## Frugality in Path Auctions (2003)

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Venue: | In Proceedings of the 15th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms |

Citations: | 62 - 2 self |

### BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Elkind03frugalityin,

author = {Edith Elkind and Amit Sahai and Ken Steiglitz},

title = {Frugality in Path Auctions},

booktitle = {In Proceedings of the 15th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms},

year = {2003},

pages = {701--709}

}

### Years of Citing Articles

### OpenURL

### Abstract

We consider the problem of picking (buying) an inexpensive s t path in a graph where edges are owned by independent (selfish) agents, and the cost of an edge is known to its owner only. We study the problem of finding frugal mechanisms for this task, i.e. we investigate the payments the buyer must make in order to buy a path.

### Citations

1342 |
Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders
- Vickrey
- 1961
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...centrate on theseld of mechanism design (also known as implementation theory, or theory of incentives). One of the most important results here is the celebrated Vickrey{Clarke{ Groves (VCG) mechanism =-=[12, 2, 5]-=-, which guarantees ecient allocation, i.e., the bidder with the highest valuation, or, in the case of procurement auctions, the lowest cost, wins the auction. In our context, eciency corresponds to pi... |

1092 |
Optimal Auction Design
- Myerson
- 1981
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ing (or, equivalently, payment minimizing) auctions in other settings received a great deal of attention from both economists and computer scientists. One of the most prominent papers in this area is =-=[8]-=-, which constructs the optimal auction for selling an item to one out of n buyers. While Myerson's results do not apply directly in our situation, we use his techniques to derive the results in the se... |

770 | Multipart pricing of public goods - Clarke - 1971 |

638 |
Auction Theory
- Krishna
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... we find the optimal mechanism for our problem, that is, the one that minimizes the total payment to the edges. Our argument extends the reasoning in the seminal paper of Myerson [8], as presented in =-=[7]-=-. However, Myerson's original results are derived for standard auctions only, that is, the ones in which a single object is to be allocated to one out of n buyers, while in our case the buyer only gai... |

626 |
Incentives in teams
- Groves
- 1973
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...trate on the field of mechanism design (also known as implementation theory, or theory of incentives). One of the most important results here is the celebrated Vickrey--Clarke--Groves (VCG) mechanism =-=[12, 2, 5]-=-, which guarantees efficientsallocation, i.e., the bidder with the highest valuation, or, in the case of procurement auctions, the lowest cost wins the auction. In our context, efficiency corresponds ... |

571 | Algorithmic mechanism design
- Nisan, Ronen
- 1999
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...m a larger task. Each agent performs a specicsxed service, but only certain combinations of these services will suce to accomplish the larger objective. A special case of considerable interest (c.f. [=-=9, 10, 6, 1]-=-) is where each agents controls an edge in a network, and the mechanism must purchase a path between some nodes s and t. In this case, allowed teams are sets of agents which control s t paths. The pri... |

295 | the Internet - Algorithms - 2001 |

135 | Competitive auctions and digital goods
- Goldberg, Hartline, et al.
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...s to derive the results in the second part of the paper. In [11], Ronen and Saberi generalize the results of [8] in a different direction, namely, that of interdependent valuations. The recent papers =-=[4, 3]-=- investigate the properties of revenuemaximizing auctions for digital goods. These two lines of research are combined in [1], which raises the issue of frugality in shortest path 2 auctions. The autho... |

111 | Frugal path mechanisms
- Archer, Tardos
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... 2 n(c(Q) - c(P )), where c(P ) is the cost of the shortest path, c(Q) is the cost of the second-shortest path, and n is the number of edges in P . This extends the previous work of Archer and Tardos =-=[1]-=-, who showed a similar lower bound for a subclass of truthful mechanisms called min-function mechanisms. Our lower bounds have no such limitations on the mechanism. Motivated by this lower bound, we s... |

94 | Vickrey prices and shortest paths: What is an edge worth
- Hershberger, Suri
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...rger task. Each agent performs a specific fixed service, but only certain combinations of these services will suffice to accomplish the larger objective. A special case of considerable interest (c.f. =-=[9, 10, 6, 1]-=-) is where each agents controls an edge in a network, and the mechanism must purchase a path between some nodes s and t. In this case, allowed teams are sets of agents which control s---t paths. The p... |

91 | Competitive generalized auctions
- Fiat, Goldberg, et al.
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...s to derive the results in the second part of the paper. In [11], Ronen and Saberi generalize the results of [8] in a different direction, namely, that of interdependent valuations. The recent papers =-=[4, 3]-=- investigate the properties of revenuemaximizing auctions for digital goods. These two lines of research are combined in [1], which raises the issue of frugality in shortest path 2 auctions. The autho... |

51 |
Optimal Auction Design.” Mathematics of Operations Research
- Myerson
- 1981
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ing (or, equivalently, payment minimizing) auctions in other settings received a great deal of attention from both economists and computer scientists. One of the most prominent papers in this area is =-=[8]-=-, which constructs the optimal auction for selling an item to one out of n buyers. While Myerson's results do not apply directly in our situation, we use his techniques to derive the results in the se... |

38 |
On approximating optimal auctions
- Ronen
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...mal auction for selling an item to one out of n buyers. While Myerson's results do not apply directly in our situation, we use his techniques to derive the results in the second part of the paper. In =-=[11-=-], Ronen and Saberi generalize the results of [8] in a dierent direction, namely, that of interdependent valuations. The recent papers [4, 3] investigate the properties of revenue-maximizing auctions ... |

1 |
Com25 petitive auctions and digital goods
- Goldberg, Hartline, et al.
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...s to derive the results in the second part of the paper. In [11], Ronen and Saberi generalize the results of [8] in a different direction, namely, that of interdependent valuations. The recent papers =-=[4, 3]-=- investigate the properties of revenue-maximizing auctions for digital goods. These two lines of research are combined in [1], which raises the issue of frugality in shortest path auctions. The author... |

1 |
Vickrey prices and shortest 10 paths: what is an edge worth
- Hershberger, Suri
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...rger task. Each agent performs a specific fixed service, but only certain combinations of these services will suffice to accomplish the larger objective. A special case of considerable interest (c.f. =-=[9, 10, 6, 1]-=-) is where each agents controls an edge in a network, and the mechanism must purchase a path between some nodes s and t. In this case, allowed teams are sets of agents which control s—t paths. The pri... |