Open Key Exchange: How to Defeat Dictionary Attacks Without Encrypting Public Keys (1997)
| Venue: | Proc. of the Security Protocols Workshop, LNCS 1361 |
| Citations: | 56 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Lucks97openkey,
author = {Stefan Lucks},
title = {Open Key Exchange: How to Defeat Dictionary Attacks Without Encrypting Public Keys},
booktitle = {Proc. of the Security Protocols Workshop, LNCS 1361},
year = {1997},
pages = {79--90},
publisher = {Springer-Verlag}
}
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Abstract
. Classical cryptographic protocols based on shared secret keys often are vulnerable to key-guessing attacks. For security, the keys must be strong, difficult to memorize for humans. Bellovin and Merritt [4] proposed "encrypted key exchange" (EKE) protocols, to frustrate keyguessing attacks. EKE requires the use of asymmetric cryptosystems and is based on encrypting the public key, using a symmetric cipher. In this paper, a novel way of key exchange is presented, where public keys are sent openly, not encrypted. In contrast to EKE protocols, the same public-key/secret-key pair can be used for arbitrary many protocol executions. The RSA-based protocol variant is found to be quite efficient and practical. Compared to previous work on such protocols, a more solid formal treatment is given, influenced by the work of Bellare and Rogaway [3] on key exchange protocols for strong common secrets. 1 Introduction Most humans, including the current author, are quite bad at memorizing large random...
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