Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions ⋆

by Yevgeniy Vorobeychik , Daniel M. Reeves

Citations:

11 - 2 self

Datum	Value	Source
TITLE	Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions ⋆	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Yevgeniy Vorobeychik	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR AFFIL	Computer Science & Engineering; University of Michigan	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Daniel M. Reeves	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR AFFIL	Microeconomics & Social Systems; Yahoo! Research	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
ABSTRACT	Abstract. We analyze symmetric pure strategy equilibria in dynamic sponsored search auction games using simulations, restricting the strategies to several in a class of greedy bidding strategies introduced by Cary et al. We show that a particular convergent strategy, “balanced bidding”, also exhibits high stability to deviations in the dynamic setting. On the other hand, a cooperative strategy which yields high payoffs to all players is not sustainable in equilibrium play. Additionally, we analyze a repeated game in which each stage is a static complete-information sponsored search game. In this setting, we demonstrate a collusion strategy which yields high payoffs to all players and empirically show it to be sustainable over a range of settings. Finally, we show how a collusive strategy profile can arise even in the case of incomplete information. 1	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
CITATIONS	7 found	ParsCit 1.0