The Copeland Method I; Relationships And The Dictionary (1996) [2 citations — 1 self]
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author = {Donald G. Saari and Vincent R. Merlin},
title = {The Copeland Method I; Relationships And The Dictionary},
journal = {Economic Theory},
year = {1996},
volume = {8}
}
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Abstract:
. A central political and decision science issue is to understand how election outcomes can change with the choice of a procedure or the slate of candidates. These questions are answered for the important Copeland method (CM) where, with a geometric approach, we characterize all relationships among the rankings of positional voting methods and the CM. Then, we characterize all ways CM rankings can vary as candidates enter or leave the election. In this manner new CM strengths and flaws are detected. The Condorcet (or majority) winner [Cn] is the candidate who beats all others (by winning most votes) in pairwise contests. A glaring fault of this widely accepted concept is that it need not exist. Instead, for n # 5 candidates, c 1 could win all but one pairwise vote while all other candidates lose at least two. Although no one satisfies Condorcet's criterion, c 1 comes the closest, so it is arguable that she is who the voters want. She does win with Copeland's method (CM) -- an import...
Citations
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| 1 | Symmetry extensions of "neutrality," I Advantage to the Condorcet loser, Soc. Choice Welfare 9 – Saari - 1992 |
| 1 | Relationship admitting families of candidates – Saari - 1991 |
