Abstract:
This paper presents a general model that covers signalling with and without conflicts of interest between signallers and receivers. Krebs and Dawkins (1984) argued that a conflict of interests will lead to an evolutionary arms race between manipulative signallers and sceptical receivers, resulting in ever more costly signals; whereas common interests will lead to cheap signals or "conspiratorial whispers". Previous simulation models of the evolution of communication have usually assumed either cooperative or competitive contexts. Simple game-theoretic and evolutionary simulation models are presented; they suggest that signalling will evolve only if it is in the interests of both parties. In a model where signallers may inform receivers as to the value of a binary random variable, if signalling is favoured at all, then signallers will always use the cheapest and the second cheapest signal available. Costly signalling arms races do not get started. A more complex evolutionary s...
Citations
|
458
|
The selfish gene
– Dawkins
- 1976
|
|
432
|
The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic
– Axelrod
- 1984
|
|
109
|
Evolution of communication in artificial organisms
– Werner, Dyer
- 1991
|
|
95
|
The genetical evolution of social behaviour
– Hamilton
- 1964
|
|
95
|
The evolution of reciprocal altruism
– Trivers
- 1971
|
|
66
|
Adaptation and natural selection
– Williams
- 1966
|
|
58
|
Synthetic ethology and the evolution of cooperative communication
– MacLennan, Burghardt
- 1993
|
|
45
|
Biological signals as handicaps
– Grafen
- 1990
|
|
43
|
Altruism in the evolution of communication
– Ackley, Littman
- 1994
|
|
40
|
Animal signals: Mind reading and manipulation
– Krebs, Dawkins
- 1984
|
|
37
|
The dilemma of Saussurean communication
– Oliphant
- 1996
|
|
27
|
An exploration of signalling behaviour by both analytic and simulation mea for both discrete and continuous models
– Bullock
- 1997
|
|
21
|
An investigation into the evolution of communication
– Paolo
- 1997
|
|
21
|
Parent-offspring conflict
– Trivers
- 1974
|
|
20
|
Communication in discrete action-response games
– Hurd
- 1995
|
|
19
|
Monkey responses to three different alarm calls: Evidence of predator classification and semantic communication
– Seyfarth, Cheney, et al.
- 1980
|
|
16
|
The evolution of cooperation
– Hamilton
- 1981
|
|
14
|
Receiver psychology and the evolution of animal signals
– Guilford, Dawkins
- 1991
|
|
13
|
Mate selection—A selection for a handicap
– ZAHAVI
- 1975
|
|
11
|
Nepotism and the evolution of alarm calls
– Sherman
- 1977
|
|
9
|
Animal Signals: Models and Terminology
– Harper
- 1995
|
|
9
|
How not to murder your neighbor: Using synthetic behavioral ecology to study aggressive signaling
– Wheeler, Bourcier
- 1995
|
|
8
|
Animal signals: Ethological and games-theory approaches are not incompatible
– Hinde
- 1981
|
|
6
|
Acquisition of information in contests: The gulf between theory and biology
– Caryl
- 1987
|
|
5
|
Honest signalling, perceptual error and the evolution of `all-or-nothing' displays
– Johnstone
- 1994
|
|
5
|
Sexual selection and signal evolution: the ghost of biases past
– Ryan, Rand
- 1993
|
|
4
|
The evolution of costly mate preferences II. The "handicap" principle
– Iwasa, Pomiankowski
- 1991
|
|
3
|
The Theory of Evolution (Canto edition
– Smith, J
- 1993
|
