Neural mechanisms of decision making and the personal level (2013)
| Venue: | In |
| Citations: | 2 - 1 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Shea13neuralmechanisms,
author = {Nicholas Shea},
title = {Neural mechanisms of decision making and the personal level},
booktitle = {In},
year = {2013},
publisher = {University Press}
}
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Abstract
Word count 10,920 (including abstract) Can findings from psychology and cognitive neuroscience about the neural mechanisms involved in decision-making can tell us anything useful about the commonly-understood mental phenomenon of making voluntary choices? Two philosophical objections are considered. First, that the neural data is subpersonal, and so cannot enter into illuminating explanations of personal level phenomena like voluntary action. Secondly, that mental properties are multiply realized in the brain in such a way as to make them insusceptible to neuroscientific study. The paper argues that both objections would be weakened by the discovery of empirical generalisations connecting subpersonal properties with the personal level. It gives three case studies that furnish evidence to that effect. It argues that the existence of such interrelations are consistent with a plausible construal of the personal-subpersonal distinction. Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that the notion subpersonal representation relied on in cognitive neuroscience illicitly imports personal-level phenomena like consciousness or normativity, or is otherwise explanatorily problematic.
Keyphrases
personal level neural mechanism decision making cognitive neuroscience voluntary action cannot enter voluntary choice personal level phenomenon furnish evidence personal-subpersonal distinction case study philosophical objection personal-level phenomenon mental property word count notion subpersonal representation empirical generalisation subpersonal property commonly-understood mental phenomenon neural data plausible construal
