—	59.5	17.0
Town	—	22.4	25.3
County	—	18.1	57.6
Interprovincial move (%)	—	49.5	53.9
Interprovincial source (%)			
Eastern	—	37.2	16.8
Central	—	51.4	66.9
Western	—	11.5	16.2
Reason for migration (%)			
Job transfer	—	15.7	1.3
Job assignment	—	24.0	0.4
Industry/business*	—	14.3	93.1
Study/training	—	28.3	0.7
Friends/relatives	—	—	—
Retirement	—	—	—
Joining family	—	5.7	2.1
Marriage	—	7.3	1.3
Other	—	4.7	1.1

* In the survey, "industry/business" moves are considered the same as "self-initiated" moves.

are similar to those of the Census sample, essentially repeating the latter's educational ranking, where permanent migrants were the most highly educated and temporary migrants the least educated.

As described earlier, the occupational distribution of the Guangzhou survey results from a predetermined sampling framework. I used the five occupational categories consistent with conventional definitions in China: professional (including administrative), commerce, services, industrial, and agriculture. While professional and agriculture are respectively at the highest and lowest ends of the occupational stratum, the statuses of commerce, services, and industrial work are not clearly established (Stinner, Xu, and Wei 1993). This is partly a result of the ongoing transformation of Chinese cities, where new commerce, services, and industrial jobs have rapidly emerged, and partly due to the large variations of job statuses within each category. Though the survey's sampling framework arrived at occupational distributions that are different and less concentrated than those of the Census sample, the former is probably a more realistic representation of Guangzhou's economic structure in the late 1990s (see the appendix) than is the latter. In addition, the sampling framework maintains the modes from the Census sample—namely, industry (32.8 percent) for nonmigrants, professional (46.0 percent) for permanent migrants, and industry (33.9 percent) for temporary migrants (Table 2), as well as the respective occupational ranking, with permanent migrants at the top and temporary migrants at the bottom.

In short, comparisons of the Guangzhou survey sample and the Census' Guangzhou sample indicate that the survey is a reasonably good source. Most importantly, the data highlight important socioeconomic differences among the three subpopulations, and underscore hukou as an important definition of social and economic stratification in Guangzhou. Contrasts in terms of human capital are marked by a hierarchy in educational attainment: permanent migrants are the most highly educated and temporary migrants the least educated. These discrepancies in human capital and residence status have probably reinforced differentials in labor market opportunities. The next two sections deal more specifically with migration and labor market processes.

Migration Processes: Spatial Patterns, Reasons, and Decision-Making

Permanent migrants and temporary migrants have vastly differing migration processes and patterns. In the Guangzhou survey, the majority of permanent migrants came from cities and the majority of temporary migrants originated from counties (Table 2), again underscoring the urban origin of permanent migrants and the rural origin of temporary migrants. Respectively, 49.5 percent and 53.9 percent of permanent and temporary migrants were interprovincial migrants. The central region was the most popular source of interprovincial permanent and temporary migrants, but a significant proportion of permanent migrants (37.2 percent) came from the eastern region.[9] This pattern suggests that permanent mi-

grants are more likely than temporary migrants to come from more developed origins.

The contrast between permanent migrants and temporary migrants is even more marked in their reasons for migration. The standard nine "reasons for migration" listed in Table 2 have their origins in Chinese census-type surveys. It is important to note that these "reasons" connote the means and types of migration and the degree of state involvement, rather than the motives behind population movement (Fan 1999).[10] "Job transfer" and "job assignment" refer to the state's allocation of human resources by assigning school graduates and transferring workers to specific jobs and regions. "Study/training" refers to migration to attend schools or training programs. Since admission to higher-education institutes is subject to state planning and is accompanied by local hukou, "study/training" also reflects significant state involvement. By contrast, "industry/business" refers to self-initiated moves for engaging in industrial, commercial, or trade sectors and is considered migration "outside of state plan." "Friends/relatives" refers to migration to seek the help of friends and relatives, and is mostly associated with self-initiated migration. In short, while "job transfer," "job assignment" and "study/training" denote the state's significant role in monitoring human resources and the labor market, "industry/business" and "friends/relatives" are most closely identified with market forces.

"Study/training," "job assignment," and "job transfer" were the most prominent migration reasons among the surveyed permanent migrants, while temporary migrants were overwhelmingly "industry/business" or "self-initiated" migrants. The importance of "study/training" reflects the concentration of educational institutions in Guangzhou. Entrants to universities are almost always offered local urban hukou and are by definition permanent migrants. The differences in migration reason highlight the varied opportunities available to migrants. Migrants whose jobs are allocated by the state and migrants for education purposes—"within state plan" migrants—are eligible for local hukou in cities, while "outside of state plan" migrants that move on their own initiatives and are not sponsored by the state are by and large not eligible for local hukou and must appeal to market resources.

Unlike census-type surveys, the Guangzhou survey was designed to analyze migration motives and decision-making (Table 3). "Job search" was the most important motive among both permanent and temporary migrants surveyed, and "study" and "increase income" were the second leading motive respectively for permanent migrants and temporary migrants. The prominence of "job search" and "increase income" among temporary migrants indicates that immediate monetary return was a key incentive for their moves. Their reasons for leaving their origins—63.5 percent citing "low income" and 19.1 percent "few jobs," compared with 28.0 percent and 5.7 percent, respectively, among permanent migrants—further highlight the important role of short-term economic return. Finally, the reasons for choosing Guangzhou as the destination[11] depict the economic pull of the city. Specifically, "higher wages" and "ease in finding jobs" accounted for, respectively, 55.3 percent of the responses by temporary migrants and 49.8 percent of those by permanent migrants, whereas "proximity to origin" was not an important reason among either group.

