Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)

Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)

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by Noam Nisan

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@MISC{Nisan_introductionto,
    author = {Noam Nisan},
    title = { Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)},
    year = {}
}

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Abstract

Citations

954	Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders - Vickrey - 1961
659	Optimal Auction Design - Myerson - 1981
556	Multipart pricing of public goods - CLARKE - 1971
480	Algorithmic mechanism design - Nisan, Ronen
448	Social Choice and Individual Values - Arrow - 1970
441	Incentives in Teams - GROVES - 1973
348	Auction Theory - Krishna - 2010
316	Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian - Harsanyi - 1967
279	Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading - Myerson, Satterthwaite
232	Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions - Satterthwaite - 1975
223	A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding - Milgrom, Weber - 2000
170	Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods - Green, Laffont - 1977
158	Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result - Gibbard - 1973
138	Microeconomic Theory - Mas-Collel, Whinston, et al. - 1995
104	The computational difficulty of manipulating an election - Bartholdi, Tovey, et al. - 1989
97	Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions - Lavi, Mu’alem, et al. - 2003
82	The characterization of implementable choice rules - Roberts - 1979
63	Liadan Ita O’Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions - Lehmann
53	Auctions: Theory and Practice - Klemperer - 2004
44	A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition - Wilson - 1977
40	Subgame Perfection Implementation - Moore, Repullo - 1988
38	Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant-strategy implementation - Bikhchandani, Chatterji, et al.
34	Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures - Holt - 1980
32	The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium: A survey - Maskin - 1983
20	Rational expectations, information acquisition, and competitive bidding - Milgrom - 1981
1	The implementation of social to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists) 43 choice rules: Some general results on incentive compatibility. The Review of Economic Studies, (46):185 - Dasgupta, Hammond, et al. - 1979
1	Three brief proofs of arrow’s impossibility theorem - Geanakopolos - 2005
1	Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness - Saks, Yu - 2005