Evaluation of security level of cryptography: ESIGN signature scheme (2001)
| Venue: | CRYPTREC Project |
| Citations: | 2 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Menezes01evaluationof,
author = {Alfred Menezes and Minghua Qu and Doug Stinson and Yongge Wang},
title = {Evaluation of security level of cryptography: ESIGN signature scheme},
booktitle = {CRYPTREC Project},
year = {2001}
}
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Abstract
to be existentially unforgeable against chosen-message attacks assuming that the approximate e-th root (AER) problem is hard and that the employed hash function is a random function. While the AER problem has been studied by some researchers, it has not received as much attention as the integer factorization problem or the discrete logarithm problem. One way to p solve the AER problem is to factor the integer n, where n 2 q and p and q are primes of the same bitlength. The parameters recommended ensure that ESIGN resists all known attacks for factoring integers of this form. 2 Protocol specification 2.1 ESIGN key pairs For the security parameter pLen, k each entity does the following: 1. Randomly select two distinct primes, p, q, each of bitsize k and compute p n 2. Select an integer 4. 3. A’s public key is¢n£e£k¤; A’s private key is¢p£q¤. e¡ In addition, one needs to specify a hash function H¥whose output length is k bits. 2.2 ESIGN signature generation To sign a message m, an entity A with the private key¢p£q¤does the following: 1. Compute H¥¦¢m¤,and let be bit. H¢m¤ obtained from by H¥¦¢m¤ 2 q. deleting the most significant 2. Pick r uniformly from§r ¨ at random gcd¢r£p ¤ Zpq: 1©.
