Verifying Operating System Security

Verifying Operating System Security (1997)

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by J. S. Shapiro , S. Weber

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Datum	Value	Source
TITLE	Verifying Operating System Security	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR NAME	J. S. Shapiro	SVM HeaderParse 0.1
AUTHOR AFFIL	1; Distributed Systems Laboratory; University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR ADDR	PA 19104-6389	SVM HeaderParse 0.1
AUTHOR NAME	S. Weber	SVM HeaderParse 0.1
AUTHOR AFFIL	1; Distributed Systems Laboratory; University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR ADDR	PA 19104-6389	SVM HeaderParse 0.1
ABSTRACT	A confined program is one which is unable to leak information to an unauthorized party or modify unauthorized resources. Confinement is an essential feature of any secure component-based system. This paper presents a proof of correctness of the EROS operating system architecture with respect to confinement. We give a formal statement of the requirements, construct a model of the architecture's security policy and operational semantics, and show that the architecture enforces the confinement requirements if a small number of initial static checks on the confined subsystem are satisfied. The mechanism does not rely on the run-time values of user state or analysis of the programs' algorithm(s). Our verification methodology borrows heavily from techniques developed in the programming languages community. We view the operating system as a programming language whose operations are the kernel calls. This has the advantage that the security requirements of concern can be stated in forms analog...	user correction - Legacy Corrections
YEAR	1997	INFERENCE
VENUE TYPE	TECHREPORT	INFERENCE
TECH	Technical Report MS-CIS-97-26	INFERENCE
CITATIONS	6 found	ParsCit 1.0