The Feasibility of Defeat in Defeasible Reasoning (1991)
| Venue: | In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Knowledge Representation and Reasoning |
| Citations: | 23 - 3 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Vreeswijk91thefeasibility,
author = {Gerard Vreeswijk},
title = {The Feasibility of Defeat in Defeasible Reasoning},
booktitle = {In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Knowledge Representation and Reasoning},
year = {1991},
pages = {526--534},
publisher = {Morgan Kaufmann}
}
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Abstract
Systems of defeasible reasoning are characterized by defeasible proofs, called arguments. I claim that sensible criteria of defeat among arguments in those systems are feasible, be it to a certain extent. As defeat eventually becomes unenforceable, the only option left is to pursue both arguments concurrently. This paper tries to confine the reach of defeat among arguments by means of several case studies, some of which are taken from the literature. 1. INTRODUCTION Reasoning beyond the information enclosed in the premises is a tempting but risky activity. It is tempting, because sheer deductive reasoning brings us no more than what was already recorded in the premises. And it is risky, because we might jump to the wrong conclusions. This is, very briefly, the issue of ampliative inference mechanisms. Ampliative inference can be defined as the result of rational non-deterministic non-monotonic reasoning (Loui, 1990). The term itself is suggested by the American philosopher Peirce (183...
