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Anti-Corruption Strategies as Safeguard for Public Service Sector Reforms. Working Paper prepared for Anti Corruption Training
| Venue: | Consulting (ACTC) and Research Center in Political Economy (CIEP), Universidad Externado de Colombia |
| Citations: | 3 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Boehm_anti-corruptionstrategies,
author = {Frédéric Boehm and Jel K},
title = {Anti-Corruption Strategies as Safeguard for Public Service Sector Reforms. Working Paper prepared for Anti Corruption Training},
booktitle = {Consulting (ACTC) and Research Center in Political Economy (CIEP), Universidad Externado de Colombia},
year = {}
}
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Abstract
ABSTRACT: One of the main objectives of reforms in public service sectors, comprising deregulation, restructuring and private-sector participations, is the introduction of competitive pressures. In turn, effective regulation is one of the key elements for reform’s success. However, regulation is prone to capture by narrow interests. This paper provides an overview of possible anti-corruption strategies which, in the end, have the objective to safeguard the objective of reforms. The paper starts discussing organizational aspects: decentralization, horizontal organization, and the issue of regulatory autonomy. Then three key factors are presented: incentives, institutions and information. Traditional incentive theory within a principal-agent model leads to contemplating control, rewards and sanctions. A new institutional approach taking into account the characteristics of corrupt deals leads to policies aiming at augmenting the transaction costs of corruption and fostering the opportunism between corrupt partners. Finally, measures are discussed seeking to tackle the problem of information asymmetries between the different actors, which is the root for capture and corrupt opportunities.
Keyphrases
anti-corruption strategy public service sector reform anti corruption training different actor private-sector participation information asymmetry new institutional approach principal-agent model narrow interest key element corrupt opportunity public service sector corrupt deal competitive pressure transaction cost key factor traditional incentive theory reform success horizontal organization effective regulation corrupt partner regulatory autonomy main objective organizational aspect possible anti-corruption strategy
