I was inspired, not to say provoked, to write this note by Michel J. Blais's article A pragmatic analysis of mathematical realism and intuitionism . Having spent the greater part of my career doing intuitionistic mathematics, while continuing to do classical mathematics, I have come to feel that most comparisons of these two approaches to mathematics miss the essential point: intuitionism, in its simplest form, is a generalization of classical mathematics that accomodates both classical and computational models. By intuitionism I mean the approach to mathematics based on intuitionistic logic, a well-defined body of axioms and rules of inference  . So, for example, my idea of intuitionism does not include the notion of a choice sequence , or the various continuity principles associated with intuitionism , and it does not refer to the more bizarre consequences that have been drawn from Brouwer's idea of a creating subject . This lean version of intuitionistic mathematics is usually called constructive mathematics. Blais directs his comments in  at constructive mathematics rather than at the more esoteric varieties of intuitionistic mathematics.