Abstract

. We propose the sequence form as a new strategic description for an extensive game with perfect recall. It is similar to the normal form but has linear instead of exponential complexity, and allows a direct representation and efficient computation of behavior strategies. Pure strategies and their mixed strategy probabilities are replaced by sequences of consecutive choices and their realization probabilities. A zero-sum game is solved by a corresponding linear program that has linear size in the size of the game tree. General two-person games are studied in the paper by Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel in this journal issue. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72 Keywords. Behavior strategy, equilibrium, extensive game, linear programming, normal form, reduced normal form. 1. Introduction In applications, it is often convenient to describe a game in extensive form. The game tree, with its information sets, possible moves, chance probabilities and payoffs, gives a...

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