## Market research and market design (2003)

Venue: | Advances in Theoretical Economics |

Citations: | 21 - 0 self |

### BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Vohra03marketresearch,

author = {Eep Baliga Rakesh Vohra and Eep Baliga and Rakesh Vohra},

title = {Market research and market design},

booktitle = {Advances in Theoretical Economics},

year = {2003},

pages = {2003}

}

### Years of Citing Articles

### OpenURL

### Abstract

be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher, bepress. Advances in Theoretical Economics is one of The B.E.

### Citations

1368 |
Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders
- Vickrey
- 1961
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...rt about his valuation is used to determinethepricehepaysshouldhebuyorsellanobject. Thisensures incentive compatibility in dominant strategies and is an extension of the familiar idea used by Vickrey =-=[22]-=-. As all traders announce their information truthfully, we can use their reports to calculate estimated distributions and densities. When there are a large number of traders, the estimates are close t... |

1117 |
Optimal Auction Design
- Myerson
- 1981
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...onditions. 1Profit-maximizing and/or efficient mechanisms have been studied by Myerson and Satterthwaite [20] and Gresik and Satterthwaite [11]. 2Bulow and Roberts [4] building on the work of Myerson =-=[19]-=- study monopoly pricing with incomplete information. 3 “Game theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the consequences of trading rules that presumably are really common knowledge; it is d... |

484 | Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading - Myerson, Satterthwaite - 1983 |

199 | Monopoly with incomplete information - Maskin, Riley - 1984 |

181 | A Course in Density Estimation
- DEVROYE, L
- 1987
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...e. The main difficulty is to find a trade-off betweenthesetwoerrorssoastoproduceagoodestimate of f. This is the subject of a large literature on density estimation. We refer the reader to Luc Devroye =-=[9]-=- for an introduction to the literature. Here we use what is called the “histogram” estimate of the density function. Choose m, growingwithn, pointsx1,x2,...,xm in [a, b] and a number hm such that • x1... |

148 |
Efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information
- Holmstriim, Myerson
- 1983
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...um of the mechanism. For example, in a seminal paper, Wilson [23] shows that a Bayesian equilibrium of a large, sealed-bid, double auction is incentive-efficient in the sense of Holmstrom and Myerson =-=[13]-=-. In later work, Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams investigate the k-double auction and show that one of its Bayesian equilibria is asymptotically efficient. While the rules of the double-auction... |

144 | The simple economics of optimal auctions
- Bulow, Roberts
- 1989
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... may not accurately capture market conditions. 1Profit-maximizing and/or efficient mechanisms have been studied by Myerson and Satterthwaite [20] and Gresik and Satterthwaite [11]. 2Bulow and Roberts =-=[4]-=- building on the work of Myerson [19] study monopoly pricing with incomplete information. 3 “Game theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the consequences of trading rules that presumably... |

88 |
Implementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information
- Moore
- 1992
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...aximizing auction when the seller does not know the distribution of types but the bidders do know the details of the environment. But then, as in complete information implementation models (see Moore =-=[18]-=- for a survey), a mechanism can be designed where the bidders equilibrium behavior reveals the distribution at no extra cost to the seller. Such mechanisms rely on the distribution being common knowle... |

71 | Probability - Breiman - 1968 |

71 |
A dominant strategy double auction
- McAfee
- 1992
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...in the Introduction, there are many mechanisms that guarantee efficiency when the number of buyers and sellers is large when the agents know the distribution of signals. To our knowledge, only McAfee =-=[17]-=- studies an environment where neither the mechanism designer nor the agents know the distribution. In his mechanism, the sellers are ranked c1 ≤ c2 ≤ c3.. given their announcements and the buyers are ... |

55 | Optimal Pricing Mechanism with Unknown Demand
- Segal
- 2003
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ion but the distribution is not known, we resolve this issue. For this case, we show how to elicit the distribution from agents while maintaining incentive compatibility and maximizing profits. Segal =-=[21]-=-, in independent and contemporaneous work, has studied a model similar to the first monopoly pricing model we present below. He takes a Bayesian approach assuming that the designer has a prior over th... |

44 |
and Eric Maskin (2000), “Efficient Auctions,” Quarterly
- Dasgupta
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...al economy that has the same distribution of players’ types as this state. http://www.bepress.com/bejte/advances/vol3/iss1/art5sBaliga and Vohra: Market Research and Market Design Dasgupta and Maskin =-=[7]-=- study efficient auctions which are distribution-free in an interdependent-value environment (the research surveyed above deals with private values). In their paper neither the players nor the mechani... |

40 |
Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
- Wilson
- 1985
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... their costs or values but the distribution of the signals is common knowledge among the traders and also the mechanism designer. As this distribution is altered, so is the optimal mechanism. Wilson (=-=[23]-=- and [24]) 3 has argued that economic institutions should work well in a wide variety of settings and should be independent of the details oftheenvironmentsincetheymaynotbeknownwhenthemechanismis desi... |

