Retaining Sandbox Containment Despite Bugs in Privileged Memory-Safe Code

Retaining Sandbox Containment Despite Bugs in Privileged Memory-Safe Code

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by Armon Dadgar , Jeff Rasley , Justin Samuel , Ivan Beschastnikh , Cosmin Barsan , Arvind Krishnamurthy , Thomas Anderson

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Datum	Value	Source
TITLE	Retaining Sandbox Containment Despite Bugs in Privileged Memory-Safe Code	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Armon Dadgar	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR AFFIL	Department of Computer Science and Engineering; University of Washington	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR ADDR	Seattle, WA 98195	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Jeff Rasley	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR AFFIL	Department of Computer Science and Engineering; University of Washington	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR ADDR	Seattle, WA 98195	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Justin Samuel	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR AFFIL	Department of Computer Science and Engineering; University of Washington	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR ADDR	Seattle, WA 98195	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Ivan Beschastnikh	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR AFFIL	Department of Computer Science and Engineering; University of Washington	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR ADDR	Seattle, WA 98195	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Cosmin Barsan	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR AFFIL	Department of Computer Science and Engineering; University of Washington	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR ADDR	Seattle, WA 98195	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Arvind Krishnamurthy	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR AFFIL	Department of Computer Science and Engineering; University of Washington	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR ADDR	Seattle, WA 98195	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Thomas Anderson	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR AFFIL	Department of Computer Science and Engineering; University of Washington	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR ADDR	Seattle, WA 98195	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
ABSTRACT	Flaws in the standard libraries of secure sandboxes represent a major security threat to billions of devices worldwide. The standard libraries are hard to secure because they frequently need to perform low-level operations that are forbidden in untrusted application code. Existing designs have a single, large trusted computing base that contains security checks at the boundaries between trusted and untrusted code. Unfortunately, flaws in the standard library often allow an attacker to escape the security protections of the sandbox. In this work, we construct a Python-based sandbox that has a small, security-isolated kernel. Using a mechanism called a security layer, we migrate privileged functionality into memory-safe code on top of the sandbox kernel while retaining isolation. For example, significant portions of module import, file I/O, serialization, and network communication routines can be provided in security layers. By moving these routines out of the kernel, we prevent attackers from leveraging bugs in these routines to evade sandbox containment. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by studying past bugs in Java’s standard libraries and show that most of these bugs would likely be contained in our sandbox.	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
CITATIONS	54 found	ParsCit 1.0