Towards Formal Analysis of Security Protocols (1993)
| Venue: | In Computer Security Foundations Workshop VI |
| Citations: | 29 - 4 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Mao93towardsformal,
author = {Wenbo Mao and Colin Boyd and England England},
title = {Towards Formal Analysis of Security Protocols},
booktitle = {In Computer Security Foundations Workshop VI},
year = {1993},
pages = {147--158},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society Press}
}
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Abstract
The pioneering and well-known work of Burrows, Abadi and Needham (the BAN logic) which dominates the area of security protocol analysis is shown to take an approach which is not fully formal and which consequently permits approval of dangerous protocols. Measures to make the BAN logic formal are then proposed. The formalisation is found to be desirable not only for its potential in providing rigorous analysis of security protocols, but also for its readiness for supporting a computer-aided fashion of analysis. 1 Introduction A security protocol such as one for distributing cryptographic keys is essentially a few lines of a specification of a program. Its analysis can therefore be considered as analogous to the correctness verification of such a program. However, unlike the case of running a computer program, where the user naturally bears an intention to follow the instruction so to avoid potential bugs, the main objective of a dishonest user during a run of a security protocol is to ...