Table 3. Migration Considerations: The Guangzhou Survey

	Permanent Migrants	Temporary Migrants
Motive for migration (%)		
Job search	38.5	55.7
Increase income	11.7	37.7
Family/marriage	15.1	3.2
Study	28.8	1.1
Other	6.0	2.2
Reason for leaving origin (%)		
Low income	28.0	63.5
Few jobs	5.7	19.1
Family	16.0	8.8
Study	39.3	0.6
Other	11.0	8.1
Reason for choosing Guangzhou* (%)		
Higher wages	30.8	23.2
Ease in finding jobs	19.0	32.1
Family/relatives	17.7	26.2
Proximity to origin	12.9	13.0
Other	19.6	5.5

* Multiple responses are permitted. All responses are included in the percentage computation.

The above analysis of migration considerations, combined with earlier observations about migrant origins, suggest that temporary migrants in Guangzhou are mostly "upward" movers responding to the large gaps in income and employment opportunities between the city and their origins (Ma, Liaw, and Zeng 1997). In other words, to temporary migrants the push from the origins is as strong as the pull from Guangzhou. Though permanent migrants may also be "upward" movers, their migration origins and considerations suggest that, to them, pull forces are stronger than push forces.

Labor Market Processes: Job Search and Ownership Sectors

Comparisons of the job-search experiences among nonmigrants, permanent migrants, and temporary mi-

grants can shed some light on the processes by which the urban labor market is segmented and how that segmentation is related to resident status. Table 4 shows that "income" was the leading job search criterion of all three groups and that it was most prominent among temporary migrants. "Nature of work unit," referring specifically to the "ownership sector" of the employment (see below), was a criterion for respectively 18.6 percent and 23.0 percent of nonmigrants and permanent migrants, but only 4.7 percent of temporary migrants. These differences again suggest that income was an important incentive for all migration but was especially important for temporary migrants, whereas nonmonetary job attributes such as ownership sector were also high among nonmigrants' and permanent migrants' considerations. In addition, "stability" of the job was quite important, but "location" and "benefits" were of low importance to all three groups.

Nonmigrants, permanent migrants, and temporary migrants differ in their sources of information and channels for employment (Table 4). Though "relatives in Guangzhou" was the leading source of labor market information for all groups, "relatives outside Guangzhou" was a prominent source of information for temporary migrants but not for permanent migrants. Social networks, including those from home villages, were the dominant source of information for temporary migrants. On the other hand, higher proportions of nonmigrants and permanent migrants than temporary migrants used information via "advertisement" and "work unit/school." Responses to "how did you find this job?" indicate that the majority of all three groups, especially temporary migrants, relied on their own searches. Respectively, 42.6 percent and 30.7 percent of nonmigrants and permanent migrants found their present jobs by "recruitment" or "work unit assignment," reasons that accounted for only 8.3 percent of temporary migrants. In summary, though social networks and self-initiation are important to all three groups, nonmigrants and permanent migrants are more connected to institutional and organized sources and channels than are temporary migrants, who must rely on informal resources, including social networks in the origin and in the destination.

Besides occupational distribution, another important indicator of labor market segmentation is the distribu-

Table 4. Job Search and Sector: The Guangzhou Survey

	Nonmigrants	Permanent Migrants	Temporary Migrants
Criteria for job search (%)			
Income	40.9	45.3	62.7
Nature of work unit	18.6	23.0	4.7
Stability	24.9	13.2	18.8
Location	1.7	7.4	3.6
Benefits	4.7	5.7	3.2
Other	5.3	4.1	3.7
Information about labor market (%)			
Relatives in Guangzhou	50.8	49.0	41.2
Relatives outside Guangzhou	0.7	4.7	36.9
Advertisement	11.5	15.3	8.8
Work unit/school	22.4	11.0	0.2
Agencies in Guangzhou	4.1	6.0	4.1
Agencies outside Guangzhou	0	0.3	1.7
Other	9.8	13.7	6.6
How did you find this job? (%)			
Self	55.7	64.0	87.1
Recruitment	23.9	21.7	7.6
Work unit assignment	18.7	9.0	0.7
Other	1.6	5.3	4.6
Ownership sector (%)			
State-owned	43.3	57.1	16.4
Collective-owned	13.0	5.1	9.1
New-economy	22.0	20.9	55.0
Self-employed	21.7	16.9	19.4
Stability			
Number of jobs (mean)	2.2	1.9	2.5
Years at present job (mean)	9.9	3.9	2.7

tion of ownership sectors—state-owned, collective-owned, "new-economy," and self-employed. Both the state- and the collective-owned sectors are traditional socialist-type components of the state sector. This has shrunk in size in recent years; however, in large and older cities such as Guangzhou, it remains prominent. At the same time, recent reforms of SOEs and changes in the urban economy have promoted shifts of the labor force to the nonstate sector, which is relatively new and complex and includes employment in enterprises other than state-owned and collective-owned enterprises. This subsector, to which I refer in this article as the "new-economy" sector, is mainly represented by foreign-invested enterprises and by private, family-owned, and individually owned enterprises. It is especially characterized by jobs in industry and services, and is very important to temporary migrants who have little access to institutional resources and whose opportunities mainly lie outside the state sector. Self-employment is another relatively new means of livelihood outside the state sector, involving employers and individuals who own their businesses as opposed to being employees in enterprises. Both the new-economy sector and the self-employed one have rapidly gained prominence since the 1980s (Davis 1999).

SOEs accounted for 43.3 percent of nonmigrants and 57.1 percent of permanent migrants, but only 16.4 percent of temporary migrants (Table 4). The majority of temporary migrants were in the new-economy sector. These data again support the notion that nonmigrants and permanent migrants have greater access to well-established and institutional labor market processes, while temporary migrants are mostly channeled to newer and less institutionalized segments of the urban economy. In addition, roughly one in five of all nonmigrants, permanent migrants, and temporary migrants were in the self-employed sector, indicating that self-employment has emerged as an important segment of Guangzhou's labor market.

