Attacking Seven Rounds of Rijndael under 192-bit and 256-bit Keys

Attacking Seven Rounds of Rijndael under 192-bit and 256-bit Keys (2000)

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by Stefan Lucks , Theoretische Informatik

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Datum	Value	Source
TITLE	Attacking Seven Rounds of Rijndael under 192-bit and 256-bit Keys	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR NAME	Stefan Lucks	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR NAME	Theoretische Informatik	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR AFFIL	University of Mannheim	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR ADDR	68131 Mannheim A5, Germany	user correction - Legacy Corrections
ABSTRACT	. The authors of Rijndael [3] describe the \Square attack" as the best known attack against the block cipher Rijndael. If the key size is 128 bit, the attack is faster than exhaustive search for up to six rounds. We extend the Square attack on Rijndael variants with larger keys of 192 bit and 256 bit. Our attacks exploit minor weaknesses of the Rijndael key schedule and are faster than exhaustive search for up to seven rounds of Rijndael. 1 Introduction The block cipher Rijndael [3] has been proposed as an AES candidate and was selected for the secound round. It is a member of a fast-growing family of Square-like ciphers [2-6]. Rijndael allows both a variable block length of M 32 bit with M 2 f4; 6; 8g and a variable key length of N 32 bit, N an integer. In the context of this paper we concentrate on M = 4, i.e., on a block length of 128 bit, and on N 2 f4; 6; 8g, i.e., on key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bit. We abridge these variants by RD-128, RD-192 and RD-256. The number R of ...	user correction - Legacy Corrections
YEAR	2000	user correction - Legacy Corrections
CITATIONS	6 found	ParsCit 1.0