Provably Insecure Mutual Authentication Protocols: The Two-Party Symmetric-Encryption Case (1999)
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| Venue: | IN PROC. 22ND NATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY CONFERENCE |
| Citations: | 11 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Alves-Foss99provablyinsecure,
author = {Jim Alves-Foss},
title = {Provably Insecure Mutual Authentication Protocols: The Two-Party Symmetric-Encryption Case},
booktitle = {IN PROC. 22ND NATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY CONFERENCE},
year = {1999},
pages = {306--314},
publisher = {}
}
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Abstract
In practice, users will rely on a wide variety of communication protocols to conduct their work over the Internet. This paper discusses the security ramifications of using multiple authentication protocols. We demonstrate multi-protocol attacks and how they can be realized to defeat otherwise secure authentication protocols. We highlight this discussion with examples of attacks on a proposed symmetric key-based authentication protocols. We present a model of communication that reflects the existence of this type of attack, and demonstrate that a class of authentication protocols can never be secure in the presence of this type of attack.
