Applying Formal Methods to the Analysis of a Key Management Protocol (1992)
Cached
Download Links
- [www.itd.nrl.navy.mil]
- [www.itd.nrl.navy.mil]
- [chacs.nrl.navy.mil]
- DBLP
Other Repositories/Bibliography
| Venue: | Journal of Computer Security |
| Citations: | 80 - 11 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Meadows92applyingformal,
author = {Catherine Meadows},
title = {Applying Formal Methods to the Analysis of a Key Management Protocol},
journal = {Journal of Computer Security},
year = {1992},
volume = {1}
}
Years of Citing Articles
Bookmark
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
OpenURL
Abstract
In this paper we develop methods for analyzing key management and authentication protocols using techniques developed for the solutions of equations in a term rewriting system. In particular, we describe a model of a class of protocols and possible attacks on those protocols as term rewriting systems, and we also describe a software tool based on a narrowing algorithm that can be used in the analysis of such protocols. We formally model a protocol and describe the results of using these techniques to analyze security properties. We show how a security flaw was found, and we also describe the verification of a corrected scheme using these techniques. 1 Introduction It is difficult to be certain whether or not a cryptographic protocol satisfies its requirements. In a number of cases subtle security flaws have been found in protocols some time after they were published. These flaws were independent of the strengths or weakness of the cryptographic algorithms used. Examples include the N...
