Abstract

Among those addressed by Putnam's model-theoretic argument it is common opinion that the argument is invalid because question-begging. If the standard analysis of the argument is along the right lines, then what has been called the `just more theory move' is to be held responsible for this. In the present paper, an alternative reading of Putnam's argument is o#ered that makes the `just more theory move' come out perfectly legitimate, and the argument as a whole valid. 1 Introduction Metaphysical realism has been the main subject of the critical part of Putnam's work for over twenty years now. At the heart of this doctrine, as presented by Putnam, is a thesis which we shall here call Methodological Fallibilism (MF). What it says is that even an epistemically ideal theory may fall short of truth, where the notion of truth involved is that of Correspondence Truth (CT). 1 Note that MF is not merely about epistemically ideal theories. The claim is that no empirical theory, no matter how...

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