Naturalizing subjective character

Naturalizing subjective character (2005)

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by Uriah Kriegel

Venue:	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Citations:	6 - 3 self

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Datum	Value	Source
TITLE	Naturalizing subjective character	INFERENCE
AUTHOR NAME	Uriah Kriegel	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR AFFIL	; University of Arizona and University of Sydney; 1	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
ABSTRACT	When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this “bluish way it is like for me”: (i) the bluish aspect and (ii) the for-me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for-me aspect its subjective character. What is this elusive for-me-ness, or subjective character, of conscious experience? In this paper, I examine six different attempts to account for subjective character in terms of the functional and representational properties of conscious experiences. After arguing against the first five, I defend the sixth. There is something at least prima facie mysterious about conscious experience. The problem of consciousness is the problem of demystifying whatever it is that accounts for the prima facie mysteriousness of conscious experience. This would involve showing that the prima facie mysterious aspects of conscious experience are not super-natural phenomena. That is, it would require “naturalizing ” the relevant aspects of conscious experience, presumably by showing how they could exist in a purely physical world. 1 It is useful to refer to the prima facie mysterious element in conscious experience in terms of what it is like for the subject to have or undergo a conscious experience. 2 When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have or undergo my experience. 3 I suggest that we distinguish two aspects in this “bluish way it is like for me”: (i) the bluish aspect, which we may call the experience’s qualitative character, and (ii) the for-me aspect, which we may call its subjective character. Not only is the experience bluish, but I am also aware of its being bluish. Its being	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
YEAR	2005	INFERENCE
VENUE	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research	INFERENCE
VENUE TYPE	JOURNAL	INFERENCE
PAGES	23--57	INFERENCE
CITATIONS	98 found	ParsCit 1.0