Finally, the rate of job turnover was the highest among temporary migrants and lowest among nonmigrants (Table 4). The relatively small number of jobs nonmigrants held, despite their older age (Table 2), suggests a high level of job stability among them, further illustrated by their long duration in their current job (averaging 9.9 years) at the time of the survey. Temporary migrants' higher job frequency and shorter duration at the present job depict a relatively high level of job turnover, which underscores not only their association with the more insecure and fluid segments of the labor market but also their highly income-driven job search approaches.

Modeling Permanent and Temporary Migration

Evidence presented thus far indicates that substantial contrasts exist among the three subpopulations, especially between permanent migrants and temporary migrants. To quantify the relationships between resident status and the migration process, I analyzed these differences via a logistic regression analysis (Table 5). The dependent variable is coded one for permanent migrants and zero for temporary migrants. In essence, the analysis evaluates how well the independent variables predict migration that is accompanied by urban hukou versus migration not accompanied by urban hukou. The advantage of multivariate methods, such as logistic regression, over descriptive statistics is that an independent variable's contribution can be assessed while other independent variables are held constant. For example, in order to assess the strength of institutional factors, it is important to isolate the contribution of human capital factors.

Four groups of independent variables are included in the analysis: demographic, location, motive, and access. It is expected that individuals who are more highly educated, from urban backgrounds, and relatively less concerned with monetary return and who have greater access to state-sponsored and institutional opportunities are more likely to be permanent migrants, while individuals who are less highly educated, from rural areas, and highly motivated by monetary return and who rely on their own resources are more likely to be temporary migrants.

A relatively high ρ^2 (0.65) and a high percentage of correctly classified observations (93.2 percent) suggest that the independent variables as a whole are successful in identifying the salient differences between permanent migrants and temporary migrants (Table 5). Because odds ratios are unit-dependent, they are reported for reference purpose only. The size of standardized regression coefficients and associated significance tests are more reliable indicators of the relative importance of the independent variables in predicting the permanent migrant versus temporary migrant outcome.

The overall results support the expectations described earlier. The two dummy variables, SENIOR HIGH and ABOVE SENIOR HIGH, are both significant and positively related to permanent migration. The coefficient of ABOVE SENIOR HIGH is the second largest among all independent variables, which suggests that higher education is especially influential in increasing the likelihood of permanent migration versus temporary migration. The three location variables—INTRAPROVINCIAL, INTERPROVINCIAL, and PLACE OF BIRTH—are all significant and positively related to permanent migra-

Table 5. Logistic Regression on Permanent and Temporary Migrants: The Guangzhou Survey

Independent Variable	Standardized Regression Coefficient	Wald Statistic	Odds Ratio
Demographic			
EDUCATION (reference: below senior high)			
*SENIOR HIGH	1.85****	31.05	8.13
*ABOVE SENIOR HIGH	3.14****	81.26	21.42
Location			
ORIGIN (reference: central and western regions)			
*INTRAPROVINCIAL	0.85***	6.70	2.10
*INTERPROVINCIAL (eastern region = 1)	0.71***	6.80	2.88
*PLACE OF BIRTH (urban = 1)	0.77**	6.12	1.96
Motive (reference: non-income- or job-related)			
*INCOME/JOB	−0.45	2.45	0.60
Access			
*SELF-INITIATED	−3.52****	119.32	0.03
JOB INFORMATION (reference: non-Guangzhou or institutional sources)			
*GUANGZHOU	1.17****	10.94	2.74
*INSTITUTION	0.80***	6.74	2.74
Model chi-square		849.66****	
−2 log likelihood with intercept		1302.11	
−2 log likelihood of model		452.46	
ρ^2		0.65	
Percentage correctly classified		93.21	
Number of cases		1134	
Degrees of freedom		9	

Notes:
1. Dependent variable is coded 0 for temporary migrants and 1 for permanent migrants.
2. * Indicates dummy variable.
3. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ** is 0.05, *** is 0.01, and **** is 0.001.
4. $\rho^2 = 1 - (-2 \text{ log likelihood of model} / -2 \text{ log likelihood with intercept})$.

tion, indicating that migrants from within Guangdong, from the eastern region, and from urban origins are more likely to be permanent migrants.

INCOME/JOB is coded one for migrants who considered income increase or job search as the main motive for migration, and zero otherwise. Though it is not significant, its negative sign suggests that migrants most driven by income and job-related motives are more likely to be temporary migrants. SELF-INITIATED is coded one for "industry/business" or "self-initiated" migration and zero for other types of migration, and is the most influential independent variable in the analysis. Its negative sign indicates that "self-initiated" migrants without government sponsorship are more likely to be temporary migrants. Finally, both JOB INFORMATION variables are positively and significantly related to permanent migration. GUANGZHOU is coded one if "relatives in Guangzhou" or "agencies in Guangzhou" were the main source of information about the labor market, and INSTITUTION is coded one if "advertisement" or "work unit/school" was the main source. They are compared with the reference group of variables "relatives outside Guangzhou," "agencies outside Guangzhou," and "other" (Table 3). The results suggest that migrants having greater access to information in Guangzhou and to institutional sources are more likely to be permanent migrants.

The logistic regression results point to the important roles of institutional factors such as government sponsorship and channels for employment *independent* of migrants' attributes, such as their human capital and their origins. In other words, high education and urban background only partially explain permanent migrants' ability to obtain urban hukou. Likewise, temporary migrants' low education and rural backgrounds are not the only reasons for their not obtaining urban hukou. This finding underscores structural mechanisms whereby hukou status is not simply associated with the abled and competitive but is, above all, a gate-keeping mechanism that stratifies the urban labor market and relegates peasant migrants, regardless of their abilities, to peripheral, insecure, and inferior positions.

