How Minds Can Be Computational Systems

How Minds Can Be Computational Systems (1998)

by William J. Rapaport

Venue:	JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL AND THEORETICAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Citations:	7 - 2 self

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Datum	Value	Source
TITLE	How Minds Can Be Computational Systems	INFERENCE
AUTHOR NAME	William J. Rapaport	user correction
AUTHOR AFFIL	Department of Computer Science, Department of Philosophy and Center; for Cognitive Science, State University of New York at Buffalo	user correction
AUTHOR ADDR	Buffalo, NY 14260, USA	user correction
ABSTRACT	The proper treatment of computationalism, as the thesis that cognition is computable, is presented and defended. Some arguments of James H. Fetzer against computationalism are examined and found wanting, and his positive theory of minds as semiotic systems is shown to be consistent with computationalism. An objection is raised to an argument of Selmer Bringsjord against one strand of computationalism, namely, that Turing-Testfpassing artifacts are persons, it is argued that, whether or not this objection holds, such artifacts will inevitably be persons.	user correction
YEAR	1998	INFERENCE
VENUE	JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL AND THEORETICAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE	user correction
VENUE TYPE	JOURNAL	INFERENCE
PAGES	403--419	INFERENCE
VOLUME	10	INFERENCE
CITATIONS	40 found	ParsCit 1.0