Self-Regulation, Taxation and Public Voluntary Environmental Agreements
| Citations: | 33 - 6 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Lyon_self-regulation,taxation,
author = {Thomas P. Lyon and John W. Maxwell},
title = { Self-Regulation, Taxation and Public Voluntary Environmental Agreements },
year = {}
}
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Abstract
An increasingly popular instrument for solving environmental problems is the “public voluntary agreement (VA),” in which government offers technical assistance and positive publicity to firms that reach certain environmental goals. Prior papers treat such agreements as a superior, low-cost instrument that can be used to preempt a threat of traditional, inefficient, regulation. We present a more general model in which public VAs may instead be weak tools used when political opposition makes environmental taxes infeasible. We explore the conditions under which taxes, public VAs, and unilateral industry actions are to be expected, and the welfare implications of the various instruments. Notably, we also show that welfare may be reduced by the introduction of public VAs.
Keyphrases
public va public voluntary environmental agreement welfare implication environmental tax technical assistance low-cost instrument popular instrument unilateral industry action various instrument positive publicity certain environmental goal prior paper public voluntary agreement general model political opposition environmental problem weak tool