Labor Market Processes: Entering the Labor Market, Sectoral and Occupational Shifts

The first job one gets and whether one stays in the same ownership sector and occupation during job change can shed further light on the opportunity structure in the labor market. To this end, I analyzed the shifts that accompany the change from a previous nonworking status or job to the present job. Because very few respondents engaged in agriculture during the time of the Guangzhou survey (see Table 2), they are omitted from this analysis.

By "first-time job seekers," I mean individuals whose jobs at the time of the survey were their first jobs—who accounted for 30.1 percent of all respondents—plus those who were agricultural workers prior to holding the present job.[12] In other words, first-time job seekers include all those who entered the urban labor market for the first time. The high proportions of nonmigrants and permanent migrants entering SOEs comprise a testimony to these migrants' access to institutional resources such as job assignment by state agencies, and highlight the association between state-sector employment and local hukou (Figure 2). On the other hand, the majority of temporary migrants entered the new-economy sector, further supporting the argument that they have little access to state-sponsored employment.

For respondents who were not first-time job seekers, I computed the ownership sectors' retention rates and destination rates. Retention rate defined as the percentage of respondents in one sector that remained in the same sector after job change, is an indicator of the ownership sectors' relative strengths to retain labor. The rates are sector-specific and do not add up to 100 (Figures 2 and 3). Destination rate, defined as the percentage of sectoral-shift respondents who shifted into a specific sector, denotes the relative abilities of sectors to attract labor from other sectors. Destination rates are group-specific and add up to 100. Both retention rates and destination rates measure the respective sectors' attractiveness to labor. Most of all, however, they illustrate the varied opportunities the sectors offer to workers with different resident statuses.

The highest retention rates were in SOEs and the new-economy sector for nonmigrants, the self-employed sector and SOEs for permanent migrants, and the new-economy sector for temporary migrants (Figure 2). Among all three groups, however, the destination rates of the new-economy and self-employed sectors were the highest. These results indicate that while SOEs are still a favorable sector for nonmigrants and permanent migrants, who enjoyed access to state-sponsored employment to begin with, jobs in the new-economy and self-employment sectors are increasingly attractive. In particular, the high retention and destination rates of the self-employed sector among permanent migrants suggest that a shift from state-sponsored work to self-employment has occurred among such migrants. To temporary migrants, the new-economy sector is clearly the most prominent—large proportions of them entered that sector, stayed in that sector despite job change, or shifted to that sector from other sectors. Besides highlighting the differing opportunities among the three groups of respondents, the findings underscore the increased diversity and complexity of Guangzhou's labor market.



Figure 2. Ownership sectors: The Guangzhou survey.

The distributions of first-time job seekers, retention rates, and destinations rates by occupation are not functions of the survey design (Figure 3). For nonmigrants, the most popular occupation for first-time job seekers was industrial work, reflecting the industrialized economy of Guangzhou. For permanent migrants, it was professional work, which was partly a result of their high level of education and partly a result of their access to institutional resources. Industrial and services employment



Figure 3. Occupations: The Guangzhou survey.

were the leading occupations for temporary migrants that were first-time job seekers. These differences represent strong evidence for the argument that entrance and access to the labor market is heavily dependent on one's resident status.

The overall high occupational retention rates suggest that large proportions of respondents stayed in the same occupations despite job change. Among the four occupations, commerce had the highest retention rates. In particular, 92.6 percent of permanent migrants previously in commerce remained in that occupation despite job change, which appears to be associated with their high retention rate in the self-employed sector that was observed earlier (Figure 2). Commerce was the most popular occupation to which to shift, especially for permanent migrants (Figure 3). Even though commerce was not the most popular sector among first-time job seekers, its high retention and destination rates indicate that Guangzhou's economy is becoming more commercialized and that commerce is the most attractive, and the most profitable, occupation for those already in the labor market. The prominence of permanent migrants in commerce suggests that they are the most competitive group and are more likely than nonmigrants and temporary migrants to succeed in new and thriving occupations.

The above data highlight the increasing commercialization of Guangzhou's economy, the heterogeneity of its labor market, and the popularity of self-employment. Above all, the findings underscore an opportunity structure defined by resident status. Permanent migrants and nonmigrants enjoy state-sponsored employment resources when they first enter the urban labor market; as they change jobs, such migrants are especially competitive in remaining in or moving to thriving sectors and occupations, particularly self-employment and commerce. In contrast, temporary migrants have limited access to institutional resources and prestigious occupations when they enter the labor market, and are therefore highly represented in new-economy jobs and in services and industrial work. During job change, temporary migrants are once again less competitively able than those with local hukou to shift to popular occupations such as commerce.

Summary and Conclusion

In this article, I have argued that established theoretical approaches for studying the interaction between migration and labor market neglect institutions in general and state institutions in particular. In transitional economies, such as those in Russia and China, that are negotiating the difficult match between plan and market, investigations of institutions are especially revealing. The Chinese state is a critical determinant of the opportunity structure that shapes individuals' migration to cities and their participation in the urban labor market. The link between varied opportunities and resident status is induced and legitimized by gate-keeping institutions. The hukou system functions as a society-wide sorting mechanism that allocates urban citizenship to "within state plan" migrants with close affiliations with the state. These permanent migrants are, in essence, the elite in the city and are in more prestigious positions than even the urban natives. In contrast, most peasant migrants are denied local hukou in the city. The qualitative data from a 1995 survey in Sichuan and Anhui support the notion that peasant migrants' outsider institutional positions render them at the bottom of the urban socioeconomic and labor market strata.

