A HOL Extension of GNY for Automatically Analyzing Cryptographic Protocols (1996)
| Venue: | In Proceedings of the Ninth IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop |
| Citations: | 26 - 2 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Brackin96ahol,
author = {Stephen H. Brackin},
title = {A HOL Extension of GNY for Automatically Analyzing Cryptographic Protocols},
booktitle = {In Proceedings of the Ninth IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop},
year = {1996},
pages = {62--76},
publisher = {Press}
}
Years of Citing Articles
Bookmark
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
OpenURL
Abstract
This paper describes a Higher Order Logic (HOL) theory formalizing an extended version of the Gong, Needham, Yahalom (GNY) belief logic, a theory used by software that automatically proves authentication properties of cryptographic protocols. The theory's extensions to the GNY logic include being able to specify protocol properties at intermediate stages and being able to specify protocols that use multiple encryption and hash operations, message authentication codes, computed values (e.g., hash codes) as keys, and keyexchange algorithms. 1. Introduction Cryptographic protocols are short sequences of message exchanges, usually involving encryption, intended to establish secure communication over insecure networks. Whether they actually do so, or can be subverted by attacks involving modified, replayed, or mislabeled messages, is a notoriously difficult problem. There have been several examples [11, 27, 28] of published protocols, recommended by experts, that were vulnerable to attack....
