Designing networks with good equilibria (2007)
| Venue: | In SODA ’08 |
| Citations: | 23 - 4 self |
BibTeX
@TECHREPORT{Chen07designingnetworks,
author = {Ho-lin Chen and Tim Roughgarden and Gregory Valiant},
title = {Designing networks with good equilibria},
institution = {In SODA ’08},
year = {2007}
}
OpenURL
Abstract
In a network with selfish users, designing and deploying a protocol determines the rules of the game by which end users interact with each other and with the network. We study the problem of designing a protocol to optimize the equilibrium behavior of the induced network game. We consider network cost-sharing games, where the set of Nash equilibria depends fundamentally on the choice of an edge cost-sharing protocol. Previous research focused on the Shapley protocol, in which the cost of each edge is shared equally among its users. We systematically study the design of optimal costsharing protocols for undirected and directed graphs, single-sink and multicommodity networks, different classes of cost-sharing methods, and different measures of the inefficiency of equilibria. One of our main technical tools is a complete characterization of the uniform cost-sharing protocols—protocols that are designed without foreknowledge of or assumptions on the network in which they will be deployed. We use this characterization result to identify the optimal uniform protocol in several scenarios: for example, the Shapley protocol is optimal in directed graphs, while the optimal protocol in undirected graphs, a simple priority scheme, has exponentially smaller worst-case price of anarchy than the Shapley protocol. We also provide several matching upper and lower bounds on the bestpossible performance of non-uniform cost-sharing protocols.







