Abstract

ABSTRACT: Determinism has long been a core assumption in many forms of behaviorism, including radical behaviorism. However, this assumption has been a stumbling block for many— both within and outside the field of radical behaviorism—resulting in misunderstanding and misrepresentation. The following paper provides a descriptive taxonomy of four kinds of determinism assumed or asserted in the radical behavioral literature. This taxonomy is intended to organize these deterministic positions, provide working definitions, and explore their implications. Through this work, it is hoped that behaviorists and nonbehaviorists alike will possess a clearer understanding of determinism in behavioral analysis. In his introduction to About Behaviorism, B.F. Skinner alluded to problems that many have experienced in understanding radical behaviorism. Skinner provided a list of twenty criticisms commonly leveled at his research program and remarked, “These contentions represent, I believe, an extraordinary misunderstanding of the achievements and significance of a scientific enterprise” (1974, p. 5). Although Skinner did not mention the notion of determinism per se in this passage, it clearly underlaid many such criticisms. Skinner was keenly aware of

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