Results from the 1998 Guangzhou survey I conducted support the argument that an opportunity structure defined by hukou, together with human capital-type factors

such as education, results in a socioeconomic hierarchy in which permanent migrants are the most prestigious, urban nonmigrants are in the middle, and temporary migrants are the least prestigious. This opportunity structure has led to varied migration processes between permanent and temporary migrants and differing labor market processes among the three subpopulations. Permanent migrants have the advantage to begin with, as they are more highly educated and come from more developed locations. Their access to institutional resources and government channels further privilege them in the labor market. The net result is that they have the most prestigious occupations, they are the most competitive in the labor market, and they are more likely than nonmigrants and temporary migrants to succeed in new sectors. Though urban nonmigrants also have urban hukou and associated benefits, they occupy somewhat lower positions in the labor market hierarchy than permanent migrants. Temporary migrants are dislocated from institutional resources, are crowded into peripheral segments, and are less capable of advancing in the labor market. Their marginalized positions leave them few options other than relying on informal sources and striving for immediate monetary gains.

Though differences in human capital and backgrounds are important factors, statistical analyses in this article have shown that individuals' resident status exerts independent and substantial effects on their labor market processes. Their labor market outcomes, especially in terms of income and benefits, are also significantly different (as reported elsewhere; see Fan 2001). Guangzhou's attractiveness to migrants, its diverse and commercialized economy, and its rapidly growing labor market suggest that these observations may well be repeated in other large Chinese cities that have also received numerous migrants. This article's findings suggest that in the Chinese city, state institutions not only shape migration processes and labor market segmentation but are also engendering a new social order marked by institution-backed socioeconomic stratifications.

The Chinese urban labor market is complex. Its complexity is due in no small part to the persistent role of the state in monitoring the way in which plan and market coexist. It is this institutional factor that undermines the applicability of existing theories. The neoclassical and behavioral approaches do not specifically address the role of institutions. The labor market segmentation theory offers a useful guide, but it needs to expand to incorporate the role of the state and state institutions. An institutional perspective is especially necessary in socialist and transitional economies in which segmentation is very much defined by institutional affiliations and status.

Appendix

A sampling framework with stratification both across occupational categories and the eight urban districts in Guangzhou was used to guide the sampling process. Using the distribution of major occupations in Guangzhou from the 1990 Census as a basis, four types of adjustments were made. I made the first adjustment to reflect the changes in the city's economic structure between 1990 and 1998, by increasing the relative proportions of commerce and services. Then, I adjusted the occupational proportions of the three types of subpopulations in order to reflect their likely occupational distributions. The actual occupational distributions of these three groups in Guangzhou are not known, because official data do not include migrants that have not registered with local authorities. Therefore, I relied on informants in Guangzhou, including State Statistical Bureau survey specialists, as well as a variety of scholarly and journalistic sources that estimated the breakdowns of occupational categories (e.g., management, street vendors, garment workers, etc.) among migrants in Guangzhou (Fan 2001). Third, in order to facilitate comparison among the three subpopulations, I made adjustments to ensure that sufficient numbers of them in respective occupational categories were included. For example, I adjusted upward the proportions of nonmigrants and permanent migrants in the categories under commerce. Finally, I allocated roughly equal proportions to men and women, except for occupational categories that are clearly dominated by one sex (e.g., nannies, who are predominantly women, and construction workers, who are predominantly male).

The geographic proportions for the initial sampling framework across the eight urban districts of Guangzhou were derived based on existing data of the geographic distributions of population, nonagricultural population, and migrants in Guangzhou, as well as the settlement history of individual urban districts. For example, Yuexiu and Haizhu were allocated larger proportions because they are among the oldest and most urban parts of Guangzhou, and they are known for increasing concentration of migrants during the 1990s. Conversely, smaller proportions were allocated to suburban districts, such as Baiyun, that are less known for migrant concentration.

Using an initial sampling framework, a team of six interviewers employed the quota-sampling technique and randomly selected individuals who satisfied the occupational and geographical criteria until the predetermined numbers or proportions in the initial sampling framework were reached. Each selected respondent was given a questionnaire to fill out with the help of the interviewer.

During the survey, fine adjustments were made to the sampling framework in cases where the predetermined numbers or proportions were judged too high or too low based on our field observations. For example, it was extremely difficult to find industrial workers in Guangzhou who were permanent migrants. Accordingly, the proportions of permanent migrants in the industrial category were adjusted downward. By and large, however, we were able to follow quite closely the initial sampling framework. The occupational breakdowns in Table 2 summarize the final sampling framework by major occupation.

In this study, the quota-sampling technique is more appropriate than the traditional random sampling method based on databases provided by local authorities, for three reasons. First, official databases inevitably overlook temporary migrants who did not obtain proper paperwork such as the temporary residence permit. My informants in Guangzhou and the survey both suggest that a large proportion of temporary migrants choose not to obtain proper permits because of the fees involved and because the permit requirement may not be strictly enforced. For example, among the temporary migrants included in the survey, 19.0 percent did not obtain temporary residence permits. The quota-sampling technique allows us to examine this important group, which is easily missed using official databases. Second, random sampling based on official databases makes it difficult to satisfy the occupational stratification criterion outlined above. Third, a survey not based on official databases permits more in-depth questions to be asked.

Though the technique described above did not yield a representative and random sample, specific strategies were employed to increase as much as possible the representativeness, randomness, and quality of the survey data. First of all, the occupational and geographical stratifications outlined earlier reduced possible occupational and spatial skewedness of the data. Second, several guidelines were used to reduce possible biases of the data. For example, no more than one person per household and one person per work place were interviewed, except under special circumstances. If significant variations in resident status (nonmigrants, permanent migrants, and temporary migrants) and in other demographic dimensions such as age, income, and education existed within the household or workplace, we allowed a maximum of two interviewees per household and four interviewees per workplace. Third, I employed a total of only six interviewers in order to minimize possible inconsistencies during the interviewing process. All six interviewers had had extensive prior experience in conducting questionnaire surveys in Guangzhou, and all were trained specifically for administering the questionnaire used in the study. Finally, a pilot survey was conducted in December 1997, six months before the actual survey, which tested the questionnaire and identified and resolved possible inconsistencies among the six interviewers.

