Why There Is No Statistical Test For Confounding, Why Many Think There Is, And Why They Are Almost Right (1998)
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BibTeX
@MISC{Pearl98whythere,
author = {Judea Pearl},
title = {Why There Is No Statistical Test For Confounding, Why Many Think There Is, And Why They Are Almost Right},
year = {1998}
}
Years of Citing Articles
OpenURL
Abstract
this paper is to bring to the attention of investigators several basic limitations of the associational criterion. We will show that the associational criterion does not ensure unbiased e#ect estimates, nor does it follow from the requirement of unbiasedness. After demonstrating, by examples, the absence of logical connections between the statistical and the causal notions of confounding, we will de#ne a stronger notion of unbiasedness, called stable unbiasedness, relative to which a modi#ed statistical criterion will be shown necessary and su#cient. The necessary part will then yield a practical test for stable unbiasedness which, remarkably, does not require knowledge of all potential confounders in a problem. Finally,wewill argue that the prevailing practice of substituting statistical criteria for the e#ect-based de#nition of confounding is not entirely misguided, because stable unbiasedness is in fact what investigators have been and should be aiming to achieve, and stable unbiasedness is what statistical criteria can test.







