On the complexity of Matsui’s attack

On the complexity of Matsui’s attack (2001)

by Pascal Junod

Venue:	in Selected Areas in Cryptography, SAC 2001
Citations:	12 - 2 self

Datum	Value	Source
TITLE	On the complexity of Matsui’s attack	INFERENCE
AUTHOR NAME	Pascal Junod	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR AFFIL	Security and Cryptography Laboratory; Swiss Federal Institute of Technology	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR ADDR	CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
ABSTRACT	Abstract. Linear cryptanalysis remains the most powerful attack against DES at this time. Given 2 43 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, Matsui expected a complexity of less than 2 43 DES evaluations in 85 % of the cases for recovering the key. In this paper, we present a theoretical and experimental complexity analysis of this attack, which has been simulated 21 times using the idle time of several computers. The experimental results suggest a complexity upper-bounded by 2 41 DES evaluations in 85 % of the case, while more than the half of the experiments needed less than 2 39 DES evaluations. In addition, we give a detailed theoretical analysis of the attack complexity.	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
YEAR	2001	INFERENCE
VENUE	in Selected Areas in Cryptography, SAC 2001	INFERENCE
VENUE TYPE	CONFERENCE	INFERENCE
PAGES	199--211	INFERENCE
VOLUME	2259	INFERENCE
CITATIONS	6 found	ParsCit 1.0