The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation

The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation (2004)

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by Elliot Anshelevich , Anirban Dasgupta , Jon Kleinberg , Éva Tardos , Tom Wexler , Tim Roughgarden

Venue:	In FOCS
Citations:	150 - 22 self

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@INPROCEEDINGS{Anshelevich04theprice,
    author = {Elliot Anshelevich and Anirban Dasgupta and Jon Kleinberg and Éva Tardos and Tom Wexler and Tim Roughgarden},
    title = {The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation},
    booktitle = {In FOCS},
    year = {2004},
    pages = {295--304}
}

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Abstract

Network design is a fundamental problem for which it is important to understand the effects of strategic behavior. Given a collection of self-interested agents who want to form a network connecting certain endpoints, the set of stable solutions the Nash equilibria may look quite different from the centrally enforced optimum. We study the quality of the best Nash equilibrium, and refer to the ratio of its cost to the optimum network cost as the price of stability. The best Nash equilibrium solution has a natural meaning of stability in this context it is the optimal solution that can be proposed from which no user will defect.

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