A CCA2 Secure Variant of the McEliece cryptosystem
| Citations: | 2 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Döttling_acca2,
author = {Nico Döttling and Rafael Dowsley and Jörn Müller-quade and Anderson C. A. Nascimento},
title = { A CCA2 Secure Variant of the McEliece cryptosystem},
year = {}
}
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Abstract
The McEliece public-key encryption scheme has become an interesting alternative to cryptosystems based on number-theoretical problems. Differently from RSA and ElGamal, McEliece PKE is not known to be broken by a quantum computer. Moreover, even tough McEliece PKE has a relatively big key size, encryption and decryption operations are rather efficient. In spite of all the recent results in coding theory based cryptosystems, to the date, there are no constructions secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model – the de facto security notion for public-key cryptosystems. In this work, we show the first construction of a McEliece based public-key cryptosystem secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model. Our construction is inspired by a recently proposed technique by Rosen and Segev.
Keyphrases
cca2 secure variant mceliece cryptosystem ciphertext attack standard model interesting alternative public-key cryptosystem secure security notion public-key cryptosystems mceliece pke tough mceliece pke quantum computer big key size number-theoretical problem decryption operation mceliece public-key encryption scheme recent result first construction
