Unreliable Intrusion Detection in Distributed Computations

Unreliable Intrusion Detection in Distributed Computations (1997)

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by Dahlia Malkhi , Michael Reiter

Venue:	In Computer Security Foundations Workshop
Citations:	62 - 1 self

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Datum	Value	Source
TITLE	Unreliable Intrusion Detection in Distributed Computations	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR NAME	Dahlia Malkhi	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR AFFIL	AT&T Labs---Research, Murray Hill	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR ADDR	New Jersey, USA	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR NAME	Michael Reiter	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR AFFIL	AT&T Labs---Research, Murray Hill	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR ADDR	New Jersey, USA	user correction - Legacy Corrections
ABSTRACT	Distributed coordination is difficult, especially when the system may suffer intrusions that corrupt some component processes. In this paper we introduce the abstraction of a failure detector that a process can use to (imperfectly) detect the corruption (Byzantine failure) of another process. In general, our failure detectors can be unreliable, both by reporting a correct process to be faulty or by reporting a faulty process to be correct. However, we show that if these detectors satisfy certain plausible properties, then the well-known distributed consensus problem can be solved. We also present a randomized protocol using failure detectors that solves the consensus problem if either the requisite properties of failure detectors hold or if certain highly probable events eventually occur. This work can be viewed as a generalization of benign failure detectors popular in the distributed computing literature. 1 Introduction In this paper we consider how to defend the integrity of a dist...	user correction - Legacy Corrections
YEAR	1997	INFERENCE
VENUE	In Computer Security Foundations Workshop	INFERENCE
VENUE TYPE	CONFERENCE	INFERENCE
PAGES	116--124	INFERENCE
CITATIONS	22 found	ParsCit 1.0