On the Importance of Checking Cryptographic Protocols for Faults (1997)
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BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Boneh97onthe,
author = {Dan Boneh and Richard A. Demillo and Richard J. Lipton},
title = {On the Importance of Checking Cryptographic Protocols for Faults},
booktitle = {},
year = {1997},
pages = {37--51},
publisher = {Springer-Verlag}
}
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Abstract
We present a theoretical model for breaking various cryptographic schemes by taking advantage of random hardware faults. We show how to attack certain implementations of RSA and Rabin signatures. An implementation of RSA based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem can be broken using a single erroneous signature. Other implementations can be broken using a larger number of erroneous signatures. We also analyze the vulnerability to hardware faults of two identification protocols: Fiat-Shamir and Schnorr. The Fiat-Shamir protocol can be broken after a small number of erroneous executions of the protocol. Schnorr's protocol can also be broken, but a larger number of erroneous executions is needed. Keywords: Hardware faults, Cryptanalysis, RSA, Fiat-Shamir, Schnorr, Public key systems, Identification protocols. 1 Introduction Direct attacks on the famous RSA cryptosystem seem to require that one factor the modulus. Therefore, it is interesting to ask whether there are attacks that avoid this....