Acknowledgments

The research on which this article is based was funded by the National Science Foundation (SBR-9618500), the Luce Foundation, and the UCLA Academic Senate. I am grateful to Ling Li for her major role in administering the Guangzhou survey, and to Daming Zhou and Zhaoyuan Luo for helping me access the data from the Sichuan and Anhui survey. I would also like to thank Kam Wing Chan and Yunyan Yang for their contribution to a collaborative project, Chase Langford for cartographic assistance, and John Paul Jones III and the five anonymous referees for comments and suggestions. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the International Workshop on Resource Management, Urbanization and Governance in Hong Kong and Zhujiang Delta, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 23–24 May 2000, and at the Pacific Rim Workshop, Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies, UCLA, 3–4 August 2000.

Notes

1. Estimates of surplus rural workers in China vary considerably; most fall in the range of 100 to 220 million (Solinger 1999a, 18).
2. This survey was administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and included 300 peasant households in twelve villages in Anhui and Sichuan. It was conducted during late January and early February of 1995, when many out-migrants had returned to their home villages for the Spring Festival. The accounts by the interviewed households were transcribed word for word; the average length is approximately 3,000 Chinese words.
3. In the mid-1990s, when this survey was taken, monthly wages in the range of 200 to 500 yuan (U.S. $25–40) were quite typical of peasant migrants in industrial or services sectors. By the late 1990s, similar jobs could offer wages up to 1,000 yuan.
4. The statistics are based on a sample of the 1990 Census provided by the National Information Center. It is a one-percent clustered sample containing information about every individual in all households of the sampled village-level units (villages, towns, or urban neighborhoods in cities), and consists of a total of 11,475,104 records.
5. The 1990 Census defines a migrant as an individual five years or older whose usual place of residence on 1 July 1985 was in a different city, town, or county than on 1 July 1990 and (1) whose hukou was in the 1990 place of residence or (2) who had stayed in the destination for more than one year or had left the hukou location for more than one year.

The first type of migrants had obtained local hukou at the destination and were by definition permanent migrants, whereas the second type of migrants did not obtain local hukou and were temporary migrants. The Census excludes moves within cities or counties, migrants younger than five years old, migrants who died between 1985 and 1990, multiple moves, and return migrants between the two years. Furthermore, the "more than one year" requirement excludes temporary migrants who had stayed in the destination for less than one year and those who had left the hukou location for less than one year, who in the Census were grouped under their hukou locations rather than their destinations (Banister and Harbaugh 1992). The 1995 One-Percent Population Sample Survey uses definitions similar to the 1990 Census, except that it examines the period 1990–1995, includes migrants of all ages, and employs a "more than six months" requirement.

6. Approximately three-quarters of these migrants had stayed in the destination for less than one year, partly accounting for the large discrepancies between the survey's estimates and those from the Census (Table 1).
7. The survey was designed in conjunction with other members of a collaborative project. See this article's acknowledgements.
8. The 1990 Census' Guangzhou sample includes Guangzhou's city proper (*shiqu*) and suburban districts (*jiaoqu*), but not the surrounding counties Guangzhou administers.
9. The most popular regional delineation in China is one established during the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986–1990), involving the eastern (coastal) region, which is the most developed and has grown rapidly since the economic reforms, and the central and western regions, which have lagged in economic growth (Figure 1).
10. Detailed definitions of the nine reasons for migration can be found in SSB (1993, 513–14, 558).
11. Multiple responses were permitted for this question, which partly explained the scattered distribution of the responses.
12. Former agricultural workers accounted for a significant proportion of temporary migrants (24.3 percent).

References

Amsden, H. A. 1980. *The economics of women and work*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Banister, J., and C. W. Harbaugh. 1992. *Rural labor force trends in China*. Agricultural and Trade Report (Situation and Outlook Series, Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture). Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture.

Breman, J. 1976. A dualistic labour system? A critique of the informal sector concept. *Economic and Political Weekly* 11 (48): 1870–75.

Buckley, C. 1995. The myth of managed migration: Migration control and market in the Soviet period. *Slavic Review* 54 (4): 896–914.

Calavita, K. 1992. *Inside the state: The Bracero Program, immigration, and the I.N.S.* New York: Routledge.

Cao, X. 1995. Zhongguo nongcun laodongli liudong yu renkou qianyi yanjiu zongshu (Summary of research on rural labor flows and population migration in China). *Nongcun Jingji Yanjiu Cankao* (*Rural Agricultural Research*) 2:23–33.

Chan, K. W., T. Liu, and Y. Yang. 1999. *Hukou* and non-*hukou* migrations in China: Comparisons and contrasts. *International Journal of Population Geography* 5:425–48.

Chan, K. W., and L. Zhang. 1999. The *hukou* system and rural-urban migration in China: Processes and changes. *China Quarterly* 160:818–55.

Cheng, T., and M. Selden. 1994. The origins and social consequences of China's hukou system. *The China Quarterly* 139:644–68.

Christiansen, F. 1990. Social division and peasant mobility in Mainland China: The implications of the *huk'ou* system. *Issues and Studies* 26 (4): 78–91.

———. 1992. "Market transition" in China: The case of the Jiangsu labor market, 1978–1990. *Modern China* 18 (1): 72–93.

Cook, S., and M. Maurer-Fazio. 1999. Introduction to the special issue on "The workers' state meets the market—labor in China's transition." *Journal of Development Studies* 35 (3): 1–15.

Davis, D. 1999. Self-employment in Shanghai: A research note. *China Quarterly* 157:22–43.

