Algorithms for Rational Agents (2000)
| Venue: | In Proc. of the 27th Annual Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Informatics |
| Citations: | 17 - 3 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Ronen00algorithmsfor,
author = {Amir Ronen},
title = {Algorithms for Rational Agents},
booktitle = {In Proc. of the 27th Annual Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Informatics},
year = {2000},
pages = {56--70}
}
Bookmark
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
OpenURL
Abstract
Many recent applications of interest involve self-interested participants. As such participants, termed agents, may manipulate the algorithm for their own benefit, a new challenge emerges: The design of algorithms and protocols that perform well when the agents behave according to their own self-interest. This led several researchers to consider computational models that are based on a sub-field of game-theory and micro-economics called mechanism design. This paper introduces this topic mainly through examples. It demonstrates that in many cases selfishness can be satisfactorily overcome, surveys some of the recent trends in this area and presents new challenging problems. The paper is mostly based on classic results from mechanism design as well as on recent work by the author and others.
