Abstract

We present a qualitative, decision-theoretic account for statements of the form: "You ought to do A, if C". We show that adding a qualitative causal theory (in the form of a graph) as part of an epistemic state is sufficient to facilitate the analysis of action sequences, their consequences, their interaction with observations, their expected utilities and, hence, the assertability of conditional "ought" statements. 1 Introduction Obligation statements, also called deontic statements, come in two varieties: obligations to act in accordance with peers' expectations or commitments to oneself, and obligations to act in the interest of one's survival, namely, to avoid danger and pursue safety. This paper develops a decision theoretic account of obligation statements of the second variety, using qualitative abstractions of probabilities and utilities. The idea is simple. A conditional obligation sentence of the form "You ought to do A if C" is interpreted as shorthand for a more elaborat...

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