39 |
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown
- Baron, Myerson
- 1982
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...v)+O(hm)+2rn/hm. q lg lg n Choose hm → 0 so that rn/hm → 0. Since rn is O( ) this can always n be done. Since hm → 0 as n and m go to infinity it follows that fk(v) → f(v) almost surely. In fact supx∈=-=[0,1]-=- |fk(x) − f(x)| → 0. Furthermorefornand m 8 See Chung [6]. 13 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003s14 Advances in Theoretical Economics Vol. 3 [2003], No. 1, Article 5 sufficiently large, f... |

10 |
An estimate concerning the Kolmogorov limit distribution
- CHUNG
- 1949
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... Since rn is O( ) this can always n be done. Since hm → 0 as n and m go to infinity it follows that fk(v) → f(v) almost surely. In fact supx∈[0,1] |fk(x) − f(x)| → 0. Furthermorefornand m 8 See Chung =-=[6]-=-. 13 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003s14 Advances in Theoretical Economics Vol. 3 [2003], No. 1, Article 5 sufficiently large, fk(v) > 0 almost surely as f(v) > 0 for all v. We note tha... |

7 |
2004]: “Robust Mechanism Design”, mimeo
- Bergemann, Morris
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...o does not know the distribution of types, it is not clear how to approach implementation of this allocation rule. Hence, recent work on distribution-free implementation, such as Bergemann and Morris =-=[2]-=-, assumes that the rule being implemented is itself distributionfree. When the set of traders is large and types are independent draws from the same distribution but the distribution is not known, we ... |

7 |
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility,” mimeo
- McLean, Postlewaite
- 1999
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...stributions are common knowledge. Therefore, our adaptive mechanisms maximize profits as if the distributions and densities are common knowledge when the mechanism is designed. McLean and Postlewaite =-=[16]-=- 6 propose an interesting definition of information smallness which is related to our approach: an agent is informationally small if his information does not change the probability assessment of a com... |

6 |
Asymptotic efficiency in large economies with asymmetric information
- Gul, Postlewaite
- 1992
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ire that the distribution is not common knowledge among the traders and replace Bayesian incentive compatibility by ex post incentive compatibility. For example, Maskin [14] and 4 Gul and Postlewaite =-=[12]-=- take a mechanism design approach and show in a more general environment that a Bayesian equilibrium of their mechanism implements a nearly-efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational alloc... |

3 |
Game-Theoretic Approaches to TradingProcesses
- Wilson
- 1987
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...sts or values but the distribution of the signals is common knowledge among the traders and also the mechanism designer. As this distribution is altered, so is the optimal mechanism. Wilson ([23] and =-=[24]-=-) 3 has argued that economic institutions should work well in a wide variety of settings and should be independent of the details oftheenvironmentsincetheymaynotbeknownwhenthemechanismis designed. For... |

2 |
Implementing the Optimal Auction,” mimeo. Produced by The Berkeley Electronic
- Caillaud, Robert
- 1998
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...h and market design. One way to relax the assumptions of the standard model is to require that the distribution of values be common knowledge amongst the agents only. For example, Caillaud and Robert =-=[5]-=- study a revenue-maximizing auction when the seller does not know the distribution of types but the bidders do know the details of the environment. But then, as in complete information implementation ... |

2 |
Hartline and Anna Karlin (2002): “Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions,” (Extended Abstract), European Symposium on Algorithms
- Deshmukh, Goldberg, et al.
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...er know that values are independent draws from an unknown distribution. Goldberg et al. [10] investigate such a model where a monopolist has a constant marginal cost of production (in Deshmukh et al. =-=[8]-=-, their results are extended to the case of a broker intermediating trade between buyers and sellers with private information). To describe their results, we need some notation. Let D be the set of al... |

2 |
Anna Karlin and Andrew Wright (2001): “Competitive Auctions
- Goldberg, Hartline
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...esigner has a prior. A third relaxation is to eliminate the assumption that the traders and the mechanism designer know that values are independent draws from an unknown distribution. Goldberg et al. =-=[10]-=- investigate such a model where a monopolist has a constant marginal cost of production (in Deshmukh et al. [8], their results are extended to the case of a broker intermediating trade between buyers ... |

2 |
The Rate at which aSimpleMarketConvergestoEfficiency as the Number of Traders Increases: An Asymptotic Result for Optimal Trading Mechanisms
- Gresik, Satterthwaite
- 1989
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... a small sample and hence may not accurately capture market conditions. 1Profit-maximizing and/or efficient mechanisms have been studied by Myerson and Satterthwaite [20] and Gresik and Satterthwaite =-=[11]-=-. 2Bulow and Roberts [4] building on the work of Myerson [19] study monopoly pricing with incomplete information. 3 “Game theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the consequences of tradi... |