Automated Anonymity Verification of the ThreeBallot Voting System (2013)
| Venue: | In IFM. Pp |
| Citations: | 1 - 1 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Moran13automatedanonymity,
author = {Murat Moran and James Heather and Steve Schneider},
title = {Automated Anonymity Verification of the ThreeBallot Voting System},
booktitle = {In IFM. Pp},
year = {2013},
pages = {94--108}
}
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Abstract
Abstract. In recent years, a large number of secure voting protocols have been proposed in the literature. Often these protocols contain flaws, but because they are complex protocols, rigorous formal analysis has proven hard to come by. Rivest’s ThreeBallot voting system is important because it aims to pro-vide security (voter anonymity and voter verifiability) without requiring cryptography. In this paper, we construct a CSP model of ThreeBallot, and use it to produce the first automated formal analysis of its anonymity property. Along the way, we discover that one of the crucial assumptions under which ThreeBallot (and many other voting systems) operates—the Short Ballot Assumption—is highly ambiguous in the literature. We give var-ious plausible precise interpretations, and discover that in each case, the interpretation either is unrealistically strong, or else fails to ensure anonymity. Therefore, we give a version of the Short Ballot Assump-tion for ThreeBallot that is realistic but still provides a guarantee of anonymity.
Keyphrases
threeballot voting system anonymity verification complex protocol var-ious plausible precise interpretation crucial assumption short ballot assump-tion rivest threeballot voting system formal analysis recent year short ballot assumption voter anonymity rigorous formal analysis csp model anonymity property large number pro-vide security voter verifiability secure voting protocol
