Coalition Formation Processes with Belief Revision among Bounded-Rational Self-Interested Agents (1999)
Cached
Download Links
- [www.cs.wustl.edu]
- [www.cs.wustl.edu]
- [siesta.cs.wustl.edu]
- DBLP
Other Repositories/Bibliography
| Venue: | Journal of Logic and Computation |
| Citations: | 28 - 5 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Tohme99coalitionformation,
author = {Fernando Tohme and Tuomas Sandholm},
title = {Coalition Formation Processes with Belief Revision among Bounded-Rational Self-Interested Agents},
journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation},
year = {1999},
volume = {9},
pages = {43--51}
}
Years of Citing Articles
Bookmark
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
OpenURL
Abstract
This paper studies coalition formation among self-interested agents that cannot make sidepayments. We show that alpha-core stability reduces to analyzing whether some utility profile is maximal for all agents. We also show that strategy profiles that lead to the alpha-core are a subset of Strong Nash equilibria. This fact carries our alpha-core-based stability results directly over to two other strategic solution concepts: Nash equilibrium and Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium.
