2006): "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

2006): "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

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by Jean Tirole , Jel Classification D , Timur Kuran , Bentley Macleod , Eric Rasmusen , Tom Romer , Armin Falk

Venue:	American Economic Review
Citations:	16 - 0 self

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Datum	Value	Source
TITLE	2006): "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior	INFERENCE
AUTHOR NAME	Jean Tirole	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Jel Classification D	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR AFFIL	1; Bénabou: Department of Economics and Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ; 08544, CEPR, IZA and NBER. Tirole: Institut d’Economie Industrielle	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR ADDR	21 Allées de Brienne, 31000; Toulouse, France	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Timur Kuran	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Bentley Macleod	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Eric Rasmusen	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Tom Romer	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Armin Falk	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
ABSTRACT	We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or imagerelated) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this “overjustification effect ” can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and more generally those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare. Keywords:	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
VENUE	American Economic Review	INFERENCE
VENUE TYPE	JOURNAL	INFERENCE
PAGES	1652--1678	INFERENCE
CITATIONS	62 found	ParsCit 1.0