De Haan, A. 1995. Migration in Eastern India—A segmented labor market. *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 32 (1): 51–93.

Duan, J. 1998. Nongcun waichu wugong qingnian di shequ dingwei (Social positions of young peasant migrants). In *Waichu Wugong Diaocha Yanjiu Wenji* (Collection of papers on surveys of peasant out-migration), ed. Zhongshan University Anthropology Department, 74–81. Guangzhou, China: Zhongshan University Anthropology Department.

Fan, C. C. 1996. Economic opportunities and internal migration: A case study of Guangdong Province, China. *The Professional Geographer* 48 (1): 28–45.

———. 1999. Migration in a socialist transitional economy: Heterogeneity, socioeconomic and spatial characteristics of migrants in China and Guangdong province. *International Migration Review* 33 (4): 493–515.

———. 2001. Migration and labor market returns in urban China: Results from a recent survey in Guangzhou. *Environment and Planning A* 33 (3): 479–508.

———. Forthcoming. Permanent migrants, temporary migrants, and the labor market in Chinese cities. In *Resource management, urbanization, and governance in Hong Kong and the Zhujiang Delta*, ed. K. Y. Wong and J. Shen. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.

Farer, T. J. 1995. How the international system copes with involuntary migration: Norms: institutions and state practice. *Human Rights Quarterly* 17 (1): 72–100.

French, R. A., and F. E. I. Hamilton. 1979. Is there a socialist city? In *The socialist city: Spatial structure and urban policy*, ed. R. A. French and F. E. I. Hamilton, 1–21. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.

Goldstein, A., and S. Guo. 1992. Temporary migration in Shanghai and Beijing. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 27 (2): 39–56.

Goldstein, S., and A. Goldstein. 1991. *Permanent and temporary migration differentials in China*. Papers of the East-West Population Institute no. 117. Honolulu: East-West Population Institute.

Gonganbu huzheng guanliju (Public Security Bureau). 1997. *Quanguo zanzhu renkou tongji ziliao huibian* (Tabulations of the national temporary population statistics). Beijing: Zhongguo renmin gongan daxue chubanshe.

Gordon, I. 1995. Migration in a segmented labour market. *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers* NS 20:139–55.

Granovetter, M. 1974. *Getting a job: A study of contacts and careers*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

———. 1981. Toward a sociological theory of income differences. In *Sociological perspectives on labor markets*, ed. I. Berg, 11–47. New York: Academic Press.

Gu, S. 1992. Two types of population migration in China: A comparative study. *Chinese Journal of Population Science* 4 (1): 75–84.

Guangdong wailai nongmingong lianhe ketizu (Joint Study Group on Migrant Workers in Guangdong). 1995. Jingying yimin yu xinxing da chengshi zhanlue (Elite migration and the strategies of newly developed large cities). *Nongcun Jingji Yanjiu Cankao* (Rural Economic Research) 2:1–15.

Gupta, M. R. 1993. Rural-urban migration, informal sector, and development policies: A theoretical analysis. *Journal of Development Economics* 41:137–51.

Hanson, S., and G. Pratt. 1991. Job search and the occupational segregation of women. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 81 (2): 229–53.

Harris, J. R., and M. P. Todaro. 1970. Migration, unemployment, and development: A theoretical analysis. *American Economic Review* 60:126–42.

Hoffmann, D. L. 1991. Moving to Moscow: Patterns of peasant in-migration during the First Five-Year Plan. *Slavic Review* 50 (4): 847–57.

Kerr, C. 1954. The Balkanization of labor markets. In *Labor mobility and economic opportunity*, ed. E. W. Bakke and P. M. Hauser, 92–110. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Knight, J., and L. Song. 1995. Towards a labor market in China. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 11 (4): 97–117.

Knight, J., L. Song, and J. Huaibin. 1999. Chinese rural migrants in urban enterprises: Three perspectives. *Journal of Development Studies* 35 (3): 73–104.

Li, R. 1993. Nan zhongguo diqu laodongli shichang zhuangkuang yu zhujiang sanjiaozhou laodongli shichang di fazhan (Labor market situation in southern China and development in the Zhujiang Delta). *Renkou Yanjiu* (Population Research) 1993 (6): 13–18.

Li, S. 1995. Population mobility and urban and rural development in Mainland China. *Issues and Studies* 31 (9): 37–54.

———. 1997. Population migration, regional economic growth, and income determination: A comparative study of Dongguan and Meizhou, China. *Urban Studies* 34 (7): 999–1026.

Lin, G. C. S. 1997. *Red capitalism in South China: Growth and development of the Pearl River Delta*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Lo, C. P. 1994. Economic reforms and socialist city structure: A case study of Guangzhou, China. *Urban Geography* 15:128–49.

Lo, C. P., C. W. Pannell, and R. Welch. 1977. Land use changes and city planning in Shenyang and Canton. *Geographical Review* 67:268–83.

Ma, L. J. C., and B. Xiang. 1998. Native place, migration, and the emergence of peasant enclaves in Beijing. *China Quarterly* 155:546–81.

Ma, Z., K.-L. Liaw, and Y. Zeng. 1997. Migrations in the urban-rural hierarchy of China: Insights from the microdata of the 1987 national survey. *Environment and Planning A* 29:707–30.

Maurer-Fazio, M. 1995. Building a labor market in China. *Current History* 94 (593): 285–89.

McGee, T. G. 1982. Labor markets, urban systems, and the urbanization process in Southeast Asian countries. *Papers of the East-West Population Institute* 81:1–28.

Mitchneck, B. 1991. Geographical and economic determinants of interregional migration in the USSR, 1968–1985. *Soviet Geography* 33:168–89.

