On Team Formation

On Team Formation (0)

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by Philip Cohen , Hector Levesque , Ira Smith

Venue:	Contemporary Action Theory. Synthese
Citations:	54 - 0 self

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Datum	Value	Source
TITLE	On Team Formation	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR NAME	Philip Cohen	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR AFFIL	1	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR NAME	Hector Levesque	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR AFFIL	2	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR NAME	Ira Smith	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR AFFIL	1	user correction - Legacy Corrections
ABSTRACT	this paper is inspired by philosophical work, it is squarely motivated by the concerns of building intelligent systems that are capable of collaborative behavior, either with a user, or with other such systems. Still, we hope that the paper sheds light on philosophical issues, and treats the subject of joint action at a sufficiently precise level to be illuminating of problems that any philosophical account needs to confront. An important consequence of focusing on joint actions, rather than solely on individual actions, is the opportunity to rethink related theories. In particular, we claim that speech act theory will need to be recast in light of joint action theory since many of the basic illocutionary acts (e.g., requests, promises) are intimately involved in eatablishing, monitoring, and discharging joint activities. However, despite this tight relationship, no existing speech act theory provides guidance on this connection. This paper takes a first step in the direction of linking speech act theory and joint action theory by showing how various speech acts can be used to form and disband teams. It is by now commonplace to observe that joint action is different from a collection of individual actions, even if they are coordinated. Agents can be acting in a coordinated fashion, as in ordinary automobile traffic, but not be acting together. Conversely, agents can be acting together, but not be coordinated except at the start and end of their joint action (e.g, see [36]) The key property distinguishing joint or collaborative action from mere coordinated action is the joint mental state of the participants. The best way to explore what this mental state must be is to imagine a joint action going astray. Our favorite example is driving in a convoy, versus ordinary traff...	user correction - Legacy Corrections
YEAR	0	user correction - Legacy Corrections
VENUE	Contemporary Action Theory. Synthese	INFERENCE
VENUE TYPE	CONFERENCE	INFERENCE
PAGES	87--114	INFERENCE
CITATIONS	45 found	ParsCit 1.0