Single Crossing Properties And The Existence Of Pure Strategy Equilibria In Games Of Incomplete Information

Single Crossing Properties And The Existence Of Pure Strategy Equilibria In Games Of Incomplete Information (1997)

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by Susan Athey

Venue:	Econometrica
Citations:	87 - 5 self

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@ARTICLE{Athey97singlecrossing,
    author = {Susan Athey},
    title = {Single Crossing Properties And The Existence Of Pure Strategy Equilibria In Games Of Incomplete Information},
    journal = {Econometrica},
    year = {1997},
    volume = {69},
    pages = {861--890}
}

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Abstract

This paper analyzes a class of games of incomplete information where each agent has

Citations

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1	provide sufficient conditions for existence of mixed strategy equilibria in games with finite types. Simon and Zame - Dasgupta, Maskin - 1986
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1	shows that Theorem 2 can be easily extended to show that if every finite-action game has an equilibrium in strategies of bounded variation, the continuum-action game will as well - Athey - 1997
1	show that the use of atomless Loeb measure spaces for the types, as an alternative to Lebesgue, can restore the applicability of limiting arguments - Khan, Sun - 1996
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