A Logic of Relative Desire (1991) [26 citations — 1 self]
Abstract:
: Although many have proposed formal characterizations of belief structures as bases for rational action, the problem of characterizing rational desires has attracted little attention. AI relies heavily on goal conditions interpreted (apparently) as absolute expressions of desirability, but these cannot express varying degrees of goal satisfaction or preferences among alternative goals. Our previous work provided a relative interpretation of goals as qualitative statements about preferability, all else equal. We extend that treatment to the comparison of arbitrary propositions, and develop a propositional logic of relative desire suitable for formalizing properties of planning and problem-solving methods. 1 Introduction Question your desires.---William Shakespeare Standard theories of rational action take decisions of the agent to depend on beliefs about the relative desirability of the results of its available actions [2, 3]. The predominant approach to planning in artificial intelli...
Citations
| 667 | Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Trade-os – Keeney, Raia - 1976 |
| 603 | Agent-oriented programming – Shoham - 1993 |
| 134 | The Logic of Decision – Jeffrey - 1965 |
| 89 | Preferential semantics for goals – Doyle, Wellman - 1991 |
| 82 | Formulation of Tradeoffs in Planning Under Uncertainty – Wellman - 1990 |
| 35 | A model for deliberation, action and introspection – Doyle - 1980 |
| 2 | Introduction: On the need for theory of desire – Marks - 1986 |
| 2 | utilities: A reconciliation. in preparation – Goals - 1991 |