Mitchneck, B., and D. A. Plane. 1995a. Migration patterns during a period of political and economic shocks in the Former Soviet Union: A case study of Yaroslavy' Oblast. *The Professional Geographer* 47 (1): 17–30.

———. 1995b. Migration and the quasilabor market in Russia. *International Regional Science Review* 18 (3): 267–88.

Nongyebu nongcun jingji yanjiu zhongxin (NNJYZ) (Ministry of Agriculture). 1995. *Zhongguo nongcun laodongli liudong: gean fangtan ziliao* (Labor Migration in China: Accounts of Individual Interviews). Beijing: Ministry of Agriculture.

Pilkington, H. 1998. *Migration, displacement, and identity in post-Soviet Russia*. New York: Routledge.

Piore, M. 1979. *Birds of passage: Migrant labor in industrial societies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Reich, M., M. Gordon, and R. Edwards. 1973. A theory of labor market segmentation. *American Economic Review* 63:359–65.

Reskin, B., and H. Hartmann. 1986. *Women's work, men's work: Sex segregation on the job*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Roberts, K. D. 1997. China's "tidal wave" of migrant labor: What can we learn from Mexican undocumented migration to the United States? *International Migration Review* 31 (2): 249–93.

Sakamoto, A., and M. D. Chen. 1991. Inequality and attainment in a dual labor market. *American Sociological Review* 56 (3): 295–308.

Schultz, T. W. 1961. Investment in human capital. *American Economic Review* 51:1–17.

Shen, J. 1995. Rural development and rural to urban migration in China 1978–1990. *Geoforum* 26 (4): 395–409.

Shen, J., and N. A. Spence. 1995. Trends in labor supply and the future of employment in China. *Environment and Planning* C 13:361–77.

Shen, Y. M., and C. Z. Tong. 1992. *Zhongguo renkou qianyi* (China's population migration). Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe.

Sit, V. F. S. 1989. Hong Kong's new industrial partnership with the Pearl River Delta. *Asian Geographer* 8 (1/2): 103–15.

Sjaastad, L. A. 1962. The costs and returns of human migration. *Journal of Political Economy* 70 (Supplement): 80–93.

Solinger, D. J. 1999a. *Contesting citizenship in urban China: Peasant migrants, the state, and the logic of the market*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

———. 1999b. Citizenship issues in China's internal migration: Comparisons with Germany and Japan. *Political Science Quarterly* 114 (3): 455–78.

State Statistical Bureau (SSB). 1993. *Zhongguo 1990 nien renkou pucha ziliao* (Tabulation of the 1990 population census of the People's Republic of China). Vol. 4. Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe.

———. 1997. *Zhongguo 1% renkou chouyang tiaocha ziliao* (Tabulation of the 1995 One-Percent Population Sample Survey of the People's Republic of China). Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe.

Stinner, W. F., W. Xu, and J. Wei. 1993. Migrant status and labor market outcomes in urban and rural Hebei Province, China. *Rural Sociology* 58 (3): 366–86.

Tang, W. S., D. K. Y. Chu, and C. C. Fan. 1993. Economic reform and regional development in China in the 21st century. In *Pacific Asia in the twenty-first century: Geographical and developmental perspectives*, ed. Y. M. Yeung, 105–33. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.

Todaro, M. P. 1969. A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in less developed countries. *American Economic Review* 59:138–48.

———. 1976. *Internal migration in developing countries: A review of theory, evidence, methodology, and research priorities*. Geneva: International Labour Office.

Waldinger, R. 1992. Taking care of the guests: The impact of immigrants on services. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 16:97–113.

Wang, F. 1997. The breakdown of a great wall: Recent changes in the household registration system of China. In *Floating population and migration in China: The impacts of economic reforms*, ed. T. Scharping, 149–65. Hamburg: Institute of Asian Studies.

———. 2000. Gendered migration and the migration of genders in contemporary China. In *Redrawing boundaries: Work, household, and gender in China*, ed. B. Entwisle and G. Henderson, 231–42. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wolpert, J. 1965. Behavioral aspects of the decision to migrate. *Papers and Proceedings of the Regional Science Association* 15:159–69.

Wong, L., and W.-P. Huen. 1998. Reforming the household registration system: A preliminary glimpse of the blue chop household registration system in Shanghai and Shenzhen. *International Migration Review* 32 (4): 974–94.

Wright, R., and M. Ellis. 1997. Nativity, ethnicity, and the evolution of the intraurban division of labor in metropolitan Los Angeles. *Urban Geography* 18:243–63.

———. 2000. The ethnic and gender division of labor compared among immigrants to Los Angeles. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 24 (3): 583–600.

Yang, Q., and F. Guo. 1996. Occupational attainment of rural to urban temporary economic migrants in China, 1985–1990. *International Migration Review* 30 (3): 771–87.

Yang, X. 1993. Household registration, economic reform, and migration. *International Migration Review* 27 (4): 796–818.

———. 2000. Determinants of migration intentions in Hubei province, China: Individual vs. family migration. *Environment and Planning A* 32 (5): 769–87.

Yang, X., and F. Guo. 1999. Gender differences in determinants of temporary labor migration in China: A multilevel analysis. *International Migration Review* 33 (4): 929–53.

Yang, Y. 1994. *Zhongguo renkou qianyi yu fanzhan di chanqi zhanlue* (Long-term strategies of population migration and development in China). Wuhan, China: Wuhan Chubanshe.

Zhou, D. 1998. Zhongguo nongmingong di liudong: nongmingong shurudi yu shuchudi bijiao (Migration of peasants in China: comparison of origins and destinations). In *Waichu Wugong Diaocha Yanjiu Wenji* (Collection of papers on surveys of peasant out-migration), ed. Zhongshan University Anthropology Department, 3–23. Guangzhou, China: Zhongshan University Anthropology Department.

Correspondence: Department of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1524, e-mail: fan@geog.ucla.edu