• Documents
  • Authors
  • Tables
  • Other Seers ▼
    RefSeer AckSeer CollabSeer SeerSeer
  • Log in
  • Sign up
  • MetaCart

CiteSeerX logo

Advanced Search Include Citations
Advanced Search Include Citations | Disambiguate

Position auctions (2007)

Cached

  • Download as a PDF

Download Links

  • [www.ischool.berkeley.edu]
  • [www.cs.columbia.edu]
  • [www.cs.brown.edu]
  • [www.cs.brown.edu]
  • [people.ischool.berkeley.edu]
  • [www.cis.upenn.edu]
  • [www.gsb.stanford.edu]
  • [www.ftc.gov]
  • [www.sims.berkeley.edu]
  • [www-2.cs.cmu.edu]
  • [www.cs.duke.edu]
  • [www.cs.cmu.edu]

  • Save to List
  • Add to Collection
  • Correct Errors
  • Monitor Changes
by Hal R. Varian
Citations:137 - 3 self
  • Summary
  • Active Bibliography
  • Co-citation
  • Clustered Documents
  • Version History

Versions

  • Version 0
  • Version 1

Version History

Metadata Version 1

User correction supplied by mph

DatumValueSource
TITLE Position auctions user correction
AUTHOR NAME Hal R. Varian user correction
AUTHOR AFFIL UC Berkeley, United States user correction
ABSTRACT I analyze the equilibria of a game based on the ad auction used by Google and Yahoo. This auction is closely related to the assignment game studied by Shapley-Shubik, Demange-Gale-Sotomayer and Roth-Sotomayer. However, due to the special structure of preferences, the equilibria of the ad auction can be calculated explicitly and some known results can be sharpened. I provide some empirical evidence that the Nash equilibria of the position auction describe the basic properties of the prices observed in Google's ad auction reasonably accurately. user correction
YEAR 2007 user correction
CITATIONS 9 found ParsCit 1.0
The National Science Foundation
  • About CiteSeerX
  • Submit Documents
  • Privacy Policy
  • Help
  • Data
  • Source
  • Contact Us

Developed at and hosted by The College of Information Sciences and Technology

© 2007-2010 The Pennsylvania State University