Limits of the Cryptographic Realization of Dolev-Yao-style XOR (2005)
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| Venue: | Computer Security, Proceedings of ESORICS 2005, number 3679 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Citations: | 9 - 3 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Backes05limitsof,
author = {Michael Backes and Birgit Pfitzmann},
title = {Limits of the Cryptographic Realization of Dolev-Yao-style XOR},
booktitle = {Computer Security, Proceedings of ESORICS 2005, number 3679 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
year = {2005},
pages = {178--196},
publisher = {Springer-Verlag}
}
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Abstract
The abstraction of cryptographic operations by term algebras, called Dolev-Yao models, is essential in almost all tool-supported methods for proving security protocols. Recently significant progress was made in proving that such abstractions can be sound with respect to actual cryptographic realizations and security definitions. The strongest results show this in the sense of reactive simulatability/UC, a notion that essentially means retention of arbitrary security properties under arbitrary active attacks and in arbitrary protocol environments, with only small changes to both abstractions and natural implementations.







