Beyond shallow models of emotion

Beyond shallow models of emotion (2001)

by Aaron Sloman

Venue:	Cognitive Processing: International Quarterly of Cognitive Science
Citations:	55 - 13 self

Datum	Value	Source
TITLE	Beyond shallow models of emotion	INFERENCE
AUTHOR NAME	Aaron Sloman	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR AFFIL	; School of Computer Science; The University of Birmingham; Abstract:	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR ADDR	; Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
ABSTRACT	There is much shallow thinking about emotions, and a huge diversity of definitions of “emotion ” arises out of this shallowness. Too often the definitions and theories are inspired either by a mixture of introspection and selective common sense, or by a misdirected neo-behaviourist methodology, attempting to define emotions and other mental states in terms of observables. One way to avoid such shallowness, and perhaps eventually achieve convergence, is to base concepts and theories on an information processing architecture, which is subject to various constraints, including evolvability, implementability, coping with resource-limited physical mechanisms, and human-like functionality. Within such an architecture-based theory we can distinguish (at least) primary emotions, secondary emotions, and tertiary emotions, and produce a coherent theory which explains a wide range of phenomena and also partly explains the diversity of theories: most theorists focus on only a subset of types of emotions.	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
YEAR	2001	INFERENCE
VENUE	Cognitive Processing: International Quarterly of Cognitive Science	INFERENCE
VENUE TYPE	CONFERENCE	INFERENCE
PAGES	177--198	INFERENCE
VOLUME	2	INFERENCE
CITATIONS	27 found	ParsCit 1.0