@MISC{Duclos_verificationof, author = {Mathilde Duclos}, title = {Verification of Cryptographic Schemes in the Computational Model}, year = {} }

Share

OpenURL

Abstract

In this work, we use several approaches to prove cryptographic protocols correct. All these approaches use the computational model: no assumptions are made on what the adversary can or cannot do, but adversary not running in a polynomial time (with respect toward a security parameter) are left out of the study. The first approach is to design an efficient transformation to message-transmition protocol to protect the senderanonymity. The proof shows that the probability of a polynomial time adversary guessing the number of messages sent by a party are negligeable, all the adversary can guess is the range of the amount of messages sent. The second approach is to use a formal logic (CIL) to prove an intrusion-resilient session-key generation protocol correct. Intrusion resilient means that the adversary is allowed a virus into the parties running the protocol. The virus is represented as a circuit sent to the parties executing the protocol. The adversary get back the result of the circuit at the end of the session. Thanks Throughout this work, I had the pleasure to work and discuss with many different people from Verimag lab and scalp project. I would like to now thank them for the help and time they gave me. I thank Yassine Lakhnech, my advisor, for the time and discussions we had. I thank Marion Daubignard, who was always there to help me grasp CIL, and other concepts that I first thought